IR 05000424/1993014
| ML20056D168 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1993 |
| From: | Balmain P, Brian Bonser, Skinner P, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056D165 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-93-14, 50-425-93-14, NUDOCS 9308050054 | |
| Download: ML20056D168 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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'k REGION 11 S
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
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=*.e Report Nos.:
50-424/93-14 and 50-425/93-14 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Hos.:
50-424 and 50-42; License Nos.: HPF-68 and NPF-81 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: May 30, 1993 - June 26, 1993
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7/F[f3 Inspector: [
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&c B. R. Bon'sdr," fnior glfenKInspector Dhte Signed
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7h/f3 gg R. D. Starkey, esfdent Ins ector Date' Signed
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gg.P.A.Balmain,Repidentlagpector
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Approved by:
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P. Skinner, Chief D~ ate Signed Reactor Projects Section 3B Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, inspection entailed inspection in the following areas: plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, and follow-up of open items.
Results:
One non-cited violation (NCV) was identified.
The NCV involved a failure to perform temperature monitoring surveillances on three areas in the Unit 2 main steam valve rooms.
The violation was due to implementing a procedure revision before a design change and a Technical Specification amendment were com-plete (paragraph 3b).
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The licensee's response to NRC Bulletin 93-02, Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers,-was reviewed and closed.
The licensee plans no action based upon the conduct of containment
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inspection procedures at the end of each outage and that fibrous material of this type is not stored in containment (paragraph Sa).
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9309050054 930714 PDR ADOCK 05000424 G
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees j
- J. Beasley, General Manager Nuclear Plant S. Bradley, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
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W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support S. Chesnut, Manager Engineering Technical Support
- C. Christiansen, SAER Supervisor C. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent R. Dorman, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness G. Frederick, Manager Maintenance
- W. Gabbard, Nuclear Specialist, Technical Support
- M. Griffis, Manager Plant Modifications M. Hobbs, I&C Superintendent
- K. Holmes, Manager Operations
- D. Huyck, Nuclear Security Manager
- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
- R. LeGrand, Manager Health Physics and Chemistry
- D. McCary,_ Maintenance Engineering Supervisor G. McCarley, ISEG Supervisor
- A. Rodgers, Nuclear Specialist
- M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor
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C. Stinespring, Manager Administration
- J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors, engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors, and office personnel.
Oglethorpe Power Company Representative
T. Mozingo
NRC Resident Inspectors
- B. Bonser D. Starkey
- P. Balmain i
- Attended Exit Interview An alphabetical list of abbreviations is lacated in the last paragraph of the inspection report.
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2.
Plant Operations - (71707)
a.
General
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The inspection staff reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory
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requirements, Technical Specifications, and administrative controls. Control logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift relief records, LC0 status logs, night orders, standing orders, and clearance logs were routinely reviewed. Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, engineering support and technical support personnel.
Daily plant status meetings were routinely attended.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts j
and shift changes. Actions observed were conducted as required by i
the licensee's procedures.
The number of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by TS. Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumen-tation and recorder traces important to safety. Operating parame-
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ters were verified to be within TS limits. The inspectors also reviewed DCs to determine whether the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine
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basis. They included, but were not limited to the turbine i
building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rocms, cable spreading rooms, NSCW towers, DG buildings, AFW buildings, and the low voltage switchyard.
During plant tours, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /procedurer were followed. This included observation of HP practices and review of area surveys, radiation work permits, postings, and instrument calibration.
The inspectors verified that the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions.
Inspectors verified that persons and packages were checked prior to entry ir,to the PA; vehicles were properly authorized, searched, and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; and personnel in vital areas were authorized.
b.
Unit 1 Summary The unit began the period operating at 100% power and operated at full power throughout the inspection perio _
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c.
Unit 2 Sunrnary The unit began the period operating at 99% power and operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
d.
Inappropriate Use of Standing Order On May 27. Operations issued Standing Order 2-93-06, RHR-SI Header Flow Test. The purpose of the S0 was to measure the change in RHR
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flow while the RHR pump is on miniflow and aligned to the SI test header to the RWST.
Prior to this test, RHR flow testing was conducted via the RHR full flow test line to the RWST. The RHR
full-flow test path has raised personnel safety concerns by Operations because of manual valves which must be operated in a high radiation area.
In addition, one train of RHR is essentially rendered inoperable when the RHR full-flow test path is used. The 50 was initiated to determine if another flow path was feasible.
The inspectors were concerned with SO 2-93-06 because rather than giving temporary instructions, as a 50 is intended to do, it gave specific operating instructions and was written in the format of a
procedure. Further review by the inspectors and discussions with Operations management confirmed that the 50 did not deviate from nor change the intent of existing procedures, even though it was written like a procedure. The concern regarding the use of an S0 for detailed operating instructions, rr.ther than a procedure revision, was also addressed in NRC Inspection Report 424,425/92-27. The ISEG has also reviewed the use and implementation of Standing Orders and identified some of the same concerns in the i
February 1993 ISEG Monthly Report.
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The specific concerns regarding SO 2-93-06 were resolved with the licensee. The licensee agreed that the format of the S0 was i
inappropriate and stated that the intent of the S0 was not to i
i circumvent approved procedures. The inspectors will continue to monitor the use of 50s.
e.
Emergency Drill i
On June 16, the licensee conducted a table top exercise at the Vogtle EOF. Participants in the drill included key licensee representatives, state and county representatives from Georgia and i
South Carolina, and the resident inspectors. The exercise i
consisted of walking through a drill scenario with each participant describing their respective actions. The drill was beneficial in that it provided the participants the opportunity to share information with their counterparts and provided a chance to gain a better understanding of needs during an actual event.
Significant areas covered during the exercise included:
actions that would be taken at different Emergency Action Levels by local and state officials; the importance of accurate and timely information to emergency agencies; important information on the i
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Emergency Notification form; different communications that would take place during an event; and media contacts and news releases.
F No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
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General
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Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection, independent verification as required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests were also observed in whole or in part, to determine that approved procedures were available, equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests
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were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and system restoration was completed.
SURVEILLANCE NO.
TITLE 28911-2 Seven Day Battery Inspection and Maintenance (Unit 2 A Train)
14810-1 TDAFW Pump IST 88007-203 Limiting Hot Channel Factor 205 Determination 88023-201 One Point Incore/Excore Detector i
Calibration 88025-2 Determination of Movable Incore Detector Operating Voltages b.
Missed Temperature Monitoring Surveillance On May 31, during a control room review of Procedure 14001-2 Rev.
7, Shift Area Temperature Logs, the operator reviewing the logs identified that three rooms were deleted in error from the procedure. These three rooms, numbers 159, 122, and 123 are part of the Unit 2 MS valve rooms. When this omission was identified temperatures were immediately logged and found in the normal range.
Surveillance Procedure 14001-2, is required by TS 4.7.10, and per-formed every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to document temperatures in specific plant rooms. This ensures that safety related equipment not serviced by ESF HVAC systems and necessary for safe shutdown of the plant will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of environmental qualification temperatures.
Equipment exposed to excessive l
temperatures can degrade and result in a loss of operability.
In this ca.se the inspectors concluded that temperatures in these
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rooms had not exceeded their limits during the period that the temperatures were not monitored. Outside air temperatures were not unusually high and existing ventilation in these rooms, which was reviewed in a previous inspection, had been modified to keep these rooms cooler (see NRC Inspection Report 424,425/92-14). Air temperatures and ventilation in the Unit 2 MS valve rooms have been a continuing concern, especially during the summer months.
The licensee's investigation found that Revision 7 to Procedure 14001-2 was implemented by the night shift on May 29.
Procedure
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14001-2 was revised in anticipation of a Unit 2 design change (DCP 92-V2N0031) which will delete manual temperature monitoring in
these rooms.
This design change was not complete and the required TS amendment to delete these rooms from the TS surveillance requirements was not approved. This design change, when t
completed, will provide a flow of outside air to each MSIV actuator via roof mounted air handlers.
In addition to the air flow around the MSIVs, high temperature and low temperature sensors in the vicinity of the MSIVs will be installed to annunciate in the control room if an abnormal temperature condition exists.
The annunciators will allow the deletion of the periodic temperature readings. This design change is complete on Unit 1.
The cause of this event was a failure by Operations personnel to properly coordinate the procedure revision with the DCP implementation and TS amendment, and to question their completion before the procedure's approval. The inspector's review of this event found this to be a personnel error and not a programmatic
deficiency. The licensee has taken corrective action and has also stated that a review of the communications interface between the design change group and Operations will be conducted to enhance j
the process.
This missed surveillance is a violation of TS 4.7.10.
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violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement i
Policy. This is identified as NCV 50-425/93-14-01, Missed Temperature Monitoring Surveillance.
c.
Failure to Satisfy Unit 1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor Surveillance Relationships
During the previous inspection period on May 17 and during this inspection period on June 15 and June 21, the Unit i Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, FQ(Z), Power Distribution Limit failed to satisfy TS 4.2.2.2 surveillance relationships and exceeded the transient FQ(Z) limit. TS surveillance requirements provide limits on the heat flux hot channel factor and nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel
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factor which ensure that:
(1) the design limit on peak local power density is not exceeded, (2) the DNB criterion is met, and (3) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200*F ECCS acceptance criteria limit. The inspector
reviewed the licensee's actions and implementation of special condition surveillances since TS 4.2.2.2 also provides transient limits on FQ(Z) to ensure design limits are not exceeded for operational transients that may occur within the AFD band.
If the transient limits are exceeded this TS also requires that the AFD band be reduced accordingly.
The inspector reviewed the results of Procedures 88007-1, Limiting Hot Channel Factor Determination, and 88005-C, Target Axial Flux Difference Determination, which were performed for the May 17, June 15 and June 21 FQ(Z) determinations. The inspector verified based on completed procedures (88005-C) that new AFD limits were calculated per TS 4.2.2.2.g.2.
On June 15, the licensee also determined that maximum normalized computed FQ(Z) had increased since the May 17 determination which required the licensee to perform a special condition surveillance in accordance with TS 4.2.2.2.f.2 to measure FQ(Z) at least once per 7 EFPD until two successive maps indicated that this value was not increasing. The inspector also verified by reviewing completed procedures that the licensee implemented these special condition surveillances.
Based on this review and discussions held with reactor engineering personnel, the inspector determined that the licensee's actions met TS 4.2.2.2 requirements. The inspector also concluded from
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these discussions that the failure to satisfy the transient limit i
for FQ(Z) occurred because design predictions used to develop the FQ(Z) surveillance limits did not closely reflect the observed performance of the Unit 1, Cycle 5 core. This discrepancy between design predictions and actual measurements was also noted during low power physics testing when the results of the reference bank measurement did not satisfy the test procedure's review criterion.
(see IR 424,425/93-10)
One non-cited violation was identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance i
with approved procedures, TS, and applicable industry codes and
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standards. The inspectors also verified that redundant components were operable, administrative controls were followed, clearances were adequate, personnel were qualified, correct replacement parts were used, radiological controis were proper, fire protection was adequate, adequate post-maintenance testing was performed, and independent verification requirements were implemented. The inspectors
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independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to l
service. Outstanding work requests were also reviewed to ei.sure that
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the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance activities.
s The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance activities:
MWO NOS.
WORK DESCRIPTION 19203004 Implement DCP 91-VIN 0199, Activate the Turbine-Generator Power System Stabilizer
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19302287 Replace Failed SOLA Transformer INB532X 29203766 Battery Charger 2CDICA 18 Month Calibra-tion 29103086 Perform PM on NSCW Tower B Fan #1 A9200644 Perform PM on TSC Inverter 29301387 V0TES Testing on NSCW Valve 2HV-1807
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Follow-up of Open Items (90712) (92700) (92701) (92702)
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The following Licensee Event Reports and follow-up item were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements: adequacy of description, verification of TS compliance and regulatory requirements,
corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, adherence to reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.
a.
Bulletin No. 93-02: Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers This bulletin discussed the blockage of ECCS suction strainers due to the presence of air filters and other temporary material which can be the source of fibrous material in reactor containments.
The bulletin requested the licensee to take specific actions to address the concern of fibrous material compromising the functional capability of the ECCS. The bulletin also contained specific reporting requirements. The licensee responded, by
letter dated June 3, 1993, that no fibrous air filters or other temporary sources of fibrous material not designed to withstand a LOCA are installed or stored in the primary containment.
Plant procedures require thorough inspections inside containment prior to returning to power following an outage. These procedures verify that no debris is present in containment which could end up in the containment sump. The inspector verified that these procedures were performed on each unit for the most recent outages. Because procedures are already in place to conduct containment walk downs, the licensee does not plan to take any i
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additional actions. The inspectors also normally perform containment walk downs following each outage specifically
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inspecting for debris and general housekeeping conditions.
b.
(Closed) LER 50,424/92-09, RCP Thermal Barrier Isolation Valves Declared Inoperable The cause of the event was M0 VATS vendor data which specified a change in the test equipment inaccuracies, placing the thrust values for these valves outside the acceptable limits. The li-censee initiated corrective action by increasing the close torque switch settings for valves IHV-19055 and 1HV-19057 in order to provide the necessary closure thrust. Calculations to account for the MOVATS inaccuracies were also verified for all other valves to ensure that the correct as-left thrust data had been used. The
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review determined that this was an isolated incident and that no other valves were affected. Diagnostic testing for 1HV-19055 and 1HV-19057 was successfully completed in the Spring of 1993 during 1R4.
The inspector determined that the licensee initiated appropriate i
corrective action to address this item. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) LER 50,425/92-010, Reactor Trip Due to Inadvertent
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Grounding of Circuits in the Generator l
The causes of this event were the use of test leads that were not adequately insulated and a personnel error on the part of a vendor technician in making an inadvertent pin contact.
For future testing of this type the licensee will use insulated test leads.
Other generator card frames / cabinets have been examined for
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similar applications and all were found to present similar trip hazard possibilities. As an interim corrective action the licensee fabricated a test point board with adequate clearance of insulated points.
" UNIT TRIP HAZARD" signs have been placed on the doors of the regulator cubical and extender boards have been labeled with appropriate caution signs regarding the use of insulated leads with these type of boards. Special insulated slip on test lead connectors were also purchased for use during future testing on these boards.
Based on the review by the inspector, this item is considered closed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Exit Meeting The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 28,
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1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector de-I scribed the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the
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licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
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material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the
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inspection.
Item No.
Description and Reference NCV 50-425/93-14-01 Missed Temperature Monitoring Surveillance 8.
Abbreviations l
AFD
- Axial Flux Difference AFW
- Auxiliary Feedwater System CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations i
- Deficiency Card i
- Design Change Package DG
- Diesel Generator DNB
- Departure from Nucleate Boiling ECCS
- Emergency Core Cooling Systems
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- Effective Full Power Days EOF
- Emergency Operations Facility
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- Emergency Response Facilities i
FQ(Z)
- Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor HVAC
- Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning IR
- Inspection Report ISEG
- Independent Safety Engineering Group
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- In-Service Test
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LC0
- Limiting Condition for Operation LER
- Licensee Event Report LOCA
- Loss of Coolant Accident
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MOVATS
- Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System MS
- Main Steam System MSIV
- Main Steam Isolation Valve l
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MWO
- Maintenance Work Order
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- Non-Cited Violation NPF
- Nuclear Power Facility NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSCW
- Nuclear Service Cooling Water System PA
- Protected Area PM
- Preventive Maintenance RCP
- Reactor Coolant Pump RHR
- Residual Heat Removal System
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- Refueling Water Storage Tank SAER
- Safety Audit And Engineering Review SI
- Safety Injection J
S0
- Standing Order TDAFW
- Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System i
TS
- Technical Specifications
WRT
- Work Request Tag 1R4
- Unit 1 Refueling Outage Number 4
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