IR 05000424/1987048
| ML20238A613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1987 |
| From: | Conlon T, Hunt M, Mcelhinney T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238A588 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-48, 50-425-87-35, NUDOCS 8708310146 | |
| Download: ML20238A613 (11) | |
Text
- _ - _ _ - _ _ _
apeau UNITED STATES p
- o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
"
[ ' ~I '
-
o REGION 11 g
j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
- '-
t A TLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
\\...../
l l
i Report Nos.:
50-424/87-48 and 50-425/87-35 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and CPPR-109 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: August 3-7, 1987 Inspectors:
/M [T1fu,,
R/Cl/87 M. D. Hunt '
D' ate Signed
'
M ITNwC &
%)c2 ) ) % 3 D. McElhinney
/
Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:
M. N Miller
Approved C
- 4 /
/
h'E/'Y7 T. E. Conlon, Chief Date Signed Plant Systems Section Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was in the areas of Construction Deficiency Reports (CDRs), Unresolved Items (URIs), and Inspector Followup Items (IFIs).
The inspectors also reviewed the cable installation program being conducted for Unit 2.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
8708310146 070825 DR ADOCK OSO
---_
.__ ____-__________ _______-____ ________ - _-_- _ ___ _
_
___
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
..
.
s REPORT DETAILS l-H 1.
Licensee Employees Contacted.
- P.'D. Rice, Vice President and Project Director
- C W. Hayes, Vogtle QA Manager
- T. Greene, Vogtle Plant Manager
- E. D. Groover, QA Site Manager -. Construction
- C. Belflower, QA Site Manager
- L. B. Glenn, Manager - QC.
'*W. C. Ramsey, Project Engineering Manager
>
- C, D. Markham, Project Manager - Westinghouse
- A.; W. Harrelson, Electrical Discipline Manager
- D. M. Fiquett, Unit 2' Field Construction Manager
- G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
- W..E. Mundy, QA Supervisor
- W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist
'*A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant Plant Support Manager
- R..Sammons, Senior Engineer - Operations
- R. Sprankle, Senior Engineer - Fire Protection
- C, C. Matson,. Field Engineer - Electrical
- R. E. Hollands, Electrical Construction Supervisor
- W. R. Bainbridge,' Engineer Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, and office personnel.
.
NRC Resident Inspectors H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector - Construction
,
- J. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector - Operations i
!
p
- Attended exit interview l
l 2.
Exit Interview l
!
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 6 and 7, 1987, i
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors i
de. scribed the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following new item was identified during this inspection:
URI 50-425/87-35-01, Review Cable Interlacing Requirements Contained in Procedure ED-T-07, paragraph 7.
'
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
J l
_ _ - _
-.
-
.__
-_
_
l
.-
e.?
.
i 3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702).
(Closed) URI 50-424/85-28-05, Use of Shear Bars in the Auxiliary Building Base Mat The use of shear bars in the auxiliary building base mat deviates from Section 12.13 of ACI 318-71 which is a FSAR commitment.
A review of the calculations prepared by Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC)
which evaluated the adequacy of these bars showed that while the bars do not meet the letter of the code requirement, no deficiency in i
strength exists.
Also, as a result of this findin5, BPC evaluated the adequacy 'of the bars in question by conservatively discarding in whole or
,
i part, the bar capacity in the tension zone.
This evaluation showed that adequate strength exists even though the bars are not detailed in-accordance with ACI 318-7 requirements. This item is closed.
(Closed) URI 50-424/86-135-01 and 50-425/86-62-01, Review Classification Criteria for RTS Components The manual Reactor Trip handswitch and the manual' Safety Injection
)
i handswitch for both units were originally listed incorrectly as non-safety project' Class G1J in the instrument index.
The instrument index has now
,
been revised and the above listed handswitches are classified in the
instrument index as Q11J safety-related for both units.
This item is
-
. closed.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
!
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
One unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 7.
5.
Inspector Followup Items (IFI) (92701)
(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-135-02 and 50-425/86-62-02, Reactor Trip Breakers, i
To comply with the concerns of the NRC inspector, the licensee has held training on reactor trip breaker maintenance which was conducted by the vendor's representative.
Procedure 27765-C, " Westinghouse Type DS416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance," Revision 7, has been issued and incorporates the latest revision of t.he Westinghouse maintenance manual.
A review of all maintenance work orders related to reactor trip breakers has been established to record the-following critical breaker items for
trending purposes:
!
