IR 05000424/1998011
| ML20237B412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237B408 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-98-11, 50-425-98-11, NUDOCS 9808180241 | |
| Download: ML20237B412 (22) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-424. 50-425 License Nos: NPF-68. NPF-81 Report No: 50-424/98-11, 50-425/98-11 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company. In Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Location: 8805 River R Waynesboro GA 30830 Dates: June 22-26, 1998 Inspectors: W. Sartor. Exercise Team Leader J. Kreh. Radiation Specialist K. O'Donohue. Resident Inspector W. Maier. Emergency Preparedness Specialist. Region I {
Approved by: Barr Chief. Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety l
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t Enclosure
! 9808180241 980731 !
PDR ADOCK 05000424 G PDR L_ __
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V0GTLE NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-424/98-11 and 50-425/98-11 This routine, annvinced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise for the Vogtle Nuclear Generating Plant. This NRC/ FEMA-evaluated exercise was a plume exposure pathway exercise with offsite participation by the States of Georgia and South Carolina. the Savannah River Site, and Burke. Aiken. Barnwell. and Allendale Counties. The exercise was conducted on June 24, 1998, from 8:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. This report summarizes the observations of the four-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness program as it implemented its emergency plan and procedures in response to the simulated accident. A separate FEMA report will be issued that evaluates the performance of the States and countie The NRC team observed the licensee's response in the Control Room Simulator (CRS), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operational Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Based on the performance observed, the team concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to implement the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure Proaram Areas Evaluated and Results
- Scenario--The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency response capability for the onsite and offsite emergency organizations. (P4.1)
> Control Room Simulator--The control room simulator crew properly analyzed plant conditions and responded with timely and correct action The utilization of the STA functional res onsibility did not 3rovide for an independent engineering assessment of lant conditions. (34.2.b.1)
> Technical Support Center--Command and control of TSC operations were proficient. Accident management and mitigation efforts were adequate in scope and effective in their implementation. (P4.2.b.2)
> 0)erational Su) port Center--The OSC was effectively managed to support t1e repair tascs directed by the TSC. (P4.2.b.3) j
> Emergency Operations Facility--The EOF staff functioned efficiently in performing assigned task There was good interaction between the i licensee staff and the offsite agencies' representatives in briefing {
sessions, but interaction outside of the briefings was restraine (P4.2.b.4) I l
> Licensee Critique Process--A thorough critique process was followed by j
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an outstanding management presentation that summarized the most significant exercise observations.
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Report Details IV. Plant Sucoort P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
P4.1 Exercise Scenario Insoection Scooe (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements of the licensee's pla Observations and Findinas The licensee submitted the scope and objectives for the biennial emergency exercise to the NRC with a letter dated March 16. 1998. The exercise scenario package was submitted with a letter dated May 7,199 A review of the package indicated that the scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the offsite agencies for their participation in the exercis Conclusion l
The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency capability of the onsite and offsite emergency organization P4.2 Emeraency Response Facility (ERF) Observations and Criticue Exercise Evaluation Scoce During this inspection, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's biennial full-participation, emergency preparedness exercise in the Control Room Simulator (CRS). Technical Support Center (TSC).
Operational Support Center (OSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies. development of protective action recommendations (PARS), command and control, communications, and the overall implementation of the Emergency Plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of the exercise. Acceptance criteria are contained in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. site Emergency Plan. Emergency Plan implementing procedures, and industry guidance in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP- Rev.1. " Criteria for Preparations and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."
