IR 05000424/1987014

Insp Repts 50-424/87-14 & 50-425/87-10 on 870209-13. Violations Noted:Failure to Assure Adequate Protection of Vital Equipment,Follow Procedures for Control Welding Activities & Accomplish Adequate Corrective Actions

ML20209F383
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/23/1987
From:	Blake J, Hallstom G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209F071	List: IR 05000424/1987014 ML20209F063 ML20209F146
References
50-424-87-14, 50-425-87-10, NUDOCS 8704300272
Download: ML20209F383 (9)

Text

UNITED STATES

,! psp E8%g'o,

,

NUCLEAR RE2ULATORY COM:'lSSION

& o REGION il 7 g 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W SUITE 2900

1. 8 o ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

%...../

Report Hos.: 50-424/87-14 and 50-425/87-10 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-61 and CPPR-109 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conduc d:,

February 9-13, 1987 Inspector: st S,fA 3-/S-87 G. A. Ha Estrom~ Date Signed

? ,

'

Approve b Am% t 3 23-d'7 c4 J. J. Blake' . Section Chief Date Signed

- Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site in the areas of an electrical quality concern (Unit 1), housekeeping (Units 1 & 2),

materials control (Units 1 & 2), welding activities associated with safety-related Class 1E electrical supports (Unit 2), and licensee identified items (50.55(e)).

Results: Three violations were identified; Failure to Assure Adequate Protection of Vital Equipment (Unit 1 only) paragraph 5; Failure to Follow Procedures for Control Welding Activit'es (Unit 2 only), paragraph 7b; and Failure to Accomplish Adequate Corrective Actions (Unit 2 only), paragraph 7 DR ADOCK 0500

__

.

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• H. Pinson, Vice President, Construction

• Bockhold, General Manager, Vogtle Nuclear Operations

• W. Hayes, Project Quality Assurance (QA) Manager

• D. Groover, QA Site Manager, Construction

• E. Belflower, QA Site Manager, Operations

• G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator D. M. Fiquett, Unit II Field Construction Manager

• E. M. Dannemiller, II, Technical Assistant to General Manager of Operations

• G. R. Frederick, QA Engineering Support Supervisor, Operations

• C. Gabberd, Senior Regulatory Specialist, Operations R. Perry, Compliance Engineer, Construction R. Hollands, Electrical Discipline Coordinator, Construction R. R. Snell, Second Shift Superintendent, Construction W. R. Davis, Electrical Engineer, Construction -

G. Classcock, Electrical Engineering Supervisor, Construction I. Galbreath, Welding Engineer, Construction E. L. Coleman, Project Welding Supervisor, Construction J. E. Gunter, QC Inspector, Construction

• J. R. Ross, QC Inspector Supervisor, Construction Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, mechanics, and office personne Other Organizations D. P. Niehoff, Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC), Deputy Engineering Group Supervisor (EGS) - Civil / Structural

• T. Sweeney, BPC Electrical Engineer J. M. Jacops, BPC Engineering Group Leader (EGL) -Electrical

• R. Vote, BPC QA Engineer D. Sewell, BPC EGS - Mechanical J. T. Mamon, BPC EGL - Plant Design P. D. Patel, BPC Senior Engineer - Plant Design S. K. Thomas, BPC EGL - Civil / Structural R. Valdez, BPC QA Engineer S. T. Cloyd, Vogtle Structural Analysis Mobile Unit (V-SAMU), Senior Engineer J. R. Blount, Cleveland Electric Company (CEC), Project Manager W. H. Fish, CEC, Assistant Project Manager l

.. _ _ _ _ . ._

.

