IR 05000424/1987003

Insp Repts 50-424/87-03 & 50-425/87-03 on 870105-09.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Seismic Analysis for as-built safety-related Piping Sys (IE Bulletin 79-14) & safety-related Piping Sys

ML20210E032
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	01/29/1987
From:	Blake J, Vias S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210D977	List: IR 05000424/1987003 ML20210D973
References
50-424-87-03, 50-424-87-3, 50-425-87-03, 50-425-87-3, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8702100216
Download: ML20210E032 (10)

Text

- - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

pm RQ, UNITE 3 STATES 4 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[' n REGION il y j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * r ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323

\...*/

Report Nos.: 50-424/87-03 and 50-425/87-03 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302

'

Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: CPPR-108 and CPPR-109 Facility Name: Vogtle Inspection Conducted: January 5-9, 1987 j

Inspector:

S. J. Vias M0

[2f I7

' Date Signed

[

Approved by: . [, L /Irtj / d 7 J.J.Blake,SectionCyief f 'Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection on site was conducted in the areas of seismic analysis for as-built safety related piping systens (IEB 79-14),

safety-related pipe supports, base plate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts (IEB 79-02), inspector followup items, licensee identified items, other previous enforcement matters and followup on employee concerns in Rattle Point Walkdown Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000424 O PDR

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• R. E. Conway, Senior Vice President, Project Director

• P. D. Rice, Vice President Vogtle Project

• C. W. Hayes, Quality Assurance (QA) Manager

• E. D. Groover, QA Site Manager - Construction

• A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, and office personne Other Organization

.

.

R. C. Summerfield, Bechtel Power Corp., Readiness Review Team Leader

!

NRC Resident Inspector

,

• H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector-Construction

,

• Attended exit interview l

l Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 9,1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license No new items were identified during this inspectio The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action On Previous Enforcement Actions (25528, 25529, 50090) (Closed) Violation 424/83-13-05 and 425/83-13-03, Verification of Expansion Anchor Design Value This matter concerns the design allowable loads for concrete expansion anchors which are based on manufacturer's test data. The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representatives and reviewed their response and documentation presented. The licensee received a I letter from Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC), dated November 3,1983,  !

.. .. .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

.

which stated that the ultimate load capacity of each specified anchor is provided by the manufacturer using the test results of an inde-pendent test laborator All tests were conducted in accordance with ANSI / ASTM E 488-76, ICB0 Test Standard, and Expansion Anchor Manufac-turer's Institute's Test Standard, with Certified Test Reports available from each manufacture Each of the manufacturers have a quality assurance program in effect, prepared in compliance with the provisions of ANSI N45.2-1971 " Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," which also meets the requirements of the NRC QA requirements of 10 CFR 50 -

Appendix A complete review was conducted, by the licensee, of the manufacturer's test data for the ultimate load capacity for each of the concrete expansion anchor brands listed in specification No. X2AP01, Section No. C9.7. The review resulted in the conclusion that all the anchors, with the exception of Hilti " Kwik Bolt" and the Phillips " Sleeve Anchor", have a factor of safety equal to or greater than four, as required by IE Bulletin 79-02. CSCN No. 406, dated October 20, 1983, to the specification X2AP01 deleted the Hilti and Phillips from the list of permissible brands of anchor No field work was required since these two brands have not been used by constructio This matter was also reviewed in the Readiness Review Module 8, Structural Steel, Section 7.4.4.6, Drilled-In (Expansion) Anchors. It was determined that the values of allowable loads for the anchors listed in Appendix G of the General Design Criteria (DC-1000-C), have been properly taken from the independent laboratory test report listed above. There were no findings from this review. This entire matter is considered close b. (Closed) Violation 424, 425/85-06-03, Filler Plates with Pipe Straps are Being Utilized Without Proper Documentatio This matter concerns the failure to submit design changes, involving filler plates and filler plate welds in conjunction with pipe straps, to the Project Engineer for review and acceptanc This concern has received extensive review recently due to NRC identified items, allegation review (see paragraph 6) and licensee evaluations. It has been determined in the various reviews that there were nonengineered installations and inaccurate inspections due to unclear procedures. All licensee procedures and specifications pertaining to the installation, inspection and design of filler plates and filler plates with pipe straps have been reviewed by the appro-priate personnel and training has been conducted for all responsible personne . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .

"

.

With the above corrective actions, the proper use of filler plates and pipe straps is now controlled in an acceptable manner. This should preclude any misunderstanding in the proper installation and inspection of these items. This item is considered close c. (Closed) Violation 424/86-78-01, Incorrect Steam Generator Main Steam Nozzle Load Allowables and Reference Specification. This matter concerned two items; first, is the incorrect allowable for the main steam nozzle in the weight load condition in the Fc direction, and second is the incorrect referenced specification in the calculation of the main steam nozzle for Steam Generator No. The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representa-tives and reviewed their response. For the first item, the licensee stated that the discrepancy occurred during the transposition of load information from the Westinghouse local coordinate diagram to the Bechtel local coordinate diagram and is considered to be an isolated case of human error. For the second item, the incorrect reference to the source of the allowable nozzle loads is also attributed to human error. A comparison was made between the information in the correct source document (Westinghouse Specification E-953236) and the informa-tion in the calculatio The comparison confirmed that the correct information was used in the calculatio Calculation X4CP-7110 has been revised to correct the discrepancies identified in the violation. To prevent recurrence, appropriate stress group personnel were reminded of applicable project procedural require-ments in the checking of design calculations and were reminded of the importance of strict adherence with appropriate attention to detai This matter is considered closed, d. (Closed) Violation 424/86-78-02, Failure to Follow Procedure for Documenting Deviation This matter concerned two separate cases where deficiencies were not identified and documented by the vendor required by NISCO Engineering Specification E.S.142. The first discrepancy involved a mechanical impression found on a bottom mounted instrumenta-tion guide tube No. 48-P-4 and was determined to be indeterminate and should have been reported as a deviation. The second, involved two "U" bolt connections to bottom mounted instrumentation guide tubes that exceeded allowable clearance The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representa-tives and reviewed their response and corrective actions. The licensee stated that the first discrepancy is attributed to a failure to properly apply applicable procedural requirements to an indeterminate condition. The discrepancy was subsequently documented in Deviation Report (DR) NI-233 and was dispositioned "use as is" af ter having been evaluated by engineering. The second discrepancy is attributed to

_ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _

'

.

inspector oversight during the final walkdown. This discrepancy was subsequently documented in DR NI-206, and was also dispositioned "use as is" following an engineering evaluatio In addition, another walkdown was conducted of guide tube supports and no further clearance discrepancies were foun To prevent recurrence, appropriate NISCO engineering and quality control personnel were reinstructed in project requirements for the identification, documentation, and resolution of deviating or indeterminate conditions, and were instructed again as to the importance of strict adherence to procedures. This entire matter is considered close e. (Closed) Violation 50-424/86-62-03, Inadequate Construction Procedures for Installation and Inspection of Spring Supports and Clamp The matter concerns PPP Procedures IX-32 and IX-50 being inadequate relative to the installation / inspection of spring hangers and snubber clamps and in the control of clamp bolting material Procedure IX-50 has been revised by PPP to more clearly define installation and inspection requirements for spring type pipe supports and associated hardware. In addition, PPP Site Instruction #94 has been developed and implemented to provide further guidance in the setting of spring cans and the installation or removal of stop pin PPP Procedure VIII-1 and Site Instruction #64 provide adequate direction for the marking of small support parts. Procedures IX-50 contains reference to Procedure VIII-1 and Procedure IX-32 was revised

,

on July 7,1986, to address marking of small support part Revisions have been made to PPP Procedure IX-32 and associated Process Sheets to address the inspection of snubber clamp installation. All snubber clamp installed previous to the recent procedure revision have been identified and evaluated for adequacy. This matter is considered close This corrective action also closes deficiency 424/86-62-08, Inadequate Review of Installation and Inspection of Spring Supports, as identified in Readiness Review Report 424/86-44, paragraph 4 for Module 11, Stress Analysis and Support f. (Closed) Violation 424/86-62-06, Discrepancies Between Pipe Supports, Design Documentation and QC Documentatio This matter concerns a number of specific discrepancies between design documents, as-built conditions, and inspection records. The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representatives and reviewed

.