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2 ERF Observations. Findinas and Facility Criticues b.1 Control Room Simulator Observation and Findinas l The control room simulator crew quickly analyzed and responded to emergency plant conditions. They correctly diagnosed an Antici]ated Transient dithout Trip (ATWT) condition and responded to it. Tley also I promptly recognized a failure of containment mini-purge dampers to isolate when required, and they mobilized inplant personnel to try to achieve isolation of the dampers. The crew executed emergency actions in accordance with appropriate procedure The Shift Superintendent (SS) promptly recognized the emergency condition resulting from the ATWT and accurately classified it as an Aler He did, however delay approximately four minutes from the time he recognized the emergency condition until he announced the Alert condition over the plant public address system. He used this time to mobilize his communicator and prepare his own administrative paperwor He did not make any explicit announcement of the event classification to the control room simulator crew before his plant Jage announcemen Despite this delay in formal event declaration. T1e SS ensured that offsite notifications of the Alert declaration were made within fifteen minutes of initial recognition of the emergenc The inspector also observed that the control room simulator crew member initially assigned the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) functional responsibility became the status loo) circuit phone talker. The STA responsibility was then assumed by tie Unit Shift Supervisor (USS)who was involved in the direction of emergency operating 3rocedure step The inspector noted that this practice of assigning t1e STA functional responsibility to the USS and assigning other duties to the original crew member with STA responsibilities negated the availability of the independent engineering assessment of plant conditions normally associated with the STA responsibility. This did not adversely impact the crew's mitigation capability for this particular scenario not was ;
the practice contrary to any license requirement (Technical :
Specifications or Emergency Plan).
Cpnclusion The control room simulator crew properly analyzed plant conditions and l
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responded with timely and correct actions. The utilization of the STA ;
functional responsibility did not provide for an independent engineering !
l assessment of plant conditions.
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b.2 Technical Sucoort Center Observations and Findinas Following the Alert declaration at 8:11 a.m., the order to staff the ERFs was issued promatly via an announcement from the Control Room Simulator (CRS) on t1e public-address system (PA) at 8:15 The TSC Manager announced at 8:28 a.m. that the facility was staffed, since all required personnel were present and prepared to fulfill their designated responsibilities. At 8:37 a.m. (only 26 minutes after the Alert declaration), the Plant General Manager assumed the position of
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Emergency Director (ED) after taking a turnover from the interim ED (who was in the CRS), and the TSC was declared operationa The TSC itself was a marginal facility in terms of size (even discounting the presence of controllers, evaluators, and observers), but licensee personnel nevertheless functioned effectively. The staff continuously monitored plant conditions using information from computer monitors which displayed (simulated) plant data in real time. These
. data were supplemented by status boards which documented such information as essential equipment out of service and event chronolog Command and control of TSC operations by the ED (or TSC Manager after the ED's departure) were proficient. Periodic briefings facilitated the flow and exchange of plant status information. The TSC staff was attentive and participatory during these briefings. Accident management and mitigation efforts were adequate in scope and effective in their implementatio The TSC and OSC functioned in a coordinated manner to i establish repair priorities for nSC damage-control team The
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inspectors noted that PA announcements were heard in the TSC at an unnecessarily high volume. While these announcements were important as
" feedback" to the TSC staff, they did not need to be at a sound level that halted discussions and facility briefings.
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The declarations of Site Area Emergency (at 9:24 a.m.) and General
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Emergency (at 10:22 a.m.) by the ED was timely and correct. However.
l the bases for decision-making in regard to protective action l recommendations (PARS) were not documented in logs for the positions of ED., TSC Manager, or HP' Supervisor, as reviewed by the inspectors. Such
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documentation should have been given high priority, but was not included i in applicable logs, while some of the information that was included in applicable logs. (e.g. , the medical condition of an injured individual) was of marginal significance for this type of record.
l Emergency notification message no. 5 incorrectly utilized the format of l Item 15 by using line D. "Other." to list the sectors recommended for I
evacuation instead of line B. " Evacuate." which was not even checked.
I In an actual emergency, this type of deviation from proper use of the notification form would have had the potential to cause unnecessary confusion among State and local officials.
