IR 05000424/1990020
| ML20058F671 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1990 |
| From: | Aiello R, Brian Bonser, Brockman K, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058F658 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-90-20, 50-425-90-20, NUDOCS 9011090051 | |
| Download: ML20058F671 (14) | |
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># 282pb UNITED STATES
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- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION ll -
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101 MAR 88*TA STREET, N.W.,
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t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 l
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.l Report Nos.:
50-424/90-20 and 50-425/90-20
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Licensee:
Georgia Power Company
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P.O.
Box 1295
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J Birmingham, AL 35201 if Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License.Nos.: NPF-68 and'NPF-81 t
Facility Name:
Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
August 25.- September 28, 1990 t
[-oC s o/26/ % ~
Inspectors:
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B. R.-Bonser, Senibr' Resident Inspector Date Sitfned-S i b.a I%
fo[tC/90-
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.Aiello,iResi4ent Inspector Datd Sit 3ned R.,F.
, Y_ E $l N s jar-
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R.
D. Sta(key, Reagdent Inspector.
Date Sit ned -
J Accompanied By:
P. A. Balmain,. Resident Inspector M.
S. Hunt,-Regional Inspector.
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MO 4/M!90 -
^pproved By:
K/E. Br66kman', Section Chief Date' Signed y
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY Scope:
This routine. resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations;Lsurveillance, observation;
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maintenance observation; refueling' operations;-review of
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licensee event reports and~ followup on previous inspection findings.-
Results:
One violation was' identified-for an inadequate ~ diesel.-'
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generator procedure (paragraph 3b).
Two non-cited violations (NCV) were Tidentified:
Violation of Technical Specifications regarding
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. containment Spray'(paragraph'2d)
Failure to log; entry into a TS action statement
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(paragraph 2e) '
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A weakness was identified in the area of' operator L
awareness and knowledge of operating status
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-(paracraphs 2d, 2e, and 3b).
9011090051 901025 PDR A00CK 09000424
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DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J.. Cash, Operations; Superintendent
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Chestaut, Manager Technical Support t
- G.
Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear-Plant i,
C. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent
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Greene, Assistant General' Manager Plant Support-H. Handfinger, Manager 1 Maintenance
- K. Holmes, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness
- M.
Horton, Manager Engineering Support
- W.. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations-
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- R.
LeGrand, Manager Health Physics and' Chemistry'
- G.
McCarley, Independent Safety: Engineering' Group Supervisor
- R.
Odom, Nuclear Safety-and Compliance Supervisor-
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Swartzwelder, Manager Operations other licensee employees contactedLincluded-technicians, supervisors, engineers, operators,~ maintenance. personnel,:
quality control. irispectors, and office personnel.
- Attended Exit Interview An alphabetical list of acronyms and initialisms is located in the last paragraph of the inspection report.
2.
Plant' Operations - (71707)
The inspection staff: reviewed plant operations throughouti
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the reporting period to verify conformancn: with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications,- ar.d administrative controls.
Control logs, shift supervisors' logs', shift
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relirf records, LCO status logs, night' orders and standing l
e ordcrs, lifted. wires and jumper logs, and' clearance logs were routinely reviewed.. Discussions were conducted with.
riant operations, maintenance, chemistry,' health physics, engineering support and technicalLsupport personnel.
Daily plant status meetings were routinely: attended.
Activities within the control room were monitored during i
shifts and shift changes.
Actions observed.were conducted i
as required by the. licensee's procedures..
The complement of licensed personnel:on each shift met or. exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications.
Direct i
observations were' conducted of control room panels,
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instrumentation and recorder traces.important to safety.
and operating parameters were observed to verify they,were within Technical Specification limits.
The. inspectors
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l also-reviewed Deficiency, cards to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting. problems'and implementing. corrective actionse j
Plant tours wereitaken during the reporting period on a routine basis.- Tours included but were not limited to the t
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turbine building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, NSO4 towers,
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diesel buildings, AFW buildings and the' low voltage switchyard.
