ML20198F863

Insp Repts 50-424/97-06 & 50-425/97-06 on 970601-0705. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20198F863
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	08/04/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198F853	List: ML20198F846 ML20198F855 ML20198F863
References
50-424-97-06, 50-424-97-6, 50-425-97-06, 50-425-97-6, NUDOCS 9708130165
Download: ML20198F863 (30)

See also: IR 05000424/1997006

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)

REGION 11

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50 425

License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

Report No:

50-424/97-06. 50-425/97-06

Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc.

Facility:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 1 and 2

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Location:

7821 River Road

Waynesboro. GA 30830

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Dates:

June 1 through July 5. 1997

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Inspectors:

C. Ogle. Senior Resident Inspector

M. Widmann. Resident inspector

K. O'Donohue. Resident Inspector (in training)

J. Canady Resident Inspector (Section 08.1. R5.1 and S2.1)

P. Kellogg, Reactor Inspector (Sections E1.1. E2.1 and E7.1)

G. Kuzo. Reactor Inspector (Sections R1.1 R1.2. R1.3. R3.1.

R7.1. R7.2 and R8.1)

Approved by:

P. Skinner. Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure 2

9708130165 970004

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ADOCK 05000424

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-424/97-06. 50-425/97-06

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations.

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engineering. maintenance, and plant support.

The report covers a five-week

period of resident inspection.

It also includes the results of announced

inspections by regional inspectors in the health physics and engineering

areas.

Doerations

in general. the conduct of operations was professional and

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safety-conscious (Section 01.1).

The operator response to a failed open atmospheric relief valve was

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timely, appropriate, and indicated good operator attention (Section

01.2).

Maintenance

Maintenance and surveillance activities were generally completed

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thoroughly and satisfactorily (Sections M1.1 and M1.2).

An example of a non cited violation was identified for failure to open

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links in a containment spray system valve control circuit as required by

the maintenance work orders (Section M3.1).

Another example of a non-cited violation was identified for a

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maintenance technician performing maintenance on a diesel generacor fuei

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oil transfer pump without obtaining appropriate authorization (Section

M3.2).

Enaineerina

Inadequate knowledge of plant computer server hardware network address

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configurations during troubleshooting resulted in intermittent display

cf Unit 1 data on the Unit 2 integrated plant computer.

However, the

impact of this intermixing of data was negligible due to the rapid

identification of the problem (Section E1.1).

Engineering has been effective in keeping the backlog low and 3roperly

prioritizing the work contained in the various lists (Section E2.1).

The inspectors concluded that the engineering department was performing

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effective self-assessments.

Corrective actions planned for assessment

findings were of adequate scope (Section E7.1).

The Quarterly Trend Reports, while an excellent trending tool, are

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reactive assessments in that they assess the deficiency cards identified

and look for trends in the number and causes of these ident Fied

Enclosure 2

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deficiencies. The Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support Self-

Assessment was the only 3ro-active assessment identified of the

assessments reviewed.

111s assessment was pro-active in that it

reviewed the programs in place to identify where problems might occur in

the future (Section E7.1).

Plant Suncort

In general, conduct in the plant supDort area was satisfactory (Section

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R1.1).

Radiological controls, area postings, and container labels met Technical

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Specification and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements (Section RI.2),

A poor contamination control practice was identified for an outside

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radwaste and material storage area (Section R1.2).

The established program for storage and accountability of Special

Nuclear Material was implemented appropriately (Section R1.2).

Overall, licensee controls for minimizing internal exposure were

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effective with the uptake of radionuclides evaluated appropriately

(Section R1.3).

Documentation for internal exposure evaluations was limited (Section

R1.3).

Training and medical certification for personnel using respiratory

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protective equipment were conducted in accordance with ap] roved

procedures and met the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 3 art 20

(Section R1.3).

The service air compressor system supplied Grade D respirable air in

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accordance with 10 CFR 20. Appendix A requirements (Section R1.3).

Licensee programs to control and monitor liquid and airborne

radionuclide releases were maintained and implemented properly (Section

R3.1).

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The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) sampling,

analysis, and reporting program requirements were implemented

effectively (Section R3.1).

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Projected offsite doses resulting from effluents were well within the

limits specified in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual and 40 CFR 190

(Section R3.1).

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The licensee's implementation of the General Employee Training program

for contractors and temporary workers was in accordance with procedural

requirements and 10 CFR 19.12 (Section R5.1).

Enclosure 2

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A May 1997 audit of the Chemistry Program area was performance based

with no programmatic issues identified (Section R7.1).