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Conclusions
Command and control of TSC operations were proficient. Accident management and mitigation efforts were adequate in scope and effective in their implementation. The declarations of Site Area Emergency and General Emergency were timely and correct. Logs and offsite l notification forms were not always employed correctl ,
b.3 Operational Suooort Center Observations and Findinas Following the Alert declaration at 8:11 a.m.. personnel started arriving in the OSC and it was activated at 8:37 a.m. The OSC was located on the second floor of the maintenance building in the lunch roo Preparations for dispatching maintenance teams to the plant were handled effectively in the OSC. Periodic briefings were conducted for the maintenance pool of personnel. Repair teams' priorities were coordinated with the TS Conclusions The Operational Support Center was effective in providing repair teams as directed by the TS b.4 Emeraency Ooerations Facility Observations and Findinas The emergency operations facility (EOF) was adequately and quickly staffed following the Alert declaratio The facility was placed in standby status within one half hour following the Alert declaration, and it was activated immediately following the Site Area Emergency declaration. Both of these times are within the limits contained in the licensee's emergency pla The EOF staff maintained order and tolerable noise levels without extensive direction by either the EOF manager or the Emergency Directo Logkeeping was generally complete and accurate, but some discrepancies were noted. For example, the Dose Assessment Manager's narrative log contained radiation monitor readings for the most part and was not usable to reconstruct dose assessment activitie Despite the poor logkeeping, the dose assessment staff performed their other duties in accordance with the licensee's emergency plan and procedures. The EOF dose assessment staff kept track of three separate teams. They maintained nearly continuous communication with these teams and tracked the team members' radiological exposures at regular intervals. The dose assessment staff positioned the teams with due regard for maintaining the team members' radiological exposures ALAR _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __
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A health physicist conducted hourly habitability surveys in the EO These surveys included area radiation surveys, air samples and contamination swipe surveys. The swipes taken were not numbered, however, and no floor plan maps of the EOF were used to document each swipe's location. The technician was unaware of any floor maps of the EOF that were available for this purpose. This deficiency in radiological practices had no negative impact on the licensee's performance during the exercise since no contamination was simulated in the EO If there had been contamination, pinpointing its location could have become difficul The dose assessment staff in the EOF performed twelve dose projections based on effluent radiation monitor readings and two back calculations of the radiological source tecii based on field team readings. They regularly )osted the updated dose projections, using the most recent data, in t1e EOF. One posted dose projection listed an incorrect protective action recommendation for the given meteorological conditions, but this error was self-corrected and did not have any
- adverse effect on the licensee's overall respons The EOF Manager exercised overall command and control of the EOF from its initial staffing after the Alert declaration until the arrival of the Emergency Director two and a half hour later. As the senior manager at the EOF. the EOF Manager conducted regular briefings for the offsite authorities. These briefings were comprehensive, they relied on input from all of the area coordinators, and a free flow of cuestions and information took place between the licensee's staff anc the offsite agency representative After the Emergency Director arrived at the EOF. these briefings were less informative. The Emergency Director solicited input only from the Dose Assessment Manager. There was less questioning of technical issues by the offsite agency representatives toward the end of the exercise.
l Beyond the formal briefings, interaction between the licensee's stMf
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l there was little exchange of dose assessment results between these l responder Following the printout of one dose projection, the l representative of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) was l craning to see the results while the licensee's staff was analyzing the
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data. There was no observed offer to exchange the information nor was there an observed request for the information by the DNR representative.
l Although the notification of the General Emergency declaration was made from the Technical Support Center (TSC), the inspectors in the EOF were
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able to hear the voice transmission of this emergency notification message. They noted that the format and content of the message was so constructed as to delay excessively the transmission of the protective action recommendation contained in this notification to the offsite agencie The General Emergency condition was declared at 10:22 and the notification to the offsite agencies started at 10:33 Because the communicator in the TSC had to orally repeat portions of the
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message multiple times for transcription by these offsite agencies. the reading of the protective action recommendation did not occur until time 10:47 a.m. . twenty-five minutes after the General Emergency declaratio Conclusions The EOF staff succeeded in performing all the functions required by the emergency plan. The dose assessment staff exhibited excellent control of the field monitor teams and very good knowledge of the dose assessment computer cod The dose assessment staff's knowledge of protective action recommendations was good, with only one mistake made in determination of protective actions which was corrected by the licensee. Logkeeping by the staff was inconsistent some logs were not easily read or able to be interpreted. Offsite agency briefings in the EOF were excellent but suffered somewhat toward the end of the exercis Radiological habitability surveys were regularly performed, but accounting practices for swipe surveys was poor. There was good interaction between the licensee staff and the offsite agencies'
representatives in briefing sessions, but interaction outside of the briefings was restrained. The construction, detail and mode of transmission of the emergency notification form transmitting the General Emergency declaration caused an excessive delay in relaying protective action recommendations to the offsite agencie b.5 Licensee Facility Criticues Following the exercise. the licensee conducted facility critiques where the players provided their own assessment of their performance and identified areas that needed improvement. The post-exercise critiques in the CRS.TSC. and EOF were observed by the inspectors and were observed to be thorough, open, and self-critical. Deficiencies as well as strengths were self-identified by the exercise participants. The licensee controller / evaluator organization then made a listing of all comments that had been provided to include evaluator observations and provided a preliminary findings list of four page These were then reviewed for significance to higher level management, and an excellent slide presentation was developed and presented just prior to the exit meeting. The quality of this self critique process and its presentation was exemplary and a quantum step improvement over the previous graded exercis P8 Miscellaneous EP Issues l
P (Closed) Violation 50-424. 50-425/97-04-08: Failure to maintain copies of EPIPs up to date in all required locations.