During plant = tours,-housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
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The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies / procedures were followed.
This included
observation of HP practices and review of area surveys,
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radiation work permits. postings, and instrument calibration..
The inspectors verified that the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable.of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages
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were checked' prior'to entry.into the PA; vehicles were properly authorized, searched, and escorted within the pA;
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i persons within the PA displayed photo identification.
badges; and personnel in vital areas were authorized.
b.
Unit 1 Summary Unit 1 operated in Mode 1>(Power Operations) at' full power throughout the reporting. period, c.
Unit 2 Summary Unit 2 began this inspection period-in Mode 1 at 58%
power.
On September 14, power was reduced, a manual-reactor trip was initiated and the unit entered its first refueling outage (2R1)..Cooldown-of the reactor coolant system continued and the unit entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown).and then Mode 5-(cold. Shutdown) on September 16.
Mode 6 (Refueling) entry occurred on September.20.-
Preparations for midloop operations were completed:on September 19, steam generators nozzle dam installation was completed on September 20 and midloop operations were terminated on September 21.
Reactor vessel head lift occurred on September 21'and the reactor vessel internals
were removed and stored on September 24.
Fuel movement began on September 26; at the close of this inspection-period approximately 118 of 193 assemblies had been removed and placed in the spent fuel poo.
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Containment Spray Removed from Service i
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On September 16, 1990,1with' Unit.2:in Mode;4, the. Shift
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Supervisor issued a' clearance to-remove;the train A and B-
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CS pumps from service for' maintenance. : The clearance, however, was intended to be issued 3n: Mode 5 when the CS
system TS no longer applied.
At-5$40:a.m.'.EDT clearance ~
i tags were hung on the actuation handswitches on the' main control board and the switches were.then.taken to their-
" Pull-to-Lock" position by the RO.: This. rendered bothL
trains of CS inoperable'and in violation ~of-TS 3'6.~2.1,
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Containment Spray System, and placed the unit inLTS'3.0.3.
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The SS recognized the error and the handswitchesLwere
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restored to the " Automatic" position at 5:47fa.m..EDT.
'l Both trains of CS had been11noperable'for seven minutes.
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Returning-the handswitches to;" Automatic"~ restored only.
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the train B CS pump, the train ADCS pump motor breaker was being racked out at the time.
Plant. Equipment Operators-A]
were' notified and the train A pump motor-breaker was racked in.
The train A-CS pump wasistarted toiverify j
proper breaker operation and the pump was declared
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operable at 7:02 a.m. EDT..
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This event was caused by'the SS issuing a Mode 5. clearance in Mode 4 and allowing bothLCS pumps to be removed.from service, and the RO failing to question the directions given by the SS before taking both CS pumps:to the
" Pull-to-Lock" positinS.
This appears to be' indicative of a weakness in the area of operator awareness and knowledge of operating status and is one'of three examples-i documented in this report.
This event is identified as non-cited' violation, NCV 50-424/90-20-02:
Personnel Error Leads To' Containment Spray System Inoperability.
This licensee identified i
violation is not being cited because criteria.in Section V.G.1 of.the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
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The licensee notified the NRC Operations Center of the event at 12:20 p.m., six hours and forty minutes after the event.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, this was a four
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i hour non-emergency reportable event.
The licensee was
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slow in reporting this event due to an initial mistake in interpreting the guidance provided in 10 CFR 50.72.
In a subsequent review of the guidelines,'the licensee classified this event.as reportable and reported it.
The classification of events has been a source of discussion and controversy with all levels of licensee management The resident inspectors will continue to monitor tLe licensee's classification of events and timeliness of reporting.
The licensee also plans to submit a LER on.
this event.
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Main Steam Safety Valve Testing e.
