IR 05000424/1989007
| ML20248D981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1989 |
| From: | Aiello R, Burger C, Hunt M, Rogge J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248D956 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-89-07, 50-424-89-7, 50-425-89-10, NUDOCS 8904120098 | |
| Download: ML20248D981 (23) | |
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' . , }' *;.4 j c,g,' I 9[0 UNITED STAVES - B %"'{ l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - i g'4' g
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.p F _ ' REGION 11 ; ' .; n g Ij .101 M ARIETTA STRMT, N.W.
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y-ATLANTA, GEOEC. A 30323 k...,. / , ' .... , . , . . . . "j , ' , Report Nos.: 50.-424/89-07-and 50-425/89-10 Licensee: Georgia Power Company ) .P.O. Box 1295 D Birmingham,.-AL 35201, d l Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68~and NPF-79 a , Facility.Name: -Vogtle 1 and 2-Inspection Conducted: January'21-- February 17, 1989-- < , Inspectors: b-b~%- ' N/Y /8 9 . p J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector-Date $1gned 6. 42A.
4/n ' h' C. W. Burger, Senior.. Resider.1 Inspector Data Signed j ~ , Ch 42A-2 /w/re ' - k. R. F. Aiello,. Resident Inspector Date Signed.
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4-- dd~ h __ 3// %/5" l ' h M. D. Hunt, _ Regional Inspector (February 6-9) Date Signed ' 3//4b 9 - Approved By: 4' ' % g., r M. V. Sinkule, Section Chief Date Signed Division of. Reactor Projects < SUMMARY ( Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed resident Inspection in' d the following areas:- plant operations, radiological control s, maintenance, surveillance, security, initial fuel load-(Unit 2),:and-quality programs and administrative controls affecting quality.
i Results: Seven vio~1ations were' identified.
Four licen'see identified
violations.in the area of operations which were not cit'ed " Failure 'To Implement Procedure'. 35611-C Which Resulted, In ~ An. Inadvertent-01scharge Of Reactor. Coolant To Th'e Fuel 1 Handling Building Drains," ~ i paragraph 3.b.(2)(b); " Failure. To Establish An Adequate. Procedure Per TS 6.7.1 Which Led To A Personnel Error In Removing. Two ESF ! Chilier Trains From Sesvi ce," paragraph 3.b.(2)(d); " Failure 1 To Establish'An Adequate Procedure And Provide' Adequate 8904120098 890321
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tabeling," 3.b.(3)(a); and " Failure To ' Perform TS 4.2.4.1, 12 Hour QPTR Surveillance Within 4.0.2 Requirements" 3.b.(3)(b).
One licensee identified violation in the. area of radiological controls l which was not cited "Fbilure To Establish And Implement Adequate ' Procedues For Functional Testing Of Radiation Monitor 1RE-0003" 3.b.(3)(c).
One licensee identified violation-in the area of maintenance which was not cited " Failure To Comply With TS ' , , i 3.3.3.5.2 Which Require That The NSCW Fan Transfer Switch Be Operable J At The Remote Shutdown Panel" 3.b.(2)(c).
One licensee identified a violation in the area of surveillance which was not cited " Failure l To Implement. Procedure 54035-1 Prerequisite Which Resulted In An i Unplanned Safety Injection" 3.b.(2)(a).
i The areas inspected were considered adequate in that no specific ! ' strengths or weaknesses were identified by or to the NRC inspectors.
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Persons Contacted Licen'ee Employees l s l
- G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Plant
) R. M. Bellamy, Plant Manager i
- T. V. Greene, Plant Support Manager
J. E. Swartzwelder, Nuclear Safety & Compliarice Manager - W. F. Kitchens, Manager Operations M. A. Griffis, Maintenance Superintendent ) '*C. C. Echert, Manager Chemis#ry and Health Physics
- A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant. Plant Support Manager H. M. Handfinger, Assistant Plant Support Manager F. R. Tiranons, Nuclear Security Manager
- G. A. McCarley, ISEG Supervisor f
- G. fl. Frederick, Quality Assurance Site Manager Operations j
W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor j R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor > P. D. Rice, Vice President, Vogtle Project Director R. H. Pinson, Vice President, Project Construction C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent q Other licensee employees contacte6 included craftsmen, technicians, supervision, engineers, operations, maintenance, chemistry, QC inspectors, and office personnel.
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- Attended Exit Interview i
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Operational Safety Verification - (71707)(93702) The plant began this inspection on January 21, 1989 while Unit 1 was conducting a normal plant shutdown required by technical specifications in
order to repair a primary code safety valve loop seal drain socket weld I and Unit. 2 was making preparations for initial fuel load.
Following i repairs anu testing, Unit 1 entered Modes 4 and 3, hot shutdown and hot standby respectively.
On January 27, Unit 1 entered Mode 2 (Startup), j achieved criticality and entered Mode 1 (Power Operation). On January 29 q Unit 1 achieved 100% power.
On February 10, Unit I was manually tripped ) due to lowerina water level in all four stean' generators as a result of a ) trip of main f eed pump turbine "A" due to high vibration.
7he Unit 1
reactor trip was complicated b; a failure of the TOAFW pump to perform as j designed.
Followup surveillance and testing of the TDAFW pump was ~ conducted, however no cause for failure was determined.
On February 11, 'Jnit 1 reentered Mode 2 and e.chieved criticality. On February 12, Unit 1 e.ntered Mode 1 and was maintaining 74% reactor power through the end of this inspection pericd until repairs and testing on the "A" MFP are umplete. Unit 2 received a low power (55%) license on February 9, 1989 i . _ ___ - __-________ ___ -
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l and began loading fuel on February 10. Delays and interruptions occurred while conducting core alterations.
A faulty limit switch was discovered j on the upender in the feal handling building prior to transferring the j first fuel assembly and a broken sprocket on the fuel transfer cart
occurred after the.102nd assembly was moved.
