IR 05000424/1993021

Insp Repts 50-424/93-21 & 50-425/93-21 on 930822-0918.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Surveillance,Maint,Esf Sys Walkdown,Installation & Testing of Mods & Followup of Open Items

ML20058Q266
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/07/1993
From:	Balmain P, Brian Bonser, Skinner P, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058Q253	List: IR 05000424/1993021 ML20058Q249
References
50-424-93-21, 50-425-93-21, NUDOCS 9310260121
Download: ML20058Q266 (19)

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. UNITED STATES d:KP M r i ty

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1 NUCLEAR hEGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 -

.SJ  : 101 MAnlETTA STREET, N.W..' SUITE 2900

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f  : Report.Nos.:. 50-42.4/93-21 and 50-425/93-21

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'JLicensee:C. Georgia _Powe'r Company

'P. 0.. Box 129 @y e , Birmingham,'AL 35201 nm M License Nos.:

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Docket'Nos':."50-424 and 50-425

. NPF-68 and NPF-81

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• ' Facility Name: Vogtle I and 2'

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? c l Inspection Conducted:' August 22 -' September 18, 1993-

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Resident Inspector

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f /0-6'93 P. A.:B 1mainUR sident Inspector- Date Signed Accompanied;by: . eymour.-

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Approved L;;: . #bke - .4 Nh

.P.JSkinner, Ehjef Date Signed

, Reactor.Projedts Section 3B Division of Reactor Projects c. : ,

SUMMARY 4

Scope

Thi's routine inspection ~ entailed inspection in the following-areas: plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, engineered safety features / system walkdown, installation and testing of '

modifications,"and fol. low-up of open11tem ,

!Resultsi:: .Oneinon-cited vioistion-(NCV)-was identifie :The NCV- in'volved the.;identificationf of.' inadequate-wide range reactor coolant system (RCS) pressureichannel . calibration

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procedures.. The procedures did not include' testing of ' solid state

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a protection system input' relays that are part of the:-actuation

, circuitry for:the RCS7 cold-overpressure protectio'n ' system. . The W, ~

. licensee's identification of this-deficiency is identified.as a-

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k J A review of the Unit 2 reactor trip on September 8 identified that the cause of the_ trip was personnel error. The quality control inspection being performed on the reactor coolant pump breaker cubicle had been properly authorized and was part of an established program of inspection. The inspectors concluded that permitting such inspections during plant operations on~ equipment that are trip hazards, without more careful planning _and control,

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was a weakness (paragraph 3d).

Five-recent radiation monitor failures caused invalid Engineered 1 Safety Feature actuations. The licensee's preliminary reviews y indicate that. the' most likely cause of the failures was quench gas (U; leaking out of the radiation monitor detector tubes (paragraph 4c),

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REPORT DETAILS y

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' Persons Contacted I

Licensee Employees

• J. Beasley, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations S. Bradley,' Reactor Engineering Supervisor

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• Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support l

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• S. Chesnut, Manager Engineering Technical Support

• C. Christiansen, SAER Supervisor

.C.'~Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent'

• R. Dorman, Manager Training and' Emergency Preparedness ,

• G. Frederick, Manager Maintenance  !

~ *W. ' Gabbard, Nuclear. Specialist, Technical Support

• M.. Griffis, Manager Plant Modifications

? M. Hobbs, I&C Superintendent-K. Holmes, Manager Operations

<h . *D. Huyck, Nuclear Security Manager  ;

• W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Support  !

• I. Kochery, Health Physics Superintendent 1

• R. LeGrand, Manager Health Physics and Chemistry  ;

G.- McCarley, ISEG Supervisor

• H. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor  ;

• Slivka, Technical. Specialist ISEG

• Cr Stinespring, Manager Administration

'*J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning C. Tynan, Nuclear Procedures Supervisor

• J.' Williams, Operations Superintendent Unit 1 Otherl licensee' employees contacted included technicians, supervisors, engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors, and' office personne Oglethorpe Power Company Representative

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• T. Mozingo NRC Personnel

• B. Bonser

• D. Starkey

• P. . Balmain

• C. Carpenter

• Attended Exit'. Interview An alphabetical list of-abbreviations is located in the last paragraph

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p . Plant Operations- (71707)

