ML20198F863
| ML20198F863 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198F853 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-97-06, 50-424-97-6, 50-425-97-06, 50-425-97-6, NUDOCS 9708130165 | |
| Download: ML20198F863 (30) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1997006
Text
.
,
.
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION 11
Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50 425
License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81
Report No:
50-424/97-06. 50-425/97-06
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc.
Facility:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 1 and 2
a
Location:
7821 River Road
Waynesboro. GA 30830
l
l
Dates:
June 1 through July 5. 1997
I
Inspectors:
C. Ogle. Senior Resident Inspector
M. Widmann. Resident inspector
K. O'Donohue. Resident Inspector (in training)
J. Canady Resident Inspector (Section 08.1. R5.1 and S2.1)
P. Kellogg, Reactor Inspector (Sections E1.1. E2.1 and E7.1)
G. Kuzo. Reactor Inspector (Sections R1.1 R1.2. R1.3. R3.1.
R7.1. R7.2 and R8.1)
Approved by:
P. Skinner. Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 2
9708130165 970004
ADOCK 05000424
G
,
- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
'.
.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-424/97-06. 50-425/97-06
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations.
~
engineering. maintenance, and plant support.
The report covers a five-week
period of resident inspection.
It also includes the results of announced
inspections by regional inspectors in the health physics and engineering
areas.
Doerations
in general. the conduct of operations was professional and
e
safety-conscious (Section 01.1).
The operator response to a failed open atmospheric relief valve was
e
timely, appropriate, and indicated good operator attention (Section
01.2).
Maintenance
Maintenance and surveillance activities were generally completed
e
thoroughly and satisfactorily (Sections M1.1 and M1.2).
An example of a non cited violation was identified for failure to open
e
links in a containment spray system valve control circuit as required by
the maintenance work orders (Section M3.1).
Another example of a non-cited violation was identified for a
o
,
maintenance technician performing maintenance on a diesel generacor fuei
'
oil transfer pump without obtaining appropriate authorization (Section
M3.2).
Enaineerina
Inadequate knowledge of plant computer server hardware network address
e
configurations during troubleshooting resulted in intermittent display
cf Unit 1 data on the Unit 2 integrated plant computer.
However, the
impact of this intermixing of data was negligible due to the rapid
identification of the problem (Section E1.1).
Engineering has been effective in keeping the backlog low and 3roperly
prioritizing the work contained in the various lists (Section E2.1).
The inspectors concluded that the engineering department was performing
e
effective self-assessments.
Corrective actions planned for assessment
findings were of adequate scope (Section E7.1).
The Quarterly Trend Reports, while an excellent trending tool, are
e
reactive assessments in that they assess the deficiency cards identified
and look for trends in the number and causes of these ident Fied
Enclosure 2
i
%
.
4
.
2
deficiencies. The Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support Self-
Assessment was the only 3ro-active assessment identified of the
assessments reviewed.
111s assessment was pro-active in that it
reviewed the programs in place to identify where problems might occur in
the future (Section E7.1).
Plant Suncort
In general, conduct in the plant supDort area was satisfactory (Section
e
R1.1).
Radiological controls, area postings, and container labels met Technical
e
Specification and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements (Section RI.2),
A poor contamination control practice was identified for an outside
o
radwaste and material storage area (Section R1.2).
The established program for storage and accountability of Special
Nuclear Material was implemented appropriately (Section R1.2).
Overall, licensee controls for minimizing internal exposure were
e
effective with the uptake of radionuclides evaluated appropriately
(Section R1.3).
Documentation for internal exposure evaluations was limited (Section
R1.3).
Training and medical certification for personnel using respiratory
e
protective equipment were conducted in accordance with ap] roved
procedures and met the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 3 art 20
(Section R1.3).
The service air compressor system supplied Grade D respirable air in
e
accordance with 10 CFR 20. Appendix A requirements (Section R1.3).
Licensee programs to control and monitor liquid and airborne
radionuclide releases were maintained and implemented properly (Section
R3.1).
e
The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) sampling,
analysis, and reporting program requirements were implemented
effectively (Section R3.1).
e
Projected offsite doses resulting from effluents were well within the
limits specified in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual and 40 CFR 190
(Section R3.1).
e
The licensee's implementation of the General Employee Training program
for contractors and temporary workers was in accordance with procedural
requirements and 10 CFR 19.12 (Section R5.1).
Enclosure 2
.
.
