ML20056G849
| ML20056G849 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1993 |
| From: | Balmain P, Brian Bonser, Skinner P, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056G847 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-93-16, 50-425-93-16, NUDOCS 9309070236 | |
| Download: ML20056G849 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1993016
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
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Report Nos.: 50-424/93-16 and 50-425/93-16
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Licensee: Georgia Power Company
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P. O. Box 1295
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Birmingham, AL. 35201
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Docket Nos.: .50-424 and 50-425
License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
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Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted: June 27, 1993 - July 31, 1993
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Inspector:
3. R. 3g Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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. h R. 0" Star W esident Inspector
Date Signed
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p. A. Balm
Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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Approved by:
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P. Skinner, Chief'
Date Signed
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Reactor Projects Section 3B
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection entailed inspection in the following
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areas: plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, fire
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protection and follow-up of open items.
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Results:
One violation and one non-cited violation (NCV) were identified.
The violation involved the inappropriate storage of
flammable / combustible materials within a safety related area of
the plant. A locker was identified in the Auxiliary building
containing these materials in quantities exceeding those allowed
and in a mix that was recognized as unsafe, and without any
evaluation by fire protection personnel (paragraph Sb).
The NCV involved a failure to follow procedure. During
restoration of the Unit 1 D-train battery following a cell
replacement, an operator incorrectly restored a battery charger to
service prior to closing the battery breaker. This error in the
9309070236 930823
ADOCK 05000424
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equipment restoration sequence resulted in losing power to a vital
instrument panel which tripped all the bistables on channel IV of
the Solid State Protection System (paragraph 2f).
An Unresolved Item (URI) was opened to complete a review of the
causes of a Unit 1 reactor trip on July 28. The trip occurred on
pressurizer low pressure while technicians were valving in a
pressurizer pressure transmitter following its replacement
(paragraph 2e).
The inspectors found that the licensee's root cause determination
and evaluation of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) venting
deficiencies was effective in determining the cause of recurrent
gas accumulation while performing ECCS flowpath verification
surveillance tests (paragraph 3b).
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's use of a temporary reverse
osmosis system to process Unit 1 Recycle Holdup Tank waste water.
The system was of particular interest because it is similar to a
previous issue on the use of temporary radwaste processing systems
at Vogtle. The inspectors found that the licensee had adequately
addressed the concerns that may be associated with this system
(paragraph 2g).
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
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- J. Beasley, General Manager, Plant Vogtle
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S. Bradley, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
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W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support
- S. Chesnut, Manager Engineering Technical Support
- C. Christiansen, SAER Supervisor
C. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Dorman, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness
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G. Frederick, Manager Maintenance
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- W. Gabbard, Nuclear Specialist, Technical Support
M. Griffis, Manager Plant Modifications
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M. Hobbs, I&C Superintendent
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K. Holmes, Manager Operations
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- D. Huyck, Nuclear Security Manager
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- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
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- I. Kochery, Health Physics Superintendent
R. LeGrand, Manager Health Physics and Chemistry
G. McCarley, ISEG Supervisor
R.--Moye, Plant Engineering Supervf " r
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M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and C W
Supervisor
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C. Stinespring, Manager Administration
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- J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning
C. Tynan, Nuclear Procedures Supervisor
- J. Williams, Operations Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors,
engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors,
and office personnel.
Oglethorpe Power Company Representative
T. Mozingo
NRC Resident Inspectors
- B. Bonser
- D. Starkey
- P. Balmain
- Attended Exit Interview
An alphabetical list of abbreviations is located in the last paragraph
of the inspection report.
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Plant Operations - (71707)
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a.
General
The inspection staff reviewed plant operations throughout the
reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory
requirements, TSs, and administrative controls. Control logs,
shift supervisors' logs, shift relief records, LC0 status logs,
night orders, standing orders, and clearance logs were routinely
reviewed. Discussions were conducted with plant operations,
maintenance, chemistry, health physics, engineering support and
technical support personnel. Daily plant status meetings were
routinely attended.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts
and shift changes. Actions observed were conducted as required by
the . licensee's procedures. The- complement of licensed personnel
on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by TS. Direct
observations were conducted of control room panels,
instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety.
Operating parameters were verified to be within TS limits. The
inspectors also reviewed DCs to determine whether the licensee was
appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective
actions.
Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine
basis. They included, but were not limited to the turbine
building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms,
cable spreading rooms, NSCW towers, DG buildings, AFW buildings,
and the low voltage switchyard.