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Quality control Whole Body Count activities were conducted in accordance

with approved procedures and demonstrated system operability (Section

R7.2)

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Licensee programs and analyses for selected radionuclides within

airborne effluent streams met established minimum detectable

concentrations (Section R7.2).

Problems were identified in analyses of the Radiological Environmental

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Monitoring Program cross-check sample by the offsite laboratory (Section

R7.2),

Dose expenditure was controlled adequately w"h emergent and forced

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outage work activities resulting in the 1996 person-ren goals being

exceeded (Section R8.1).

Personnel contamination events (PCE) were not controlled effectively in

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1996.

Corrective actions to address PCEs appeared to be adequate

(Section R8.1).

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A violation was identified for the failure of six individuals to

document their fitness for duty following recall for an emergency

preparedness drill (Section P2.1).

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The licensee tested the security secondary power sup)1y system and its

components in accordance with the Physical Security alan (Section S2.1).

Enclosure 2

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Reoort Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1

The unit operated at full power throughout the inspection period,

Unit 2

The. unit operated at full power throughout the inspection period.

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Operations

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Conduct of Operations

-01.1 General Comments (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent

reviews of ongoing plant operations.

In general, the reviews indicated

that the conduct of- operations was professional and safety-conscious.

01.2 Doerator Resoonse to Failed Onen Atmosoheric Relief Valve (ARV)

a.

Insoection Stone (71707)

The: inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in response to a Unit 2

failed pressure transmitter for ARV 2PV-3030. The inspectors reviewed

the Unit 2 control room-operator logs, the associated deficiency card

-(DC), and Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18008 C. " Secondary Coolant

Leak," Revision 5

The ins)ectors also interviewed members of the

operating crew on duty at t1e time of the event.

b,

MServationsandFindinas

On June 14. 1997, at approximately 9:17 a,m. With the unit at full

power, atmospheric relief valve. 2PV-3030, failed to the open position.

In response, the reactor operator (RO) took the immediate actions of

ADP 18008-C, placed 2PV-3030 in manual control, and closed the valve.

The A0P was exited approximately 30 minutes later following isolation of

2PV-3030.

The licensee informed the inspectors that the event was-caused by a

failed ARV

Maintenance work

order (MWO) pressure transmitter and power supply card.

297013250 was written to repair / replace the failed

components. On June 16, 1997, the failed components were replaced and

the valve operation was restored to normal.

Enclosure 2

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c.

Conclusions-

The inspectors concluded that the operator response to the failed open

ARV 2PV-3030 was timely, appropriate, and indicated good operator

attention to main control room plant parameters and alarm indications.

02

Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

02.1 Safety-Related Walkd n

a.

Insoection Scone (71707)

The inspectors walked down selected portions of the following engineered

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safety feature (ESF) systems as part of the routine inspection effort to

verify availability and overall coadition of the systems:

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ESF Room Coolers Units 1 and 2 (Control Building)

The inspectors also verified portions of the safety related chiller flow

path in the control building.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspectors verified proper system configurations through walkdowns

of accessible portions in t1e plant, a review of main control room

indicators. and an examination of system drawings.

The inspectors also

observed material condition of system components during the walk downs.

The inspectors identified a minor discrepancy between the system drawing

and observed plant configuration. Additionally, a minor labelling issue

was identified.

These issues were forwarded to the licensee for

resolution.

c,

. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the systems reviewed were available to

perform their design function and that the systems were properly

aligned.

No significant discrepancies were noted during these

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inspections.

Enclosure 2

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02 2 Containment Penetrations Walkdown

a,

Insnection Scone (71707)

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following

containment penetrations to verify proper valve lineups:

Penetration

[Lr111

Title

28, 29

1,2

Auxiliary component cooling water (ACCW)

supply and return

34, 35

1,2

Containment spray supply pumps 1 and 2

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1,2

Safety injection test and drain line

48

1,2

Nonnal letdown line

55

1,2

Eddy current / sludge lancing and pressure

test valve

70A,70B,71A,71B

1,2

Containment hydrogen monitor suction and

discharge

72A,728,73A,73B

1,2

Accumulator sample lines

83, 84

1,2

Normal containment purge supply, purge

exhaust and equalizing

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Post-accident air exhaust

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b.

Observations and Findinas

Proper valve lineups were observed for all penetrations,

No

discrepancies between Procedures 14475-1/2, " Containment Integrity

Verification-Valves Outside Containment," Revision 15 and Revision 8,

respectively, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table

6,2,4-1. Containment Penetration / Isolation Valve Inforr.ation, were

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identi fied,

c.