At the end of thf s I inspection ceriod all fuel assemblies had been ' loaded and preparations ' were being made to perform core verification, install the epper core-internals, and set the react 6r vessel head. One ESF actuation occurred on j February 14, 1989.
When the outside air intake rad' monitor PE-12116
failed due to a loss of power causing a Unit'2 control coom isolation.
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Control Room Activities Control Room tours and observations were performed to verify that J facil1ty operations were being safely conducted within regulatory requirements.
These inspections consisted of one os more of the l following attM butes as appropriate at the time of the inspection.
- Proper Control Room staffing - Control Room access and opeirator behavior - Adherence to approved procedures for activities in progress - Adherence to Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations - Observance of instruments and recorder traces of safety related and important to safety systems for abnormalities l - Review of annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct l - Control Board wclkdowns - Safety parameter display and the plant safety wxitoring system operability status.
i - Discussions and interviews with the On-Shift Operations Supervisor, ' Shift Supervisors, Reactor Operators, and the Shift l Tecnnical Adviscrs (when stationed) to determine the plant status, l plans, and tu assess operator knowledge I - Review of the operator logs, unit logs and shift turnover sheets While conducting a routine inspection of the control room, in l particular, interviewing the: Shift Supervisor and the Reactor Operator tc determine the plant status and assess operator knowledge, the inspector noticed a weakness in that the operators did not know vinen or if the moderator temperature coefficient went positive on a down pcwer transient.
Furthermore, this information was not available in the control room. This weakness was discussed with the acting Operations Superintendent who took orompt corrective action by insuring that a copy of the "MTC versus Average Moderator Temperature" curve from the Vogtle Unit 1 cycle 2 and Unit 2 cycle 1 i nuclear design report, was placed in the control room plant technical data book.
, l Wo violations or deviations were identified.
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Facility Activities j Facility tours and-observations uer e performed to - assess the i effectiveness of the administrative controls estab?ished by direct observation of plant ectivities, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety systems status i and LCOs, licensee meetings and facility records.
During these ! inspections the following objectives were achieved: (1). Safety System Status - Confirmation of system operability was ) 'I obtained by verification that flowpath valve alignment, control and power supply alignments, component conditions, and support systems for the accessible portions of the ESF trains were proper. The inaccessible portions are confirm'ed as availability ) l permi ts. During the Unit 1 startup on February 11, the ) l inspector questioned the operability of the auxiliary feedwater J l actuation upon a loss of feed pumps.
The issue resulted when l L operators were trying to revise procedures to alicw trip testing of the B main feedwater pump with the A main feedwater pump disabled.
Since the TS requires two operable channels tripping to produce an AFW actuation, the inspector questioned the i resetting of an inoperable pump.
The resetting of the inoperable pump was necessary to preclude an AFW actuation upon performing the other feed pump trip test.
The inspector concluded that the failure to get an actuation was definite l proof that both channels were inoperable. The inspector further I concluded that since this was not the source of feedwater to the l steam generators, that an actuation of AFW upon loss of two l ' feedwater pumps lacked significance.
The next issue however, pertained to how the licensee was to maintain operable circuitry with a disabled feed pump.
The licence connitted to maintain i the disabled pump in a tripped condition so that a loss of the I running feed pump would result in an AFW actuation. According I to unit procedures, this is the normal practice for a non l running feed pump.
Restoration of the disabled pump would require the disabling of the circuitry each time the pump was l reset.
Clarification with NRR was in progress at the end of , ' l this report.
The final resolution of this item is identified l as: Inspection Followup Item 50-424/89-07-01 " Clarify TS Channel Operability And Action Statements."
(2). Plant Housekeeping Conditions Storage of material and - components and cleanliness conditions of vcrious areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether ' i safety and/or fire hazards existed.
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1 I A special walkdown of the Unit 2 containment was performed with the Vice President, Construction and the Technical Support Manager.
The inspector identified areas that were_ typical of poor housekeeping practices or ineffective cleanup efforts..The j licensee responded by placing key managers in charge of a two l day cleanup effort.
Following this cleanup the inspector i reexamined containment and concluded that progress had been made, however tools, trash, and other debris was still evident.
The licensee continued to apply resources and recognizes that a ) comprehensive effort now would preclude problems when ! containment becomes contaminated.
A secondary issue was i identified by the Plant Manager regarding control of planned j work inside containment.
A walkdown of containment with the l , l Plant Manager was also performed to judge the ongoing progress j . of the cleanup.. The original special walkdown also included.two l l levels of the Unit 2 Control Building to stress the necessity J for a more controlled cleanup effort.
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(3). Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, { actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency l equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
j i l (4). Radiation Protection - Radiation' protection activities, staffing I and equipment were observed to verify proper program ) implementation.
The inspection included review of the plant j program effectiveness.
Radiation work pennit's and personnel l compliance were reviewed during the daily plant tours.
i Radiation Control Areas were ob*erved to verify proper ' identification and implementation.
(5). Security - Security controls were observe to verify that security harriers were intact, guard forcet.are on duty, and access to the Protected Area was controlled in accordance with the facility security plan.
Personnel were observed to verify proper display of badges and that' personnel requiring escort were properly escorted.
Personnel within Vital Areas were observed to ensure proper authorization for the area.
Equipment operability or proper compensatory activities were verified on'a
periodic basis.
l i (6). Surveillance (61726)(61700) - Surveillance tests were observed l to verify that approved procedures' were being used; qualified l personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to i verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; ' and TS requirements were fcilowed.
