IR 05000424/1992031
| ML20128A510 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1993 |
| From: | Balmain P, Brian Bonser, Skinner P, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128A484 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-92-31, 50-425-92-31, NUDOCS 9302020233 | |
| Download: ML20128A510 (17) | |
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'%Q UNITID STAT [S e,
NUCLI AR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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Peport Nos.:
50-424/92-31 and 50-425/92-31 Licensee:
Georgia Power Company P.-0. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201
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Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.:
NPF-68 and NPT-81 facility Name:
Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
November 29, 1992 - January 2, 1993 b b b;7 M bro ~r d esident inspector I f 2 6[9 $
Inspector:
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A BTR IIonst r Te Date signed E E &d n
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~R D75tarkpy, Residpj)t Inspector Da'te s'igned sssd v
,/u/n P. A. Uilm{in, Resid(iil Inspector Ulte Signed Accompanied by:
J. L. Starefos D. A. Seymour S. J _ Vias Approved by:
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lilnner, ChTer 09tesigned Reactor. Projects Section 30 V
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine inspection entailed inspection in the following-areas: plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, a review of the special nuclear _ material accountability program, review of licensee event reports and follow-up.
-Results:
One non-cited violation (NCV) and one inspector follow-up-item (IFI) was identified.
The NCV involved a failure to follow radiological control procedures by plant equipment operators during )erformance of a
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surveillance which involved, entering posted hig1 radiation areas
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and breaching and venting h tentially contaminated systems-(paragraph 2f).
The Ifl involved a-weakness in the program for the control and.
-accountability of nonfuel-special nuclear material--(SNM).
9302020233-930126.
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following the licensee's identification of a deficiency in the transfer of a fission chamber from the site warehouse, a review of the procedures in place concluded that there was not adequate guidance to preclude the unauthorized transfer of non-fuel SNH (paragraph 5).
During the inspection period, Unit 2 shutdown due to increasing
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identified leakage. Overall, the shutdown was conducted safely l
and a significant amount of work was completed in a short time
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(paragraph 2d).
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Beasley, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations S. Bradley, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
- W. Durmeister, Manager Engineering Support t
- S. Chesnut, Manager Engineering Technical Support
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- C, Christiansen, SAER Supervisor
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C. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Dorman, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness
- G. Frederick, Manager Maintenance
- B. Gabbard, Technical Support
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- M. Griffis, Manager Plant Modifications
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M. Hobbs, I&C Superintendent
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- K. Holmes, Manager llealth Physics and Chemistry
- D Iluyck, Nuclear Security Manager W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
- R. LeGrand, Manager Operations
- G. McCarley, ISEG Supervisor R. Moye, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- H. Shelbani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor W. Shipman, General Manager Nuclear Plant
- C. Stinespring, Manager Administration
- J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning C. Tynan, Nuclear Procedures Supervisor J. Williams, Supervisor Work Planning and Controls Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors, engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors, and office personnel.
Oglethorpe Power Company Representative
- T. Mozingo
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NRC-Resident Inspectors
- B. Bonser
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- D. Starkey
- P. Balmain
- J. Starefos
- Attended Exit Interview An alphabetical list of abbreviations is located in the last paragraph of the inspection-report.
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2.
plant Operations - (71707)
a.
General The inspection staff reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory
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requirements, Technical Specifications, and administrative i
controls.
Control logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift relief
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records, LCO status logs, night orders, standing orders, and clearance logs were routinely reviewed. Discussions were j
conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry and health l
physics, engineering support and technical support personnel.
Daily plant status meetings were routinely attended.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and shift changes.. Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensen's procedures.
The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by TS.
Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety.
Operating aarameters were observed to verify they were within TS limits.
T1e inspectors also reviewed DCs to determine whether the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine basis. They included, but were not limited to the turbine
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building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, NSCW towers, DG buildings, AFW buildings, and the low voltage switchyard.
During plant tours, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health )hysics policies / procedures were followed.
This included caservation of HP practices and review of area surveys, radiation work permits, postings, and instrument calibration.
l-The inspectors verified that the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned fonctions; persons _and packages were checked prior to entry into the pA; vehicles were pro)erly authorized, searched, and escorted within the pA; persons wit 11n the PA displayed photo j
identification badges; and personnel in vital. areas were authorized.
b.