[ . General-The inspection staff reviewed plant operations.throughout the p?. . reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory

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requirements,-TSs, and administrative controls. Control logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift relief records, LC0 status logs, night orders, standing orders, and clearance logs were routinely reviewed. Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance,. chemistry, health physics, engineering support and

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techn_ical support personnel. Daily plant status meetings were routinely. attende Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and shift changes. Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's procedures. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by TS. Direct

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r observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safet perating parameters were verified to be within TS limits. The

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-inspectors. also reviewed DCs to determine whether the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective action Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine basi They included, but- were not limited to the turbine building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading . rooms, NSCW towers, DG buildings, AFW buildings, and the low voltage switchyar During plant tours, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observe '

The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies / procedures were followed. This included observation of HP practices and' review of area surveys, radiation work permits, postings, and instrument calibratio "

The inspectors verified that the. security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions. Inspectors observed that persons and packages were. checked prior to entry into the PA; vehicles were- ,

properly authorized, searched, and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; and personnel in' vital areas were authorized.

' Unit 1 Summary The unit began the period. operating at 100% power and operated at -

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3 Unit.2 Summary The unit began the period at approximately 97% power and was coasting down for refueling outage 2R3 scheduled to begin on September 10. On September 8, the unit automatically tripped from 79% power due to low flow in RCS loop #4 caused by the tripping of RCP #4 (see paragraph 3d). The unit entered 2R3 two days earlier than scheduled. Mode 6 was entered on September 17. The inspection period ended with the reactor vessel head removed and with preparations underway to begin defueling the reactor core.

p d.- Review of Boraflex Use in Spent Fuel Pools Recently, degradation of Boraflex neutron-absorption material was s identified in the SFP storage racks at another commercial reactor facility. -The inspectors determined that the licensee is aware of Boraflex degradation problems at other utilities and that similar problems have not been experienced at Vogtle. Boraflex is also used in the SFP storage racks at Vogtle. Based on Boraflex degradation concerns the inspectors reviewed procedures related to Boraflex sampling, SFP chemistry controls, and interviewed

_ personnel'-involved in those activitie The licensee's Boroflex inspection program is controlled by procedure ~ 88020, Boroflex Surveillance Program. Within that inspection program selected accelerated and long term sample coupons.from the Unit 1 SFP are tested periodically at the direction of the Reactor Engineering Supervisor. Spent fuel is not stored for an extended period of time in the Unit 1 SFP, which consists of Westinghouse fuel racks, ~ but is transferred to the Unit 2 SFP which has higher density HOLTEC fuel racks. Coupons from the Unit 2 SFP are tested in accordance with HOLTEC vendor guidance following each refueling outage. All tested sample coupons are evaluated by an independent laboratory testing facility. The licensee has also established a program to monitor boron concentration in the SFP. Although procedures require monthly sampling, in practice, boron samples of the SFP are taken Weekly and must fall within the range of 2400-2600 ppm. The inspector reviewed'the results of the last three samples and found that all were within the acceptable range. It should be noted that Vogtle TS, Section 5.6, Fuel Storage, takes no credit for borated water in the SF The inspectors reviewed the controls that are in. place to prevent SFP dilution. Procedure 13719-1/2, Spent Fuel' Pool Cooling and Purification System, contains numerous cautions which stress to the operator that SFP boron concentration should be checked

, following SFP w keup to ensure a minimum boron concentration of 2000 ppm. The -inspectors also reviewed, with Operations training personnel, the training related to SFP dilution given to Operations personnel.

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The inspectors concluded that the licensee has instituted adequate controls to monitor-Boraflex degradation, to control SFP boron concentration, and to ensure operator awareness of the need for proper SFP chemistr Shutdown Risk Walkdowns I During the Unit 2 refueling outage, the: licensee established contingency plans and controls for periods of higher shutdown

. risk. The licensee periodically walks down critical systems or instrumentation lineups to verify availability. The inspectors also performed selected verifications.