R. B. Duncan, CEC, Labor Manager H. L. Miller, CEC, Welding Coordinator R. V. O'Keefe, CEC, Craft Instructor B. Jones, CEC, Raceway Engineer J. Lake, CEC, Second Shift Superintendent S. R. Leaf, CEC, Construction Engineer NRC Resident Inspectors

• H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector (Construction)

• J. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector (Operations)

• R. Schepens, Resident Inspector (Operations)

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 13, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the license The inspector noted that corrective actions in response to the findings had begun prior to the end of this inspectio Violation 424/87-14-01, Failure to Assure Adequate Protection of Vital Equipment (Unit 1 only), paragraph Inspector Followup Item 425/87-10-01, Revision of Bechtel Specification X3AR01 Section E8 - Raceway Systems (Unit 2 only), paragraph Violation 425/87-10-02, Failure to Follow Procedures for Control of Welding Activities (Unit 2 only), paragraph Violation 425/87-10-03, Failure to Accomplish Adequate Corrective Action (Unit 2 only), paragraph The licensee did identify as proprietary some of the materials provided to and reviewed by the inspector during this inspection; however, details from those materials are not included in this repor . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters Licensee Actions on previous enforcement matters within the scope of this inspection were not complet . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio _ _ - . . .

-- _ _ _ - .._ _ . .. ... ..

.

3 Independent Inspection Effort Housekeeping (548348), Material Identification and Control (42902B), and Material Control (429408).

The inspector conducted a general inspection on Unit 2 containment, the control building and the reactor auxiliary building.to observe activities such as housekeeping, material identification and control; material control, and storage. . This general inspection was expanded to include housekeeping observations during the inspector's examination of an electrical quality concern for Unit 1 as reported in paragraph 6 belo During the above examination, the inspector noted apparently abandoned tools and construction debris lying on top of Calvert Buss and steel 1 beams near tne roof of Room RA 48 (Unit 1) in the Control building. The inspector further noted that the items were located above vital equipment (neutron detection instrumentation and 4160 volt switchgear) and were of

size or type (24 inch C-clamp,10 ft. length of P1001 unistrut,1 1/2 ft.

length'of large conduit, aerosol cans) which could fall and cause damage to vital equipment during the life of the plant. The inspector further

' noted that several licensee inspections of Room RA 48 had occurred prior

. - to and during turnover, which should have identified the housecleaning i discrepancies. The inspector informed cognizant licensee personnel that-

'

this matter was considered a lack of conformance to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XIII, and would be identified as Violation 424/86-14-01, Failure to Assure Adequate Protection of Vital Equipment.

, Electrical Quality Concern (Unit 1)

During the examination of electrical supports reported in paragraph 7, the inspector was informed of quality concerns by an electrical craftsman

associated with the suspected use of galvanized sheetmetal covers (non-environmentally qualified) for Calvert Buss Raceways in Room RA 48 and RA 50 of the Control Building. The inspector was aware of approved field change request E-FCRB-19078 which allowed substitution of sheetmetal covers for instrumentation raceways not required to meet RG 1.75 Separa-tion Requirements. Cognizant licensee personnel informed the inspector

' that E-FCRB-19078 did not apply to Calvert Buss aluminum raceway which is designed to route 4160 volt power cables and conforms to specific environ-

'

mental qualification requirements. The vendor supplied aluminum covers are required to maintain environmental qualifications for Calvert Buss

Racewa The inspector noted that the craftsman's concern could be the result of misunderstanding of requirements of E-FCRB-17591 which required i that any sheet-metal used as an additional fire preventing barrier on Calvert Buss be attached to the Buss (Raceway) and could not replace the vendor supplied cover. After additional discussion, the inspector completed a field examination of Calvert Buss Raceway in Rooms RA 48 and

. RA 50 of the control building to assure that requirements had been met.

.

i

, _ - , - - _ _ _ . . _ , . _ _ _ _ _ , . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ ,,,,,,m., ,,,..,,-._, . _ ___ ,,__,y , _ . , _ . _ . . . , _ _ , . _ .

~

.

