IR 05000424/1987041
| ML20237K615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1987 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237K603 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-41, 50-425-87-29, NUDOCS 8708270231 | |
| Download: ML20237K615 (11) | |
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pea Giopg'o-UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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REGION H n
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,j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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'e-ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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/106 1 4 1987
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Report Nos.: 50-424/87-41 and 50-425/87-29 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and CPPR-109 Facility Name:
Vogtle l'and 2 Inspection Conduc
Ty 27-29,~ 19
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Inspector:
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A. L."Cunningh Da'te 5t'gned
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Accompanying Personnel:
J. M. Will, Jr.
A. Gooden J. L. Kreh J.
Menning
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Approved by: \\
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T. R. Decker, Section Chief Ddte Signed l
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards'
SUMMARY Scope:. This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the annual radiological' emergency preparedness exercise..
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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8708270231 870814 gDR ADOCM 05000424 PDR
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REPORT DETAILS j
1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
- J. P. O'Reilly - Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- E. M. Howard - Manager, Nuclear Training and Emergency Preparedness
- G. Bockhold, General Manager, Vogtle Nuclear Operations
- T. Greene, Plant Manager
- P. R. Bemis, Plant Support Manager
- L. A. Hill, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager
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- J. N. Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
- P. Rushton, Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
- W. F. Kitchens, Operations Manager
- D. F. Hallman, Chemistry Superintendent
- S. Ewald, Manager, Health Physics and Chemistry
- R. D. Mothena, Hatch Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager, Operations.
- I. A. Kochery, Health Physics Supervisor
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 29, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas evaluated and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this exercise.
4.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasions.
While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
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- The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario also provided sufficient-information.to the State, counties, and local government agencies consistent'with their participation in the exercise.
The licensee made 'a significant commitment -to training and personnel through the use of. evaluators, and specialists participating' in the
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exercise.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the
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exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Drill Scenarios (82301)
The scenarios for the medical emergency and fire drills were reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test specific functions in the
licensee's emergency plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph-IV.F j
of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
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The scenario developed for the medical emergency drill was explicit,.
and adequately exercised the participating licensee organization and
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offsite local emergency agencies.
The scenario provided sufficient information to the local support agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the drill.
The licensee and offsite support agencies demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel by use of controllers,
evaluators, and specialists participating in the drill.
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controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the drill. Neither:
prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players was observed.
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The scenario developed for the fire. drill was also explicit, and adequately exercised the participating licensee organization.
The scenario provided sufficient information to the offsite support organizations consistent with the scope of their participation in the drill.
Licensee organizations demonstrated a significant commitment to j
training and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and
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specialists participating in the drill.
The controllers provided I
adequate guidance throughout the drill.
Neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players was observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not requi red.
Discussions with licensee representatives and detaihtd review of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a suffic hint numbe r of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). At the above cited response centers, the required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licentee's Radiological Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654 namely:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response;
- (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizations' interaction.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of on shift personnel.
The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the dutier of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emecgency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Manager.
Required interaction between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant i
to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and guidance promulated in Section II.C of NUREG 0654, Revision 1 namely:
(1) accommodation of selected Stated emergency response representatives at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; and (2) identification of organizations capable of augmenting the planned response.
Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt, effective and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
Assistance resources from offsite support organizations was limited to ambulance services, and hospital facilities.
Response of the subject organizations was prompt,
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efficient and indicative of effective emergency response training.
The scope and objectives of the exercise precluded required support of offsite fire brigades.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action ' level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D. of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in IE Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and
properly classify an emergency and escalate it to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed.
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actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was i
effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
The system was observed to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequences.
The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency.
A delay of approximately 15 minutes in declaration of the General Emergency was observed and documented by licensee controllers, observers,
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and NRC evaluators during the exercise. This finding was also identified, documented, and fully discussed during the licensee's controller / observer q
critique conducted following termination of the exercise.
Several causes of the subject delay were considered, namely:
p(ostulated1) controller error or failure to inform the plant equipment operator of steam valve leak; (2) momentary failure of simulator within the delay time i
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regime ~, and/or the corresponding loss of synchronization between ERF and (3) conflicting-(information given by controller simulator computers; and 4) general confusion attending regarding steam valve leakage; momentary loss of simulator.
The licensee committed to critically review this finding and implement necessary corrective actions-indicated.
The licensee was informed that the subject findings would be reviewed during subsequent exercises to verify that adequate corrective actions have been -
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implemented to preclude delay in declaration of emergency classifications.
It should be~ noted=that delay in declaration of the subject classification did not indicate the licensee's unawareness of EALs or cognizance of their emergency classification matrix.
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/87-41-01, 50-425/87-29-01:
Delay in Declaration of General Emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations. and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations -were established.
This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.. Notification of the States of Georgia and South Carolina, i
and designated local offsite organizations was completed within 15 minutes
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following declaration of each emergency classification.
Telephone notification of the States of Georgia and South Carolina, and local response organizations was promptly followed by transmission of hard copies of the respective notification.
Such copies included prevailing meteorological information, average release rate (source terms in uCi/sec)
where applicable, site boundary integrated dose projections, and recoinmended protective actions when necessary.
Consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise, the prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ was not actuated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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i 11. EmergencyCommunications/82301)
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This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt j
communications among principal response organizations and emergency i
personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of
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NUREG-0654 The inspector observed communications within and between the licensre's I
emergency response facilities, the licensee and offsite agencies, ant the i
offsite environmental monitoring teams and the E0F.