3
A May 1997 audit of the Chemistry Program area was performance based
with no programmatic issues identified (Section R7.1).
e
Quality control Whole Body Count activities were conducted in accordance
with approved procedures and demonstrated system operability (Section
R7.2)
e
Licensee programs and analyses for selected radionuclides within
airborne effluent streams met established minimum detectable
concentrations (Section R7.2).
Problems were identified in analyses of the Radiological Environmental
e
Monitoring Program cross-check sample by the offsite laboratory (Section
R7.2),
Dose expenditure was controlled adequately w"h emergent and forced
o
outage work activities resulting in the 1996 person-ren goals being
exceeded (Section R8.1).
Personnel contamination events (PCE) were not controlled effectively in
e
1996.
Corrective actions to address PCEs appeared to be adequate
(Section R8.1).
e
A violation was identified for the failure of six individuals to
document their fitness for duty following recall for an emergency
preparedness drill (Section P2.1).
e
The licensee tested the security secondary power sup)1y system and its
components in accordance with the Physical Security alan (Section S2.1).
Enclosure 2
.
- _-
__ - _-__-_- - _ -
. . .
,
Reoort Details
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1
The unit operated at full power throughout the inspection period,
Unit 2
The. unit operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
I,
Operations
01
Conduct of Operations
-01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent
reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general, the reviews indicated
that the conduct of- operations was professional and safety-conscious.
01.2 Doerator Resoonse to Failed Onen Atmosoheric Relief Valve (ARV)
a.
Insoection Stone (71707)
The: inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in response to a Unit 2
failed pressure transmitter for ARV 2PV-3030. The inspectors reviewed
the Unit 2 control room-operator logs, the associated deficiency card
-(DC), and Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18008 C. " Secondary Coolant
Leak," Revision 5
The ins)ectors also interviewed members of the
operating crew on duty at t1e time of the event.
b,
MServationsandFindinas
On June 14. 1997, at approximately 9:17 a,m. With the unit at full
power, atmospheric relief valve. 2PV-3030, failed to the open position.
In response, the reactor operator (RO) took the immediate actions of
ADP 18008-C, placed 2PV-3030 in manual control, and closed the valve.
The A0P was exited approximately 30 minutes later following isolation of
The licensee informed the inspectors that the event was-caused by a
failed ARV
Maintenance work
order (MWO) pressure transmitter and power supply card.
297013250 was written to repair / replace the failed
components. On June 16, 1997, the failed components were replaced and
the valve operation was restored to normal.
Enclosure 2
u
.
A
2
c.
Conclusions-
The inspectors concluded that the operator response to the failed open
ARV 2PV-3030 was timely, appropriate, and indicated good operator
attention to main control room plant parameters and alarm indications.
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Safety-Related Walkd n
a.
Insoection Scone (71707)
The inspectors walked down selected portions of the following engineered
I
safety feature (ESF) systems as part of the routine inspection effort to
verify availability and overall coadition of the systems:
,
ESF Room Coolers Units 1 and 2 (Control Building)
The inspectors also verified portions of the safety related chiller flow
path in the control building.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors verified proper system configurations through walkdowns
of accessible portions in t1e plant, a review of main control room
indicators. and an examination of system drawings.
The inspectors also
observed material condition of system components during the walk downs.
The inspectors identified a minor discrepancy between the system drawing
and observed plant configuration. Additionally, a minor labelling issue
was identified.
These issues were forwarded to the licensee for
resolution.
c,
. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the systems reviewed were available to
perform their design function and that the systems were properly
aligned.
No significant discrepancies were noted during these
,
inspections.
Enclosure 2
_
.
_ _ _
'
,
,
e
3
02 2 Containment Penetrations Walkdown
a,
Insnection Scone (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following
containment penetrations to verify proper valve lineups:
[Lr111
Title
28, 29
1,2
Auxiliary component cooling water (ACCW)
supply and return
34, 35
1,2
Containment spray supply pumps 1 and 2
41
1,2
Safety injection test and drain line
48
1,2
Nonnal letdown line
55
1,2
Eddy current / sludge lancing and pressure
test valve
70A,70B,71A,71B
1,2
Containment hydrogen monitor suction and
discharge
72A,728,73A,73B
1,2
Accumulator sample lines
83, 84
1,2
Normal containment purge supply, purge
exhaust and equalizing
100
1,2
Post-accident air exhaust
i
b.
Observations and Findinas
Proper valve lineups were observed for all penetrations,
No
discrepancies between Procedures 14475-1/2, " Containment Integrity
Verification-Valves Outside Containment," Revision 15 and Revision 8,
respectively, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table
6,2,4-1. Containment Penetration / Isolation Valve Inforr.ation, were
i
identi fied,
c.
Conclusion
Observed containment penetration c'onfigurations were in accordance with
the lineup procedures.
02.3 Storaae of Monorail Beam (71707)
On July 3,1997, during a routine tour of the auxiliary building, the
inspectors identified a removable portion of the overhead monorail beam
4
. placed in close proximity to the Unit 2. Train A. Centrifugal Charging
Pum) (CCP).
The beam was located ap3roximately 14-inches from the
outacard end of the CCP 2A motor,
T1e beam was on the motor-pump
bedplate perpendicular to the pump / motor centerline, and was resting on
the long axis of the beam.
Enclosure 2
.-
.
=-.
. - .
-
- -.
--
-.-
,
'
,
4
Following questions on the appropriateness of this storage location, the
beam was removed and a DC was generated.
Pending additional inspector
review, this is identified as Unresolved item (URI) 50-425/97-06-01.
Monorail Beam Stored On 2A CCP Bedplate.
03
Operations Procedures and Documentation
03.1 Walkdown of Clearances (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors walked down the following
clearances:
19700474
Diesel Generator (DG) 1B "A" control power
19700517
Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) containment cooler 5
and 6 return valve 1HV-1830. motor operator preventive
maintenance
29700238
Containment spray pump train A discharge valve 2HV-9001A
No problems or concerns were identified.
08
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92700)
08.1
(Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-424/96-012:
Main Generator
Stator Cooling Short Circutt Leads to lurbine/ Reactor Trip.
This event was documented in Inspection Report 9.,-12 (Section 01,3).
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions .dentified in the LER and
concluded they are sufficient.
No new issues Nere raised in the LER.
'
This LER is closed.
II.
Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 Maintenance Work Order Observations
a.
Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities involving the
following work orders:
19701859
DG 1B "A" control power light socket replacement
29603040
Containment spray pump 2A motor cooler plenum rotated
29700055
Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). 2HV-3006A. change out
hydraulic oil
29701080
Atmospheric relief valve 2PV-3020. reservoir sight gauge
oil leak
29701148
Safety injection pump train B: replacer nt of handswitch
2HS-8920 common mini-flow isolation vi
e
Enclosure 2
-
.
--
-- _ _.
.
.-
-
.
5
29701198
MSIV, 2HV-3006A. hydraulic pump discharge fitting leak
29701230
Broken reach rod on 212087U6074. letdown cation bed 1 outlet
isolation valve
29701232
Repair / replace diaphragm in 21901U4144, reactor water
storage tank supply isolation valve
b.
Observations and Findinas
The observed maintenance activii.ies were performed satisfactorily.
M1,2 Surveillance Observation
a.
Insoection Scone (61726)
The inspectors observed the performance or reviewed the following
surveillances and plant procedures:
14475 1/2
Containment integrity verification - valves outside
containment-
14495-1
Auxiliary feedwater flow path verification
14645-2
Solid State Protection System (SSPS) slave relay containment
spray pump train A test
14804-2
Safety injection pump train B inservice ann rem for both units.
The 1997 year-
to date (YTD) dose expenditure of 12.5 person rem was significantly less
than the 24 person rem goal.
For 1996, aparoximately 195 Personnel Contamination Events (PCEs). i.e.
skin or clotling contamination exceeding 1000 counts per minute (CPM).
were documented relative to the 60 PCE goal established.by the licensee.
Approximately 41 PCEs (21 percent) of the total resulted from improper
cleaning of protective clothing.
Corrective actions included changing
the laundry vendor, improved housekeeping, revising training and
conducting special sessions regarding contamination control, and issuing
memoranda to operations and maintenance staff regarding personnel
contamination control issues.
For 1997 YTD. six PCE's were documented
relative to a goal of three PCEs.
As of June 3.1997, contaminated
square footage was less than one percent of accessible plant areas.
c.
Conclusions
Dose expenditure was controlled adequately with emergent and forced
outage work activities resulting in the licensee's 1996 person rem goals
being exceeded.
Personnel contamination events were not controlled effectively in 1996.
Corrective actions to address PCEs appeared to be adequate
Enclosure 2
(
.
,
.
9
23
P2
Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources
P2.1
(Closed) Unresolved item (URIL50-424. 425/97-05 06:
(FFD) Statements Potentially M1ssing for Recalled Individuals
a.
Insnection Scone (71750)
,
l
URI 50 424. 425/97-05 06 documented inspector observations that several
individuals recalled to the site for an emergency preparedness (EP)
drill did not complete the emergency response facility (ERF) sign in
sheets.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 00663-C. ' Fitness For Duty
Program." Revision 5. and ERF sign-in sheets.
The individuals who
failed to sign the sheets were interviewed,
b.
Observations and Findinns
Following the May 27, 1997. EP drill, the inspectors verified the
implementation of the FFD program.
Specifically, automated control
access device (ACAD) accountability badging records from the Operations
Support Center (OSC) and Technical Support Center (TSC) were compared
against the ERf sign-in sheets.
The inspectors determined that six
individuals reported to either the TSC or the OSC but did not sign any
ERF sign-in sheet.
These six individuals filled designated positions
required for minimum staffing for activation of the OSC or TSC.
When interviewed. the six individuals all acknowledged that they had not
signed in on an ERF sign-in sheet.
Further, one individual indicated
that he had consumed alcohol within five hours of reporting to the TSC.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that six individuals did not designate their
fitness-for duty when they failed to annotate the emergency response
fccility sign-in sheets.
This is identified as Violation (VIO) 50-424.
425/97-06-05. FFD Sign in Sheets Not Completed For ERF Respondents.
S2
Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
S2.1 Review of Physical Security Power Sonolv
a.
Inspection Scone (71750)
The inspectors held discussions with security personnel and reviewed
'
surveillance data packages associated with the testing of the security
secondary power supply system and its components.
Enclosure 2
.
4
.
24
b.
Observations and Findinos
The inspectors held discussions with security personnel regarding the
Physical Security Plan (PSP) requirements for the testing of the
security secondary power supply and its com)onents.
The inspectors
reviewed the appro3riate sections of the PS) that addressed the testing
requirements for t1e security diesel generator and its associated
communications loads.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 14986 C. " Security Diesel Generator
Load Test." Revision 5 and associated data packages for the past 18
months.
The procedure data package included requirements for alarm
annunciators and the operability of the Central and Secondary Alarm
Stations communications equipment.
c.
fang 1gsigns
The licensee tests the security secondary power supply system and its
components in accordance with the PSP.
V.
Manaaement Meetings and Other Areas
X
Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a manner
contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a special
focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or
parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections
discussed in this re nrt, the inspectors reviewed the applicable
portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected.
The
inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the
observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters.
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at tie conclusion of the inspection on July 8,1997.
The
licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary
information was identified.
Enclosure 2
_
l
'
.
.
4
25
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
J. Beasley, Nuclear Plant General Manager
J. Gasser. Plant Operations Assistant General Manager
P. Rushton Plant Support Assistant General Manager
S. Chestnut. Manager Operations
K. Holmes. Manager Maintenance
!
M. Sheibani. Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor
'
,
A. Parton, Chemistry Superintendent
l
C. Tippins
Jr., Nuclear Specialist I
Licensee Jorocrate Reoresentatives
W. Ollinger. SNC Corporate
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37550:
Engineering
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
IP 61726:
Surveillance Observation
IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
IP 83723:
Training and Qualifications: General Employee Training. Radiation-
Safety. Plant Chemistry. Radwaste, and Transportation
IP 83750:
Occupational. Radiation Exposure
IP 84750:
Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental
Monitoring
IP 92700:
Onsite followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
QPf0fd
50 425/97 06-01
Monorail Beam Stored On 2A CCP Bedplate
(Section 02.3)
50-425/97-06-02
Failure Tc follow Maintenance Work Request
Program. Two Examples (Sections M3.1 and
M3.2)
50-424. 425/97-06-03
Testing Of Parallel Circuits For MSIVs
(Section E8.1)
Enclosure 2-
,
'.
do
.-
26
50 424, 425/97 06 04
IFl
Review Results Of Licensee Audit Of
Offsite REMP Sample Processing Laboratory
And Corrective Actions (Section R7.2).
50 424. 425/97-06 05
V10
FFD Sign-In Sheets Not Completed For ERF
Respondents (Section P2.1)
Closed
50 424/96 012
LER
Main Generator Stator Cooling Short
l
Circuit Leads To Turbine / Reactor Trip
l
(Section 08.1)
50 425/97-06 02
Failure To follow Maintenance Work Request
Program. Two Examples (Sections M3.1 and
'
M3.2)
50 425/96 005
LER
Pressurizer Safety Valve's lift Setpoint
Found Out Of Tolerance (Section M8.1)
50 424, 425/97 05-06
-URI
Fitness For Duty (FFD) Statements
Potentially Missing For Recalled
Individuals (Section P2.1)
Enclosure 2
i
'
.
__