l l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's June 6. 1997 reply to the notice of violation. The corrective steps and results thereby achieved (as delineated in the licensee's reply) were selectively reviewed and verified by the inspectors. These corrective steps comprised training of Document Control personnel and changes to document distribution processes. Review of copies of the EPIPs maintained at the various ERFs
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disclosed no discrepancies. The licensee *s corrective actions for this violation appeared to have been effectiv This violation is close (Closed) Insoector Follow-un Item 50-424. 425/96-13-01: Exercise Weakness--The onsite emergency organization failed to implement the protective actions for non-essential onsite personnel when directed to do so by the E This objective for demonstrating the ability to warn or advise onsite individuals of emergency conditions was fully met for this exercis V. Management Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to licensee management on June 26. 1998. The summary indicated the exercise was fully satisfactor i
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee B. Anderson Nuclear Specialist B. Brown.. Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager S. Chesnut. Operations Manager J. Ealick Engineering Support Manager G. Frederick. Assistant General Manager--Support J. Gasser. Assistant General Manager--Operations K. Holmes. Maintenance Manager I. Kochery. Health Physics and Chemistry Manager C. Lindell MEAG Onsite Coordinator L. Mayo. Onsite Emergency Preparedness Coordinator B. Mundy Nuclear Specialist C. Stinespring. Administration Manager J. Swartzwelder. Outages and Planning Manager C. Tippins. Nuclear Specialist B. Waters. Materials Supervisor INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302: Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ,
I Attachment (12 pages):
Objectives and Standard Scenario Abstract and Time Line
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1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE Junc 24,1998 O ' OBJECTIVES AND STANDARDS V
The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) emergency preparedness exercise objectives are based on Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements provided in 10CFR50.47, " Emergency Plans," and 10CFR50, Appendix E, " Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities." Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1,
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans" was utilized in developing the objective Accident Assessment and Classification 1.(All) Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine emergency i action levels (EAL) parameters and correctly classify the emergency throughout j the exercis )
i Standard Criteria: Determine the correct highest emergency classification level based on events which were in progress, considering past events, and their impact on the current condition This should be done within 15 minutes from the time the initiating condition (s) or EAL is identifie Notifications 1.(All) Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize site emergency response personne Standard Criteria: Complete checklist 1, Plant Page Announcement,91002-C,
" Emergency Notifications" and perform the announcement within 5 minutes of the initial event classification for an Alert or highe There is no standard for upgrade announcement .(All) Demonstrate the ability to expeditiously notify state, local and federal authorities (NRC) of emergency condition Standard Criteria: Transmit checklist 2 of procedure 91002-C, " Emergency Notifications" completed through item #3 of Notification form within 15 minutes of event classification (recorded in item #6) for an initial notification of states and local authorities. Method: Voice O
v ( ) Denotes objective minimum frequency objectiv. doc -1- EX98
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l 1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE June 24,1998 OBJECTIVES AND STANDARDS
Transmit checklist 2 of procedure 91002-C, " Emergency Notifications" completed through item #3 within 60 minutes oflast transmittal for a follow-up notification to state and local authorities. Method: Voice or facsimile with voice confirmatio Transmit information using checklist 3 of procedure 91002-C, " Emergency Notifications" within 60 minutes of event classification for an initial notification of the NR Method: Voice 3.(All) Demonstrate the ability to warn or advise onsite individuals of emergency condition Standard Criteria: Complete checklist "A" of procedure 91704-C, " Actions For Security During A Radiological Emergency" within 15 minutes of notification (via plant page or telephone) from control roo .