During plant tours, housekeeping, security, equipment status and
radiation control practices were observed.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics
policies / procedures were followed. This it.:1uded observation of
HP practices and review of area surveys, radiation work permits,
postings, and instrument calibration.
The inspectors verified that the security organization was
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properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing
their assigned functions.
Inspectors observed that persons and
packages were checked prior to entry into the PA; vehicles were
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properly authorized, searched, and escorted within the PA; persons
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within the PA displayed photo identification badges; and personnel
in vital areas were authorized.
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b.
Unit 1 Summary
The unit began the period operating at 100% peer and operated at
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' full power until July 28. On this date an automatic reactor trip
occurred because a low pressurizer pressure signal was generated
when maintenance technicians incorrectly valved in a pressurizer
pressure-transmitter. The unit returned to power operation on
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July 29. At the close of the inspection period the unit was
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operating at 80% power.
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Unit 2 Summary
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The unit began the period operating at full power. On June 28,
the unit was manually tripped due to decreasing SG 2 narrow range
level caused by SG 2 MFRV failing closed. The unit returned to
power operation on June 29, reached full power on June 30, and
remained at full power through tha end of the inspection period.
d.
Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip
On June 28, Unit 2 was manually tripped from full power (99%
power)'because of indications of loss of feedwater flow to SG 2,
and because narrow range level for SG 2 was at approximately 45%
(trip _setpoint) and decreasing. The event occurred due to MFRV 2
failing closed.
Follcwing the event all systems functioned
normally with the exception of source range nuclear instrument,
2NI-32, which did not indicate onscale when the source range
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instruments were energized.
The licensee's investigation of the MFRV failure determined that
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the valve closed due to a tracking / driver card failure in the 7300
process control system. The circuit board was replaced and the
MFRV was returned to service. The licensee initiated a failure
analysis of the defective card. A similar tracking / driver card
failed on September 14, 1992, resulting in the loss of speed
cont:ol to the Unit IA MFP causing pump speed to decrease to
minimum and the initiation of a manual trip due to decreasing SG
levels.
While the unit was shutdown the inspectors reviewed two recent NRC
generic issues with the licensee that could have required action
prior to startup. These issues concerned NRC GL 93-04:
Rod
Control System Failure and Withdrawal of Rod Control Cluster
Assemblies, and NRC Bulletin 93-02: Debris Plugging of ECCS
Suction Strainers. The inspectors verified that the licensee
completed actions 1, 2, and 4 of Westinghouse Nuclear Safety
Advisory Letter 93-007, which addressed the rod control system
concerns. The licensee had already completed the actions required
by Bulletin 93-02. A review of these actions was documented in
NRC IR 50-424,425/93-14.
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The-inspectors observed the reactor startup on June 29, and noted
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that there were no significant problems.
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Prior to the reactor startup, the inspectors reviewed results of
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NI-32 troubleshooting documented in MWO 29302223, which determined
that a pulse driver card had failed. The inspectors verified from
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the work description documentation that the card was replaced in
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accordance with procedure 22408-C, Circuit Board Removal and
Reinstallation. The inspectors noted no calibration or
adjustments were required for this card and procedure 24696-2, NIS
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Source Range Channel 2N32 Channel Calibration, sections 4.2.3 and
4.2.4 were performed to verify the NIs operation. Following the
reactor start up the inspectors observed that the licensee
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declared 2NI-32 inoperable again because it was indicating onscale
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at 30-40 cps with the source range instruments deenergized. The
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inspectors reviewed this problem with I&C supervision and the
maintenance manager and verified that the false indication was
unrelated to the pulse card failure and does not impact operation
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of the instrument when it is energized.
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e.
Unit 1 Reactor-Trip
At 11:50 pm on July 28, 1993, Vogtle Unit I tripped from 100%
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power on pressurizer low pressure. At 10:14 pm I&C technicians
entered the Unit I containment building to replace pressurizer
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pressure transmitter IPT-457. The transmitter was successfully
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replaced and calibrated without incident. However, while valving
in the transmitter to return it to service a reactor trip occurred
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on two out of four pressurizer low pressure logic.
Pressure
transmitter IPT-457 shares a common sensing line with pressurizer
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pressure transmitter IPT-458 and two pressurizer level
instruments. When IPT-457 was valved in it dropped pressure in
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the sensing line causing two of the four pressurizer pressure
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instruments to read low pressure. Although procedure 24527-1,
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Rev.13, Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel III IP-457 Analog
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Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration', contains
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cautions on valving in this instrument since the pressure in this
sensing loop can affect other pressure and level transmitters,
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there were indications that an error was made while valving in
IPT-457.