Af ter completing the inspection, the inspector informed cognizant licensee personnel that the quality concern regarding Calvert Buss was not substan-tf ated but that discrepancies regarding housekeeping had been identified as reported in paragraph . Safety-Related Structures (Unit 2)(55100)

The inspector examined welding work activities for Seismic IE Electrical Supports as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure requirements were being met. The applicable codes are the AWS D1.1 Structural Welding Code - 1975 Revision and the AWS D1.3, Structural Welding Code -Sheet Steel - 1981 Revision, Welding Procedure Specifications and Quality Assurance Procedures (1) Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS) applicable to the weld joints listed in paragraph 7.b(1) were selected for review and comparison with the applicable code as follows:

WPS Process PQR 129, Rev. 6 SMAW* Prequalified 140, Rev. 8 SMAW 140-1 thru 140-42 129-1 thru 129-3 134, Rev. 6 SMAW 134-1 thru 134-18 142, Rev. 5 SMAW 142-2, -3, -5, -6-8, -9, -12 thru - 18

• SMAW - Shielded metal arc weldin The above WPSs and their supporting Procedure Qualification Records (PQRs) were reviewed to ascertain whether essential, supplementary and/or nonessential variables, including thermal treatment, were consistent with Code requirements; whether the WPSs were properly qualified and their supporting PQRs were accurate and retrievable; whether all mechanical tests had been performed and the results met the minimum requirements; whether the PQRs had been reviewed and certified by appropriate personnel; and whether any revisions and/or changes to non-essential variables were note (2) The below listed documents were reviewed to ascertain whether adequate plans and procedures had been established to assure that welding would be controlled and accomplished consistent with commitments and regulatory requirement .

wr - --

-4 m ,,- - - ~ ,

- . . . _ .__ . _ _

l

. 1

.

l

5 Document N Title

'

GWS-ST-1, Rev. 6 General Welding Standard

DC-A-01, Rev. 15 Drawing Control DT-E-01, Rev. 12 Electrical Documentation

,

X3AR01, Rev. 32 Electrical Construction Specification-Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant linits 1 and 2

, GD-T-17, Rev. 5 Housekeeping GD-T-13, Rev. 5 General Welding Control

,

During the above review, the inspector noted that over 30 FCRs/DCNs were outstanding for Section E8, Rev. 23 of X3AR0 Therefore, this upper-tier BPC Specification did not conform to BPC PRM Requirements for revision of specifications / drawing Cognizant licensee personnel provided a copy of Corrective

!

Action Request (CAR) No. VS-87-209, dated January 9,1987, for the inspector's revie CAP, No. VS-87-209 identified the problems with incorporation of construction specification change notices with several BPC Construction Specifications, including X3AR01, Section E8. Corrective actions required revision .to incorporate overdue construction specification change notices;

,

i.e., outstanding FCRs/DCNs, but full compliance was not

,

anticipated until February 27, 198 The inspector concluded that further review of Revision 24 of X3AR01-Section E8 was necessary and informed cognizant licensee

'

personnel that this item will be identified as Inspector Followup Item 425/87-10-01, Revision of Bechtel Specification

>

X3AR01, Section E8-Raceway System Production Welding The inspector observed in-process welding activities of seismic 1E support field welds inside the Control Building as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure requirements were

,

i being me The below listed welds were examined in-process to verify proper

,

welder identification and location, welding porcedures, WPS assign-ment, welding technique and sequence, materials identity, weld geometry, fit-up, temporary attachments, gas purging, preheat, i

!

-. . . _ _ _ . - . . _ - _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . , . , . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ , _ , _ , . . . , , . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . , , _ . . _ _ _ _ , _ . _ , . _ _ . . . _ ,

i

-

.

electrical characteristics, shielding gas, welding equipment condi-tion, interpass temperature, interpass cleaning, process control systems, qualifications of inspection personnel, and weld history record Drawing N Weld Status AX2D66N013 R/15- 6"x6"x7'9" Final Pass Detail 9-Type 3 TS to Beam Flange (Hanger No. 28-elev. 216')

V-FCRB-102 to Dw /8" Q A 36 Stud Final Pass AX2D11R003 R/3 to 5"x12"x3/4" plate (welded 360 degrees as a full penetration groove) (12 assemblies welded)

E-FCRB-4602F to Dw /2"x3 1/2"x34 Second Pass AX2D11N160 TS to 4"x4"x3/8" E-FCRB-4601 F to Dw plate (2 welds)

AX2011N162 (Support No. 454-Type 272)

4"x4"x11" TS Fit-up/ tack to 4"x4"x3/8" First Pass plate (Detail 16)