L While Unit 2 was in mode 5 with the RCS loops filled, several B train systems were taken out of service including the B train RHR system. The TS require with one train of RHR inoperable that the L

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water level in the. secondary side of at least two SGs shall be greater than 17%'as read on the wide range instrumentation. The inspector verified AFW flowpaths to the SGs, ARV operability, electrical lineups and control room lineup The inspectors accompanied operations personnel on the walkdown and. verified that the sightglass lineup was performed in accordance with procedure 11899-2, RCS Draindown Configuration Checklist. The inspectors also verified that the pressurizer was adequately vented, that the RCS sightglass manifold had an adequate. vent path-and that the sightglass isolation valves were f

in the correct position RHR Containment Sump Recirculation Lines During the in'spection period with Unit 2 in Mode 1, the A train RHR system was taken out of service for maintenance. The purpose of this planned outage was to prepare the A train for the refueling outage and reduce maintenance dose. Dose rates are significantly higher in some areas when the plant is shutdow During a. review of. operations in the control room, the inspector 1

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-identified that as part of the RHR system maintenance the licensee had performed pre and post maintenance LLRTs on the RHR encapsulation vessel and removed the vessel ~ head to perform maintenance on the emergency sump valve operator (2HV-8811A). The 1 valve was also stroked to verify operability. The inspector raised a. concern to the licensee that the TSs covering primary containment integrity and containment leakage had been violated as a result of this maintenanc The Vogtle FSAR.section 3.8.2.1.4 describes the containment spray and RHR isolation' valve encapsulation vessels as leaktight housings-which function as extensions of the containment pressure retaining barrier. As such, these vessels and their bellows expansion joints are considered parts of the containment and are

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subject to ASME III Class MC (containment system) requirement This design (a single containment isolation valve outside the main containment) was employed, because it was not practical to install containment isolation valves inside containment. In the Vogtle SER, NUREG 1137,section 6.2.4, the NRC acknowledged that this design deviated from GDC 56 requirements since there was not an isolation valve inside containment. The NRC staff accepted this design after the licensee confirmed that the encapsulation vessels were subject to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Type B testing requirement The inspector learned after investigating this issue further that ,

the design of the sump recirculation lines and encapsulation vessel are not_as described in the FSAR. The encapsulation vessels are not an extension of the containment pressure retaining

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boundary. The piping from the containment sump to the isolation valve in each vessel is enclosed in a leaktight concentric guard-pipe. This guard pipe is welded to the' suction piping at a point located inside the-containment. The space between the suction pipe and the concentric guard pipe is filled with grout. The welded _ seal .in containment is subject to the containment ILRT and is der.igned so that neither the encapsulation vessel nor the guard pipe' interact directly-with the sump or containment atmospher Therefore, the encapsulation vessels and guard pipe are not a part of'the barrier between the containment atmosphere and the external-environment and do not serve as part of the containment pressure retaining boundary. The Appendix J requirements also do not appear to be necessary. The encapsulation. vessels in effect serve

.as -leak containment vessels should the sump suction valve suffer a passive failure ~in the recirculation phase of operation. Passive failures include valve packing leaks and pipe cracks. This subject matter was discussed in detail during a meeting held with NRC and GPC personnel on September 8,199 The inspector concluded after reviewing the design of the sump recirculation lines that the licensee had acted safel Since the vessel does not communicate directly with containment a direct pathway to the auxiliary building was not being opened during the vessel LLRT or while the vessel head was removed. The inspector i had no further concerns. The licensee has prepared a change to the FSAR to clarify the 'ign of these lines. The licensee is

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also.considering removing 6ne encapsulation vessels from the LLRT progra No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Observation (61726) General Surveillance tests were reviewed t" the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed

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were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.

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The surveillances reviewed are listed below:

SURVEILLANCE N Illif 14980-2_ Diesel Generator Operability Test-28 28210-2- Main Steam Line Safety Valve Testing, 2HV-9002A 11899-2 RCS Draindown Configuration Checklist 14805-2 RHR Pump & Check Valve IST 14546-1 TDAFW Operability Test 24525-2 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel I 2P-455 Analog Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration 14005-2 Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculation b. Improper Classification of Diesel Generator Tests On September 1, the inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 Diesel Generator Logbook maintained in the control room. The review identified several DG starts that had been logged as " valid successful tests" on the DG Completion Sheet I when the DGs were run for less than one hour. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.108, Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used As Onsite Electric Power Systems At Nuclear Power Plants, defines a " valid successful test" as one that includes a successful _ start,_ including those initiated by. bona. fide signals, followed by successful loading to a least 50% of continuous rating and continued operation for at least one hou '