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All safety systems functioned as expected following the trip. A
problem occurred, however, on digital rod position indication.
Rod M-14 on control bank D indicated full- out on one DRPI channel
and full in on the other channel. There were no other indications
that the rod was stuck and the licensee promptly completed n
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shutdown margin calculation to verify a safe shutdown. Since
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there was a pre-existing DRPI problem on another control rod,
repairing the rod position indication was a start-up restraint.
Following repair of DRPI the plant commenced a reactor startup on
July 29 at 2:53 pm and was critical at 4:07 pm. The Unit was
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subsequently synchronized to the grid and power was increased. On
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the morning of July 30, with reactor power at about 50%, a QPTR
calculation identified that the measured QPTR exceeded the TS
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3.2.4 limit of 1.02.
This placed the Unit in the QPTR LC0 action
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statement. Reactor power was reduced to less than 50 percent to
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investigate the power tilt. This phenomenon was significant
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because it was unexpected and could not be explained. The
licensee suspected a xenon transient in the core caused the power
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tilt and anticipated that it would burn away with continued
operation. This was partially confirmed several hours later when
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the QPTR had lowered to less than 1.02.
Due to this core anomaly
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the licensee approached full power invoking the TS Special Test
Exceptions'normally reserved for core physics tests. The
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inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions to reach full power
with the special test exceptions invoked, and concluded that their
use was appropriate.
In this case, as with a core following a
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refueling, fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core
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and related instrumentation were measured. The licensee is
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continuing to investigate the cause of the power tilt.
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At the close of the inspection period the inspectors had not fully
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reviewed and assessed the cause of the trip.
Pending completion
of this review this issue is identified as an Unresolved Item
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(URI) 50-424/93-16-01: Review Causas of Pressurizer Low Pressure
f.
Inadvertent Tripping of Unit 1 SSPS Channel IV Bistables
On July 22, the licensee entered the 2-hour action statement of TS
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3.8.2.1, DC Sources, when float voltage on cell #26 of the D-train
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battery, IDDIB, was measured below the allowable voltage during
the routine weekly surveillance.
Prior to the cell replacement,
Operations personnel had deenergized one of the two battery
chargers which normally supply power to the 125 VDC switchgear
1D01, as required by procedure 13405-1, 125 VDC IE electrical
Distribution System. The battery breaker at IDDI was also opened
by Operations as directed by procedure 13405-1. Once the
defective battery cell was replaced, Operations attempted to
restore the deenergized battery charger and the battery to
service.
During the restoration process the operators incorrectly
reenergized the second D train battery charger (IDDICA) prior to
closing the battery breaker-to IDDI. This error in sequencing the
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equipment caused a voltage swing on the bus. This resulted in the
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redundant battery charger IDDICB tripping (charger IDDICA remained
on-line); a blown fuse in, and tripping of, inverter IDDlI4; and
the resultant loss of power to 120 VAC vital instrument panel
IDYlB, powered from the inverter. Numerous control room
annunciators were illuminated and all the Channel IV SSPS
bistables were tripped.
Panel IDY1B remained deenergized for 27
minutes until its alternate power supply, a regulated transformer,
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was energized. During the 27 minutes, Channel IV of SSPS remained
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in a tripped condition.
If another bistable of either of the
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remaining three channels of SSPS had been tripped prior to or
during this event, the reactor would have automatically tripped.
The licensee subsequent;y restored inverter IDDlI4 and the D-train
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battery prior to the expiration of the LCO action statement time
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limits.
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The inspector discussed this event with several of the licensee
personnel involved, reviewed procedure 13405-1, and toured the
plant areas where the breaker manipulations occurred.
Two
deficiencies were noted which contributed to the event.
First,
the operator, when restoring battery charger IDDICA to service,
failed to follow the procedural limitation of step 2.2.5 of
procedure 13405-1 which states that without the battery breaker
c?osed in, only one charger should be energized to supply the bus.