4.(All) Demonstrate the capability of the Prompt Notification System for the public to operate properly when require Standard Criteria: Sirens: 90% of the sirens operate properly as indicated by the Whelen feedback system. NOAA Tone Alert Radios: A NOAA Tone Alert Radio is activate Emergency Response 1.(All) Demonstrate the capability to direct and control emergency operation Standard Criteria: Subjective evaluation of the command and control demonstrated by the Control Room in the early phase and the TSC in the latter phase of the emergency. In general there should be positive control of teams sent out to investigate and make repairs of equipmen Priorities should be established and necessary personnel made aware of the priorities. The TSC should be aware of the status of the plant and organize resources to mitigate the consequences of the emergency situation.
I I 2.(All) Demonstrate the ability to transfer emergency direction from the Control Room l 7 (simulator) to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and from the TSC to the (d Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) in a timely manner.
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I 1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE June 24,1998
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V OBJECTIVES AND STANDARDS l Standard Criteria: Subjective enluation of briefings that were conducted l prior to turnover responsibility. Personnel documented
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transfer of duties per procedure 91101-C, " Emergency Response Organization" and 91102-C, " Duties Of The l
Emergency Director" when required.
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3.(All) Demonstrate the ability to prepare for around the clock staffing requirement Standard Criteria: Complete 24-hour staff assignments per procedures 91203-C, " Activation And Operation Of The Emergency Operations Facility" and 91106-C, " Duties Of The TSC Support Coordinator" 4.(6 Yrs.) Demonstrate the ability to perform assembly and accountability in a timely manne Standard Criteria: Protected area personnel assembly and accountability completed within 30 minutes of the Alert or higher emergency declaration via public address announcemen There should be 10 or less personnel missing for (g accountability to be considered satisfactor Emergency Response Facilities 1.(All, except after normal work hours,6 Yrs.)
Demonstrate timely activation of the TSC, Operations Support Center (OSC), and EO Standard Criteria:
TSC and OSC Activation The TSC and OSC should be activated within about an hour of the initial notificatio EOF Activation The Emergency Operations Facility will be capable of being activated within about an hour of the initial notification of an Site Area emergency or higher declaratio Initial notification during normal working hours is the plant page announcement of the
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declaration of the Emergency. Initial notification after normal working hours is the time the last person that is necessary to activate the facility is notified by the Cs emergency recall syste U
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1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE June 24,1998 A OBJECTIVES AND STANDARDS (,)
Activation time in any situation shall not be greater than 90 minutes from event declaratio .(All, except ENC,2 Yrs.) Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment, security provisions, and habitability precautions for the TSC, OSC, EOF, and Emergency News Center (ENC).
Standard Criteria:
Adequacy of the Emergency Equipment Subjective evaluation of the adequacy of the emergency equipment in the emergency response facilities. Generally, there should be sufficient lighting, ventilation, and equipment (copiers, administrative supplies, procedures, maps, drawings, etc.) to support efficient operations of the staff assigned to the emergency facilitie Adequacy of the Security Provisions The Security Shift Captain should implement and follow procedure 91704-C,
" Actions For Security During A Radiological Emergency".
O Adequacy of Habitability Precautions The Health Physics Supervisor (TSC) should implement procedure 91110-C, " Duties Of The Health Physics Supervisor (TSC)", Health Physics Supervisor Checklist, Subsequent Actions, In-Plant Radiological Assessment after an onsite/offsite release has occurre The Dose Assessment Manager should implement the Dose Assessment Manager checklist of procedure 91203-C, " Activation And Operation Of The Emergency Operations Facility", Subsequent Actions, step 1 .(All) Demonstrate the adequacy of communications for all emergency support resource Standard Criteria: The emergency response communications listed in procedure 91204-C, " Emergency Response Communications" were available and operational. The l communications systems were tested in accordance with
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TSC, OSC, and EOF Activation Checklists. The ERF
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personnel were able to operate all specified conununication l
q system Clear and timely communications links were V established and maintained for the duration of the exercise.