The inspectors o'oserved portions of the following surveillance and reviewed completed data against acceptance criteria:
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{ ! I Surveillance No, Title j
14618 Rev. O SSPS Slave Relay K610 Train "A" SI 14835 Rev. 3 Boric Acid Injection Check Valve Cold Shutdown Inservice Test 14406 Rev. 2 Boron Injection Flow Path Verification i (Shutdown) l 14980 Rev. 14 EDG Operability Test 14830 Rev. 5 Quarterly AFW Check Valve Inservice Test 14540 Rev. 3 Main Turbine Valves Monthly Stroke Test l 14810 Rev. 7 TDAFW Pump Inservice Test 14661 Rev. O SSPS Slave Relay Test Train "B" RWST Low Level i 14663 Rev. O SSPS Slave Relay Test Train "B" FC I ' Isolation 14425 Rev. 5 PR Quarterly ACOT (7). Maintenance Activities (62703) - The inspector observed i maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment j clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention I work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;
l quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; retesting and return of systems to service was prompt and correct; TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance Work Order backlog was reviewed.
Maintenance was observed and MWO packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities: , MWO No.
Work Description '
18606863 Investigate / Rework TPCW Pump #2 Miniflow Valve Controller I 28981006 Rework Reactor Makeup Water Supply l Valve (2-R28-44-144) And Diaphragm 28901670 Repair Lube Oil Heat Exchanger . Leak At Flange Of Jacket Water- ! Inlet Lube Oil Outlet (8). Title 10 Positions (913008)- The inspector conducted a thorough walkdown of the facility to verify that the required notices to workers and instructions to workers were posted per 10 CFR 19.11 and 10 CFR 19.12 respectively.
(9). Initial Fuel Load (72524) - Unit 2 - This inspection consisted of witnessing all aspects of the initial fuel loading for Unit 2, verifying conformance to the Technical Specifications,
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administrative and procedural requirements, reviewing applicable fuel load procedures and the control room log.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Review of Licensee Reports (90712)(90713)(92700) a.
In-Office Review of Periodic and Special Reports This inspection consisted of reviewing the below listed reports to determine whether the information reported by the licensee was technically adequate and consistent with the inspector knowledge of the material contained within the report.
Selected material within the report was questioned randomly to verify accuracy and to provide a reasonable assurance that other NRC personnel have an appropriate document for their activities.
(Closed) Special Report 50-424/89-01 " Inoperable Radiation Monitor."
Steam line radiation monitor RE-13120 was removed from service on January 5, 1989, after displaying erratic readings.
Troubleshooting found a faulty cable, which was replaced, and an intermittently sticking check source actuator, which was readjusted.
Following testing, the monitor was returned to service on January 17, 1989.
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Licensee Event Reports and Deficiency Cards Licensee Event Reports and Deficiency Cards were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72, were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the technical specifications and other regulatory requirements were satisfied.
In-office review of LERs may result in further followup to verify that the stated corrective actions have been completed, or to identify violations in addition to those described in the LER.
Each LER is reviewed for enforcement action in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C.
Review of DCs was performed to maintain a realtime status of deficiencies, determine regulatory compliance, follow the licensee corrective actions, and assist as a basis for closure of the LER when reviewed.
Due to the numerous DCs processed only those DCs which result in enforcement action or further inspector followup with the licensec at the end of the inspection are listed below.
The LERs and DCs denoted with an asterisk indicates that reactive inspection occurred at the time of the event prior to receipt of the written report.
(1) Deficiency Card reviews:
- DC 1-89-417/416 " Manual Reactor Trip Following Trip Of MFP "A"
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And Rapidly Decreasing Steam Generator Levels / Failure Of TDAFW' Pump.To Perform Its Intended Function". On February 10, 1989, the Unit.1 reactor was manu' ally. tripped due' to a lowering of water level in all ;four steam generators.
The levels in the steam generators dropped as a-result of MFP "A" tripping on high vibration.
The trip was further complicated by the TDAFW pump . failing to perform its : intended safety function. Surveillance and other extensive test ware performed on1the'TDAFW pump with the root cause of the pump trip being' inconclusive.
- DC 1-89-456 " Failure To Perform Surveillance On The Containment Building Telephone Page. System Breaker."
On February 15, the : Licensee identified that TS surveillance 4.8.4.1.a.2 had not been performed on a 120 volts' alternating Current Feeder Breaker,LCB-6, for' containment.
The licensee identified this during a review of Unit 2 data. This item will receive further followup submitted as an LER.
- DC 2-89-487 " Power loss To 2RE-12116 Results In A Control Room Isolation."
On February 14, the first reportable Unit 2 ESF actuation occurred as a results of a power loss to the instrument.
This item will receive further ; followup when submitted as an LER.
- DC 2-89-494." Tie Wrap Discovered In Reactor Vessel During Core Loading."
On February 12, the licensee. identified a single white tie wrap. This tie wrap identical to those used to hold up a plastic cover over the reactor. vessel during rod drive shaft-
installation.
Visual inspection verified no other tie wraps were present.. The single tie wrap was - removed.
Westinghouse evaluation justified that ten tie wraps could remain undetected and'not be a safety problem.
No Further followup of this item i will be performed.
(2) The following LERs were reviewed and are ready for closure pending verification that the licensee's - stated corrective actions have been completed.
< (a). 50-424/88-28, Rev. 1 " Safety Injection Initiated While Performing Test Procedure."
0n October 16, 1988,. with the Unit in Mode 6 (Refueling), an unplanned Safety Injection signal was generated, prior to the procedural step in which . it.was expected, while performin0 Procedure 54055-l'" Train A Diesel Generator And' ESF System Actuation Test"..The' system engineer was aligning the Solid State Protection . hile positioning Logic B System to simulate a SI signal.
W selector switch, a signal was generated which caused a SI actuation.
.Th'e plant responded as expected with a SI . signal present. There was no injection to the reactor _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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vessel since the ~ affected pumps were isolated from the Reactor Coolant System and on miniflow at the time.
The . cause of this. eventwas personnel. error.. The system-engineer failed to complete a prerequisite for the test.
Correctives actions included an immediate change of.
- , procedures 54055-1 and 54065-1 to complete the 'ESFAS test > using other circuitry _and a rewrite of these procedures.to make the procedures easier.to follow. This item represents ~ a violation of-NRC requirements which meets the criteria for non citation.