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The operator stated that even though he understood the correct
sequence and had performed the evolution numerous times he became
confused during this particular evolution and mistakenly closed
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the wrong breaker. He also failed to communicate with the control
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room prior to beginning the restoration process. The second
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contributing factor was the lack of a specific " Caution" in
procedure section 4.1.3, Place a 125 VDC Bus Battery Charger In
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Service. Although a " Limitation" was stated at the beginning of
the procedure, the inspector concluded that a " Caution"
appropriately placed in section 4.1.3 regarding the use of two
chargers without the battery breaker closed may have prevented
this event.
This event was significant because one channel of SSPS remained in
a tripped condition for 27 minutes during which time the margin to
a RPS and/or ESFAS was significantly reduced.
The licensee took
prompt corrective action in identifying the cause of the error and
restoring the SSPS channel to service and has initiated a human
factors evaluation to review procedure 13405-1. The details of
this event were discussed with shift personnel during subsequent
Operations shift turnover meetings. This event was caused by both
a failure to follow a procedure and the inadequacy of the same
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procedure. This violation will not be subject to enforc2 ment
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action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and
correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section
VII. B of the Enforcement Policy.
This non-cited violation is
identified as NCV 50-424/93-16-02, Failure to Follow Procedure and
Inadequate Procedure Results in Inadvertent Tripping of SSPS
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Channel IV.
g.
Recycle Hold-Up Tank Waste Water Processing
On July 2 the licensee notified the inspectors that they intanded
to use a temporary reverse osmosis system to process about 90,000
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gallons of mixed (radioactive and chemical) waste water stored in
the Recycle Holdup Tank in the auxiliary building. The reverse
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osmosis system is a portable skid mounted unit which will be
operated in the ARB. The licensee stated that the waste is
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composed of relatively high concentrations of nitrates and is
radiologically contaminated requiring processing prior to
discharge to the environment. The reverse osmosis system will
concentrate the mixed waste for later disposal. This system was
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selected instead of processing the waste water through the
normally used ion exchangers because nitrates readily exchange
with the resins currently in use in~the ARB and would cause
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premature exhaustion.
Large amounts of exhausted resin would
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create a larger volume of solid radioactive waste.
This system was of particular . interest to the inspectors because
it is similar to a previous issue, that was reviewed and closed,
on the use of temporary radwaste processing systems that do not
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meet RG 1.143_(see NRC Inspection Reports 50-424,425/90-19
Supplement I and 50-424,425/92-20). The inspectors reviewed the
safety evaluation, and the set-up of the reverse osmosis system in
the ARB while considering the concerns identified with the
previous system. The licensee's previous calculation package and
safety analysis bounds this clean-up activity. The licensee has
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also implemented controls to ensure the reverse osmosis skid is
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monitored at all times. The inspectors verified it was attended
while in operation. The inspectors concluded that the licensee
had adequately addressed the concerns associated with this
temporary system. The inspectors will continue to monitor the
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system while it is in operation.
One non-cited violation was identified.
3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
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a.
General
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Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify
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procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed
were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions,
acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection,
independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies
noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in
whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved
procedures were available, equipment was calibrated, prerequisites
were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test
results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.
SURVEILLANCE NO.
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14705-1
Boron Injection Flow Path Verification
14980-2
Diesel Generatu 2A Operability Test
14986-301
Security Diesel Generator Operability Test
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SURVEILLANCE NO.
TITLE
14952-C
Fire Suppression System Annual Pump Test
14423-2
Source Range NIS ACOT
14980-1
D/G 1A Semi-Annual Operability Test
b.
Review of ECCS Venting Deficiencies
During the previous inspection period on June 23, the licensee
identified a large volume of gas vented from valve 2-1204-X4-451,
RWST Return Line Vent. This discovery was made during the weekly
venting performed in accordance with operations standing order
C-93-007, which was initiated to determine the cause of the gas
accumulation. Gas was vented from this point on two previous
occasions in April 1993 and October 1992, during monthly ECCS
venting _ required by TS (see NRC irs 50-424,425/93-07 and 92-23).
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Following the identification of_ the gas on June 23, the licensee
reviewed all activities that occurred since the last venting, as
documented in operations logs, that could have potentially caused
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the gas accumulation. On June 26, the licensee reperformed these
activities with venting both before and after to determine the
source of accumulation.
Following the draining of a safety
injection accumulator, a large volume of gas which was determined
by chemistry to be nitrogen, was vented from the 451 valve. The
licensee concluded that the pressure drop from accumulator
pressure of approximately 600 psi to 30 psi at the SI test header
caused nitrogen to come out of solution and collect in the RWST
common miniflow return line.