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1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE June 24,1998
/7 OBJECTIVES AND STANDARDS V
4.(6 Yrs.) Demonstrate the ability to evacuate onsite personnel (represented by a sample population) to a relocation cente Standard Criteria: Personnel from the Assembly Area (Admin. Bldg.) should respond to the evacuation page announcement and report to the designated relocation center. The Emergency Director should choose the correct relocation center as determined by wind direction. The ED should also pre-stage adequate numbers of security and HP personnel at traffic control points and the relocation cente ;
5.(6 Yrs.) Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the radiological monitoring and decontamination of personnel evacuating to the i relocation cente I Standard Criteria: Subjective, equipment in the emergency kits should be complete and in good working orde Radiological Assessment and Control c
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1.(All) Demonstrate the ability to obtain onsite radiological surveys and sample Standard Criteria: HP Technicians should demonstrate the ability to obtain appropriate instruments (range and type) and take survey In addition airborne samples should be taken when the conditions indicate the need for the informatio Contamination or smear surveys may also be required if the scenario conditions warran .(Annual, may be done during a semi-annual HP Drill)
Demonstrate the ability to utilize the post accident sampling system to collect and analyze radiological sample Standard Criteria: A PASS sample should be taken and analyzed for radioactivity. The Sample should be counted in on-site
! facilities if possible or arrangements made to ship the l sample to Framatome Technologies. A grab sample is l
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satisfactor A satisfactory time is 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> from the decision to take a sample until the sample has been analyzed, ifit is possible to analyze the sample on sit O ( ) Denotes objective minimum frequency objectiv. doc -5- EX98
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1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE June 24,1998
/' OBJECTIVES AND STANDARDS 3.(Al!) Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency worker I Standard Criteria: Emergency workers should be issued self reading dosimeters when radiation levels require and exposure should be controlled to 10CFR20 limits unless the ED I authorizes emergency limits. Exposure records should be available, either from the ALARA computer or a hard copy dose report. Emergency workers include Security and '
personnel within all emergency facilities. Issuance of self -
reading dosimeters is not required in the TSC or the Control Room (simulator). ,
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4.(All) Demonstrate the ability to assemble and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely manne Standard Criteria: One Field Monitoring team should be ready to be deployed '
within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of being requested from the OSC, and no later than 90 minutes from the declaration of an Alert or higher emergenc (3 g 5.(All) Demonstrate the ability to satisfactorily collect and disseminate field team dat Standard Criteria: Field data to be collected is dose rate or cpm from the
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plume, both open and closed window, and air sample gross / net cpm for particulate and iodine, if applicabl Satisfactory dissemination is from the field team to the Dose Assessment Manager via the field team communicator and/ or field team coordinato .(All) Demonstrate the ability to develop dose projections and determine appropriate protective action Standard Criteria: Dose projections from the dose assessment computer code should be compared to procedure 91305-C, " Protective l Action Guidelines" to determine appropriate protective action recommendations for the public. On site protective actions will normally be detennined by direct measurement of the environmen .(6 Yrs.) Demonstrate the ability to make the decision whether to issue protective drugs, KI, to emergency worker v/O ( ) Denotes objective minimum frequency objectiv. doc -6 EXS8 t
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1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE June 24,1998 OBJECTIVES AND STAN'DA'RDS d Standard Criteria: KI should be taken if the estimated dose to the thyroid will exceed 25 rem CD .(2 Yrs.) Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker Standard Criteria: Personnel should follow standard Health Physics procedures for monitoring and decontamination of personne .(6 Yrs.) Demonstrate the use of equipment and procedures for the collection and transportation of samples from areas that receive deposition from the airborne plume. Samples should include soil, vegetation, and wate Standard Criteria: Personnel should follow standard Health Physics procedures for sampling in addition to procedure 91303-C,
" Field Sampling And Surveys" Medical
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t 1.(All) Demonstrate the ability to respond to and treat a contaminated injured individua %
Standard Criteria: The emergency first aid team should arrive on medical scene within 10 minutes of notification (plant emergency beeper 911 activation). Within 2 minutes after arrival the team should perform basic ABC's. The team should evaluate for radiological contamination after the medical evaluation assessment. The team should properly package the injured individual for offsite transportation if require Proper communications with the Control Room and cr the OSC should be maintained for the duration of the exercis G Public Information 1.(All) Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the development and dissemination of clear, accurate and timely information to the news media.