r-

,

. ,

.y

+;~ n 5 -

their response and corrective actions. During thi~1icensee review, they identified additional inspection and documentation, thus removing the discrepancies from the violation. For the discrepancies that were acknowledged by the licensee in which hardware was affscted, Deviation Reports have been issued to ensure proper resolution. The inspector agrees with the licensee statement that the discrepancies are not indicative of deficiencies of a programmatic nature in the installation ,

and inspection of pipe support systems, but are isolated cases of .- ,

craftsman and/or inspector error. Where appropriate, craf tsman and/or 23 .

inspection personnel have been given corrective instruction in project procedural requirements to prevent recurrenc This matter is considered close ;

4. Unresolved Items -

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio _

5. Construction Deficiency Reports (CDRs) (92700)

The inspector examined the licensee's evaluation, reporting and correction; of the items which have been reported to Region II as potential construction deficiencies. The item and the review performed are described below:

, (Closed) CDR 424, 425/86-102, (M-102), Pipe Support Tolerance and Installation Procedures, (10 CFR 50.55(e)). The final report was submitted on October 21, 1986, and was determined to be acceptabl The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representa- -

tives and reviewed sup)orting documentation to veri fy that the corrective action ident" fied in the report has been completed. This '

matter concerned changes made to construction specification X4AZ01, Division P-5. These changes could potentially affect pipe supports installed prior to the changes, in that they could= restrict pipe movement beyond that calculated in the pipe stress analysis and could'

result in loads on pipe support structures in excess of calculated design load The described conditions were the result of unclear representation of the pipe design criteria / tolerance. The specirica-tion has since been revised according to project procedures to improve the clarity of the existing installation tolerance and/or criteri Furthermore, the potential impacts of these clarifications have been analyzed and collective actions, when necessary, have been initiated /

completed and are being tracked by the program for completion of work (PCW).

Based on the inspector's verification that the licens6e had satisfac-torily completed their evaluation and that no further corrective action was necessary, other than the actions stated above, this matter is considered closed.

l r

Np b v .

. ,

-

/%

a ,

e e

,

~

I (Closed) CDR 424, 425/86-135, (M-135), ASME Buried Piping, (10 CFR 150.55(e)). The fini report was submitted on December 31, 1986, and was determined to be acceptable. The inspector held discussions.with w , responsible license representatives and reviewed supporting documenta-1 tion to verify that the corrective action identified in the report has been complete This matter concerned the fact that during the y '

preparation of the documentation for ANSI B31.1 buried piping analysis,

. it was identified that portions of ASME section-III, Class 3 fuel oil transfer lines were embedded in the basemat of the Diesel Generator

'

. .

'

. Building (DGB) without pipe sleeves at the interface between the DGB

?c and the soi The project design criteria requires that the subject

-

piping be designed for the imposed loads on the piping system including

.

.

differential building settlement and differential seismic motions

, between building and soi The piping isometric drawings for lines 1/2-2403-051, 053, 068, 066, 043 and 044 at DGB basemat to soil interface depicted these lines as

" buried" in soil but these lines are actually embedded in the basemat concrete. The stress analyst assumed that the piping was sleeved at this location. As a result of the rigid connections, these lines could be subjected to stresses above ASME Code allowables due to the relative

/ seismic anchor motion and building settlement loadings.

J ,y\ ,

-

Additional safety related buried lines have been identified at other building to soil interface Engineering verification of these additional buried lines concluded that the lines pass through pipe sleeves / penetrations and that pipe stresses are within ASME Code

. allowable The licensee conducted reviews of buried piping (both ASME and B31.1)

and analytical scoping packages and, based on this review, determined that no other similar situations existed in safety related pipin There fore, . it has been determined that the ASME piping overstress condition is limited to the identified six diesel fuel oil lines for each unit. A quality assurance review has concluded that this condition of buried piping is an isolated event and does not represent a significant breakdown in the Bechtel quality assurance progra The inspector reviewed the licensee corrective action, which included installation of a guard pipe around the affected lines and review and the stress calculations for Unit 1, against the installed conditio for Unit 2 the corrective actions are being tracked under a program for

completion work (PCW), Item Number 2B159 Based on the inspector's verification that the licensee had satisfac-

'

torily completed their evaluation and that no further corrective action was necessary, other than the actions stated above, this matter is considered close ~