The inspectors discussed with Operations personnel and the DG

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system engineer the apparently incorrect Diesel Generator Logbook entries. ' The inspectors also. reviewed procedure 14980-1/2, Diesel Generator Operability Test, which assigns the DG system engineer the responsibility of determining the success or failure of each DG test. The inspectors found that in many instances Operations personnel completed the test evaluation section of DG Completion o

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Sheet The system engineer, who maintains the official records of DG tests, receives a copy of the logbook pages and reviews and corrects, if necessary, those entries made by Operations personne This administrative error made by Operations personnel completing the test evaluation section of the DG Completion Sheet I was discussed with Operations shift supervision. A memorandum was issued to all licensed operators reminding them that determination of DG test validity is the responsibility of the system engineer and that the test evaluation section is to be left blank by Operations personnel. The inspectors were satisfied that the '

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licensee had taken appropriate corrective actions concerning this log keeping discrepanc c. Inadequate Channel Calibration Procedures Identified for RCS Wide Range Pressure Channels On September 9, during review of a maintenance work order (MWO 29302949), the licensee identified that proceuures 24518-1/2 and 24519-1/2, Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range) Protection ACOT and Channel Calibration for Loops P-403 and P-405, did not include testing of SSPS input relays. These relays are part of the PORV actuation circuitry for the RCS COPS. The relays energize SSPS slave relays, which in turn close SSPS contacts that open the PORVs to relieve cold overpressure condition Following identification of the testing inadequacy, the licensee successfully performed the surveillance for both channels on Unit 2 under the MW The licensee also declared the Unit 1 COPS inoperable and initiated information LC0 1-93-3791. The licensee initiated an RER to install permanent jumpers across channel test card contacts to allow for convenient testing of the SSPS relay Testing of the Unit I channels will be accomplished following completion of the engineering evaluation and modification to the PORV COPS actuation circuits, or before entering a mode where COPS is require The inspector reviewed the significance of the failure to perform surveillance of these SSPS relays. Based on discussions with I&C personnel, the inspector concluded that the relays had previously functioned properly and there was no evidence to indicate that they had been inoperable. In addition the cicensee determined that no transients had occurred that n uld have required COPS to actuat TS 4.4.9.3.1.b requires that each PORV shall be demonstrated operable by performance of a channel calibration on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months. Failure to include the SSPS input relays into the surveillance program resulted in a violation of the surveillance requirements of TS 4.4.9.3. This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement .

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Policy. This non-cited violation is identified as NCV 50-424,425/93-21-01, Inadequate Channel Calibration Procedure for RCS Wide Range Pressure Channel The inspector found that the licensee's identification of this deficiency was a strength. The missed channel calibration was identified by I&C personnel during preparation to perform testing in response to an issue discussed in NRC IN 93-38. The test would confirm post test circuit configuration to ensure circuit continuity. The licensee identified inadequate verification of post testing configuration' for the P-403 and P-405 loops during

- review of the BTI functional test procedure (T-ENG-93-024). The identification of inadequately verified contacts in the RCS wide-range pressure loops expands the findings of similar examples for the RWST level and CS actuation circuitry identified previously L (NRC IR 50-424,425/93-16).

' Unit 2 Reactor Trip On September 8 at 5:30 p.m., Unit 2 tripped automatically from 79%

l power on low flow in RCS loop 4. The low flow condition occurred l when'RCP #4 tripped. All plant systems responded properly and the plant was stabilized in Mode The licensee's review determined that RCP #4 tripped when a QC inspector, while performing an inspection for lifted wires, fuses and open sliding links on breaker cubicle 2 NAB 07, jarred the breaker. cubicle door open. Breaker 2 NAB 07 is the non-1E 13.8 kV breaker to RCP #4. Several relays are located on the cubicle door. Although no targets were observed on any of the relays, the lockout relay, which receives its input from a differential relay, did trip. The cause of the. tripped relay was vibration apparently caused by the opening of the cubicle _ door. The QC inspector stated that the bottom of the door was stuck, due to recent