' Standard Criteria: At least one press release should be developed for each emergency class within 60 minutes of the emergency notification. The press release should be accurate and coordinated with appropriate agencies when the ENC is (V'T activated with those agencies who are present at the EN ( ) Denotes objective minimum frequency objectiv. doc -7 EX98
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1998 NRC GUDED EXERCl3E June 24,1998
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O OBJECTIVES AND STANDARDS b
2.(2 Yrs.) Demonstrate the ability to provide information to the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manne Standard Criteria: Subjective evaluation by the evaluator of the performance of the company spokesperson(s) and the communications staf .(2 Yrs.) Demonstrate the capability to establish end effectively operate rumor control in a coordinated fashio Standard Criteria: Calls should be returned in a timefy manner with the correct informatio Recovery 1.(6 Yrs.) Demonstrate the ability to start planning for recovery by conducting an initial briefing on recovery procedure S_tandard Criteria: The Emergency Director should conduct a briefing with key members of the Emergency Organization and outline (n 1 the steps to activate the Recovery Organization and initial
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recovery pnontie Evaluation 1.(All) Demonstrate the ability to conduct a post-exercise critique to determine areas requiring improvement and corrective actio Standard Criteria: An exercise timeline should be developed followed by an evaluation of the objectives. Significant problems in achieving the objectives should be discussed to ensure understanding of why the objective was not fully achieve Recommendations for improvement in non-objective areas should also be discussed.
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( ) Denotes objective minimum frequency objectiv. doc -8- EX98
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g 1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE
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June 24,1998 SCENARIO ABSTRACT The initid conditions have Unit I at 40% power (process of reactor shut down due to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO) and Unit 2 at 100% power with no significant operating problems. Unit 1 is 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> into the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO. Maintenance has projected that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> are needed to complete the repairs to
"A" train Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW). The "A" train NSCW is out of service due to the loss of pump's #1, #3 and #5. Unit I control systems are in manual and Unit 2 controls are in automatic. Unit I has been on line for 380 day The exercise scenario creates conditions for an off site release through the failure of the three fission product barriers on Unit 1. The sequence is initiated with a loss oflevel indication on Steam Generator (SG) #1, while at 40% power in manual rod control. The loss of the SG level causes an Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT) condition. An Alert Emergency is declared due to an " Automatic reactor trip setpoint was exceededAND an automatic reactor trip did NOT occur AND a successful manual trip occurred from the control room." Upon declaration of the Alert Emergency, the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is initiated, the TSC and OSC are activated, and the EOF is brought to standby. Assembly and accountability are actually performed. The assembly and accountability process will produce a missing perso Search and Rescue will be dispatched to investigate the missing person's last known locatio The missing individual will be found injured. The appropriate actions by search and rescue will result in the individual being prepared for transport offsite to a hospital. This medical drill will conclude once the injured person is transported from the protected are l Approximately one hour after the Alert declaration, a LOCA occurs through the reactor vessel head. Due to the forced outage caused by the loss of the "A" train NSCW, a containment purge l b
i abstract. doc 1 EX98
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1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE s June 24,1998 i
is in progress to allow containment entry to repair other equipment problems. The isolation valve (HV 2628B) inside containment fails open due to a bound operator. The isolation valve (HV 2629B) outside of containment fails open due to a sheared operator. The mini-purge exhaust )