L
-
_--- -------------------
-
- _ _ _ _
.
.
-Number of Breaker Operations-Undervoltage Trip Attachment (UTVA) Dropout Voltage-UVTA Force-UVTA Trip Load This item is closed.
(Closed) IFI 424/87-19-04, Provide Identification and Procedures for Use of the Emergency Fire Control Shutoff Valves for the H Storage Tank.
Procedure 32930G-1, Zone 530 - Hydrogen Storage Yard Fire Fighting Preplan, Rev.1, dated April 23, 1987, states that Zone 530 contains Class B combustibles, hydrogen burns with "N0 VISIBLE FLAME", and identi-fies the location of liquid hydrogen storage tank shutoff valve.
Main-tenance Work Order # A-87-01169 was issued to fabricate and attach a tag to the fire control valve air supply vent valve with instructions on how to isolate the H, flow. This item is closed.
(Closed) IFI 424/87-19-01, Incorporate Inspection and Testing of Fire Hose Station Pressure Reducing Valves Into the Fire Protection Surveillance Program.
The licensee has incorporated review of the fire hose 5 cation i
pressure reducing valves into an existing flow test procedure 91410-C, Fire Suppression System - Quarterly Main Drain Test.
Since the fire hose stations and sprinkler systems are from common supply headers, flow and pressure availability to the hose stations is directly related to the pressure and flow at the sprinkler headers. Procedure 92410-C was revised
'
to require that when unacceptable results are obtained when flow testing the sprinkler headers, the Fire Protection Engineer will evaluate the need to perform additional hose station flow and pressure tests for potential adjustments to the pressure reducing valves, if needed, to maintain proper available fire hose nozzle pressures.
This testing is acceptable to address the surveillance of the hose station pressure reducing valves therefore, this item is closed.
6.
Electrical Cable Procedure Review (Unit 2) (51061)
The inspectors reviewed the electrical construction specification
[
No. X3AR01, Revision 33, dated February 23, 1987, to determine if the technical requirements contained in the facilities' Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for safety-related electric cable, terminations and associated items had been adequately incorporated with sufficient detail and clarity.
Section 8, Electrical Power, in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
i
!
for Unit 2 was reviewed to obtain the technical requirements and commit-ments.
The inspector reviewed the following electrical construction procedures to determine if the NRC requirements, SAR commitments, and electrical i
construction specifications were properly incorporated for adequate work performance, inspection and control:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
F l
-
L
-
i
-
4.
L
ED-T-02'
Raceway Installation l-ED-T-05 Cable Reel Control-ED-T-07-Cable. Installation ED-T-08 Cable Termination E0-T-18 Cable-Bus Installation
.j.
These construction procedures were reviewed to. ensure each. contained the following requirements:
a.
The' purpose.for safety-related or Class 1E installations was clearly stated, b.
All applicable references were listed.
c.
Responsibilities are specifically defined.
d.
Inspection requirements, acceptance criteria and QC responsibilities
,
are included.
These procedures were found adequate for the activities they addressed.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Electrical Cable - Work Observation (Unit 2) (51063)
The. inspectors examined the partially completed work of the two safety-related cable-bus (Calvert) installations. These were:
1)
Cable-bus from diesel generator 2A to the 4160V switchgear 2AA02 :
2)
Cable-bus from diesel generator 2B to the 4160V switchgear 2BA03 The cable-bus installations were examined to assure the requirements in construction procedure ED-T-8, Cable-Bus Installation, were met.
The qualification records for the nine~ cable-bus installation electricians were reviewed to verify each was cercified for high voltage termination in the Calvert cable-bus.
The ociification records were, found to be satisfactory.
~
The inspectors selected and examined six safety-related 4160 volt power cables listed as follows:
2AA0210EA 2BA0304EA l
2AA0220EA 2BA0306EA 2AA0221EA 2BA0309EA The inspectors examined the cables to assure the cable types specified were. pulled.and each cable was properly identified on both ends as required by procedure ED-T-07.
The routing of each cable was verified to comply with the cabic " pull" cards.
The inspectors verified that the
- - _- -
.1
.
i s
<.
,
,
'
i.
- cable separation was maintained and different power levels were identified and segregated.
The installed cables and raceways appeared to be protected from construction damage and were clear 6nd free of debris.
Portions of the raceways were examined and found clearly identified with the specified raceway numbers listed on the " pull" cards.