The inspector reviewed the results of a corporate engineering
evaluation of the effects of gas accumulation in the miniflow
line. This evaluation determined, based on the maximum volume of
nitrogen accumulation that there would be no inipact on the
performance of the ECCS subsystem during miniflow operation of the
CCPs and/or SIPS since any trapped nitrogen would be swept toward
the RWST. Based on review of the piping configuration the
licensee's evaluation concluded that there is no potential for
water hammer in the miniflow line.
The evaluation also considered the possibility of gas migrating
upstream to the CCPs or SIPS which was a greater concern for ECCS
operability. The licensee's review of drawings showed that the
CCP alternate miniflow line contains a closed relief valve and the
SIP miniflow lines each contain a check valve which would prevent
backflow. The evaluation also determined that gas would not be
able to migrate towards the SIPS assuming the check valves leak
based on the piping configuration.
The licensee is considering a change to operations procedures for
both units to require venting of the RWST return line whenever any
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of the SI accumulators are drained to minimize the amount of time
that any gas remains in the line.
The inspector considered the licensee's root cause determination
and evaluation of the ECCS venting deficiencies effective in
determining the cause of recurrent gas accumulation. The
inspector concluded based on this review that the nitrogen
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accumulation in the RWST return line does not impact the ECCS
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subsystems.
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c.
Inadequate Post Testing Verification of Containment Spray
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Actuation Circuitry
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On July 8, following a review of NRC Information Notice 93-38,
Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Actuation
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Systems, the licensee determined that the configuration for CS
ESFAS actuation circuitry was not verified following TS
surveillance testing. The CS actuation circuitry contains
normally closed relay contacts which are opened during
surveillance testing. These contacts are restored to the closed
position following the surveillances and were not verified closed
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during the restoration.
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The licensee developed a test to measure the electrical resistance
of the affected CS loops to determine that the contacts were
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closed. The inspector observed this testing on July 14, for each
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CS loop on both units and verified that all measured resistances
were within the required limits specified in MW0s 19302540 and
29302445. The licensee will revise TS surveillance procedures to
incorporate this resistance check following CS surveillance
testing'to verify continuity of the actuation circuitry.
Based on this review the inspector concluded that the licensee
responded appropriately to IN 93-38 and is taking adequate
corrective action to ensure the configuration of CS actuation
circuitry following.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
a.
General
The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed
personnel, and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted
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in accordance with approved procedures, TSs, and applicable
industry codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that
redundant components were operable, administrative controls were
followed, clearances were adequate, personnel were qualified,
correct replacement parts were used, radiological controls were
proper, fire protection was adequate, adequate post-maintenance
testing was performeo, and independent verification requirements
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were implemented. The inspectors independently verified that
selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to_ ensure that the
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licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance activities.
The inspectors witnessed or. revieved the following maintenance
activities:
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MWO NOS.
WORK DESCRIPTION
29302270
Tighten Bonnet Capstrews on MFIV 2HV-5230
29302278
Disassemble and Inspect Failed 4-Way Valve From
MFIV 2HV-5228
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C9300061
- Adjust Governor on Diesel Fire Pump #1
29302293
Investigate Cause of Invalid Count Rate on
Source Range N32
.29202339
Repair Control Building Safety Feature
Electrical Fan Inboard Bearing Pedestal Support
19302614
Replace Cell #26 on Train D Battery
19302540,
Take Resistance Readings for Loops IP-
29302445
934,935,936 and 937 (Unit 1) and Loops 2P-
934,935,936,and 937 (Unit 2)
29302223
CPS Meter Not Indicating on N32
19302644
NSCW Pump #3. Discharge Valve Failed to Shut When
Pump Stopped
b.
Non-Class IE 4160/480 Volt Load Center Transformer Failures
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On' July 7 and again on July 20 the licensee experienced failures
of non-1E 4160/480 volt transformers. The two failures occurred
on transformers located in the maintenance building (transformers
ANB-09X and ANB-10X} and were similar to past failures of these
type GE transformers. These failures were the twelfth and
thirteenth failures since the first failure occurred in April,
1988. These two transformers were shared by both units, and were
similar in age to the Unit I transformers that failed. The
history of 4160/480 volt non-lE transformer failures at Vogtle has
been documented in several NRC inspection reports and was most
recently documented by the EDSFI team inspection in NRC IR 50-
424,425/93-11, dated July 23, 1993. The inspectors will continue
to monitor any further corrective action by the licensee.
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c.