Unit 1 Summary
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L The unit began the period operating at 100% power and operated at-full power throughout the inspection period.
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Unit 2 Summary i
The unit began the period operating at 100% power. On December 12, the unit began a shutdown due to increasing identified RCS leakage. The unit entered Mode 5 on December 13. The unit returned to 100% power on December 19.
The unit remained at full power through the end of the inspection period, d.
Unit 2 Shutdown Due to increasing Identified Leakage On December 12, 1992, at 8:00 p.m., Unit 2 began shutting down due to increasing identified leakage from 2HV-8702B, RHR Suction from
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RCS Hot leg Loop 4 isolation Valve.
The licensee began the unit shutdown a day earlier than planned due to an increase in the identified leakage fro.n approximately 2.5 gpm to 4.75 gpm.- The shutdown had been planned to repair the valve leak before it became excessive and forced a shutdown.
The leakage was classified as identified leakage. The stuffing box on this type valve is designed with a lantern ring leakoff connection with packing above and below the lantern ring.
The water passing through the leakoff line is classified as identified leakage because it is collected in the RCDT. During shutdown of the unit leakage peaked at about 9 gpm (TS limit for identified leakage is 10 gpm).
With the plant in Mode 4 and the RHR system providing shutdown cooling, a TDAFW start signal was received. The TDAFW pump did not reach operating speed due to SG pressures at a) proximately 60 psi.
The start signal was caused by two SGs, whici were being drained, reaching the low-low level setpoint.
The MDAFW pumps had
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been isolated as required by procedure, however, the TDAFW pump was not secured because SG 1evels are not normally lowered in Mode 4.
To prevent future non-valid ESF actuations of this type the licensee is revising procedure 12006-C, Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown to disable the TDAFW pump in addition to the MDAFW pumps.
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Also in Mode 4 while performing a maintenance PM on reactor trip switchgear a feedwater isolation occurred when electricians were checking for free movement of the reactor trip breaker cell switches.
This ESF actuation is discussed in detail in paragraph 2e below.
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During the outage in addition to repacking valve 2HV-8702B major tasks included: repacking the other RHR loop suction isolation valve 2HV-8701B; and a letdown isolation valve, 2LV-459; a hydrogen leak on the main generator was repaired; and a source range and extended range nuclear ' instrument were replaced.
The unit restarted on December 16 and achieved criticality on-December 17.
Overall the inspectors found that the shutdown.and startup were performed safely and that the licensee accomplished a significant amount of work during this short outage-by carefully
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planning prior to the shutdown and reacting appropriately to work discovered after shutdown.
The inspectors also toured containment
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during the outage and found the general condition and housekeeping to be good. The leaks were repaired.
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e.
Unit 2 feedwater Isolation During Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance
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On Occomber 13, Unit 2 was in Mode 4 and cooling down to enter
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Mode 5.
Long cycle condensate /feedwater recirculation was in
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progress to cool the condensate system and feedwater loops 2, 3, and 4 BfRVs and the loop 1 MFIV were open. Maintenance personnel were performing an inspection on the reactor trip switchgear using procedure 27767-C, Reactor Trip Switchgear' Checkout and Maintenance. During manipulation of the switchgear the P-4 reactor trip permissive was cycled off and on and a reactor trip signal was initiated.
The unit was already tripped, threfore, no control rod movement occurred. However, a main feedwat r system isolation did occur upon initiation of the P-4 permissi'e concurrent with a low reactor coolant system average temperature.
The open MflV and BfRVs closed as designed and isolated long cycle recirculation.
Control room operators verified the actuation was
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invalid and reestablished the long cycle recirculation lineup.
The licensee determined that procedure 27767-C should not have been scheduled for performance during Mode 4 and that the procedure was inadequate because it gave no limitations on its performance based on plant configuration. As corrective actions the licensee changed the preventive maintenance checklist-to note that 27767-C should not be performed until the SSPS is placed in
" test" upon entering mode 5.
Also procedure 27767-C has been
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revised to add a precaution against its performance'with the SSPS in service. A raview of similar procedures did not identify any others as having the potential for causing unnecessary ESF actuations. The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the ESF actuation and determined that it had minimal safety significance and that the licensee responded with appropriate corrective actions.
f.