The inspector noted during a review of Unit 2 Shift Supervisor logs and Deficiency Cards for September 12, 1990, that entering and exiting TS action statements for Main Steam Safety Valves had not been logged as required by Vogtle operations procedure 10001-C, Logkeeping, and procedure 10008-C, Recording Limiting Conditions for Operations.
The licensee'as part of normal planned surveillance testing was performing procedure 28210-2,= Main Steamline
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Code Safety Valve Satpoint Verification.
As required by I
the surveillance procedure, personnel established communication with the control room.
Several of the safety valves failed to meet the acceptance criteria and were subsequently reset to the correct setpoint.
The inspector noted that when safety valves 2PSV-3001, 2PSV-3003 and 2PSV-3005 were tested and did not meet their Technical Specification setpoint range, entry into TS 3.7.1.1 action statement had not been logge(
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Investigation into this incident revealed that
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communications between the control room and the main steam i
valve room had been established and.the status of the safety valves being tested had been communicated to the control room; however operators did not recognize that a
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T9 a? tion statement had been entered Lnd failed:to log entry into the action statement.
As part of the test procedure, the safety valves were immediately adjusted in accordance with the procedure when they were found out of tolerance.
Based on the times given in the Deficiency Cards and interview of personnel none of the valves were inoperable for more than four hours from the time of discovery.
The licensee took immediate action to improve
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j communications and to log entries into the action
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statement.
The licensee also committed to enhance the Main Steamline Code Safety Valve Verification procedure-to
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ensure clearer communications between the control room and the main steam valve room duri.g future tests.
This is the second of three examples of a weakness in the area of operator awareness and knowledge of operating stotus.
Failure of the SS to be cognizant of plant status and log i
entry into a TS action statement is identified as a non-cited violation (NCV) 50-325/90-20-02: Failure to log Entry inta a TS Action Statement During Main Steamline
.Afety Valve Testing Resulting in a TS 6.7.la Violation.
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thl; 12C identified violation is not being cited ' bec'use criteria specified in Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.were satisfied.
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f.
Review of Medical Records On September 19, 1990, the inspector reviewed the licensee's medical files for NRC licensed operators to evaluate requirements concerning the medical condition of NRC licensed operators.
The focus of this inspection was to ensure that the licensee is exercising due care in the execution of its responsibilities in the care of licensed operator medical records maintenance.
Specifically, the.
inspector compared six medical records against the licensee's medical certification as documented on NRC Form 396, " Certification of Medical Examination by Facility Licensee" to determine what medical restrictions, if any, were associated with the individual licenses.
The inspector also verified that in two examples where restrictions were indicated on the medical certificate that those restrictions were stated on the license issued to the individual operator.
For those medical records examined, no deficiencies were identified.
g.
Mid-Loop Operations The inspector verified that prior to re:#;hing RCS mid-loop during 2R1 that certain pre-mid-loop activities were
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completed.
Specifically (1) The licensee demonstrated
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that the containment equipment hatch could be manually closed within 25 minutes as directed by procedure 12008-C,
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j Mid-loop Operations, Rev.
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The actual closure time was 21 minutes and 40 seconds.
Additionally, the equipment l
hatch was closed prior to reaching mid-loop and remained closed during mid-loop operations.
(2) Two independent i
incore thermocouples were operable.
(3) Three independent RCS level indications were operable.
(4) At least two additional means of adding inventory to the RCS were available in addition to the RHR systems.
(5) A j
pressurizer manway was removed thus providing a vent path i
to prevent over pressurization of the reactor vessel upper (
plenum.
i Two non-cited violations were identified.
3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to
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verify procedural and performance adequacy.
The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work.
The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that j
i approved procedures. *e available, equipment was i
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calibrated, prerequisites were met, tents were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.
Listed below are surveillances which were either reviewed or witnessed:
Surveillance No.