Moisture Controller Calibration Frequencies On Safety Related
!
Ventilation Systems
As a followup to a weakness identified with the PM calibration
intervals established for pressure switches in the EHC system and
MFPT thrust bearing wear detectors (see NRC Inspection Report 50-
424,425/93-13) the inspectors reviewed other instrument
calibration intervals. A review of moisture controllers on the
,
safety related piping penetration and CREFS HVAC systems found
'
,
'
that the calibration frequency of these controllers was 600
months. These controllers assist in the function of the HVAC
system by modulating electric heaters to maintain the relative
humidity of the air passing through the system filters. Two
controllers on Unit I had not been calibrated since January, 1987.
The inspectors found that these controllers have no TS or FSAR
required or vendor recommended calibration interval. The
,
1
inspectors were concerned, however, that with a 600 month
'
,
calibration interval these instruments may not receive any
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calibrations after their initial set up.
After reviewing this issue with the licensee, the inspectors found
j
that the licensee had recently recognized that the 600 month
calibration interval on these controllers appeared excessive and
was in the process of revising the interval to 60 months. The
inspectors also learned that the PM program is periodically
reviewed and FM intervals are frequently revised based on work
history, system reliability, and system engineer input. The
inspectors were satisfied that the licensee's present PM program
was adequate to recognize and act upon issues as identified in
this case. The inspector also concluded that there were no
,
immediate system operability concerns since TS required
'
surveillance tests are performed which test most of the moisture
controller loop.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Fire Protection Program (64704)
a.
Diesel Driven Fire Pump No.1 Fails Surveillance
l
On July 7, diesel driven fire pump No.1 failed to meet the
!
acceptance cr.teria of procedure 14952-C, Fire Suppression System
- Annual System Pump Test, when it did not achieve the required
calculated net pump pressure (discharge pressure minus suction
pressure) of at least 123 psi. The actual recorded net pressure
l
I
was 117 psi which was subsequently confirmed using temporary M&TE
equipment.
The inspector observed vendor recommended governor adjustments as
they were made by licensee mair,tenance personnel and observed the
maintenance run of the diesel fire pump following those
adjustments. The inspector was satisfied that appropriate
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12
procedures were followed and that the diesel fire pump
subsequently achieved the required acceptance criteria.
,
b.
Improper Storage of Flammable / Combustible Liquids
On July 15, during a routine walkdown of the Unit 2 Auxiliary
Building, the inspector opened a flammable storage cabinet in room
144 to inspect the contents of the cabinet. The cabinet contained
numerous flammable / combustible items. The inspector did not take
a complete inventory of the cabinet but did note the following
items: 1) five 5-gallon cans of diesel fuel, each full of diesel;
2) two 1-gallon cans of isopropanol; 3) one gallon of ethyl
alcohol; 4) one aerosol can of magnaflux cleaner / remover; 5) one
aerosol can of enamel paint; 6) approximately 20 plastic l-gallon
containers of various lubricating oils,10 of which were
completely full; 7) a 1-gallon container of isopropyl alcohol
labeled as " Internally Contaminated" and 8) various other
lubricants and unidentifiable substances.
The inspector was concerned that a potential fire hazard existed
because the cabinet was unorganized and in crowded condition.
Some of the containers were turned on their side and were resting
atop other upright containers apparently because the cabinet was
too crowded to place them in an upright position. The inspector
searched the area for a transient combustibles permit but could
not find one which evaluated the contents of the cabinet. The
inspector informed the SS of the condition of the cabinet and
questioned the lack of a posted permit.
Afterwards, the inspector reviewed procedure 92015-C, Use, Control
and Storage of Flammable / Combustible Materials, and discussed it
with the engineering supervisor responsible for the fire
protection program. The procedure states that
flammable / combustible liquids with a permit may be temporarily
placed in flammable storage cabinets in safety related structures
provided the liquids are used on a periodic basis.
This
particular cabinet did not contain a permit, and based on the
crowded condition of the cabinet, it was apparent that none of the
liquid been used recently enough to be reasonably considered
periodic usage. Step 4.3.3.16 of the procedure states that
aerosols shall not be stored with other flammable / combustible
materials in flammable storage cabinets. As discussed earlier,
'
two aerosol can were found in the cabinet.
Table 8 of procedure
92015-C lists the amount of combustible materials allowed within
an area without a permit being required. The quantity of
materials stored in the cabinet far exceeded the allowable amount
stated in Table 8.