Failure to follow Radiological Control Procedures On December 24, the licensee identified an event where two plant'
equipment operators failed to follow radiological control procedures while performing Unit 2 surveillance procedure 14460-2, ECCS Flow Path Verification.
The error was identified during a~
discussion between the Operations shift superintendent and a Hp foreman at a turnover status meeting.
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To perform the.ECCS flow path verification procedure, posted high radiation areas must be entered and potentially contaminated systems are breached and vented. This-requires notification of HP
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that potentially contaminated systems are to be vented and observation of proper radiological control practices including
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signing onto a specific RWP that allows entry into posted high radittion areas, and review of dose rate surveys prior to entering the areas.
It was determined that two plant equi) ment operators had performed the ECCS flow path surveillance wit 1out notifying HP or signing onto the proper RWP.
Both of the individuals were signed onto an RWP (#92-0022) which is only for routine rounds and valve lineups.
One plant equipment operator had performed the surveillance concurrently with normal operations rounds.
The other equipment operator performed independent verification of valves following completion of the surveillance.
Both of the PE0s entered posted high radiation nreas and one had breached potentially contaminated systems without HP being present.
Procedure 00930-C, Radiation and Contamination Control, step 5.1.4.3 requires personnel to be signed onto a specific RWP prior to entry into any high radiation area and also that entry is permitted only after the dose rate level has been made known to personnel.
Procedure 14460-2, Step 3.3 also requires personnel to observe proper radiological practices when venting systems.
The inspector reviewed access data for the' RWP used for ECCS flow verification (#92-0107) and surveillance tracking records for procedurs 14460 for both units for the previous six months and found that personnel had been signing onto the appropriate RWP to per form this surveillance. The inspector also verified from EDRD dose rate records that the two PE0s did not enter actual high radiation areas. The highest dose rate encountered by either PE0 was 30 mR/h.
This event represents a violation of Radiological Control and Operations Surveillance procedures.
The inspector noted that~a similar violation of personnel implementation of HP controls had occurred previously and is documented in NRC IR 50-424,425/92-20.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for this event and found them acceptable.
The inspector determined that corrective actions for the previous violation would not have prevented this violation since this was an isolated event.
The licensee's corrective actions included providing a shift briefing to all of the operating crews and counseling the individuals involved.
This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying'and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section Vll.B of the NRC Enforcement policy. This violation is identified as NCY 50-424,/92-31-01, failure to follow Radiological Control and Operations Surveillance Procedures.
One non-cited vio1ation was identified.
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3.
Surveillance Observation and Procedure Review (61726) (61700)
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General Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy.
The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspectes to determine that approved
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procedures were available, equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test-results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.
SURVElltANCE N0.
IllLE 14980-1 Diesel Generator Operability Test 88009-C Hoderator Temperature Coefficient Determination (E0L) - Unit 1 14860-2 PORY Cold Shutdown Inservice Test 14850-2 Cold Shutdown Valve Inservice Test (2HV-5227)
14423-2 Source Range NIS ACOT 14809-1 ESF Chilled Water Pump Inservice Test f
12003-C Reactor Start-up 14005-2 SOM Calculations b.
Surveillance Procedure Review The inspector reviewed procedures and programs that provided instruccions for the steam generator blowdown valve surveillance, E-Bar surveillance, and PORV surveillance.
During the inspection the following documents were reviewed:
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35110-C
. Chemistry Control of the Reactor Coolant System; Rev 16 Dated 12-22-89, Rev 17 l-Dated 12-13-90-L l
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33020-C Determination of Average Beta-Gamma Energy (E-Bar) of Reactor Coolant-Manual Method; Rev 2 Dated 12-05-86, Rev 3-Dated 9-07-90 28905-C Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload By-Pass 18 Month. Verification; Rev 6 Dated-11-18-88, Deleted 1-17-90 30090-0 Chemistry Technical Specification Surveillance Performance Coordination; Rev 7 Dated 4-26-89, Rev l-24-90 34330-C Surveillance of the DRMS; Rev 0 Dated-1-18-90 14860-C Cold Shutdewn In-Service Test; Rev 1 Dated 11-18-88, Rev 2 Dated 2-01-90 for the above areas of surveillance, the following DCs were reviewed and discussed with the plant staff to assure that discrepancies and deficiencies identified in the field were being dispositioned properly:
1890741 1890091 1890177 1891441 1900301 2900092 2900101 1920003 2900077 2891360 1911017 1900324 1910071 2910115 2900079 1900293 2900328 1920021 2920034 1920046 1920054 2920039 The inspector conducted discussions.with engineers, technicians and managers.