Title 13145-1, Rev. 24 Diesel Generators (1A)
14546-2, Rev. 3 TDFW Pump Operation Test 14802-2, Rev. 3 NSCW Pump And Discharge Check Valves IST - Pump 4 14810-2. Rev. 4 TDAFW Pump And Check Valve IST 14825-1, Rev. 15 Quarterly Train
14825-2, Rev. 5 Quarterly Inservice Valve Test Train
'A' Containment Spray TENG-90-29, Rev. O LOSP Test of 2B Sequencer Response Time b.
Diesel Generator 2B Sequencer Response Time Test on September 25, 1990, the licensee performed Temporary Engineering Procedure, T-ENG-90-29, LOSP Test of Sequencer Response Time.
The purpose of the procedure was to align the plant to respond properly-to the receipt of a
" Degraded Voltage" actuation (Loss of Offsite Power).
This test is normally done under the control of the ESFAS test procedure, however, test equipment problems did not allow running the test when the Train B Diesel Generator and Engineered Safety Features Actuation Test was performed.
The test involved inssrting a simulated undervoltage signal, shedding the B-train vital bus, starting of DG 2B, and reenergizing the bus with the 2B DG.
The end of the test involved securing the 2B DG in accordance with procedure 13145-2, Diesel Generators, and paralleling the normal power source back on to the 4160V q
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buss.
To secure the DG, the operator in the control room used l
section 4.4.2 of the procedure, Emergency Stopping Train A(B) Diesel Generator.
When the_ Emergency Stop Reset Pushbutton was depressed by the operator in the diesel building, the 2B DG unexpectedly restarted.
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This event occurred because the LOCA/LOSP actuation signal.
to the DG had not been reset prior-to depressing the
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Emergency Stop Reset Pushbutton.
This resulted from a
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procedure inadequacy in that a step which should have
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required resetting the LOSP signal by depressing the Reset From LOCA/LOSP pushbutton had been omitted from the
procedure; and the operator failed to recognize from the electrical board annunciator indications that the actuation signal was not cleared.
This is the third of three examples indicative of a weakness in the area of operator awareness and knowledge of operating status.
Procedure 13145-2, was inadequate in that it did not provide adequate instructions to shutdown the diesel and
resulted in an inadvertent diesel-generator start.-This is a violation of TS 6.7.la Procedures and Programs and is
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identified as violation 50-424,425/90-20-01:
Inadequate r
Diesel Generator Procedure Resulting In Violation of TS 6.7.la.
c.
As a follow-up to the March 20, 1990 event where the 1A Diesel Generator failed to respond as intended, and the
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subsequent IIT inspection which identified problems with
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the manner in which CALCON temperature switches were
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calibrated, a Region II inspector reviewed the revised-calibration procedures in effect at the site.
The preliminary results of this review indicated some concerns.
During review of the CALCON temperature rwitch problems,
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it was found early on that the switches were calibrated by
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use of a " generic" temperature switch calibration I
procedure.
This procedure was written for the testing of l
temperature switches used in electrical circuits and did not address calibration of pneumatic temperature switches.
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When problems with establishing setpoints and tolerances, as well as the identification of a high number of switch failures, was identified, the engineering department was asked to evaluate the problem and to provide clarification.
The vendor was contacted and instructions were developed; however, these instructions were only added to the MWos as attachments.
A combination of the generic procedure and the vendor.
instructions were used to calibrate the Unit 1 EDG jacket water temperature switches immediately prior to the March 20 event.
The 1A EDG jacket water temperature switches did not function as intended (on March 20, 1990) and were found to be out of calibration after the EDG failure was investigated.
As a result, the licensee entered into a detailed examination of the causes for these switch's malfunction.
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l The results of the subsequent testing revealed that the
basic reason for the temperature switch failure was improper calibration methodology.
These findings led to l
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the development of a detailed procedure for controlling
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the calibration activities.
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The failure of the temperature switches to perform as
intended is, in part, the result'of the inadequate calibration procedure which was used prior to March 20,
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1990.
This inadequate calibration procedure was included
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in the overall discussion of inadequate root cause analysis concerning the CALCON switches that occurred during the enforcement conference held at the Region II
offices on September 5, 1990.