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painting of the switchgear room floor, and that he used a screwdriver to pry the door ope The inspector reviewed the licensee's practice of inspecting breaker cubicles while a unit is at power. These cubicle inspections.are part of a routine QC program to verify proper fuse applications, to inspect for lifted leads, and inspect sliding links. Each cubicle included in this inspection program is inspected on a 18 month frequency. On this day the QC inspector was performing a random monthly cubicle inspection and had properly obtained the permission from the USS before beginning the

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breaker inspection The inspector concluded that the cause of the trip was personnel error. The breaker cubicle door was clearly labeled " unit trip hazard" yet the QC inspector used force to open it. The inspector also concluded that permitting such breaker inspections during power operations on equipment that is a trip hazard, without more

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c'areful planning and contr' ol, was a weakness. An additional

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bottom of the cubicle door and subsequently resulted in the door

being difficult to open. The inspectors will review the

' licensee's corrective actions as follow up to the LER.

p One non-cited violation was identifie . Maintenance Observation (62703)

- General Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TSs, and applicatne industry codes and standards. Activities, procedures, and work orders were examined to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to

• service, and:that limiting conditions for operation were met. The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to servic The inspectors' witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance activities:

MWO NO WORK DESCRIPTION

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29302908 Modify Transfer Tube Gate Valve per MDD 93-V2M093 29301853 Perform PM on RHR Pump A

19300980 Perform PM Checklist SCL00140, Type GS-2N Terry Turbine Quarterly Maintenance - T&T Valve Emergency Trip Linkage Adjustment 29301859 Perform PM on CS Suction Valve 2HV-9002A 29303040 - Obtain cable resistances of the tier-to-tier. and rack-to-rack cables for the 20 battery'

' Review of Licensee Leak Repair Program

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's leak repair program for procedural control, engineering evaluations, system applications, and management oversight. Leak repairs are administratively controlled by maintenance-procedure 25037-C, In Process Control Program For On Line Repair Of Valve Packing, Bonnet and Flange Gaskets._ Specific contractor procedures are used for each

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L applicatio Leak Repair, Inc. is currently performing all leak repair wor Leak repairs are accomplished by applying either a wire wrap, clamp, injection ring or drilling into.the valve, and then injecting the sealant through an injection valve. Each proposed leak repair.is considered a maintenance activity, but requires u

engineering approval. Depending upon' the nature of the repair, a

.TM may be required. Typically only those leak repairs involving safety related or primary systems will receive a PRB revice. QC

. also only. inspects safety-related and primary sysi.sa leak repair The SAER (QA) group does not routinely audit the leak repair program, but has on occasion reviewed specific leak repair Additionally, all. leak repairs are reviewed and approved by plant managemen The inspector reviewed the " Leak Repair Log" maintained by the maintenance department. This log records all leak repairs that have been initiated within the last three and a half year Additional records are available for leak repairs performed prior to that period. -The inspector noted that leak repairs have not been made to primary or safety related system components during the last three and a half years. The licensee does not have a prohibition against such repairs, however,.if that type repair was considered,.a safety evaluation and engineering review would be require The inspector noted that the specific type and amount of sealant used is controlled by procedure 25037-C. The procedure lists five sealants which may be used without an engineering evaluation, and limits the quantity injected to 1.2 gallons. As part of implementing a leak repair, a second MWO must be initiated to ensure that a permanent repair is made during a future outage period. The inspector confirmed that permanent. repairs have been made within a reasonable period of. tim The inspector concluded that the licensee has a program in place

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to control the use of-leak repairs, that such repairs are normally not performed on primary or -safety-related . system components, that

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that management- oversight is exercised for all leak repair c.- Review of Plant Radiation Monitor Failures During this inspection period the inspector reviewed several recent failures of radiation monitors. that resulted in actuations of ESF. equipmen Since July of this year, five failures of radiation. monitors occurred: ARE-2533, FHB Radiation Monitor failed on July 16; 2RE-0002, Containment Low Range Radiation Monitor, on August 12; lRE-0002 on August 22 and September 21; and IRE-0003, Containment-Low Range Radiation Monitor, on Lm

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September 18. These failures resulted in a FHB isolation i actuation and four CVI actuations respectivel '