They explained the background of.how the surveillances were performed, the kind of discrepancies that were identified, and the corrective actions being taken.
Based on this review, the inspector.concludad that personnel performing-surveillance.were aggressive in identifying and reporting deficiencies and that the procedures in place were being properly used and updated as needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
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General j
The-inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel,. and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted
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The inspectors also frequently verified that redundant components were operable, administrative controls were followed, clearances were adequate, personnel-were
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qualified, correct replacement parts were u_ sed, radiological controls were proper, fire._ protection-was_ adequate,-adequate post-maintenance testing was performed, and independent verification requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was oroperly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the
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licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance activities.
q The inspecters witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance activities:
MWO NOL WORK DESCRIPTION 19204073 Replace Cell 156 in Unit 10 Battery 19203720 Install Single Cell r.harger on Cell
- 40 in Unit lA Battery 29202020 Troublesnoot Ground on Source Range NI 2N32 b-Unit 2 Steam Generator Secondary Manway Leak-l On November 30, during a walkdown of the Unit 2 montainment,
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personnel discovered a steara leak m the secondary manway of SG
- 1. The walkdown was prompted by intermittent containment condensate coolev leak detection alarms. With the exception of-the leak detection alarm, there were no other indications -
(tueerature or _high humidity)-of leakage within containment.
The v ilc. of the leakage was estimated to be approximately 0.4 gpm and was reported as-a three to four foot plume of steam spraying _
from-the gasket area on one side of the manway.
The licensee determined that a tempor4ry repair was feasible while at 100% power and performed a safety emluation for,iustification.
nf the repair method to be used. The sealant rnatcrial to be used 4.s evaluated ti Southern Nuclear Company as satisfactory for the
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nigh temperature environment to which it-would be exposed. The repair was made in two steps with a separate'. temporary
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modification package for. each step.
The first step was completed on December 3 when the sealant material was injected into the.
gasket area and'the leak was stopped.
Or. December 21, following _ a Unit 2 maintenance outage, a clamp was placed around the manway to provide a more secure-support for the temporary seal.
A permanent-repair will be made during the next refueling outage.
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Th' inspectors reviewed the licensee's -safety evaluations and-temporary modification package for the SG manway leak repair and determined that the licensee had performed an adequate analysis'of..
the method used to temporarily repair the manway leak. The inspectors had no concerns.
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c.
Unit 1 Battery Cell Failures During this inspection period the inspectors noted.two. instances where entry into Unit 1 IS LCOs was required due to-low battery cell voltage readings during surveillances.
This issue was previously noted as a declining performance trend in NRC IR'
424,425/92-23.
On December 8, the inspector observed installation of a single cell charger on cell #40 in the 1A battery. The single cell charge was initiated because the voltage reading on this cell was-measured at 2.129 volts which was below the category B l_imit of 2.13 volts per TS 3.8.2.1, D. C. Sources.
This required entry into a seven day LCO.
The single cell charge installation was.
removed on December 13, and the cell voltage was to 2.20 volts.
On December 17, the inspector observed maintenance personnel-replacing cell #56 in the ID battery. The cell's voltage was measured at 2.060 volts during surveillance testing. _This voltage
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was below the category B, 2.10 volts allowable value per TS 3.8.2.1 and required entry into a two hour LCO. The new cell was installed within the two hour LCO.
The licensee is continuing to investigate the recurring cell failures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Review of Special Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Program The inspector reviewed selected portions of-procedures used for _the control and accountability of non-fuel SNM at Vogtle, interviewed personnel, reviewed historical records, and verified the locations of several unirradiated fission chambers containing SNM.
The inspector also reviewed the causes and corrective actions for a-licensee identified deficiency.