Conclusion

Observed containment penetration c'onfigurations were in accordance with

the lineup procedures.

02.3 Storaae of Monorail Beam (71707)

On July 3,1997, during a routine tour of the auxiliary building, the

inspectors identified a removable portion of the overhead monorail beam

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. placed in close proximity to the Unit 2. Train A. Centrifugal Charging

Pum) (CCP).

The beam was located ap3roximately 14-inches from the

outacard end of the CCP 2A motor,

T1e beam was on the motor-pump

bedplate perpendicular to the pump / motor centerline, and was resting on

the long axis of the beam.

Enclosure 2

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Following questions on the appropriateness of this storage location, the

beam was removed and a DC was generated.

Pending additional inspector

review, this is identified as Unresolved item (URI) 50-425/97-06-01.

Monorail Beam Stored On 2A CCP Bedplate.

03

Operations Procedures and Documentation

03.1 Walkdown of Clearances (71707)

During the inspection period, the inspectors walked down the following

clearances:

19700474

Diesel Generator (DG) 1B "A" control power

19700517

Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) containment cooler 5

and 6 return valve 1HV-1830. motor operator preventive

maintenance

29700238

Containment spray pump train A discharge valve 2HV-9001A

No problems or concerns were identified.

08

Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92700)

08.1

(Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-424/96-012:

Main Generator

Stator Cooling Short Circutt Leads to lurbine/ Reactor Trip.

This event was documented in Inspection Report 9.,-12 (Section 01,3).

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions .dentified in the LER and

concluded they are sufficient.

No new issues Nere raised in the LER.

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This LER is closed.

II.

Maintenance

M1

Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 Maintenance Work Order Observations

a.

Insoection Scoce (62707)

The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities involving the

following work orders:

19701859

DG 1B "A" control power light socket replacement

29603040

Containment spray pump 2A motor cooler plenum rotated

29700055

Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). 2HV-3006A. change out

hydraulic oil

29701080

Atmospheric relief valve 2PV-3020. reservoir sight gauge

oil leak

29701148

Safety injection pump train B: replacer nt of handswitch

2HS-8920 common mini-flow isolation vi

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Enclosure 2

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29701198

MSIV, 2HV-3006A. hydraulic pump discharge fitting leak

29701230

Broken reach rod on 212087U6074. letdown cation bed 1 outlet

isolation valve

29701232

Repair / replace diaphragm in 21901U4144, reactor water

storage tank supply isolation valve

b.

Observations and Findinas

The observed maintenance activii.ies were performed satisfactorily.

M1,2 Surveillance Observation

a.

Insoection Scone (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance or reviewed the following

surveillances and plant procedures:

14475 1/2

Containment integrity verification - valves outside

containment-

14495-1

Auxiliary feedwater flow path verification

14645-2

Solid State Protection System (SSPS) slave relay containment

spray pump train A test

14804-2

Safety injection pump train B inservice ann rem for both units.

The 1997 year-

to date (YTD) dose expenditure of 12.5 person rem was significantly less

than the 24 person rem goal.

For 1996, aparoximately 195 Personnel Contamination Events (PCEs). i.e.

skin or clotling contamination exceeding 1000 counts per minute (CPM).

were documented relative to the 60 PCE goal established.by the licensee.

Approximately 41 PCEs (21 percent) of the total resulted from improper

cleaning of protective clothing.

Corrective actions included changing

the laundry vendor, improved housekeeping, revising training and

conducting special sessions regarding contamination control, and issuing

memoranda to operations and maintenance staff regarding personnel

contamination control issues.

For 1997 YTD. six PCE's were documented

relative to a goal of three PCEs.

As of June 3.1997, contaminated

square footage was less than one percent of accessible plant areas.

c.

Conclusions

Dose expenditure was controlled adequately with emergent and forced

outage work activities resulting in the licensee's 1996 person rem goals

being exceeded.

Personnel contamination events were not controlled effectively in 1996.

Corrective actions to address PCEs appeared to be adequate

Enclosure 2

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P2

Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources

P2.1

(Closed) Unresolved item (URIL50-424. 425/97-05 06:

Fitness For Duty

(FFD) Statements Potentially M1ssing for Recalled Individuals

a.

Insnection Scone (71750)

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URI 50 424. 425/97-05 06 documented inspector observations that several

individuals recalled to the site for an emergency preparedness (EP)

drill did not complete the emergency response facility (ERF) sign in

sheets.

The inspectors reviewed Procedure 00663-C. ' Fitness For Duty

Program." Revision 5. and ERF sign-in sheets.

The individuals who

failed to sign the sheets were interviewed,

b.