The. inspector reviewed.the results of three completed licensee event critiques that determined the causes of the failure The failure of ARE-2533 was due to a momentary DPH power reset event that actuated the FHB isolation since the monitor fails safe when a reset occurs. A design change (DCP 93-VAN 0058) was initiated prior to this failure and is still being evaluated to modify the DPM circuitry to eliminate DPM power reset failure The failures of 2RE-0002 and 1RE-0002'were due to failures of the GM tube / preamp assemblies. .There have been several previous failures in the GM tube / preamp assemblies. Preliminary reviews of the latest failures of IRE-0003 and 1RE-0002 have determined that leaking quench gas from the GM detector tubes is the most likely cause of the failure The inspector reviewed performance trending data of the RMS and noted that the number of out-of-service radiation monitors has decreased significantly. Based on this review, the inspector concluded radiation monitor reliability has improved since past inspections (NRC irs 50-424,425/92-11; 91-33 and 91-22), and that this series of failures appeared unrelated to past failures. The inspector will continue to monitor the licensee's evaluation of the most recent failure Arcing Observed During IE Battery Maintenance Activities On September 14, while observing work activities on the 2D battery >

conducted under MWO 29303040, the inspector observed a maintenance worker using an uninsulated torque wrench contact two terminals between two battery cells causing an electrical arc. The inspector discussed the use of uninsulated tools on IE batteries with the Maintenance Manager and the Electrical Maintenance Foreman. From these. discussions, the inspector determined that general use tools for battery maintenance are insulated and maintained in a controlled cabinet near the batterie Normally torque wrenches with insulated handles are issued from the tool room for battery maintenance. However controls for issuing the insulated torque wrenches were not effective and the insulation had been removed to support other maintenance activities. . The licensee is procuring additional torque wrenches for battery maintenance and will insulate the handles and issue them only for battery maintenance. The inspector will verify the control of these torque wrenches when they are receive The inspector verified, based on a review of this event, that this was an isolated occurrence, since the electrician involved did not 1 normally work on batteries. In addition, the potential for personnel injury was minimal due to the low voltages involve l l

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h The battery was' disconnected from the DC bus during this maintenance and was not required by TS with the Unit in Mode P Diesel Fuel Filtration In response to concerns identified with DG fuel filter clogging and more frequent than expected filter change outs (see NRC.IR 50-424,425/93-11), the licensee processed the diesel fuel in each of the four DG fuel oil storage tanks through a portable filtration system.-This activity was expected to reduce the fuel particulate concentration- and improve fuel quality. The filtration system consisted of a trailer mounted portable filtration unit with fuel suction and discharge hoses run through penetrations in the DG fuel oil storage tank building s

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~The inspectors reviewed this activity to determine if the operability of the DGs during the filtration process and the safety'of the activity was maintained. The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation for the TM, the procedure used to perform the filtration, walked down the portable system while it was in operation, and verified safety measures. The DG fuel oil transfer system was operable during the filtration and precautions were taken to prevent turbulence in_the storage tanks. Based on this review the inspectors had no operability or safety concern Following the filtration fuel oil particulate samples showed that particulates had been reduced significantly.

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No violations or deviations were identifie .- ESF System Walkdown (71710)

During this inspection period the inspector performed an ESF walkdown of the Unit 2 Control Room Emergency Filtration System. The inspector reviewed appropriate sections of the TSs, FSAR, system alignment procedure and P& ids to verify' proper system alignment. During the walkdown, the inspector noted several incorrect locations referenced for components in procedure 11301-2, CBCR Normal HVAC and Emergency Filtration System Alignment. In addition, the inspector noted that the cubicle location numbers for 480V AC switchgear were not labeled consistentl These observations were brought to the attention of operations-supervision who initiated a procedure revision to correct the discrepancies. Based on this review, the inspector did not have any operability concerns with the syste No violations or deviations were identifie i l

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13 Review of RHR Pump Coupling Upgrade and Impeller Modification (37828)

During this inspection period the licensee completed DCP 92-V2N0142 to modify the B train RHR pump coupling configuration. The existing c'oupling was modified to add a spacer coupling between the pump and motor shafts. . In addition, a mechanical seal and pump shaft radial