,.
The qualifications for seven of the QC inspectors were examined and each was properly certified for the activity being inspected.
Cable pulling activities were observed for 22 partial pulls for Class IE digital control cables.
The cables were pulled from the cable spreading room to the control room.
Sufficient manpower was assigned to make the pulls and one QC electrical inspector witnessed the pulling operation.
The electrical foreman and QC electrical inspector were interviewed and both were knowledgeable of construction procedure ED-T-07 Cable Installation.
The cables were examined and both ends were properly identified as specified on the cable pull cards and as required by the procedure.
The inspectors examined portions of the cable trays and found them to be clean and free of debris.
All cable trays examined were properly identified as listed on the pull cards.
All work observed was found to be satisfactory and in accordance with construction procedure ED-T-07.
The following cables were observed as partially pulled:
2BJ8211SC 2BJ8209SC 2BR8843SA 2BJ9385SH 2BR88908SA 2BR3513SG 2BR8881SA 2BR35485G 2BR8890ASA 2BR8823SA 2BR8986BSD 2BR8824SA 2BR10951SE 2BR8825SA 2BR10953SE 2BH12976SD 2BJ27901SH 2BH12977SE 2BR3507SG 2BJ8209SF 2BR0781SF 2BJ8211SF During the observation of the cable pulling activities in the cable spreading room, the inspector observed that cables from vertical tray 2BE353TQFCVA passing through the floor penetration 2BE399KS165 appeared to interlace.
The offset between the cable tray and the floor penetration, the location of the tie-bar in the penetration and the sequence in which the cables are installed may present a potential cable interlacing p roblem.
Construction Procedure ED-T-07, Exhibit 10, Checklist for Cable Pulling, Item 9, states "no interlacing of cables in trays." Discussions j
with the licensee representatives revealed the cables observed had not
been QC inspected and accepted.
There appears to be some confusion when l
interlacing of cables is acceptable.
Construction Specification j
No. X3AR01-E9 permits cable interlacing Viere practical while the
procedure checklist does not.
There are no provisions for documenting
!
- - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _.
-_
_ - _ _.
_ _ _ _ _
_ -
_
_ _ _
_
_ - _ _
. _ _
___
tyi
.4
,
.-
.
y_
n 9.'
^
.
,
_,
.
,/
]
..
i
['-
j
,
'
>.
,,
when6 cable ' interlacing is acceptable.. The cable interlacing' situation will be examined:further during subsequent inspections and is identified
.,
as Unresolved ' Item (URI) 50-425/87-35-01, Review Cable Interlacing
)
'
' Requirements Contained in Procedure ED-T-07.
Within the areas examined, no violations cr deviations were identified.
>
- 8.
Licensee Identified Items, 10 CFR 50.55(e).(92700)
(Closed) CDR 425/82-36, Delaval Diesel' Generator Piston Skirt Cracking.
l
.0nLOctober 28, 1982, Transamerica Delaval notified the NCR of potential
,
^. 7 defects in components ' furnished for DSRV and DSR Standby Diesel Gene-
!
i rators... The potential defect was the existence of residual stress in the
'
piston skirts which was the result of the method of heat treating. The residual stress, in combination with operational stress, could result in
engine failure.
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 2 has two DSRV-164
diesel engines and determined that this item is reportable in accordance l
with 10 CFR 21'.
Georgia Power Company (GPC) letter to the NRC, dated
June 11, 1984, indicated.that the existing type "AN" piston skirts would be replaced with the type "AE" piston skirts. The type "AE" piston skirts were properly heat treated and are not susceptible to the problems reported for the type "AN" piston skirts.
The inspectors reviewed the
)
following documentation:
.!
l Maintenance Werk Orders (MWO) D/P-84-104F I
-
MWO 2 - 84 - 00002
-
MWO 2 - 84 - 00023
-
Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance Procedures 2403 -001 i
-
Revs. 7'and 9
'
Review,of the documentation indicates that the type "AN" piston skirts
'
have been replaced with the type "AE" piston skirts.
The inspectors
conclude that GPC's resolution to this issue is adequate.
This item is closed.
(C1osed). CDR 425/83-48, NLP Printed Circuit Cards, On June 1,1983, Westinghouse Electric Corporation informed the NRC of a potential problem
.
'
within the Westinghouse 7300 Process Prott.ction System.