Step 4.2.8 states that materials not
specifically listed in Table 8 require a permit before transport
or use. The diesel fuel stored in the cabinet is not listed in
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Table 8 and should have had a permit.
Step 4.3.4.3 requires that
each flammable or combustible container shall be conspicuously
labeled per procedure 00262-C, Control of Chemicals / Fluids, to
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13
indicate the contents of the container. Contrary to that
requirement, the cabinet contained a 1 gallon can of isopropyl
alcohol with the contents of the can written in pencil on the side
of the can.
Finally, step 4.3.3.12 of the procedure states that
transient flammable / combustible liquids left unattended in safety
related areas without a permit are considered inappropriately
stored.
In addition to the cabinet described above, an adjacent locked
'
cabinet within the same room contained a 55-gallon drum used to
temporarily store used lube oil.
Step 4.3.3.3 ::f procedure 92015-
C states that drum storage of Class IB liquids, which includes
,
lube oil, is allowed only in non-safety related plant buildings.
,
The licensee took prompt corrective action by cleaning out both
the cabinets and leaving only those items which will be used on a
periodic basis. A Transient Combustible Permit listing the
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contents of the cabinet was affixed to the front of the cabinet.
l
This inappropriate storage of flammable / combustible liquids within
i
a safety related area is a violation of procedure 92015-C and is
identified as VIO 50-424,425/93-16-03, Failure to Follow Procedure
Involving Indoor Storage of Flammable / Combustible Liquids.
One violation was identified.
6.
Follow-up (90712) (92700) (92701) (92702)
The Licensee Event Reports and follow-up items listed below were
reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of TS
,
compliance and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken,
existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements
satisfied, and relative safety significance of each event.
a.
(Closed) LER 50-424/92-010, Technical Specification Surveillance
Not Performed When Diesel Generator Inoperable.
The cause of DG 1A start failures was a vendor fabrication error
in an air distributor housing sleeve which prevented proper
venting of the pilot air from an air start valve. This resulted
in continuous starting air admission to a cylinder, impeding the
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starting roll and subsequent start. The details of these DG start
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failures and the immediate corrective actions taken by the
licensee were documented in NRC IR 50-424,425/92-30. This
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inspection report documents that the inspector personaliy observed
or verified the replacement of the right bank air distributor and
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the replacement of several leaking air start valves.
Report 92-30
also documents that the licensee tested the remaining DGs and no
similar discrepancies were found. Additionally, Shift
Superintendents were advised by Standing Order C-92-08 to alert
upper management whenever unexpected events occur during DG runs
or surveillances.
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Because the licensee identified that there were four leaking air
start valves on DG 1A (each valve was subsequently replaced), a
request was made of the DG vendor, Cooper Energy Services, to
1
evaluate the maximum acceptable leakage of these air start valves.
'
The evaluation results were issued in Cooper Engineering Report
- SA-01-1993, dated May 13, 1993. The vendor conducted both an
analytical investigation and an actual field test on a DG similar
to those at Vogtle. The results of those tests demonstrated that
even when accounting for the accumulation of all possible worst
,
case conditions, it is unlikely that starting air valve leakage
could prevent an engine from starting. The inspector reviewed the
vendor evaluation and test methodology and ad no concerns with
the conclusions of that evaluation.
Based upon the inspector's review of the licensee's corrective
actions and the documentation of the DG 1A failure event as
described in IR 92-30, this LER is considered closed.
b.
(Closed) LER 50-425/92-012, Quarterly Valve Stroke Time Testing
Performed Late - Missed TS Surveillance.
The cause of this event was a procedure inadequacy. Procedure
00404-C, Surveillance Test Program, was revised on August 31,
1992, to require the surveillance task sheet to be dated when the
)
first independent task for any surveillance is completed and then
signed-off when all tasks on that task sheet are completed.
The
date for completion of the first independent task will key the
next due date for proper scheduling of the surveillance.
This event was documented in NRC IR 50-424,425/92-18 and
identified as a NCV. Furthermore, the inspector verified that
procedure 00404-C has been appropriately revised to preclude
recurrence of this event. This LER is considered closed.
c.
(Closed) LER 50-425/92-13, Control Room Controls Area Inadequately
Attended - Violation of Administrative Controls
The cause of the event was personnel error. The B0P operator
forgot that he had relieved the operator at the controls, and left
the Unit 2 "at the controls area." This event was documented in
NRC 1R 50-424,425/93-13 as two violations.