This deficiency involved a fission chamber 'which was removed from the Unit 2 Containment and transferred to storage in the auxiliary building, and a replacement fission chamber which was-issued from.the site warehouse without the completion ~ of a fission chamber transfer form as required by Procedure 93640-C, Revision 6, _
Internal Transfer of Special Nuclear Material. This procedure requires that the SNM custodian or his designee prepare a Fission Chamber Transfer Form, which is then submitted to the Reactor Engineering _
supervisor for authorization, and then transmitted to the individual directing _the fission chamber transfer. -After the fission chamber transfer, the SNM custodian completes the FCTF. The completed FCTFs are used to update the Fission Chember History Cards, which are integral to
.the perpetual _ inventory of the fission chambers, and to the control and
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accountability of non-fuel L SNM onsite.
The transfer of the fission chambers involved in this deficiency occurred on December 14,-1992, at 1:07-a.m..
The licensee subsequently identified that the fission chambers had been moved without proper 3 l
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4 notification, and records completion, later on December 14.
The-licensee's compensatory actions included verifying the locations of the fission chambers, and completion of the appropriate forms.
The inspector determined that it became necessary to replace. the extended range instrument fission chamber during the replacemea of a.
source range nuclear instrument.
During replacement of the source range instrument the cable to the extended range instrument fission chamber was inadvertently damaged, necessitating the unplanned replacement.
The-procedures being used did not prompt the workers to follow the requirements for the transfer of norrfuel SNM.
The inspector determined that while many licensee individuals were cognizant of the requirements with regard to the transfer of SNM, the individuals involved in the transfer of the fission chamber were not knowledgeable of these requirements.
The inspector alsu deter ined that when thc warehouse issued the replacement fission chamber, their computer screen (Inventory Summary Storekeeper Screen) prompted ther to first notify a specific individual without indicating a reason.
The individual listed was supposed t<
ensure that the procedures for the control and accounting of SNH were followed. The name on the screen, however, was outdated and inappropriate. As a result the control room-SS authorited thr. tiansfer of the fission chamber without completing the documentation requirements.
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The SNM custodian is responsible, by procedure, for the inventory and
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maintenance of records of the movements and locations of all SNM within item Controlled Areas in the plant, and should be notified of the
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receipt of fission chambers in order to maintain control and accountability of the SNM.
The inspector determined that there are two types of fission chambers in use at Vogtle:. movable incore fission chambers (detectors);-and excore, post-accident fission chambers.
The latter are larger than the incore flision chambers, and are stored in the warehouse. The incore fission chambers,.upon receipt at'the warehouse, are imme fiately routed to a locked, key-controlled, storage cabinet in the HP counting-room.
In an effort to control.the receipt and transfer of SNM, the licensee had implemented an " informal' control over the HP cabinet key. The HP storage cabinet key was not to be released for use without the notification of the SNM custodian. However, the inspector determined that, on at least one previous instance (on March 3,1992), fission chambers were received and/or transferred without the SNM custodian being notified.
This informal control failed in that the key was accessed and the storage cabinet was unlocked without the notification
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The. inspector also reviewed procedure 93660-C Revision 5, Physical Inventories of Special Nuclear Material, which delineates the requirements for the six-month physical inventories of non-fuel SNM.
The inspector noted that this procedure exempted the movable incore
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fission chambers from the physical inventory requirements, contradicting-the guidance aromulgated in IN 88-32. The inspector reviewed the records-for p1ysical inventories performed during the past three years and determined that the licensee was including unirradiated fission chambers in the physical inventories; however, the inventories did not appear to include the fission enambers in use in containment, other than the post-accident fission chambers.
The inspector did verify that the location of the in-use fission chambers was recorded on the fission chamber histcry cards.
The inspector also noted during this review that the fission chamber history cards did not specifically identify the specific casks used for disposal of the fission chambers.
The inspector did determine, based on interviews with the licensee, that che casks had a separate, written log, which identified by number the fission chambers they contained.
The inspector ai,a performed an inventory of the contents of the HP atorage cabinet and compared the contents against the-fission chamber history cards and the FCTCs. No problems were identified.
The inspector concluded that the program for the control ar.d accocotability of non-fuel SNM at Vogtle was weak in that ~the procedures in place did not contain adequate guidance to preclude the unauthorized transfer of non-fuel SNM.
The licensee verbally committed to review the program and clarify the requirements for the receipt, transfer, and inventorying of non-fuel SNM. This was identified as IFI 50-424,425/92-31-02:
Inadequate SN!! control and accountability procedures-lead to program weakness.