Westinghouse determined that loop power supply (NLP) circuit cards. shipped from Westinghouse Industry Electric Division (WIED) between August 1, 1980 and September 1,1982 were equipped with a thermal heat sink assembly on the inverter transistors that is subject t-potential failure of the adhesive bond in the thermal _ link. assembly.
Fa lure of the bond could cause the heat sink to separate and fall off the printed circuit board.
This could cause shorting of the low level signals. An engineering review identified three defective cards in the balance of plant (B0P) process cabinet'
,
1604QSPP1 (C-1) at Vogtle Unit 1.
The inspection determined that no defective cards were utilized in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 NSSS cabinets.
The licensee reported this concern to the NRC pursuant to the requirements
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ - -
!
l l'
.
.
!
,
or 10 CFR _50.55(e) on January 11, 1984.
The licensee submitted a letter
!
on January 6, 1956 which provided the specific corrective actions taken to l
resolve this condition.
The three defective NLP cards were returned to
'
Westinghouse, reworked using a new style heat sink assembly which elimi-
'
nated the use of adhesive, and replaced in cabinet 1604QSPPl.
The new style heat sink assemblies were installed in the Unit 2 B0P process protection cabinets at the Westinghouse manufacturing facility before being shipped to the site. This item is closed.
j (Closed) CDR 425/84-71, Cable Separation Discrepancies.
The licensee
submitted a final report to the NRC on May 31, 1985 pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
This item existed for Unit 1 and was closed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-424/86-45.
The corrective actions
'
implemented for Unit 1 should preclude the reoccurrence of this problem with the Unit 2 cable installations. The NRC will continue to monitor the construction activities pertaining to the Unit 2 cable installations to verify that the Vogtle Project cable separation criteria are being met.
This item is closed.
(Closed) CDR 425/85-80, Diesel Generator Control Panel Overheating, The licensee submitted the final report on August 23, 1985 pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
This item was closed for Unit 1 in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-424/86-45.
On May 17, 1985, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, Transamerica Delaval Incorporated (TDI) notified the NRC of a potential defect with the Engine Generator Control Panels. The potential problem associated with the control panel is overheating, which could lead to the-failure of some components.
In order to resolve the overheating problem, TDI recommended that the ventilation duct providing outside air for the control panel be split into three branches.
One branch going to the exciter bridge chassis section of the panel and the other two branches going to the power transformer section and the current transformer / reactor section.
Each branch is to be sized so that the air flow to each section of the panel will be proportional to the heat load generated within the section.
The inspectors reviewed the following documentation:
Final Walkdown Verification Travelers
-
Fabrication, Installation & Assembly Travelers
-
-
Drawing No. 2X4DJ5103, Rev. 3, Diesel Generator Building HVAC.
Level 1 Plan Elevation 220' - 0" to 255' - 0" The inspectors also preformed a walkdown of the diesel generator building.
The diesel generator control panel ventilation installation was compared to the HVAC drawing 2X4DJ5103 for the "A" and "B" trains.
Review of the documentation and the walkdown inspection indicates that the vendor recommendations for diesel generator control panel ventilation modifi-cations have been completed.
This item is closed.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
_ - - _ - -. - -
__
__
_.
_
_ _ _ -
L>.
L (Closed) CDR 425/86-100,' Spliced ' Instrument Cables Inside the Containment
.and MSIV Areas.
The licensee informed' RII of the potential. reportable condition where the environmental qualification of cables installed in the above _ areas may be negated when the outer jacket is removed during splicing operations.
The following corrective action were taken for Unit 1.
1.
In order to rebuild the stripped portion of the cable jacket, and to maintain the cable qualification, construction specification X3AR01-E9 was revised via CSCN No. 476 delineating the requirement of installing and retrofitting the Raychem heat shrinkable tubing splice kits for jacket replacement and/or repair.
2.
The requirement is. applicable to those instrument cables identified by deviation report ED-12247 to have been improperly spliced and are required to remain functional during the first three. hours of a LOCA.
The requirement will also cover any ' fixes to similar installation problems that will occur in the future.
The retrofitting work is in progress and the closing of Deviation Report ED-12274 will signify the completion of work.
A field change Request No. E. FCEB-19422 was written for Construction Specification X3AR01-E9 which includes a list of cables located in containment and the Main Steam Isolation Valve vault which will have heat I
shrink tubing (Boots) added to insure cable EQ integrity.
This item is closed.