Observations and Findinns

Following the May 27, 1997. EP drill, the inspectors verified the

implementation of the FFD program.

Specifically, automated control

access device (ACAD) accountability badging records from the Operations

Support Center (OSC) and Technical Support Center (TSC) were compared

against the ERf sign-in sheets.

The inspectors determined that six

individuals reported to either the TSC or the OSC but did not sign any

ERF sign-in sheet.

These six individuals filled designated positions

required for minimum staffing for activation of the OSC or TSC.

When interviewed. the six individuals all acknowledged that they had not

signed in on an ERF sign-in sheet.

Further, one individual indicated

that he had consumed alcohol within five hours of reporting to the TSC.

c.

Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that six individuals did not designate their

fitness-for duty when they failed to annotate the emergency response

fccility sign-in sheets.

This is identified as Violation (VIO) 50-424.

425/97-06-05. FFD Sign in Sheets Not Completed For ERF Respondents.

S2

Status of Security Facilities and Equipment

S2.1 Review of Physical Security Power Sonolv

a.

Inspection Scone (71750)

The inspectors held discussions with security personnel and reviewed

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surveillance data packages associated with the testing of the security

secondary power supply system and its components.

Enclosure 2

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b.

Observations and Findinos

The inspectors held discussions with security personnel regarding the

Physical Security Plan (PSP) requirements for the testing of the

security secondary power supply and its com)onents.

The inspectors

reviewed the appro3riate sections of the PS) that addressed the testing

requirements for t1e security diesel generator and its associated

communications loads.

The inspectors reviewed Procedure 14986 C. " Security Diesel Generator

Load Test." Revision 5 and associated data packages for the past 18

months.

The procedure data package included requirements for alarm

annunciators and the operability of the Central and Secondary Alarm

Stations communications equipment.

c.

fang 1gsigns

The licensee tests the security secondary power supply system and its

components in accordance with the PSP.

V.

Manaaement Meetings and Other Areas

X

Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a manner

contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a special

focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or

parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections

discussed in this re nrt, the inspectors reviewed the applicable

portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected.

The

inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the

observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters.

X1

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee

management at tie conclusion of the inspection on July 8,1997.

The

licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during

the inspection should be considered proprietary.

No proprietary

information was identified.

Enclosure 2

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. Beasley, Nuclear Plant General Manager

J. Gasser. Plant Operations Assistant General Manager

P. Rushton Plant Support Assistant General Manager

S. Chestnut. Manager Operations

K. Holmes. Manager Maintenance

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M. Sheibani. Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor

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A. Parton, Chemistry Superintendent

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C. Tippins

Jr., Nuclear Specialist I

Licensee Jorocrate Reoresentatives

W. Ollinger. SNC Corporate

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37550:

Engineering

IP 37551:

Onsite Engineering

IP 61726:

Surveillance Observation

IP 62707:

Maintenance Observation

IP 71707:

Plant Operations

IP 71750:

Plant Support Activities

IP 83723:

Training and Qualifications: General Employee Training. Radiation-

Safety. Plant Chemistry. Radwaste, and Transportation

IP 83750:

Occupational. Radiation Exposure

IP 84750:

Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental

Monitoring

IP 92700:

Onsite followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power

Reactor Facilities

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

QPf0fd

50 425/97 06-01

URI

Monorail Beam Stored On 2A CCP Bedplate

(Section 02.3)

50-425/97-06-02

NCV

Failure Tc follow Maintenance Work Request

Program. Two Examples (Sections M3.1 and

M3.2)

50-424. 425/97-06-03

URI

Testing Of Parallel Circuits For MSIVs

(Section E8.1)

Enclosure 2-

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50 424, 425/97 06 04

IFl

Review Results Of Licensee Audit Of

Offsite REMP Sample Processing Laboratory

And Corrective Actions (Section R7.2).

50 424. 425/97-06 05

V10

FFD Sign-In Sheets Not Completed For ERF

Respondents (Section P2.1)

Closed

50 424/96 012

LER

Main Generator Stator Cooling Short

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Circuit Leads To Turbine / Reactor Trip

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(Section 08.1)

50 425/97-06 02

NCV

Failure To follow Maintenance Work Request

Program. Two Examples (Sections M3.1 and

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M3.2)

50 425/96 005

LER

Pressurizer Safety Valve's lift Setpoint

Found Out Of Tolerance (Section M8.1)

50 424, 425/97 05-06

-URI

Fitness For Duty (FFD) Statements

Potentially Missing For Recalled

Individuals (Section P2.1)

Enclosure 2

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