One IFI was identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports, follow-up (90712) (92700)
(92701) (92702)
The Licensee Event Reports and follow-up items listed below were reviewed to determine if the information provided met'NRC requirements.
Tht. determination included:
adequacy-of. description, verification of TS compliance and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and relative safety significance of each event..
a.
(Closed) LER 50-424/92-04, Rev 0, and Rev 1, Reactor Shutdown Due to Excessive Unidentified Leakage.
The root-cause of the weld failure which resulted in the leakage was determined to be caused by low amplitude high cycle fatigue
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due to vibration. On June 26, 1992, Westinghouse issued the results of a metallurgical investigation of the cracked drain valve weld. The inspector reviewed the investigation report and noted.that the crack initiated on the inside diameter of the piping material and I mpayated through the pipe and.then through-l the weld.
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The licensee 1mplemented design change DCP 92-VIN 0174 which
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installed additional piping supports on two of the three similar unsupported drain valve assemblies on Unit I that may be susceptible to vibration induced fatigue.
The third drain valve assembly is the assembly which experienced the failure and resulted in the leak.
This assembly was removed and _ plugged as
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described in NRC IR 92-11.
The assembly will be reinstalled with i
additional supports during the next refueling outage.
The licensee reviewed Unit 2 for similar drain / vent valve configurations and identified four unsupported drain valve assemblies. A DCP was initiated to design and install supports on the four lines identified to prevent a potential fatigue failure.
Based on this review this item is closed.
b.
(Closed)
LER 50-424/91-004, ESF Actuations Result from Ground
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Condition Troubleshooting.
The licensee determined that battery charger IB01CA_was experiencing voltage fluctuations which were responsible for the actuations that occurred. According to the battery charger vendor, the voltage fluctuations could have been caused by failure of any one of six circuit boards and could be eliminated by using a later model circuit board.
The six control circuit boards were replaced with the later model circuit boards and the battery charger was restored to operable status.
The control circuit
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boards of the remaining safety ~ related battery chargers will be inspected and replaced, if necessary, as part of the normal
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preventive maintenance program.
Based on this rev1w this item is closed.
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c.
(Closed)
LER 50-424/92-008, Reactor Trip Due to Main Feedwater Pump Loss of Spaed Control.
Troubleshooting determined that the cause of this event was the failure of the MFP A speed controller tracker / driver circuit card.
A new circuit card was installed and the failed card v:as returned to the vendor for failure analysis.
This was the third ~ failure within the past year of a card in this location.
The vendor analysis concluded that there was some contamination in the conformal coating on the card which allowed a resistance leakage-between the OP Amp and some other voltage source on the card.
.A new OP amp was. Installed on the card and the conformal coating was replaced in the area of the OP Amp circuitry.
The card then performed correctly and was calibrated. The vendor did not consider this failure to be a generic issue or that it was related-to other card failures in the same card slot. The licensee has
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initiated an open item to contact other licensees to determine if
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there is-a history of these. type failures within the industry.
Based on this review this item is closed.
d.
(Closed) LER 50-424/91-16, " Failure to Complete Technical Specification Required Action for Battery Cell Low Voltage."
This item was identified as a non-cited violation in NRC IR 424, 425/92-33 for inadequate procedural guidance for interpreting cell terminal voltage data obtained during single cell charging activities. The inspectors observed the licensee replacing this~
cell on January 29, 1992 (IA battery cell 24).
The inspector verified that procedure 27915-C, General Battery Maintenance, was revised to add an appropriate caution statement to contact the maintenance foreman and shift supervisor if-the cell terminal voltage of a cell on a single cell charge drops below TS 1imits.
In addition, the licensee conducted training on this event for appropriate maintenance personnel.
Based on this review this item is closed.
e.
(Closed) LER 50-424/92-002, Rev 0, Testing Reveals ESFAS Sequencer to be Operating.0utside of Design-Basis The licensee determined that the cause of the event was due to a design inadequacy in the ATI circuitry.
The inspectors reviewed and documented this problem as an IFI in NRC IR 424, 425/92-07 which was closed in NRC IR 424,425/92-11.
Based on the follow-up to the IFI, this item is' closed, f.
(Closed) VIO 424,425/91-15-01, Failure To Follow Procedure The licensee responded to the violation-in correspondence dated
September 4, 1991. This violation involved three examples of a failure to follow procedure. One example-involved a failure to reset setpoints on a main steam line radiation monitor.
In addition to immediately resetting the monitor setpoints, the-licensee-counseled the individuals involved in the incident and.
prepared a chemistry department memo to all foremen and technicians discussing-this event and-re-emphasizing the-importance of procedural. compliance.
The second example involved a failure to install jumper and lifted wire tags on a MSIV undergoing' maintenance.. The licensee revised procedure 20429-C, Short Term Documentation of Temporary Jumpers and 1.ifted Wires, to clarify the use of temporary jumpers and lifted-wire documentation and trained electricians on the revisions to the procedcre.
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q The third example involved a failure to correctly align the SI system prior to running the SI pump. This failure resulted in apparently running the S! pump dead headed for approximately 22
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minutes. A licensee review of the test data following the test indicated that a flow rate of 42 gpm was observed in the mini-flow lines. Due to the indication of flow through a closed valve (2HV-8920), the scope of the corrective action for this violation was expanded to address the leaking mini-flow valve.
The licensee immediately performed procedure 14804-2 again, Safety Injection Pump Inservice and Response Time Tests, satisfactorily.
The e
operators associated with the event were counseled regarding the importance of procedural compliance and the importance of the requirement for reactor operators to manipulate the main control board during tag outs or restoration. An er.gineering review-of the operational impact of a closed mini-flow valve with a high leakage rate was performed and found that verificai. ion _of the common SI pump mini-flow valve to the RWST is closed during cold leg recirculation would be necessary to prevent an unacceptable safety challenge.
As an interim measure, steps were added to i
procedures 19010-0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 190130-C, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, to verify that the mini-flow valves were closed prior to transferring to cold leg recirculation and actions to take should there be leakage. An MWO was initiated on the valve and work was completed on April 20, 1991. The functional test on the valve verified no leakage.
Af ter valve 2HV-8920 was repaired the procedural compensatory actions were deleted.
Plant management was also responsive in recognizing a weakness in the area of procedural' compliance and made an effort to foster a greater awareness of procedure compliance and management-expectations.
Based on this review of the licensee's corrective actions, this item is' closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Exit Meeting The inspection scope and. findings were summarized on January 4,1993,
-with those persons. indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not -identify as proprietary any of the material-provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
lbLm No.
Dascription and Reference NCV 424,425/92-31-01 Failure to Follow Radiciogical Control-Procedures (Paragraph 2f).
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IFl 424,425/92-31-02 Inadeouate SNM control and accountability procedures lead to program weakness (Paragraph 5).
8.
Abbreviations ACOT
- Analog Channel Operational Test AfW
- Auxiliary feedwater System ATI
- Automatic Test Insertion Bfly
- By-Pass feedwater Isolation Valve BfRV
- By-Pass Feedwater Regulator Valve DC
- Deficiency Card DCP
- Design Change Package DG
- Diesel Generator ECCS
- Emergency Core Cooling System EDRD
- Electronic Direct Reading Dosinetry E0L
- End of Life ESF
- Engineered Safety Feature FCTF
- Fission Chamber Transfer form GPM
- Gallons Per tiinute HP
- Health Physics I&C
- Instrumentation and Control Ifl
- Inspector Follow-up Item IR
- Inspection Report LCO
- Limiting Condition for Operation LER
- Licensee Event Report MDAFW
- Motor Driven Auxiliary feedwater MFIV
- Main Feedwater Isolation Valve MFP
- Main Feedwater Pump MfW
- Main feedwater mR/h
- Millirem Per Hour NCV
- Non-Cited Violation NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSCW
- Nuclear Service Cooling Water System PA
- Protected Area PE0
- Plant Equipment Operator PM
- Preventive Maintenance PORV
- Power Operated Relief Valve RCDT
- Reactor Coolant Drain Tank-RCS
- Radiation' Work Permit RWST
- Refueling Water Storage Tank SAER
- Safety Audit And Engineering Review SDM
- Snutdow Margin SG
- Safety injection SNM
- Special auclear Material SR
- Source Range SSPS
- Solid Stete Protection System TDAFW
- Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater TS
- Technical Specifications
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