E-FCRB-3084F to Dw /2"x3 1/2"x Fit-up/ tack AX2011N201 R/1 33 1/4" TS to First Pass 3 1/2"x3 1/2" x 15 1/4 TS (2 welds) (Detail 3)

AX2D11N163-Type 21 2"x8"x28" TS Second Pass AX2066N001-Detail 8 to Embed During the above inspection, the inspector noted both red and blue marked grinding wheels being used on carbon steel welds by electrical craftsme The electrical craftsmen involved, indicated that the grinding wheels had been issued by the Vogtle Craft toolroom which is manned by Walsh employees and issues tools to all subconstractor Further, that they had requested grinders for work on carbon steel and the wheels had been attached. During a followup examination of the toolroom the inspector noted that:

_ _ ._ _ _ . __ . _ _ .

L

'

.

grinding wheels are returned with the grinders at end of shif *

grinders are stored in the same bin without regard to wheel colo *

toolroom employees had no written instructions regarding special colors for stainless steel.

positive information regarding previous use of grinding rocks on stainless steel versus carbon steel was unavailabl differences existed between craftsmen, supervision and tool room employees' understanding as to which color was for stain-less steel onl The inspector informed cognizant licensee personnel that this matter was considered a lack of conformance to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and would .be identified as Violation 425/87-10-02, Failure to Follow Procedures for Control of Welding Activitie During the above inspection, the inspector _also noted the use of pink uncontrolled "for information" documents for completion of wor The copy of V-FCRB-102 in use at the work site was reproduced on pink paper and clearly stamped "For Information-- Not for Con-struction Purposes." V-FCRB-102 was issued for both Units 1 and 2 on March 19, 1984. Cognizant licensee personnel were able to provide the control copy of V-FCR8-102 after a thorough search but the craftsmen involved were uninformed as to the location of, or any revisions to, the control copy. Cognizant licensee personnel provided

_ a copy of recent procedure awareness information (PAC No.12-86-2

.

issued December 9,1986) which had been provided to all supervision l and craftsmen due to the use of pink uncontrolled documents for

,

construction purposes, i.e., a lack of conformance to DC-A-01,

-

Revision 15, and DT-E-01, Revision 12. Followup discussions with the craftsmen and supervision involved indicated a lack of understanding /

j agreement as to the requirements involved. The inspector informed

cognizant licensee personnel that this matter was considered a lack

of conformance to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and would be i identified as Violation 425/87-10-03, Failure to Accomplish Adequate Correction Action.

! Licensee Identified Items (92700)

(Closed) Item 424, 425/CDR 84-63, Nuclear Service Cooling Water Supply

'

i and Return Piping.

r On May 3,1984, the licensee notified Region II of a 50.55(e) item

'

involving differential settlement of the Nuclear Service Cooling Water

,

(NSCW) towers and nearby valve house The initial piping system stress l

l

- . - --- - - - ..- - - . - - -

_

"

.

calculations had incorrectly assumed that the cooling tower and valve house for each train (Trains A and B) were on a common base mat, there-fore no differential seismic anchor motion or structural settlement was include Settlement differences could result in an overstressed condition of the piping involve The final report was submitted to Region II on September 13, 1984. During review of the final report, the inspector noted need for clarification regarding corrective actions involved. Cognizant licensee personnel indicated that completed corrective actions as of September 13, 1984, included update of the piping stress analyses for both units to include seismic anchor motion and building settlement. The subsequent use of updated stress analyses for any support redesign (load verification program) was complete for Unit 1 and would be completed prior to fuel load for Unit 2. (This information was later formally transmitted to Region II -letter dated February 18, 1987, log GN-1347.)

The inspector reviewed a random sample of stress analysis calculations for both units which included seismic anchor motion and building settlement loads. The inspector also reviewed a random sample of support redesign calculations to accommodate the additional loadings. The inspector concluded that corrective actions as identified in the final report and clarified by GN-1347 had been completed. This item is considered closed for Unit 1 due to comp'ietion of all corrective actions. This item is considered closed for Unit 2 due to programmatic controls to assure completion of all corrective actions prior to fuel loa l

1 (