IR 05000424/1999003
ML20207D275 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Vogtle ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/19/1999 |
From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20207D273 | List: |
References | |
50-424-99-03, 50-424-99-3, 50-425-99-03, 50-425-99-3, NUDOCS 9906030288 | |
Download: ML20207D275 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION ll Docket Nos: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos: NPF-68 and NPF-81 Report No:
50-424/99-03 and 50-425/99-03 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Location:
7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 l
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Dates:
March 21,1999 through May 1,1999 I
inspectors:
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident inspector K. O'Donohue, Resident inspector j
Approved by: P. Skinner, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2 l
Division of Reactor Projects I
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Enclosure
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9906030288 990519 PDR ADOCK 05000424 O
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-424/99-03 and 50-425/99-03 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection.
Operations Operation's performance during startup activities from refueling outage 1R8 was well e
planned and executed with good management involvement and oversight (Section 01.2).
Overall material conditions and housekeeping for both units were acceptable.
- Particularly noteworthy was the as-left condition of the Unit 1 containment following the refueling outage. Only a small amount of debris was identified by the inspectors during a containment closeout walkdown; this was indicative of continued positive management emphasis in this area (Section O2.1).
Plant Review Board meetings continued to be thorough and self-critical. Safety Audit e
and Engineering (SAER) group audits were comprehensive and findings were well developed and effectively communicated to management. The inspectors observed an increase in SAER monitoring and oversight during critical outage related activities in the control room. Management continued to emphasize the initiation of Condition Reports with low thresholds and corrective action plans were normally thorough (Section O7.1).
Maintenance A Non-Cited Violation was identified for an inoperable containment sump monitor that e
resulted in a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.4.15 (Section M8.1).
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 began the report period in Mode 5 in the process of completing the eighth refueling
~ outage (1R8). On March 23,1999, the unit entered Mode 4. Reactor startup commenced March 26 and the unit was tied to the electrical grid that same day completing a 26 day refueling outage. Full power operation was attained on March 30. The unit operated at L essentially full power for the remainder of the inspsction period.
' Unit 2 operated at full power throughout the entire inspection period.
1. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent control room toure to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness and communications, and adherence to approved procedures; and attended operations shift turnovers and daily management plant status meetings.
Operator logs were reviewed to verify operational safety and compliance with Technical Specifications (TS). Instrumentation, computer indications, and safety system lineups were periodically reviewed, along with equipment clearance tagouts, to assess system availability. The logbooks for both units were reviewed daily for potential entries into limiting conditions for operation (LCO) action statements. No problems, violations or
' deviations were identified in the above areas.
01.2 ' Observations of Unit 1 Heatuo and Restart from Refuelino Outaae (71707)
i The inspectors observed selected portions of the Unit 1 restart from refueling outage 1R8. Activities observed by the inspectors included entry into Modes 4,3, reactor startup, and power escalation in support of connecting the unit to the electrical grid. The inspectors determined that performance of these evolutions were well controlled, in accordance with applicable procedures, and with good management involvement and oversight.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 General Plant Tours (71707)
General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors to examine the
_ physical condition of plant equipment and to verify that safety systems were properly
. maintained and aligned. These general walkdowns included accessible portions of safety-related structures, systems, and components.
Overall material conditions and housekeeping for both units were acceptable.
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Particularly noteworthy was the as-left condition of the Unit 1 containment following the
' outage. Only a small amount of debris was identified by the inspectors during a containment closeout walkdown; this was indicative of continued positive management i
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emphasis in this area. Temporary trailers, containers, and equipment were removed, and almost all plant areas were clean to a level consistent with pre-outage conditions.
Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (40500)
The inspectors reviewed various licensee self-assessment activities including, Plant Review Board (PRB) committee meetings and minutes, Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) group audits, and daily Condition Reports (CRs) initiated by licensee personnel.
j PRB meetings continued to be thorough and self-critical. Two of the SAER audits reviewed covered plant operations and the inservice inspection program. The inspectors attended the SAER exit meetings where the audit findings were presented to management. The audits were comprehensive and findings were well developed and
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effectively communicated to management. Also, during critical outage related activities in the control room, the inspectors observed increased monitoring and oversight by
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SAER. Management continued to emphasize tM initiation of CRs with low thresholds and corrective action plans were normally thorougt.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700) (92901)
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08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-425/99-01-00: Reactor Trio When Installina Clearances in Wrona Unit The inspectors reviewed this LER and discussed it with licensee personnel. Details pertaining to the event and the licensee's corrective actions were previously discussed in detail in NRC Inspection Report 50-424,425/99-02. Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-425/99-02-01 was previously issued documenting operations personnel failure to follow verification procedures which resulted in the incorrect clearance installation and subsequent reactor trip. The inspectors verified that licensee corrective actions
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identified in the LER were satisfactorily implemented.