valve (HV 2632B) on the duct work fails open. The loss of these three isolation valves creates a release path to the environment. A Site Area Emergency is declared due to " Loss ofRCS barrier from the LOCA and Loss of Containment barrierfrom the purge exhaust systemfailure. " The EOF is activated due to this declaratio About 20 minutes after the LOCA, Train "B" Safety Injection (SI) pump trips off line due to overheating of the pump bearings. Later the Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) system Train "B" develops a major leak at the Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) #2 Heat ( Exchanger. This leak results in a loss of NSCW cooling water. This will cause the simulator crew to shut down the Centrifugal Charging Pump "B" (CCP B). The reactor core begins to boil dry in the upper head approximately 15 minutes after CCP "B" is lost (Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree, CSFST ORANGE). As the reactor head boils dry, the core exit thermocouple reach approximately 1100* F. Fuel damage occurs (approximately 30% fuel gap activity) released into the RCS. A General Emergency is declared due to loss of two barriers and the loss or potential loss of the third barrier Protective action recommendations are made to state agencie Centrifugal Charging Pump "B" is restored after the NSCW leak is secured at the ACCW heat exchanger. Field monitoring teams are dispatched to monitor the environment and locate the plume. The emergency is terminated about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the General Emergency is declare O V
abstract. doc 2 EX98 l
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1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE June 24.1998 SCENARIO TIME LINE CLASS TIME EVENT 08:00 Start Dril :05 Loss of 2/4 steam generator level indicate- occurs while at 40% power in manual rod contro +
Steam Generator #1 level transmitter LT-519 fails lo * Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT) condition occurs. The control room operators attempt to actuate reactor trip and the reactor DOES trip from the control roo ALERT 08:20 ALERT EMERGENCY declared due to " Automatic reactor trip setpoint was exceeded AND an automatic reactor trip did NOT occur AND a successful manual trip occurredfrom the control room. "
08:35 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) to the NRC activate :52 Assembly and Accountability complete. TSC and OSC activate Early dismissal may be ordered at this tim p 08:55 Report ofone missing individua :00 Search and Rescue dispatched to last known location of missing individua :10 EOF at standby.
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09:10 Loss of reactor coolant accident occurs through the reactor vessel hea (2 inch hole,900-1000 gpm)
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+ Containment purge in progress to allow containment entry to work on the forced outage additional work. The isolation valve (HV-2628B) inside containment fails in the open position due to a bound operator. The outside isolation valve (HV-2629B) fails in the open position due to a sheared operator. The mini-purge exhaust valve (HV-2632B) fails in the open position ;
due to a bound dampe + Radiation monitors RE-002/RE-003 and RE-2565 go into " ALERT" !
inside the containment buildin + Monitored release to the environment begins with normal RCS activit l (< .02 mrem at site boundary)
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timeline. doc 1 EX98
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1998 NRC GRADED EXERCISE June 24.1998 i SCENARIO TIME LINE CLASS TIME EVENT 09:25 Search and rescue locate missing individual and prepare the individual for transport to offsite medical facilit SITE AREA 09:25 SITE AREA EMERGENCY declared due to " Loss ofRCS barrierfrom the LOCA and Loss of Containment barrier from the purge exhaust system failure. "
09:30 Train "B" SI pump trips offline. (Damage to pump bearings, pump can not be repaired during course of the drill.)
09:45 EOF activate :58 Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) heat exchanger #2 (NSCW Train "B" cooling) develops lea * Leak detection alarm received in Control Room 10:10 Centrifugal Charging Pump "B" (CCP B) is tripped by operators due to loss of cooling wate 'O
+ Ctmt. Radiation monitors RE-002/RE-003 increas '
10:15 Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree (CSFST) ORANGE 10:25 Reactor head boils dry, core thermocouple 1100 GENERAL 10:30 GENERAL EMERGENCY declared due to "Potentialloss ofFuel Clad EMERGENCY barrier coupled with previous loss ofRCS and Containment barriers. "
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10:40 Fuel damage (approximately 30% fuel gap activity). !
+ Ctmt. Radiation monitors RE-005/RE-006 go into " ALARM". . ,
+ PASS sample collected.
l 10:45 Centrifugal Charging Pump "B" (CCP B) is started by operators due to isolation of NSCW leak on ACCW heat exchanger, r
12:30 Drill terminate j G(M timeline. doc 2 .
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