Resolution of this issue
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will be documented in the NRC response to the potential enforcement action.
i One violation was identified.
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4.
Maintenance observation (62703)
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The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures,
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Technical Specifications, and appl.. cable industry codes and standards.
The inspectors also verified that redundant components were operable, administrative controls were followed, clearances were adequate, personnel were qualified, cerrect replacement parts were used, radiological controls were proper, fire protection was adequate, quality control hold points were adequate l
and observed, adequate post-maintenance testing was
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performed, and independent verification requirements were implemented.
The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to service.
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Outstanding work. requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance activitics:
MWO No.
Work Description-29002532 Unit 2 Terry Turbine (TDAFW) Vibration
Monitor Will Not Reset b.
Calcon Vibration Switches On September 21, 1990, three out of four Calcon, Model E4600A, vibration switches located on the 2B diesel generator failed to function when tested during planned t
maintenance.
These vibration switches provide a
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protective trip function only during non-emergency operation and will not shut down the diesel during
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accident conditions.
The licensee has initially determined that the vibration switch failures resulted
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from blockage in the pneumatic portion of the vibration switch.
One additional vibration switch obtained from the
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nuclear operations warehouse was also found to be defective.
The licensee is continuing to evaluate these
failures.
Failure of Calcon switches has been a recurring
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problem with the diesel generator's protective trip system.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Plant Procedures (42700) (Units 1 and 2)
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This inspection consisted of a procedural review to verify that administrative controls were se.ablished and implemented to control safety related operat one.
Procedures were selected-and reviewed for technical as.quacy and incorporation of requirements as appropriate for the proper operation of a nuclear facility.
This inspection was further supplemented by an EOP inspection team that was on site from May 7-18, 1990.
The results of the EOP inspection were documented in inspection report 50-424/90-08 and 50-425/90-08.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Unit 2 Refueling Activities (60710)
Inspectors observed portions of core offload activities and verified that these activities were performed in a controlled manner and in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspectors observed the removal of several fuel assemblies from the reactor vessel and their placement into the fuel transfer system.
These evolutions were performed according to portions of procedure 93270-C, Rev. 8, SIGMA Refueling Machine operations Instructions and 93641-C, Rev. 1, Development and Implementation of the-Fuel Shuffle Sequence Plan.
The licensee experienced problems involving automatic operation of the SIGMA refueling machine prior to fuel movement, and appropriately revised procedure 93270-C to include manual performance of several steps.
The liccasee performed a 10 CFR 50.59 i
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evaluation and concluded that this manual method of operation would not have an adverse impact on safety.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Review of Licensee Reports (90712)(92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.
Based on this review, the following Leks are closedt
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a.
50-424/88-29, Rev.
O, " Computer Memory Loss Leads To Fuel Bundle Handling Incident."
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The licensee han made changes to the SIGMA refueling machines which provides a precise Z-axis position indication.
This indication will enable the operators to accurately determine, by manual means, the position of the refueling mast in the vertical plane.
Procedure 93500-C, Manual Operation Of Fuel Handling Equipment, Rev.
1, now includes a step which refers to the new manual Z-axis indication as one means of determining vertical position.
b.
50-424/88-35, Rev.
O, " Control Room Isolation Occurs During Surveillance Testing."
To preclude recurrence of this type of isolation, the licensee increased the fast overload (ZIP) setpoint on the affected inverters.
The setpoint increase prevents a current inrush from shutting down the inverter and interrupting power to the distribution panel that supplies the sequencer and the radiation monitor, c.
50-424/88-36, Rev.
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" Improper Cable Splice Leads To Operation outside TS Requirements."
Plant rarsonnel corrected the discrepancy by properly completing the splice connection.
The licensee determined that a 100% inspection of all cable terminations reworked by the specific Construction Change Control Package was required to ensure that the error was not repeated.
The inspection of the last splice was completed on March 2, 1990.
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50-424/89-18, Rev.
O, " Reactor Trip Following Spurious
Closure Of MSIV Due To Fuse Failure."
l The grounding problems in the 125 VDC distribution panel were corrected and the fuse in the MSIV control logic power supply was replaced.
One. limit switch was-found to have internal corrosion, arcing indications, and frayed conductors and was replaced.
The MSIV limit switches were
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l modified with the addition of a conduit seal to prevent i
possible water intrusion through the conduit.
The i
detector for source range channel 1 NI-31 was replaced and
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the channel recalibrated.
The MSR steam supply isolation
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valve common pressure switch was reworked and recalibrated.
The licensee determined that the failure of i
1NAA to fast transfer was apparently due to the increased i
closure time of the early-b contacts in the bus transfer t
scheme.
Adjustments were made to.the contact operating linkage to correct the problem.
Finally, to address the start failure of the non-safety related chiller, two
Cutler-Hammer type M control releys were added to the control panels by a DCP to facilitate the automatic reset function.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Followup On Previous Inspections Findings (92701,92702)
a.
(Open) NRC Bulletin No. 88-08:
Thermal Stresses In Piping
Connected To Reactor Coolant Systems.
On January 11, 1990, the NRR Project Manager for Vogtle in a letter to GPC requested additional information in order to complete the review of Vogtle's response to Bulletin 88-08.
That additional information was provided to NRC in
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correspondence dated September 7, 1990.
This item will be closed upon completion of the review by NRR.
b.
(Closed) NRC Bulletin No 88-05:
Nonconforming Materials l
Supplied By Piping Supplies, Inc. at Folsom, New Jersey and West Jersey Manufacturing Company at Williamstown, New Jersey.
On February 8, 1989, a letter from NRR to GPC stated that i
Vogtle had provided an acceptable response to NRC Bulletin 88-05.
The Safety Evaluation Report, which was an i
enclosure to that letter, stated that NRC found that GPC was responsive to the action and reporting requirements of J
Bulletin 88-05 and that GPC has qualified all nonconforming parts as being suitable for their intended service.
The NRC concluded that the identification program and the results of the tests and. analytical procedures used by GPC to qualify the nonconforming parts provided an adequate basis for resolving concerns expressed in Bulletin 88-05 with respect to demonstrating adequacy for service.
9.
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 28, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the area inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
No dissenting comments
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were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify
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as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
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the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number Description and Reference VIO 50-424,425/90-20-01 Inadequate Diesel Generator Procedure
Resulting In Violation Of TS 6.7.la (paragraph 3b).
NCV 50-425/90-20-02 Personnel Error Leads To Containment Spray Inoperability Resulting In TS
3.6.2.1 Violation (paragraph 2d).
NCV 50-425/90-29-03 Failure to Log Entry Into A TS Action Statement - Violation Of TS 6.7.la Procedure And Programs (paragraph 2e).
10.
Acronyms And Initialisms AC Alternating Current AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System CFR Code of Federal Regulations CS Containment Spray System
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DCP Design Change Package DG Diesel Generator EDT Eastern Daylight Time EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
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EOF Emergency Operations Facility EOP Emergency Operating Procedures ESFAS Engineering Safety Features Actuation System GPC Georgia Power Company HP Health Physics ISI Inservice Inspection LCO Limiting Conditions for Operations LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LOSP Loss of Offsite Power MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSR Moisture Separator Reheater MWO Maintenance Work Order NCV Non-cited Violation NI Nuclear Instrument NPF Nuclear Power Facility NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSCW Nuclear Service Cooling Water System i
PSV Pressurizer Safety Valve RCS Reactor Coolant System j
Rev Revision
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RHR Residual Heat Removal System
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RO Reactor Operator i
SG Steam Generator SS Shift Supervisor.
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TS Technical Specification
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VIO Violation 2R1 Unit 2 - 1st Refueling Outage
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