. bearing were added. These modifications are expected to improve pump reliability and provide improved maintenance access. The A RHR pump will be modified during the next refueling outage. Modifications to the pump casing were also made to increase the motor thrust bearing life in response-to NRC IN 93-0 The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation prepared for the DCP and found it adequate. The inspector also observed post modification testing performed using procedure 14805-2(TCP), RHR Pump Check Valve 'IST and Response Time Test. .The inspector verified that the test results met IST acceptance criteria. The inspector also reviewed hydraulic data taken during testing (MWO 29302752) and verified that the modified pump performance is consistent with RHR pump performance data taken during pre-operational testing. Based on this review the inspector did not have concerns with the pumps ability to meet its design functio No violations or deviations were identifie . Follow-up (9071'2) (92700) (92701) (92702)

The Licensee Event Report and follow-up items listed below were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: . adequacy of description, verification of TS compliance and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and relative safety significance of each even (Closed) IFI 50-425/89-22-03, Complete Inspection and Review of Thermal Expansion Test and Reactor Internals Vibrations Tests By September 30, 198 This item was opened for administrative tracking purposes only, required no action by the licensee, and was not discussed at the exit interview for IR 50-425/89-22. This item is considered closed because it existed only for administrative purposes and does not require any followup inspection activitie (Closed) VIO 50-424/92-02-01, Failure To Follow Procedure Results in Turbine Runback Alarm and Falsification of Dat The technicians involved in this event were disciplined in accordance with the licensee's positive discipline progra Procedure 24812-1, Protection Channel III IT-431 Analog Channel Operational ' Test and Channel Calibration, was revised to incorporate the correct; values on the ACOT data sheet and the b

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(bistable was; adjusted to' the correct setpoint. A memorandum was sent to all plant personnel-stating' plant and corporate

management's' expectations for. employee integrity. A. series of management and supervisory meetings was conducted with I&C technicians to strongly emphasize expectations for procedure

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compliance.and reliance on the integrity of the plant staff as a fundamental.-job requirement and a basis of. employment. The licensee performed an assessment in light of NRC Information Notice 92-30,' Falsification of Plant: Records,. and did -not discover any discrepanciesi Furthermore, no information could be found

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which would indicate that the technicians involved in this event-

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had falsified other documents. The inspectors also completed TI g 2515/115, Verification of Plant Records, documented in IR 50-

'J 424/92-14, and identified no significant discrepancies.

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. Based-upon the inspector's actions and review of the licensee's

- . corrective actions this ' violation is closed.

.(Closed) LER 50-425/92-011, Containment Ventilation Isolation From -

Radiation Monitor Failur The cause'of this CVI.was the failure of a count logic board in data processing _ module of 2RE-0002. The failed' circuit board was replaced and was. returned to the vendor for failure analysis. The

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vendor confirmed that a subcomponent in the count logic board had failed and that this was a random type failure with no further followup action neede Based on the inspectors review of this action, this item is closed.

. d.- (Closed).VIO 50-424/92-20-01, Failure To Follow Procedure During Unit l' Reactor Startup.

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The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated November 16, 1992. .This violation occurred during a Unit 1

<, reactor startup, when an R0 inadvertently selected " Control Bank A" on the Rod Bank Selector Switch instead of " Manual" as directed by procedure. -The-licensee's corrective actions included strengthening-the role of the_ reactor engineer to emphasize

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bi, independent reviews of reactivity parameters during startups.and special reactivity evolutions. Management also reemphasized to the R0.the importance of self-verificatio In addition,

, procedure 12003-C,- Reactor Startup, was revised to-include

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independent verification of the position of the Rod Bank Selector

. Switch, and clarification of procedure steps to ensure proper

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sequencing of the control rod bank The: inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and v verified that procedure.12003-C had been revised to ensure correct

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rod overlap during startup. Based on this review, this item is close ~ ~ ,

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l 15 l 1 (Closed) VIO 50-424/92-20-02, Failure to Follow Procedure When l Entering / Exiting an RC j

The licensee responded to the violation in correspondence dated i November 16, 1992. The violation involved the failure of security l personnel to. log onto the appropriate RWP and to obtain dosimetry l before entering an outside RCA (RWST valve gallery); and failure !