(Closed) CDR 425/86-101, Raceway Support Design Details. The licensee identified this item to RII on April 2, 1986 and submitted the corrective actinn report on June 30, 1986. The final report listed the evaluation of the problem and the actions to prevent recurrence of missing longitudinal e
bracing and support spacing of conduit supports. Those. actions were:
Detail 3 on drawing CX3DF002, applicable to Units 1 and 2, has been further clarified.
This change will ensure that installation of I
conduit runs utilizing this detail will have a minimum of two j
supports.
l l
Detail 6 on drawing AX2D94V051, applicable to Units 1 and 2, has been j
revised.
Appropriate conduit supports will require an individual
!
longitudinal brace, per this revision.
The listed drawings were reviewed by the inspector to ensure clarity of the meaning of the revised /added notes and found satisfactory. This item is closed.
(Closed)CDR'425/86-109, Diesel Generator Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Tube Support Plates Not As Designed.
The licensee submitted the final report on September 17, 1986.
The report has been reviewed and determined to be i
_
_
__
-____ _A
__ - - - _ _ -
_ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _ - - - -
-
-
_ _ _ _ _ _
._
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.-
-.
acceptable.
This item for. Unit I was' closed by NRC Inspection Report No.
50-424/86-103.
The license identified that during flushing of the jacket water heat exchanger for the Unit 1 "A" EDG, the required design flow rate of 1800 gpm could not be achieved.
The licensee determined that the
'
restriction was caused by bent tubes against the outlet nozzles.
The tubes were probably bent by a pressure surge during the flushing procedure. The heat exchanger was removed and replaced with a Unit 2 heat
,
exchanger.
The defective heat exchanger has been repaired by the vendor's heat exchanger supplier, and returned to the site.
The inspectors reviewed the following documentation:
Material Inspection Report
-
Certificate of Compliance
-
Supplier Quality Verification Documentation List-Summary
-
Certificate of Conformance - Repair Activity.
-
Pullman Powers Products - Field Process Sheet
-
Piping Materials Requisition
-
Deviation Report (DR) - PP 15738
-
Review of this documentation indicates that the defective heat exchanger was repaired, tested and installed in Unit 2
"B" Train EDG in accordance
-
with appropriate codes, drawings and specifications. This item is closed.
(Closed) CDR 425/86-118, Flaking of Positive Straps On 125 Volt DC Batteries.
The licensee submitted a final report to the NRC on June 26, i
1986 which reported the condition in accorince with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
l This item was closed out for Unit 1 in NRC inspection Report No. 50-424/87-06.
During a monthly inspection of the Unit 1 batteries, the licensee observed that a black substante was flaking off the positive straps of the Class 1E batteries.
The black substance fell across the positive and negative plates in the b%tery cell jar, which could lead to a short circuit of the batteries.
Three battery cells which exhibited flaking of the positive straps were sent to C & D Batteries, the battery supplier, for analysis.
This evaluating indicates that the positive straps contained an antimony-lead alloy in the plate-lug-to-strap weld a rea. This condition indicated that lead-antimony burning sticks had been used instead of lead-calcium burning sticks.
The presence of antimony
!
caused the flaking of particles from the positive straps of the batteries.
The licensee has replaced the defective cells for the Unit 1 batteries with new cells stored by C 8 0 Batteries for Vogtle - Unit 2. The license
,
reviewed the QA program for C & D Batteries and determined that this condition constituted an isolated manufacturing problem and not a QA
!
...
w
.10 programmatic deficiency.. C.& D Batteries ~ concluded that the presence of antimony may not.show up in-laboratory tests and recommended the batteries be visually inspected for flaking.-
The Unit 2. batteries.were installed subsequent to this problem.
The inspectors reviewed procedures number 27915-C, General ' Battery Maintenance, and - procedure number 28910-C, Class 1E 18, Month Battery Inspection and-Maintenance - Check, which.
provides' guidelines for good maintenance practice ~for both 1E and general plant batteries.. Review of these procedures indicates that the licensee..
visually inspects-for flaking of the positive straps during the monthly,
. quarterly, annually, and eighteen month maintenance checks.
Implemen-tation Lof these procedures will provide adequate assurance that future flaking of -the positive straps will' be identified before any short -
circuiting of the batteries occurs. This item is closed.
u
-
I I
_ _ _
_
_-
-_
. - _ _ _ - - _ _
_ _ _.
_ _ _ _-- -_-_:-_________ __
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -