IR 05000424/1990015

Insp Repts 50-424/90-15 & 50-425/90-15 on 900727-0803. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observation & Evaluation of Annual Emergency Response Exercise

ML20059H342
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	08/29/1990
From:	Rankin W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059H334	List: IR 05000424/1990015 ML20059H331 ML20059H339
References
50-424-90-15, 50-425-90-15, NUDOCS 9009170122
Download: ML20059H342 (16)

Text

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UNITED STATES

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' NUCLEMt REGULATORY COMMIS$10N -

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. AUG 2 L1990 y [ fReport Hos;:'

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Vl50N24/90-151and50-425/90-15 j

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l Licensee:. Georgia Power Company =

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P. 0. Box 1295

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, Birmingham, AL 35201-h 'l '.

Docket Nos.:' 50-424-and-50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and CPPR-109-

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A m Ji Facility _Name: Vogtle 1 and 2-

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.nspection Conducted:; July 27-August 3, 1990 g

I1nspector:

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Date Signed:

I!. D Testa-

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Accompanying Personnel:: D. Collins-

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A. Herdt'

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JW' Rankin h

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L. Trocine

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A. Boland G. Atthur-

$/I k Approved by:

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Sr W.H.Rankin,CFI8

. Date Signed-F o

Emergency Preparedness Section Energency Preparedness and Radiological

' Protection Branch'

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Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

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SUMMARY-

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Scop'e:1 4'

This! routine, announced inspection included observation and evaluation of the.

annual ( emergency response exercise.

Emergency organizations' activities' and -

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,. response were.selectivelyrobserved in the Control Room-(Simulator), Technical-t LSupports Center, Operations Support Center, Field Monitoring Teams, ;and

. Emergency. Operations Facility.

The inspection also included a review of the-

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+ exercise objectives and scenario details, as well as observation: of the

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.; licensee'_s post-exercise critique activities.

The exercise, which included jlg=

l participation by_ State, local. governments and Savannah JRiverc. Site, was p-(cenducted on August 1,'1990, between'the hours of 8:00 a,.m. and-1:00 p.m..

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Results:

k'ithin the' scope of the observed exercise, the licensee fully denonstrated the capability of implenenting its Emergency Plan and Energency Plan. Implenenting Procedures to provide for the health and safety of the public in a radiological energency.

One violatioil and no deviations-or exercise weaknesses were observed. -The violation, because of-the diversity of problems and number of examples,.

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indicated problems.with the maintenance and distribution of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implen.cnting Procedures (Paragraph 11).

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'i REPORT DETAILS

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Persons Contacted

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Licensee Employees-

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• J'. Badget Emergency Plan Coordinator

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• H. Beacher, Senior Plant Engineer

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• G. Bockhold, General Manager

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• J. D'Amico Outage Schedule Supervisor

'*E. Dannemiller. III. Nuclear Security Manager

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• F. Ealick. Engineering Supervisor

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• G. Frederick, Supervisor, Safety Analysis and Engineering Review

• T. Green, Assistant General Manager

• H. Handfinger, Manager, Maintenance-

• K.' Holmes, Manager.. Training and Emergency Preparedness

• E. ' Kozinsky, Operations Superintendent.

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• R.- LeGrand, Manager, Health Physics / Chemistry '

• L. Mayo,' Nuclear Specialist I

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-*J.. Petro,' Senior QAER-

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• J. Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor

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• C. Stinespring,~ Manager, Plant Administration

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. J.'Swartzwelder, Operations Manager

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• J. Williams, Plant Engineering Supervisor

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Other. licensee employees contacted during this inspection included

l-craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force mechers,

~techni.cians, and administrative personnel.

i Other Organizations

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, E. Toupin, Oglethorpe. Power Company, Representative

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I Nuclear Regulatory Commission L

• R. Starkey, Resident Inspector r'

• Attended exit interview L 1-

2.

ExerciseScenario(82301,82302)

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The scenario' for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to' test the integrated capability and a major-portion of the basic? elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and

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organization' pursuant,to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E

, to ' 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of.

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NUREG-0654.

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. The' scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives-in:

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advance of the exercise. The final exercise data and message package were

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distributed during a pre-exercise licensee briefing held. July 31, 1990, e

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The scenario developed for this day shift, full scale participation

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exercise was detailed and fully exercised - the licensee's emergency-

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organization.

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The exercise began during-the regular day shift at about 8:00 a.m. with i

Unit 1 at 100 percent power.