to complete a whole body frisk after exiting the RCA. The i licensee's corrective actions included an investigation to determine whether other departments had improperly entered the RCA. HP. briefed the following departments on RCA entry / exit requirements: Security, Operations, Training, Independent Safety Engineering Group, and contractor personnel. HP performed dose assessments for the personnel who had improperly entered / exited the RCA and determined that dose limits were not exceeded. HP also reviewed previous survey results to verify that contamination-had not been tracked outside the posted area. The GET Handbook was updated to include entry / exit requirements for "outside" RCAs and to clarify existing requirements for entering and exiting RCA The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and verified that the GET had been updated to clarify the requirements for entering and exiting RCAs,. including "outside" RCAs. The inspector also verified that the requirements for entering / exiting the RWST valve gallery were properly posted. Based on this review, this item is close (Closed) VIO 50-424/92-20-03, Improperly Barricaded High Radiation Are The licensee responded to the violation in correspondence dated November 16, 1992. This violation involved two examples of high radiation areas which were improperly barricaded. The licensee's corrective actions included briefing HP foremen and technicians on the requirements for controlling access to high radiation areas, and their responsibilities to ensure that potentially affected areas are evaluated prior to relaxing or removing barricades or control devices. An automatic door closure mechanism was added to the door leading into room A09. In addition, the licensee performed daily checks of high radiation areas until November 20, 1992. Weekly checks of high radiation areas were performed from November 20, 1992, until July 1, 1993. During this time, and as of September 16, 1993, no further examples of improperly posted or barricaded high radiation areas were identifie The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and verified that the door to A09 was locked and that an automatic door closure mechanism had been installed; and that room D78 was correctly barricaded. The inspector also discussed, with ,

cognizant licensee personnel, current practices for controlling high radiation areas. The inspector determined that the licensee

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e L-has_ continued, on an informal basis,. to perform daily checks to m: verify proper barricading and posting of high radiation area Based on this review, this item is close No-violations or. deviations were identifie . Exit Meeting g

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 20,

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1993, with those persons indicated'in paragraph 1. The inspector

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described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the_ inspection findings listed below. No' dissenting comments were received from_the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the

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-material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the-inspectio Item N Description and Reference NCV.424,425/93-21-01 Inadequate Channel Calibration Procedure for RCS Wide Range Pressure

- 9. </.bbreviations

.ACOT -Analog Chaenel Operational Test

'AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater System

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- ARV - Atmospheric Relief Valve ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers BTI - Bypass Test Instrumentation CBA - Control Bank A CBCR - Control Building Control Room

.CFR - Code-of Federal Regulations COPS - Cold Overpressure Protection System CS . - Containment Spray System ,

CVI - Containment- Ventilation Isolation DC - Deficiency Card DCP - Design Change Package DG - Diesel Generator '

DPH - Data Processing Module ES Engineered Safety Feature l FHB .. - Fuel Handling Building -i FSAR- - Final Safety Analysis Report i GDC - General Design Criteria 1-GET' General Employee Training GM - Geiger-Muller HP - Health Physics HVAC -Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning '

I&C- - Instrumentation and Controls IFI- - Inspector. Followup Item

'ILRT - Integrated Leak Rate Test IN- - Information Notice IR - Inspection Report

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IST - Inservice Test ISEG -

Independent' Safety Engineering Group Li LC0 - Limiting Condition for Operation LER- - Licensee Event Report i LLRT - Local Leak Rate Test  !

MDD- - Minor Deviation from Design

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.. MWO - Maintenance Work Order

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NCV' - Non-Cited Violation

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'NPF - Nuclear Power Facilit 'NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

~NSC Nuclear Service Cooling Water System-PA - Protected Area-P&ID- - Piping and-Instrumentation Diagram PM - Preventive Maintenance P0RV - Power Operated Relief Valve ppm - parts per million

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PRB - Plant Review Board

~QC- - Quality Control RER - Recuest for Engineering Review

.RCA - Raciation Controlled Area RC Reactor Coolant Pump 4 RCS - Reactor Coolant; System -

RHR - Residual Heat Removal System R0- - Reactor Operator

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RWP- - Radiation Work Permit

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.SAER - Safety. Audit And Engineering Review

SER - Safety Evaluation Report SFP - Spent Fuel Pool SG - Steam Generator-SSPS - Solid State Protection System H TCP - Temporary Change to Procedure

'TDAFW1 - Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System

.TI - Technical Instructio '

TM - Temporary Modification TS - Technical Specifications URI - Unresolved Item

- Unit Shift Supervisor

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.USS VIO- .- Violation--

2R3 - Unit 2-Third Refueling Outage ,

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