The inspectors also
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observed information flow among the various groups within the licenste's emergency organization.
Emergency communications were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that aedquate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
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The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.
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Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room (CR), OSC, TSC, and the E0F.
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Control Room - Use of Unit 1 Control Room was supplemented by the near-site reactor simulator throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the accident sequence, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties.
Effective manageinent of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classificatio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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It was observed that data and information provided during the course of the exercise sequence and conditions were effectively managed by the Emergency Director and the Control Room staff in implementing appropriate actions in a timely manner.
The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions.
It was noted
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that a bound log of the facility Emergency Coordinator's activities I
was maintained during the exercise.
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It was also observed that failure or momentary loss of use of the simulator occurred several times during the exercise. Such failures appeared to have no adverse impact on the exercise.
It was noted,
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however, that one such failure may have been a factor in delay of the General Emergency declaration discussed in Paragraph 9, above.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification, The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities.
Required operations at the facility proceeded in an orderly manner.
The facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff.
TSC security was promptly established and maintained.
Security maintained a log or otherwise accounted for all personnel entering i
and exiting the facility.
During operation of the TSC, radiological habitability war routinely monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was available as j
required.
Status boards and related visual aids were strategically located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staff.
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communicators were assigned to the facility, and all required notifications were promptly implemented.
Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, namely:
(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into problem solving exercises; (2)assum firm; (3)ption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the TSC to E0F was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent and consistent with changes in plant status and related emergency conditions; and
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(5) accountability, including identifying missing personnel, was j
readily implemented within the accepted time regime and was consistent with the scenario scope.
Failures of the simulator discussed above were noted and documented, c.
Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was promptly staffed following activation of the emergency plan by the Emergency Coordinator.
An inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and dispatched.
A health physics technician accompanied each team.
The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant
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During operation of this facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented.
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) '- The EOF is located in the.
training center, approximately two miles.from the plant site.
The facility' was adequately staffed and equipped to support the required emergency response consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
E0F security was promptly established and was included as a routine j
requirement for preparation and activation of the facility.
Status boards and other related visual aids were strategically located and readily accessible for viewing by the EOF. staff.
Dedicated
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communicators were assigned to the facility, and all required
notifications were promptly made.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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13. AccidentAssessment(82301)
i This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems and l
equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
. specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.
j The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
During the exercise, the
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engineering accident assessment teams functioned effectively in analyzing-plant status to provide recommendations to the Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, prevention of releases of radioactive materials, and termination of the emergency condition.
Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant group was effective in estimating the radiological impact within the plant based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements.
Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.
Radiological effluent data was received in the E0F.
The' E0F dose calculations were computed and compared on a timely basis with results received from the TSC and offsite monitoring groups.
Consistent with the
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scope of the exercise, the States of Georgia and South Carolina did not
participate in this phase of the exercise.
Additionally, licensee rad:ological field monitoring and surveillance teams were not included in the NRC Evaluation.
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Protective Response (82301)-
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This' area _ was observed to determine that guidelines established for
. protective' actions consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and that protective actions for emergency workers -including evacuation of non-essential personnel, are promptly implemented pursuant
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to.~10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance. promulgated in Section II.J
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'of NUREG-0654.
The protective measures descisionmaking process was observed by the
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Recommendations implemented by the TSC 'and E0F staffs were :
timely, effective, and consistent with the above criteria.
Protective-measures recommendations were provided by the licensee to the States of Georgia and South Carolina, designated counties and ' local offsite organizations consistent with the scope of the exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Radiological Exposure Control _(82301)
j This' area was observed to determine 1that methods for controlling radiological 1 Lexposures < in an emergency were established and. implemented for' emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelinesi consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific guidance promulgated in Section'II.K. of NUREG-0654. '
An inspector noted that radiological exposures'were controlled throughout
.the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers end
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facilities.
Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories.of emergency actions.
Adequate protective clothing and ' respiratory.
protection was available.forLuse as required.
. Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation areas access appeared adequate.
Health Physics Supervisors were observed to thoroughly brief survey ' teams prior to their deployment.
Dosimetry was available and was used.
High range dosimeters were also.
available in case they were needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
16.
Recovery Planning (82301)
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), Paragraph IV.H of Appendix. E to 10 CFR 50, and the specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-0654.
Consistent with the scope of the exercise, the licensee conducted a
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recovery planning meeting prior to termination of the exercise. Licensee
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planners discussed and established the following:
administrative and logistical support, manpower and engineering services; radiological
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i surveillance; development and assignment of a recovery organization consistent witn the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. - A review of reentry plans and status was conducted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention of manag(ement and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b) 14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E of 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
A formal critique was held on July 29, 1987, with exercise controllers and observers, licensee management, and NRC representatives.
Findings identified during the exercise designated for licensee corrective action were discussed.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed
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during subsequent inspections.
The licensee's critique was detailed, and
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addressed both substantive findings and indicated improvement items. The conduct and content of the critique were consistent with regulatory
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i requirements and guidance cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Inspector Followup (92701)
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/86-29-01, 50-425/86-01:
Consistent prompting by emergency facility controller assigned to the offsite receiving hospital.
Observation of the current medical emergency drill disclosed neither prompting nor undue communications between controllers and participants.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/86-29-02, 50-425/86-02:
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Poor contamination control and health physics practices attending preliminary treatment of contaminated injured person. Observation of the j
in-plant phase of medical emergency drill disclosed adequate contamination i
control and general health physics practices attending preliminary
treatment of the injured person.
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