11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Maintenance Work Order and Surveillance Observations (61726) (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of selected maintenance and surveillance activities. The observed maintenance and surveillance activities were completed by qualified personnel knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. Procedures were present at the work location and being followed. Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the intended activities. Problems, if encountered during the performance of activities, were properly dispositione M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92700) (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-424/99-01-00: Containment Sumo Ooeration Outside of Technical Specifications Reauirements
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The inspector reviewed the LER and CR 19980555 associated with this issue. The main cause of the event was the setpoint drift of a limit switch that should have automatically actuated the lead sump pump prior to water level overflowing into the I
adjacent trench area. Also, the level switch for the backup sump pump was not set to actuate prior to the overflow level. The inspectors verified that corrective actions for this event were satisfactorily implemented.
During the periods that the sump level flowed into the adjacent trench area, the sump monitor may not have been capable of adequately detecting reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage and was considered inoperable. This occurred several times from August 1998 through December 1998 and existed from days to weeks during each occurrence. TS 3.4.15 requires containment sump level monitors to be' operable in Modes 1,2,3, and 4. TS 3.4.15, Condition A, required the completion of a RCS water balance once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with one inoperable sump monitor. The inoperable sump water level monitor represented operation in a condition prohibited by the TS. This violation is identified as NCV 50-424/99-03-01, " Containment Sump Monitor inoperability Leads to Operation Outside of Technical Specifications," consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was in the licensee's corrective action program as LER 50-424/99-01-00 and CR 19980555.
Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 ' General Observations (37551)
The inspectors observed engineering support activities for Unit 1 outage issues, emergent day to day operational and maintenance issues, and CR evaluations.
I Timely and effective engineering support was noted in the areas reviewed. Engineering involvement and evaluations of equipment problems were thorough and technically sound.
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls I
R1.1 Routine Observation of Radiolooical Protection Controls (71750)
The inspectors periodically toured the radiological control area and observed radiological practices to verify adequacy of access controls, locked areas, personnel monitoring, surveys, and postings. The inspectors also observed Unit 1 refueling outage radiological support activities including containment access controls, coverage of outage related maintenance activities, and contamination control m
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Radiological controls were generally thorough and well planned, although an unanticipated radiation exposure during decontamination of the Unit 1 reactor cavity transfer canal was an exception. The unanticipated radiation exposure occurred on March 18,1999, and involved a decon technician receiving an exposure of 2,064 millirem shallow dose equivalent to his extremity. The licensee performed an in-depth event review of this incident comprehensive.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Routine Observation of Security and Safeauards Activities (71750)
The inspectors periodically toured the protected area for adequate lighting and security control functions, observed visitor escorting, and the use of special purpose detectors at the protected area entrance, and observed personnel, packages, and vehicles entering the protected area. The inspectors determined that the security fence was intact and the isolation zones were being adequately maintained free of objects. Lighting of the perimeter and protected area was acceptable. Visitor escorting, and special purpose detectors were used as applicable, prior to personnel or package entry.
V. Manaaement Meetinos and Other Areas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspections results to members of licensee management a the conclusion of the inspection on May 6,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Brown, Manager, Training and Emergency Preparedness W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support S. Chesnut, Plant Operations Assistant General Manager G. Frederick, Manager Operations J. Gasser, Nuclear Plant General Manager K. Holmes, Manager Maintenance P. Rushton, Plant Support Assistant General Manager M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor C. Tippins, Jr., Nuclear Specialist i INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED l
lP 37551:
Onsite Engineering l
IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing l
Problems IP 61726:
Surveillance Observation IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities l
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IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92901:
Followup - Operations IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED ITEM NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION Closed 50-425/99-01-00 LER Reactor Trip When Installing Clearances in Wrong Unit (Section 08.1)
50-424/99-01-00 LER Containment Sump Operation Outside of Technical Specifications Requirements (Section M8.1)
50-424/99-03-01 NCV Containment Sump Monitor inoperability Leads to Operation Outside of Technical Specifications (Section M8.1)
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