The inspector verified by reviewing commitment tracking system
printouts, a shift briefing book event summary, and an August 26,
1993 memo from the operations unit superintendent to the Manager,
Operations that the BOP operator vas counseled, shift briefings
were held for control room personnel, and the event was discussed
individually with each licensed operator. The briefings and
discussions emphasized the safety significance of the event;
procedural requirements concerning the "at the controls"
responsibility; how the responsibility is turned over; and log
keeping requirements for this turnover.
Based on this review, this item is closed.
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d.
(Closed) VIO 50-424,425/92-18-01, Failure To follow Procedure; and
LER 50-425/92-08, Improper Calibration of Instrument Loop Results
!
in Condition Prohibited By Technical Specifications
The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated
October 14, 1992. This violation involved three examples of a
failure to follow procedure.
One example involved a failure to
,
ensure a radiation monitor was returned to service. The licensee
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promptly counseled the USS on procedural compliance and placed a
synopsis of this event in the required reading for licensed
operators. The licensee also conducted a review of procedures
requiring personnel to " block" radiation monitor actuations. The
licensee revised procedures for the fuel handling building
effluent monitors and for the control room air intake gas monitors
i
to include a sign-off step in the " Restore To Service" section for
Operations to place the "Bloct" switch in the desired position and
independently verify. The inspector reviewed the current
revisions of these procedures to confirm the licensee's corrective
i'
actions.
The second example involved a valve misalignment and overflow of
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waste water from an oily waste separator. The licensee counseled
!
the individual, and discussed this event and the importance of
self-verification at shift briefings. Training was also given to
licensed and non-licensed operators during requalification
training on operation of the oily waste separator.
The third example in this violation involved an incorrect I&C
surveillance procedure and a failure by the I&C technician to
follow the procedure which would have led to a detection of the
procedural error. The technicians responsible for the error were
counseled and a meeting was held with other I&C personnel to
discuss the importance of performing accurate calibrations. The
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procedures which had incorrect data sheets were corrected. Other
procedures were reviewed for errors and none were identified.
Based on this review of the licensee's corrective actions the
violation and the LER covering the third example of the violation
are closed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exit Meeting
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 2, 1993,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described
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the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings
listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material
provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
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Item No.
Description and Reference
URI 50-424/93-16-01
Review Causes of Pressurizer low Pressure
Reactor Trip (paragraph 2e)
NCV 50-424/93-16-02
Failure to Follow Procedure and Inadequate
Procedure Result in Inadvertent Tripping
of SSPS Channel IV (paragraph 2f)
VIO 50-424,425/93-16-03
Failure to Follow Procedure Involving
Indoor Storage of Flammable / Combustible
Liquids (paragraph Sb)
8.
Abbreviations
ACOT
- Analog Channel Operational Test
- Auxiliary Feedwater System
- Alternate Radioactive Waste Building
B0P
- Balance of Plant Operator
- Centrifugal Charging Pump
CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations
cps
- counts per second
- Control Room Emergency Filtrations System
- Containment Spray System
- Containment Ventilation Isolation
- Deficiency Card
- Direct Current
- Diesel Generator
DRPI
- Digital Rod Position Indication System
- Emergency Core Cooling System
EDSFI
- Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection
- Electro-Hydraulic Control System
- Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
- Final Safety Analysis Report
GL
- Generic Letter
3
- Health Physics
- Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
- Instruments and Controls
IR
- Inspection Report
ISEG
- Independent Safety Engineering Group
LCO
- Limiting Condition for Operation
LER
- Licensee Event Report
- Measuring and Test Equipment
MFIV
- Main Feedwater Isolation Valve
- Main Feed Pump
i
MFPT
- Main Feedwater Pump Turbine
- Main Feedwater Regulating Valve
MWO
- Maintenance Work Order
- Non-Cited Violation
NI
- Nuclear Instrumentation
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NIS
- Nuclear Instrumentation System
NPF
- Nuclear Power Facility
NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
- Protected Area
- Preventive Maintenance
psi
- pounds per square inch
- Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio
- Regulatory Guide
- Reactor Protection Syatem
- Refueling Water Storage Tank
SAER
- Safety Audit And Engineering Review
- Safety Injection
- Safety Injection Pump
- Shift Superintendent
SSPS
- Solid State Protection System
TS
- Technical Specifications
- Unresolved Item
USS
- Unit Shift Supervisor
VAC
- Volts Alternating Current
VDC
- Volts Direct Current
- Violation