Unit 1; had: been on line for 107 days..

-r Unit 2 was in shutdown mode 5 for a turbine' outage. The site was under a severe thunderstorm warning for all' of' Burke County.

Scenario activities began when the Control Room received notification that t

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a tornado 'had' touched. down in: the switchyard and had damaged some

equipment in the area.

An Alert was declared based on a tornado striking i

theProtectedArea-(PA).

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When the Control; Room sent personnel to survey the conditions in the

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switchyard, it was determined that Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) 1A-T was lying,on its side. Then IA Diesel-Generator tripped on overspeed, and-

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both_ Feed Pumps tripped.

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.As the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC)

staff activated, security completed the onsite accountability process. At

.least one individual was determined missing. Search and rescue procedures.

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were -implemented and resulted in locating the. individual in an

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out-rf-the-way area of the plant.

The individual was not injured; he had

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not heard.the plant page announcement.

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At about 8:50 a.m. another missing person called into the Control Room

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from the vicinity of'the Hot Machine Shop. -He requested help saying that a

he was badly injured.

A first aid team was.sent to the: scene.

The individual received first aid and was transported to Humana Hospital for H

treatment.

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. Subsequently, the IB Diesel Generator was lost. A Site Area Emergency was L

declaredh to loss of on and offsite power for greater than 15 minutes.

Plant conditions continued to degrade as the~ core was uncovered. At about

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10:15 -'a.m., core damage began and containment pressure, temperature and

radiation-levels increased.

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~ A General Emergency was declared due to a hydrogen explosion in the

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L containment, and containment pressure and radiation level increased.

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significant buildup of fission products occurred in the containment.

I Within minutes a containment post-LOCA purge flow path opened, creating a c

radiation release path.

Plant monitors indicated that an offsite e

radiological release had consnenced, l-

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Offsite protective action recomendations (PARS) were ~ reevaluated as field monitoring. teams-tracked the radiological = plume.

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Conditici s improved as repairs neared completion and: power was restored.

I Makeup to the Reactor Coolant System began using the Safety Injection and Centrifugal Charging. Pumps and core inventory was restored.

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The release was terminated.

The emergency exercise was terminated at

'about 1:00 p.m. based upon the plant's obtaining a stable configuration.

The~ controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.

The

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inspector observed adequate interactions between the controllers and the

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players.

No violations or deviations were observed.

3.

Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

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This area was observed to assure that primaiy responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that-

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adequate' staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR=

' 50.47(b)(1),7 Paragraph' IV.A of Appendix E. to 10 CFR 50, and specific-

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guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.

The~ inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for

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the licensee's onsite emergency response organization, and that adequate

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staff were available to respond to the simulated emergency.

The initial

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L response _ organization _ was augmentedt : by designated licensee (

. representatives.

Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term orccontinuous _ staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.

Discussions with-licensee representatives indicated that i

' sufficient technical staff were available to provide for continuous

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staffing ofcthe augmented emergency organization, if needed.

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A The. inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the L

emergency organization in the TSC, the OSC,.and the EOF. At each response a

L center, the required staffing and assignment of responsibility was L,

consistent with the licensee's approved Emergency Plan.

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No violations:or deviations were identified.

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Emergency Classification System (82301)

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_This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level. scheme was in use by the ' nuclear facility licensee

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L pursuant to 10 CFR.50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR

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Part 50.

Emergency Plan. Implementing Procedure (EPIP) No. 91001-C titled,

" Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions," was used to promptly identify - and properly classify the scenario simulated events.

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The Alert, Sit'e Area Emergency, and General Emergency classifications were timely: and correct by - procedure.

The-Alert was declared at 'about

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8:15 a.m. because of the Loss of Heat Sink.. The Site Area Emergency was

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declared. at about 9:20 a.m. due to the' break or challenge: of 2 of 3

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fission product ~ barriers.

The General Emergency was declared at about

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10:47 a.n:. due.to the break or challenge of 3 fission product barriers.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for.

notification of. State.and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations were established.

' This area was further observed to= assure that means to provide early notification to the

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populace.within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.

i An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were' -

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established and available for-use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency condition to Federal, State, and local-response

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organizations, and _to alert. the licensee's 6ugmented emergency ' response.

organization.

An inspector' observed-that notifications made by the licensee at the.

Alert, Sites Area Emergency and General Emergency were timely.

The inspector further observed that follow-up communications were made in.

-accordance with' the Emergency Plan.

The ' trial use of the Fax Exchange system to concurrently transmit initial and follow-up messages to State, D,

local,- General Office, and. selected Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs)-.

was innovative and very successful.in enhancing timely comunications.

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Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

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This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt

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comunications among principal response organizations and emergency p

personnel pursuant to 10 CFR.50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to b

'10 CFR 50, 'and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of B

NUREG-0654.

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Control Room - The inspector observed that following review 'and

s analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations

personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the

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simulated emergency.

The Shift Superintendent evaluated the

significance of each degradation in plant conditions and quickly and continuously rioritized repair activities to achieve the most reliable and stable plant status.

The Shift Supervisor was meticulous in his use of procedures and was very effective in

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'I directingt the. operators-in. combating - casualties andEdevisingi

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alternate solutions to system and caponent: losses.

The - Plant

General Manager entered the Control Room shortly after the Alert was declared. ' He' assessed the situation and began a turnover from the

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Shift Superintendent, but did so in; a way that did not impact the l

management of the accident.

Once turnover was accomplished, the Plant General Manager assumed the role of Emergency Director.. After

the TSC had been' established, the Plant General Manager turned over.

t the Emergency-Director position to the TSC Manager during travel -to

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the TSC..

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Technical' Support Center - This facility was. activated f5110 wing the?

declaration of the ' Alert classification.'

The TSC; Manager

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demonstrated effective command and _ control providing periodic f

staff appeared to be cognizant, of their emergency duties,

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informative briefings on plant status to the TSC staff. The facility

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authorities, and responsibilities.

Site accountability was _

j satisfactorily accomplished within the 30-minutes guidance. When.the

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Plant-General : Manager left the TSC to travel to the Emergency Operations facility (EOF),lhe turned over the: Emergency-Director:

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_ position __to the TSC Manager.

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. Operations Support Center - The inspector observed that following the

-request' for! activation personnel responded promptly to staff the -

facility.

An inspector observed the response teams including; the

dispatch.of the medical first aid team.- The. medical response. team l

responded ' promptly.

The search and rescue team, demonstrating good L_.

initiative included I&C1 personnel who could visually identify;the

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-scenario missing person.

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Emergency Operations Facility - The EOF was staffed and-activated at y

about 9:47-a.m. which was within one hour of the Alert declaration.

n The ' facility staff were familiar with their emergency -duties,

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authorities, and emergency responsibilities.

The-EOF was provided j

with adequate -equipment to support the assigned staff.

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Security / access control was observed to be appropriately established

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and maintained? Communications using the status loop and the manager

L conference calls were effective in timely transmission of

information.. Status boards and other graphic aids were strategically 4g l-

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located and appropriately maintained.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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. Accident' Assessment (82301)-

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This area was observed to-assure that adequate methods, systems, and f'

equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required

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by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and u

p specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.

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The accident assessmentL program included an engineering assessnent' ofl

a plant status, damage caused by the simulated events,- and an assessment of

the radiological-hazard to onsite and offsite personnel.esulting from the accident.

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Onsite and offsite radiological environmental monitoring teams were i

dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas'within the influence of/ the simu ted plume.

Radi logical effluent data was a

received and reviewed in the EOF.

The inspector observed good command and control of the licensee's, field-monitoring teams, including early dispatch, minimal plume exposure, tight control of. team cumulative dose, excellent comunications, frequent plant

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status updates and cross checks-with the State of Georgia. field monitoring y

teams.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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ProtectiveResponse(82301)

This ' area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective actions during the simulated emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, t

were developed and in place, and whether protective actions for emergency'

l workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented i

promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria' in Section II.'J. of NUREG-0654-(Revision 1).

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The inspector verified that the licensee had and adequately used emergency

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procedures for. formulating PARS for the offsite populace within the-10-mile-emergency planning zone.

The inspector observed that protective

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actions were initiated ~ for onsite emergency workers following the Alert emergency declaration by conducting an accountability of those personnel inside' the plant perimeter.

The licensee's' use of the computer-based

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accountability system resulted in all except two persons within the site

fence-being accounted for within 30 minutes after accountability was

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ordered. ; The simulated evacuation of nonessential plant personnel was

' orderly and timely, j

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No~ violations or deviations were identified.

9.

ExerciseCritique(82301)

The -licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether weaknesses identified as' part of the exercise, were brought : to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654 (Revision 1).

The inspector observed the licensee's player critique conducted at the Simulator / Control Room, TSC, OSC, and E0F.

The players offered

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constructive suggestions for improvement.- ' All substantial suggestions

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~ The inspector also ob' served the licensee's controller critique conducted

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immediately following.the player critique.

The subject critique involved a deteiled discussion and' analysis of required improvements and deficiencies identified during-the exercise.

All substantive findings

were documented for review and cortection.

.The respective corrective i

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actions implemented to~ address these findings will be reviewed during

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future inspections.

A formal presentation of the critique results was

made -to licensec management on August 3.1990. - The conduct of the

. critique was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above.

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With -the exception of the procedure problem identified in Paragraph 11, all exercise objectives appeared to be met.

i No violations or deviations were identified.

10. ActiononPreviousInspectorFindings(92701)

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(Closed). Exercise-Weakness 50-424/89-21-01, 50-425/89-25-01:

Delayed-O General Emergency classification and PARS because the Emergency Director E

was enroute from TSC to E0F when situation degraded.

The inspector i

reviewed Step 5.2.7 of EPIP Procedure 91102 titied,_ " Duties of the

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L Emergency Director," and' observed the Emergency Director activities during L'

the exercise and deemed them appropriate.

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(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-424/89-21-02,50-425/89-25-02:

L Emergency Notifications were sometimes incomplete and inaccurate.

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inspector observed.the initial and follow-up notifications and, except'for l

one minor licensee identified instance, found them to be complete and l-accurate.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/09-21-03, 50-425/89-25-03:

Exercise critique not j

sufficiently critical.

The inspector observed the player critique and

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controller critique and found them to be in-depth and in detail. -(See'

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Paragraph 9)

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11 1. Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (82701)

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Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16), 10 CFR 50.54(1), and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part.50, this area was reviewed to determine whether changes were made to the program since the routine inspections of April 1989 and July 1990, and i

o to assess the impact of these changes on the overall state of emergency

- preparedness at the facility.

Vogtle Procedures 00103-C " Document Distribution and Control", 71002-0

" Controlled Document Distribution", 70408-C " Controlled Document Distribution", 40005-C " Preparation and Control of Emergency Planning

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Documents" and Interoffice Correspondence dated 4/17/90 from K. R. Holmes

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to C. Stinespring Re: Request for Controlled Distribution Log: NOT-01929 were reviewed.

As a follow-up to Inspection Report 50 424, 425/90-16 Paragraph 4, and the independent-audit conducted May 31 through June 21,1 1990, by the Safety Ant tysis and Engineering Review organization documented in. Report No. VSAER-90-162' dated July 6,1990, a c'etciled and comprehensive' review e

of-EPIPs was made in the Control Roon', OSC, TSC, EOF, and Simulator.

A number of problems were identified with the distribution and maintenance.

of EPIPs in these. facilities.

Specifically, the following problems were identified:

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a.

OSC Controlled Copy Manual Set f55 Procedure 91102 in the OSC Controlled Copy Manager's Handbook

contained Revision 6 dated September 2, 1909, instead of Revision 7, dated July 6, 1990; Procedure 91402 Revision 4 in both Manual Set f55 and the Search and Rescue Team /First Aid Team Handbook was dated October 15, 1987, while the current procedure inventory listing (dated July 30,1990) shows a s

document date of January 3, 1990, b.

EOF.- Controlled Copy Manual Set f44 Procedure 91103 was missing.

• Two copies were available of Procedure 91104 - cne current

revision (filedunder91103)andonesupersededrevision.

Procedure 91201 pages 6, 7, 8. and 9 were missing.

• Procedure 91402 was the correct revision; however, the procedure

was dated October 15, 1987, vice January 3,'1990,.on-inventory.

list.

Procedure 91503 was correct revision, but it was dated

December 28, 1988, vice January 3, 1990 on inventory list.

EOF - Controlled Copy Manual Set f66 Procedure 91402 was correct revision, but it was dated

October 15, 1967, vice January 3, 1990 on inventory list.

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Procedure 91503 was correct revision, but it was dated

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December 28, 1988, vice January 3, 1990, on inventory list.

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Simulator Control Room-Controlled Copy Manual Set f9

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Volume 1.

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Volume.1, 3-ring binder was not marked Manual Set #9.

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Procedure.91305 was a current copy,,but it was filed as:the last

procedureLin Volume 1 and the first procedure in Volume II.-

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• Procedure'91402 was'the correct revision, but the procedure was-

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dated October'15, 1987, vice January 3,1990, on inventory M. ;

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Procedure 91403 was from Manual Set Copy #57 instead of Manud

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Set copy #9.

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Procedure 91503' was the correct revision, but,it was dated

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December 28, 1988, vice January 3, 1990, on inventory list =

Simulator Control Room-Controlled Copy ManJa1 Set f57 l

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Procedure 91107 was from Manual Set f8.

Procedure 91109 was,from Manual. Set #8.

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Procedure 91204-was from Manual Set $9.-

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• 4 Procedure 91403 was from Manual Set #9.

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Manual Sets #441and #57 had cover sheets relating'to T-EP-86-1 which directed removal by April'7, 1990.

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Emergency Plan (spot check) Copy #17, Volume 1 in EOF contained

s two paga D-2 (one Revision 12, dated April 1990, and one Revision 3, dated December 1985).

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d-TSC'- Controlled Copy Manual Set #53 j

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• Procedure 91702 was from Manual Set #58.

.q Procedure 91106 vas missing procedura and no. tab was present,

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TSC - Controlled. Copy Manual Set #64 LT Two' copies of Procedure 91106 were available (both were current

revision from Manual Sets #53 and f64).

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_No Emergency Plan or EPIP problems were identified in the Control Room..

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The Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures update and

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distribution problems were identified as an apparent violation.

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' Apparent Violation (50-424, 425/90-15-01):

Failure to distribute and R

maintain current Emergency Plan and EPIPs.

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' In addition, a' spot check of (EOPs) was made in the Contro? Room, TSC; and Simulator Control' Room. = Temporary changes for E0P procedures 19251-.and:

19013 were found correctly filed in the Control Room; however, copies of these : temporary E0P procedures could not-be-located' in the TSC or Simulator Control-Room (Controlled. E0P Manual Sets #21, #14).-

In addition Procedure 19221, Revision 5 (Manua1 Set- #21) was improperly; filed resulting in-two copies of oifferent revisions being available for

. use.

One violation and no ' deviations were identified.

,12.

Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by'the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Comittee

'

and-Federal Emergency Mant'enent Agency, Region IV staff): concerning the activities of'offsite agendes during the exercise will be forwarded by.

= separate correspondence.-

-13.

Exit 11nterview

. The inspection scope. and results were sumarized on August 3,1990, with those persons-indicated in. Paragraph 1.

The inspector described the areas inspected.and discussed in detail the inspection results listed - below..

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Proprietary information is not contained in' this report. _ Licensee; management was infrmed that one Exercise Weakness and-two IFIs were considered closed.

Dissenting coments were not received from the

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licensee.

Item Number Description and Reference

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50-424,425/90-15-01 Violation - Failure to distribute and maintain current Emergency Plan and EPIPs(Paragraph 11).

At chments:

1.

Exercise Timeline

.2.

Exercise Scope and Objectives

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1990 VECF GRADED EXERCISE.

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10800 '0700.

Tornado in' Protected Areat

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o A" Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT)'

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. Train A ESF bus (IAA02) de-energized.T

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o IA Diesel.Cenerator trips or.

erspeed.

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o Both Feed pumps; trip' (No kno cause)

F

o Reactor. does not trip' on automatic trip.

(Steam generator-low level)

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0801 0701 N,

Motor-driven Feed Pump "B trips - overcurrent1

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.results in motor damage. L Wo feedwater available to:

N steam generators.

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0815 0715 ALERT

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Alert. declared because of Torna'do in Protected Area..

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0830; 0730

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Feed & bleed of Rea.ctor Coolant System (RCS)~

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Pressuriser Power Operated' Relief Valve' (PORV) failai

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i 0840. 0740 TSC and OSC activated..

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0845- 0745-

-Assembly and Accountability complete..-Missing person;

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identified.

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Contaminated injured found in the' Hot. Machine Shop.

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Transportation to hospital is required.

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0905- 0805 Search and Rescue-team locates missing person in NSCW j

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0915 7 Loss.of'.1B Diesel Generator (failure of bus IBA03--

186A' relay)i No Emergency Core Cooling Systen-(ECCS)-

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makeup capability to<the RCS. ~There is a Loss of.

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Coolant Accident (LOCA) through the failed open PORV..

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3 0930 0830:

SITE Upgrade.to. SAE due to loss of on & offsite power.

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greater than 15 minutes..

EMERGENCY j

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'0945 A0845 An-early dismissal or site evacuation should have i

N been ordered-by the Emergency' Director.

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'.'1000. 0900 EOF' activated.

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h 1015? 0915-The core is uncovered, containment pressure &

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temperature start to increase.

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i 1030,0930 Core damage.begins.

Radiation levels in containment

sharply increase.

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CE-90-1-EX1001

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TIMELINE'

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l1045! 0945;CENERAL-Si;nificant buildup' of fission products' to-the

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iEMERGENCY containment thru PORY & Pressuriser Relief Tank.

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Hg explosion in Containmenti

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containment pressure spikes to.'35 psig.

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Bus BA03-repaired.- Power restored to.' bus 'BA03.;

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W'c Commence makeup'to.RCS.with emergency core ~. cooling q

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pumps.

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~ 1101.11001L Block valve-for'PORV-capable 1 of being closed..-

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'Obtain PASS sample.

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-- Containment post L0ct. pdrge: flow path! opened du3.to

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j valve failing open. Radiat. ion release path-

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established.

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Release ' terminated by shutting valve'in post.LOCA

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. Purge flow path..

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~ l'200-Exercise completed.

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OBJECTIVES FOR 1990 CRADED EXERCISE

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The Vogtle Electric!Ceneratin's Plant 1(VECP) emergency preparedness

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i exercise objectives are based on Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1(NRC)

requirements provided in 10CFR50.47, " Emergency Plans," and-10CFR$0,

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L Appendix E, " Emergency Planning and Preparedness. for Production-and -

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- Utilization Facilities." - Additional guidance provided in NUREC-0654, tyEMA-REP-1, Revision'1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of,

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- Radiological Emergency Response Plans" was utilized in developing the

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Mbj ect ive s. -

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t Accident-AssessmentandClassificatic}

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Demonstrate the abiiity to identify. initiating conditions, determine emergency action levels (EAL) parameters,and correctly

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.i classify the emergency _throughout the exercise.

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Demonstrate the ability to provide core damage assessments.

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Notification 3.

Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize site'

i emergency.1esponse' personnel.-

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4.

Demonstrate the ability to expeditiously notify state, local and federal authorities.

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5.

. Demonstrate the ability to warn or-advise c' site individuals of

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emergency conditions.

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Emergency Response

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6.

Demonstrate the ability.to make proper decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.-

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.7.

Demonstrate the ability to transfer emergency direction from R,

Control Room (simulator) to the Technical Support Center (TSC) r.nd from the TSC to the Emergency Operations' Facility- (EOF) in a

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timely manner.

'8.

Demonstrate the. ability to perform assembly and accountability.

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9.

. Demonstrate the ability.to communicate with, and obtain assistance

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from, appropriate offsite-support organizations.:

D.

Emergency Response < Facilities 1;

-10.

Demonstrate timely activation of the TSC, Operations Support

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- Center (OSC), and EOF,

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L 11. : Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment, security provisions, and

- habitability precautions for the TSC, OSC, and EOF, and Emergency News Center (ENC).

12.

Demonstrate the adequacy of communications for all emergency

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support resources.

. GE-90-2-EX1007 Q

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Radiological'Assessme.nt'and-Control-

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.13. ~ Demonstrate;the ability-tv obtaintensite radiological surveys'and-g.

samples.:

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m 14.4 ' Demonstrate thefability.to'utilizeLthe' post accident sampling Jaystem to collect.andLanalyze' radiological samples.

-15..' Demonstrate'the= ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposures.

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Demonstrate the-ability to assemble and deploy field monitoring

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teamsLin~a timely fashion.

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17.- Demonstrate the ability to collect and: disseminate field team

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<t data.

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?l8.. Demonstrate the. ability to develop dose projections and detera*.ne.

j appropriateLprotective actions.

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19. Demonstrate the. ability to conduct Search and Rescue.

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contaminated / injured Individual.

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Demonstrate the adequacy of ambulance and hospital facilities ~ and-l

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procedures for handling contaminated / injured-individuals.

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Public Information 22.. Demonstrate the ability-to coordinate information prior to release-

.o of the media.!

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o 23. : Demonstrate the ability to brief the medialfin a clear, accurate.-.

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and timely manner.

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u 24. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in -

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a-coordinated fashion.

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Evaluation'

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h-25. - Demonstrate ability to conduct a post-exercise critique.to d

determine areas requiring-improvement or corrective action.

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GE-90

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