LIV 50-424/89-07-02." Failure To Implement Procedure 54055-1 Prerequisite Which : Resulted In ' An' Unplanned Safety-Injection - LER 88-28" (b).*50-424/88-45,Rev.0 " Fuel Handling Building' Isolation.
! ~ From High Radiation Caused f By Personnel ' Error."
On December 29, 1988 while sampling - the reactor coolant and while the Post Accident : Sampling System reactor. coolant-l line was being backflushed.. radiation monitors ARE 25328
and 2533B detected gaseous activity 7.7E-7 uCi/cc_of Xe-133 i in the' Fuel. Handling Building Heating, Ventilation and Air ! Conditioning system.
This caused an-unplanned automatic l Engineered Safety Feature actuation.
The PASS had been ' tested on December 28 and the isolation valve 1-HV-8220 had been inadvertently left open. This resulted.in a flow path for reactor coolant to discharge'to FHB drains when the-hot leg sample valve inside containment. was opened while backflushing of the PASS was -being performed.
Corrective l actions include: (1) re-emphasis of : closed-loopL ! communication for the Chemistry and Operations department personnel, (2).a caution will be also added tofthe sections of 35611-C, Rev. 7 that perform a flush 'of the PASS panel to ensure 1-HV-8220. is closed, and.(3) administrative control to maintain a closed door to room A-10. -Corrective action regarding item 2 was verified ~ complete. This item represents a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria for non citation.
LIV 50-424/89-07-03 " Failure-To Implement Procedure 35611-C Which Resulted In An Inadvertent Discharge Of Reactor Coolant To The Fuel Handling.8uilding Drains - LER 88-45" (c).*50-424/89-02, Rev. 0 " Improper Fuses May Have. Prevented . Fulfillment Of A Safety' System Function."
As a.resuit of improper fuses found' in equipment during the: construction phase on Unit 2, plant personnel. initiated a fuse verification walkdown in Unit'l to' confirm that proper fuses were installed.
On January 6,.-1989, personnel l i, i
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performing the walkdown found improperly sized fuses installed in the control circuit for a Nuclear Service Cooling Water fan. motor (1-1202-N4-002-M04).
The control circuit had a 6 amp fuse installed where the design called ' for a 30 amp fuse installed.
The fan was removed.from service and a Limiting Condition for Operation was ! initiated. An investigation was unable to determine if the l incorrect fuses had been supplied by the original vendors i or if they.were replacements installed during maintenance l or other operational activities.
The improper fuses were l replaced and the equipment returned to an operable status.
Other actions have been taken to prevent recurrence and to ! identify similar conditions.
l LIV 50-424/89-07-04 " Failure To Comply With TS 3.3.3.5.2 Which Requires That The NSCW Fan Transfer Switch Be Operable At The Remote Shutdown Panel - LER 89-02" , ! (d). 50-424/89-03, Rev. 0 " Inadvertent Removal Of Train B ESF Chiller From Service Results In Entry Into TS 3.0.3."
On January 18, 1989, Limiting Condition of Operation 1-89-032 was entered for maintenance of Train A Engineered Safety Features chiller.
On January 19, 1989, the ESF Train B chiller was inadvertently removed from service for i calibration.
This resulted in both trains being out of service, which is a condition not allowed by Technical
Specification 3.7.11; thus, the plant entered Technical l Specification 3.0.3.
Calibration of Train B was performed I under a Maintenance Work Order obtained under another MWO and noted a difference in tag numbers.
The technician realized he was working on the wrong train and informed the Shift Supervisor.
Necessary steps of the procedure were completed and Train B was returned to service. At the time of the error, the unit was in the process of conducting a shutdown and achieved Hot Standby within one hour and thirty-five minutes of the allowable seven hours.
The cause of this event was personnel error.
The technician prepared paperwork, which was subsequently approved by the Shif t Supervisor, for calibration of the wrong train.
A contributing cause was a procedure, which only gave the loop number and did not specify the train.
Corrective actions included immediate restoration of Train B to operable status, creating a separate preventative maintenance task for Loop B and adding a train indicator to the procedure loop information sheets.
LIV 50-424/89-07-05 " Failure To Establish An Adequate ' Procedure Per TS 6.7.1 Which Led To A Personnel Error In Removing Two ESF Chiller Training From Service - LER 89-03" _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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[3) The following LERs.were reviewed and closed.
(a).*50-424/87-66,Rev.O " Inadequate Labeling.Causes A' Personnel Error Which Causes A Reactor Trip. On November 11, 1987, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, an unplanned-actuation of the Reactor Protection System.-occurred.- P.lant personnel.were conducting a surveillance test of the Train "A" reactorL trip breakers.
' A Shift Technical Advisor . depressed a shunt trip. test pushbutton on the opposite - i train trip breaker panel cabinet. and a reactor. trip-occurred.
This event was caused by. personnel error,.in" i that a Shift-Technical Advisor. opened the wrong trip " breaker cabinet and' subsequently pushed the wrong test pushbutton'. Corrective action' includes _ better. labeling of each ' cabinet, revising the surveillance ; procedure to
include specific panel and pushbutton. numbers, and positive-i discipline of appropriate: individuals.
. The ' inspector j reviewed the revised.- procedures 14701-1, Rev.. 6. and - l 14701-2, Rev. O.
These procedures reflect the label changes which should preclude recurrence.
This item i represents a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria for non citation.
. ! LIV 50-424/89-07-06 " Failure To Establish-An Adequate ] Procedure And Provide-Adequate-Labeling - LER 87-66" i
(b).*50-424/87-70,Rev.1- " Inadequate Reviews Of Special 'l Condition Surveillance Logs Lead To Missed Surveillance."
On November 22, 1987, the Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio 'was calculated and found to be within its' allowable limit.
Per . Technical Specification 4.2.4.1, the QPTR to'be calculated, j requires. calculations every twelve hours when the-QPTR alarm is inoperable.
As the-alarm was inoperable on-November 22, the next calculation was ~ performed thirty-five minutes after the expiration QPTR was: calculated. :On i December 3, 1987, a QPTR was calculated three minutes after-the -expiration of' the maximum. allowable extension of the.
surveillance interval.
The cause of these events is the-j failure of the control-room supervisory personnel to become- ' aware of the mandatory time ~ requirements 'for the TS surveillance required to be performed dur.ing their.
respective shifts resulting from their review:of the Special Condition Surveillance Log. The inspector reviewed-14000-1, Rev. 17, 14000-2, Rev. 2, 14915-1, Rev.'10, and 14915-2, Rev. I to. verify corrective action was ..impl emented. This item represents a. violation of NRC requirements for the performance of_ surveillance 4.2.4.1 within.4.0.2 requirements which meets the criteria'for non' l _ -. _ _ _ __ .._ j
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i I . purposes only: ' identified for tracking' citation...The following is ~ " ' LIV-50-424/89-07-07 " Failure To Perform TS 4.2.4.1', 12 Hour QPTR Surveillance Within 4.0.2 Requirements - LER 87-70" L (c). 50-424/89-01, - Rev.- 0 " Reset Data Processing' Module Leads j To Containment Ventilation ' Isolation."- On January 4, a ] functional test of ' radiation-monitor IRE-0003 was being ) . performed following maintenance.- When a technician reset-the monitor'.s data ; processing. module -an unplanned i Containment Ventilation Isolation was ' initiating.
The event occurred due to.a failure to fully. inform the' Shift Supervisor of testing activities, an inadequate work. order: H and -inadequate. procedures, and.the technicians, . unfamiliarity with the monitor. Corrective. actions include meetings. with appropriate personnel to emphasize the
- 4 importance of full and complete' communications,. procedure 29401-C, " Maintenance Work Order Functional Tests", will be.
revised to clearly designate the appropriate. work groups for performance of functional test on radiation monitors, procedure 43591-C, Management of ARMS. Parameters",. and.
35226-C, "Techr.ical Specification And Routing Surveillance Channel Checks'and Source Checks of DRMS Monitors", will be revised -to list specific precautions to be taken when resetting the DPM, and' training' of appropriate personnel will include. a description of, the DPM power reset switch and how it works in safety related radiation. monitors.- This item represents a violation'of NRC requirements which ~ meets the criteria for non citation.. ! l l l LIV 50-424/89-07-08 " Failure To' Establish And Implement Adequate Procedures For' Functional Testing Of Radiation ' Monitor 1RE-0003 - LER 89-01"-
(d). 50-424/89-04." Reactor Coolant. Pressure Boundary Leakage Leads To Unit Shutdown."
On-January 19, 1989, a reactor shutdown was initiated due to the Technical Specification
requireme'nt (Section 3.4.6.2a) that there be no pressure i boundary : leakage from the Reactor Coolant System.
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personnel observed a rise 'in a pressurizer code safety -! valve tailpipe temperature.
Entry was ' made into the
Containment building and an investigation initiated.
i Moisture was observed in the area of a drain valve.for a-i pressurizer safety valve loop seal line.
. The pipe. ' - insulation was removed and a leak was discovered on a 3/4"_ j socket weld coupling which: connects the 3/4" drain valve to ! the 6" loop seal line.
The leak rate was estimated to be- ! less that 1 GPM. A Notification of Unusual Event was- , i ._i______i ....______m._ _
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declared and preparations were begun to reduce power and shutdown the reactor.
The required notifications to the necessary government agencies and personnel were initiated.
The reactor was shutdown and the unit entered Mode 3 (Hot Standby). u0n January 20, 1989, the unit entered Mode 5 j (Cold Shutdown) and the NUE was tenninated.
Pipe vibration ' led to fatiguing of a weld on the drain line manifold.
This vibration is. believed to be the cause of the weld cracking.
The cracked weld was repaired and new pipe supports were added to the. drain line manifold to limit. vibration.
The inspector observed the orderly shutdown of the unit to Mode 3.
In order to facilitate the shutdown two procedure revisions were executed.
The first revision lowered the removal of AMSAC equipment from service to below 40% power and the second procedure change modified the methodology for unit shutdown at 20% power.
Both changes were in response to recent NRC concerns.
4.
Three Mile Island Task Action Plan Followup - (4254018) - Unit 2 This inspection consists of verification that the licensee has implemented the requirements of NUREG 0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan-Requirements" as committed to in the facility FSAR or other appropriate documents.
Verification consisted of one or more of the following attributes, as appropriate, to determine acceptability for each listed action item: - Program or procedure established - Personnel training or qualification - Completion of item - Installation of equipment - Drawings reflect the as-built configuration - Component tested and in service or integrated into the preoperational test program The following documents were utilized in performing the review, as appropriate: l' NUREG 0578 TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report NUREG 0660 NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident NUREG 0694 TMI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses NUREG 0737 and Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements Supplement 1 FSAR and Final Safety Analysis Report Amendments NUREG 1137 and Safety Evaluation Report Supplements l l' l ______ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _
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i ! (Closed) II.E.4.2 " Containment Isolation Dependability". Positions'one through seven listed below were extosively reviewed and closed for Unit 1 ! in report 50-424/86-136.
j (1) Containment isolation system designs shall comply with the recommendations of Standard Keview Plan Section 6.2.4 (i.e.. that there be diversity in the parameters sensed for the initiation of containmentisolction).
i (2) All plant personnel shall give careful consideration to the
tiefinition of essential and nonessential systems, identify each i system determined to be ersehtial, identify each system detecmined to ! ' be nonessential, describe the basis for selection of each essential i , system, oodify their containment isolation ' designs accordingly, and i l report the results of the reevaluation to;the NRC.
] (3) All nonessential systems shall be automatically isolated by the containment isolation signal.
l (4) The design of a control system for automatic containment isolation valves 'shall be such that resetting the isolation signal will not result in the automatic renpening of containment isolation valves.
Reopening of containment isolation valves shall require deliberate operator action.
! (5) The containment setpoint pressure that initiates containment ' l 1 solation for nonessential penetrations must be reduced to the minimum compatible with normal operating conditions.
i (6) Containment purge valves that do not satisfy the operability criteria i l set forth in Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 or the Staff Interim Position of October 23, 1979 must be sealed closed as defined in SRP 6.2.4, item II.3.f during operational conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Furthermore, these valves must be verified to be closed at least every 31 days.
, (7) Containment purge and vent isolation valves must close on a high radiation signal.
The Unit 2 design and acceptance criteria are in keeping with Unit 1.
The inspector reviewed the following documentation and found positions 1-7 of
TMI item II.E.4.2 to be acceptably addressed.
FSAR Section 6.2.4.2.1 FSAR Table 6.2.4.1 Preop: 2-300-01 Integrated safeguards and load sequencing test Preops: 2-3GT-01 Containment air purification and cleanup system l 2-350-01 Digital radiation monitoring system 2-3S0-02 Digital radiat 'on monitoring system
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i TS 3/4.3.2. Table 3.3.3 j SRp 6.2.4, Item II.3.f
.11125-2 Rev. 2 Containment purge system alignment for startup and normal alignmmt 14228-2 Rev. 1 Operations monthly surveillance logs 5.
Kendgement Meetings - (30702) This activity involves inspector participation and preparation in support of the following meetings which presented site readiness.
! On January 27, 1989, Chairman Lando Zech, Jr. vis.ited the Vogtle Site to review and tour Unit 2 to determine the licensee % readiness to receive a NRC Low Power License.
Chairman Zech presented his comments to the licensee's management at the exit interview.
The Chairman also formally addressed the plant operations staff.
The following NRC personnel were present: ! M.L. Ernst - Acting Regional Administrator, RI! M.V. Sinkule - Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects J.F. Rogge - Senior Resident Inspector C.W. Burger - Senior Resident inspector R.F. Aiello - Resident Inspector l On January 30, 1989, Thomas E. Murley, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation visited the Vogtle Site for the purpose of inspecting the .; licensee's overall readiness to receive a NRC Low Power License.
Dr.
'1 Murley spent the day at the site conducting a meeting with Resident ! Inspectors, toured Unit 2 with the Resident Inspectors, met with licensee management and presented his comments in the exit interviews.
The following NRC personnel were present: J.F. Rogge - Senior Resident inspector j C.W. Burger - Senior Resident Inspector i R.F. Aiello - Resident Inspector On February 14, 1989, Commissioner James R. Curtiss visited the Vogtle Site to review the Unit 2 licensing readiness, discuss pertinent issues, observe fuel load operations ou the fuel handling bridge in containment and tour the Unit 2 facility. The Commissioner presented his comments to the licensee's management at the exit interview.
The follow NRC Personnel were present: i M.L. Ernst - Acting Regional Administrator, Ril M.V. Sinkule - Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects J.F. Rogge - Senior Resident inspector _ma __m_
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Operational Staffing - (36301B) ) The inspector participated in a Region II team inspection with representatives from NRR to review the corporate organization responsible for the operation of Vogtle. The inspection was conducted in Birmingham, . Alabama at the Southern Company Corporate Office on December 19-21, 1988.
I The results of the team inspection will be formally documented in a NRC i report under Vogtle Report Nos. 50-424/88-60 and 50-425/88-77.
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In addition, the inspector utilized Chapter 13 of the Vogtle FSAR and ANSI J . N18.1 to complete the inspection requirements for operational staffing at I I l V"+1e.
~ No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup To Operator License Examiner Items - (92706) .l l
l The inspector received notification from the operator license examiners of l two potential problems which should be resolved. prior to issuance of a facility license. The first issue resulted during a walkdown of Procedure l 18038-2 " Operations From Remote Shddown Panels" when room numbers listed ! in the procedure were different form the actual posting. The second issue i regarded the failure of the license to provide the tools to allow an operator to manually close ESF breakers in an emergency.
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the 18038-2 procedure and noted that while the rooms had been corrected to address the examiner concerns, no labeling of the rooms to the Unit 1 standard existed. The Unit 1 standard consists of laminated paper signs which specify the essential equipment i I within the respective room.
The applicant responded by expediting and installing the permanent room signs.
The permanent signs are constructed of durable plastic.
Upgrade of the Unit I signs are part of the licensee's long range planning.
The issue of manual breaker closing was reviewed with operations personnel, engineering, and ISEG personnel. The evaluation concluded that manual closure is for maintenance use and provides a slow close of the j breaker.
Slow closing of the breaker under load is not recommended by the i vendor.
The inspector obtained the North Anna event report ~and learned ! that the problem pertained to improper maintenance practices and failura of the operators to verify that charging sprir.gs were not. charged.
The license maintenance procedures properly incorporate a check of the charging motor mounting bolts.
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Actions on Previous ' Inspection Findings - (92701)(92702) (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-424/88-02-0? " Determine Licensing Bases Status Regarding Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.la."
The inspector reviewed the licensee's package assembled in response to this unresolved item and has determined that the appropriate administrative controls are l now in place for the SG and AFW chemical addition remote-mannual valves.
(Closed) Violation 50-424/88-09-02 " Failure To Report A Condition Prohibited By Technical Specification Per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)."
The ! corrective action of submitting LERs for the missed surveillance was completed with issuance of LER 87-77, 78 and 79.
(Closed) Violation 50-424/87-37-02 Failure To Follow Procedures."
This
item concerned three examples regarding the failure to follow procedures.
The first example concerned a failure to follow procedure 12003-1 during an approach to criticality when the operator failed to shutdown the reactor when criticality was achieved outside of the estiraated critical-j position calculation.
This item has been verified resolved by. reviewing ' procedure revisions and observation of reactor startups.
The second item regarding the failure of plant personnel to resise a procedure properly while performing a control room emergency ventilation , actuation logic test.
The procedure was revised on June 28, 1987 and
resolved this concern.
! I The third item regarding the improper removal of a clearance tag where the Shift Supervisor specified the wrong valve position.
This concern wa.; resolved by revising 00304-C " Equipment Clearance And Tagging" and 00054-C l " Rules For Perform 5rj Procedures."
' (Closed) Violation 50-424/8.8-44-01 " Failure To ' Implement Operations Procedures 10001-C and 11885-C Required By' TS 6.7.1 To Monitor EDG
Performance."
The inspector reviewed the licensee's package assembled in response to this violation. The licensee believes under all circumstances that the control room was notified of the out of specification readings.
Paragraph 3.2.3 of Operations Procedure 10001-C, Rev. 7 states to circle abnormal or unusual readings in red ink, investigate the cause and record the result on the narrative section of the round sheet, report circled readings to the control room upon discovery and include a cesolution for the abnormal or unusual reading (s) in the comment section.
If the operator fails to record the data and/or fails to document / annotate out of specification data, it is not likely that the control room will be notified.
If the licensee chooses to believe the control room was notified in all cases then the concern is shifted from a lack of attention to detail on the operator's part to a lack of respc'sibility on the Shift Supervisor's nart.
Either case is a violation of N G requirements. The ' licensee provided the inspector with the appropriate documentation which documents corrective steps taken to preclude recurrance.
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I (Closed) ' Inspector Followup i tem '50-425/86-35-01 " Review Results Of l Testing The Check Valves On The Feedwater Isolation Valves." This item. j was identified to ensare. that appropriate testing would be performed which.
could _ detect ' check valve failure. ' Licensee surveillance procedure - l 14850-2, Rev. O Step 5.4.10, Cold Shutdown. Inservice. Test, has been ! .
, implemented to resolve this issue. The inspector noted that the procedure is identical to the Unit 1 counterpart procedure 14850-1.
l (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/87-27-04: " Synchronizing The ERF And SOE Clocks."
The licensee completed the hardware modification which j synchronizes the two clocks.' ' (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 50-424/88-20-01 " Review Licensee Actions To Upgrade Surveillance Performance."
This: item represented a general weakness in implementation of the surveillance ' program.
The licensee response to the concern was positive and resulted in new ~
management controls < designed to effectively schedule and. monitor the completion of surveillance.
The cornerstone of the new controls was the . 28 day schedule combined with ' status reports which' depict those surveillance which are in jeopardy.
Since inception of the program, no missed surveillance have been reported'due to administrative' oversight or last minute planning.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/88-43-03 ' Review Program For " Ensuring Hazard Protection Is Assured." This concern resulted when shield blocks were removed under a maintenance work order without' a hazard evaluation.
Programmatic controls consist of step 4.1.12.h of procedure 00350-C which states that the MWO package should contain a' shield plug removal evaluation (if applicable).
Work planners were counseled on this requirement.
(Closed) CDR 50-425/88-146 "Raychem Field Splice Kits."
The licensee reported to RII on June 1, 1988, that a condition existed.which involved a.
misapplication of vendor criteria in selecting materials used in Raycnem electrical cable field splice kits.
The final report outlining the evaluation of the safety implications and corrective actions was submitted on December 22, 1988.
The cause was determined to be a misinterpretation
of the construction specification-relative to engineering's ' intent for ~ design of all class IE splices.
This misinterpretation resulted in the thought that 1E splices must be qualified for accident conditions and not design configuration.
The corrective actions taken were to: (1) Revise the electrical construction specification X3A01, Section 59.56 to emphasis
that all future 1E sp? ice' kits comply with Raychem accidents criteria -(2) i The kits with deficiencies have been reviseo to meet Raychem criteria, (3) All new or revised kit require review by project engineering, (4) The six splices identified have been reworked to resolve the Electrical Deviation-Reports and corrective action requirements.
The inspector verified that designs included in the specification that had been found nonconforming ! had been corrected.- i l Y ._- - -_ _ __-__-______-- - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - _. -_ -_ _ -- _ ___ -____ _ __- -_-.
m , . ., , . 18: (Closed) CDR 50-4~25/88-150 and IFI 50-425/88-59-06 " Electrical Fuse Control." As the result of the IFI, which questioned the adequacy of fuse size and type control, the Licensee conducted an investigation.
The concern was to assure that fuse / breaker coordination was accomplished.
There were 690 differences identified in Unit 2 and approximately 122 l differences were identified in Unit 1.
Almost 100% of all fuses were ! inspected and verified correct, replaced or justified.
The Unit 1 fuses " were examined in a les r quantity due to the operational mode of the Unit at the time of inspection.
Where fuses were larger than I required /specified an evaluation as to coordination of the safety device feeding the fuse was made to determine if the component protected by the fuse could be sacrificed as long as coordination was in question, the correct fuse.was installed for all shutdown circuits as required.
In discussions with the responsible licensee representatives commitments were made to insure that a correct fuse list is maintained and fuses installed accordingly in a timely manner.
(Closed) CDR 50-425/89-151 " Control Room Emergency Filtration System."
This item was reported.on January 3, 1989, and the final report was submitted on January 26, 1989.
This item involved the Control Room Emergency Filtration System and the isolation of th normal control room HVAC system.
Upon receipt of a Safety Injection s.gnal, or control room outside air intake high radiation signal, the control room isolation i occurs which activates all four CREFS.
This condition was analyzed and it ! was determined that due to air duct size only one train of CREFS for each I unit should start thus a lead-lag logic was developed.
It was then determined that the time delays introduced by the lead-lag logic could impact on the isolation time for the normal HVAC system. The corrective l design changes may provide for isolation of the control room normal HVAC l system directly upon receipt of a control isolation signal.
This change was included in tha Unit 2 preoperational testing.
It is now also included in the lead-lag logic testing.
It is also included in the lead-lag logic for Unit 1.
A safety evaluation and associated FSAR changes were submitted on January 16, 1989.
(Closed) CDR 50-425/89-152 "American Air Filter Seismic Door Tabs." This item was reported on January 11, 1989 and a final report was submitted February 2,1989.
This item involved American Air Filter Cooling Units which were found to not have the required seismic door tabs installed.
The door tabs were assumed to be shipping tabs and were removed since documents did not show these retaining tabs. The retaining tabs have been reinstalled in the 9 affectea Unit 2 units.
The manufacturer.has been i re'juested by field change requests to issue revised drawings.
(t,losed) CDR 50-425/89-153 " Pump Bolting Material."
The deficiency was reported to RII on January 13, 1989, and involved certain safety-related pump and motor hold down. bolts.
Field inspections by the licensee identified cases where the installed ' bolts did not satisfy the requirements of the vendor specified material. The identified cases were ! L lw _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _
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Component Cooling Water Pumps Containment Spray Pump and Motors,
' Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motors and an. Essential Chilled Water. Pump. The final report containing the evaluation and corrective action commitments was submitted on January 31, 1989. The final report was evaluated and the'- appropriate records were reviewed to verify commitments.
In addition, the inspector. verified a portion of the replaced bolts as installed.
(Ciosed) NRCB 50-424 and 50-425/88-10 " Nonconforming Molded Case Circuit Breakers.". The licensee submitted'a report dated January 13, 1989 which described the computer searches of warehouse circuit brecker stock and the physical walkdown of these same.one hundred four (104) which are class IE molded case circuit breakers. During this inspection, the Region.II based inspector. reviewed the document packages which were developed'for each
' breaker or groups of breakers.
The traceability to the original s
manufacturer was supported by' adequate documentation.
The' response toi l this bulletin is acceptable.
9.
ExitInterviews-(30703) l The inspection scope and fir. dings were summarized en February 17,.1989 . with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. - The inspector i described.the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
No dissenting comments.were received from the licensee.
The . licensee did not identify as proprietary any of.the materials.provided to- ) or reviewed by the. inspector during this inspection. ' Region based NRC R exit interviews were attended during the-inspection period by a resident j inspector.
This inspection closed one Bulletin, three Violations,' one i Unresolved Items. -five Inspector followup Items, one' Three Mile Island I Item, five Construction Deficiency Report, and four Licensee Event Reports. The items identified during this inspection were: Inspection Followup Item 50-424/89-07-01 " Clarify TS Channel Operability l And Action Statements." - paragraph 2.b.(1) ~! LIV 50-424/89-07-02 " Failure To Implement Procedure 54055-1 Prerequisite l Which Resulted In An Unplanned Safety Injection - LER 88-28" - paragraph 3.b.(2)(a) LIV 50-424/89-07-03 " Failure.To Implement Proc' re 35611-C-Which Resulted
I In An Inadvertent Discharge Of Reactor Cool. To The Fuel Handling Building Drains - LER 88-45" - paragraph 3.b.(E (b) f
LIV 50-424/89-07-04 " Failure To Comply With TS 3.3.3.5.2 Whict. Requires , That The NSCW Fan Transfer Switch Be Operable At The Remote Shutdown Panel - LER 89-02" - paragraph 3.b.(2)(c)' LIV 50-424/89-07-05 " Failure To Establish An. Adequate Procedure Per TS 6.7.1 Which Led To A Personnel Error In Removing.Two ESF Chiller Trains. l From Service - LER 89-03" - paragraph 3.b.(2)(d) '
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LIV 50-424/89-07-06 " Failure To Establish An Adequate Procedure And Provide Adequate Labeling - LER 87-66" - paragraph 3.b.(3)(a) LIV 50-424/89-07-07 " Failure To Perform TS 4.2.4.1, 12 Hour . QPTR Surveillance Within 4.0.2 Requirements - LER 87-70." - paragraph l 3.b.(3)(b) LIV 50-424/89-07-08 " Failure To Establish And Implement Adequate procedures For Functional Testing Of Radiation Monitor 1RE-0003 - LER 89-01" - paragraph 3.b.(3)(c) 9.
Acronyms And Initialism ACOT Analog Channel Operability Test AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System AMSAC ATWAS Mitigating System Actuating Circuitry ANSI American National Standard Institute i ARMS Atmospheric Radiation Monitoring System
CFR Code of Federal Regulation CREFS Control Roon Emergency Filtration System CSB Containment Systems Branch, NRR
l DC Deficiency Cards UPM Data Process Monitor DRMS Digital Radiation Monitor System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator ERF Emergency Response Facility ' ESF Engineered Safety Features ESFAS ESF Actuation Signal FHB Fuel Handling Building FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FW Feedwater GPM Gallons per Minute HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning IFI Inspector Followup Item ISEG Independent Safety Engineering Group LC0 Limiting Conditions for Operations LER Licensee Event Reports LIV Licensee Identified Item (Violation) MFP Main Feed Pump Turbine , MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient ! MWO Maintenance Work Order l NPF Nuclear Power Facility ( NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission l NRCB Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSCW Nuclear Service Cooling Water System l NUE Notice of Unusual Event NUREG Nuclear Regulation Publication Series QC Quality Control l l - - - - _ - _
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a - i QPTR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio RII NRC Regional Office II, Atlanta Ga, j RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank ' SG Steam Generator.
SI Safety Injection System l SOE ' Sequence of Events
SRP Standard Review Plan SSPS' Solid State Protection System i I TDAFW Turbine Driven AFW Pump TMI Three Mile Island TPCW Turbine Plant Cooling Water ! TS Technical Specification l l i .-' ! i l - - - _. - - - _ - _ - _ - _. }}