. - . . . . . - - -. . . . - - --

'*

. ,

7 i

, (Closed) CDR 424, 425/86-129, (M-129), Containment Cooling- Unit Manifold Nozzles, (10 CFR 50.55(e)). This final report was submitted on December 23, 1986, and was determined to be acceptable. The-inspector held discussions with responsible licensee representatives and reviewed supporting ' documentation to verify that the corrective action identified in the report has been complete This - matter concerns the containment cooling unit manifold nozzles. The license reported that the CVI stress analysis did not include an evaluation of the effects of post-LOCA thermal conditions on the cooler / manifold interface. -There are 'eight cooling units in each unit of the plan ~

The engineering evaluation summary indicated that the pipe support-  ;

configuration for the containment cooling units (CCUs) had insufficient flexibility due to excessive thermal stresses and that corrective '

,

'

action modifications for Unit 1 had been completed. Corrective-action for the Unit 2 CCUs are. tracked -under program for completion work ,

(PCW), item no. 281587 and will be completed commensurate with Unit 2  ;

construction schedules.

'

Based on the inspector's verification that the licensee had satisfac-torily completed their evaluation and that no further corrective action .

'

was necessary,- other that the actions stated above, this matter is l considered close .

t Employee Concerns, Discussions, and Findings (99024)

.

The following employee concern was reviewed:

i . Reconciliation Walkdown of Demineralizers not Performed (R286A0293)

r

. Concern This matter concerns walkdowns of the demineralizers and associated

'

piping, not being performed during the Rattle Points reconciliation i walkdow i j Discussion  ;

! The inspector held discussion with responsible licensee representatives

and the supervisors over the Rattle Point Walkdown group and reviewed their Master List, which identified all the packages that were in the

.program, for Rattle Point Walkdown progra The inspector's review of the walkdown packages included; master list ,

entry methods,-master list data, partial walkdown of IS0s in walkdown  ;

'

packages, verification of Rattle Points identified in this review

. versus the 75% and 100% program walkdown data, and discussions with l walkdown personnel 'and supervisors. The following packages including

, walkdowns of the demineralizer piping and demin pits were reviewed:

'

i

!

!

,

- , ,-,---,w - - , ,,%,,- - m- ,,--+-.~,-,,,,,-.ywr..- ,,--,--i -,..,-w...#,--r,,,,.,

-

r--i,,,,,,,rm=-,--ri,,. ---.,-,~v,,-e-...

. r-

-

.

'

.

BG-01-050 BG-01-102 BG-01-061 EF-02-034 Included was a concern that a portion of the above packages were not walked down due to inaccessibility and were signed off without completing the walkdow The inspector observed, both on the isometric and master list, that notations were made by the responsible personnel and that indeed a portion of the piping in the demin pits not walked dow The walkdown personnel noted on the isometric that, he had walked down only a portion of piping and signed accordingl The clerk for the master list noted in the comment section of the master list

"Demin Pit /Rewalk," thus indicating that additional work was required on this package. At the time the Demin Pits were accessible, the remainder of the walkdown was properly performed and noted on the isometrics and at that time the entire package was signed off, with two sets of walkdown signatures, indicating two separate reviews and proper approvals. At this time the master list indicated that the package was completed with all the pertinent information include Also reviewed was the magnitude of work performed by the various shifts, crew, or time frame to see if any particular trend was obviou The inspector noted in the period reviewed there was nothing out of line with respect to the magnitude of work being done on any particular shift or crew or time frame, Findings Review of records on the referenced walkdowns showed that the Rattle Point Walkdown was handled properly. It is this inspector's observa-tion, based on interviews with the responsible personnel that the -

walkdown personnel were not totally aware of how the entire program worked, thus adding to the confusion and concern. No discrepancies were identified other than lack of informing the staff of the total procedures of the progra This matter is considered close . (Closed) Inspector followup Item 424,425/85-22-01, Reinspection and Evaluation of Rock Bolt Installations. This matter concerns the improper installation and inspection of Rock Bolt Anchors, identified in Violation 424, 425/84-36-04, Control and Installation of Rock Bolt Inspection Report 85-22 indicated that the reinspection and review of the identified installations would be evaluate Bechtel Power Corporation issued a letter on February 7,1985, stating that they would perform an engineering evaluation to determine whether or not retrofit is required for the rock bolts installed without washer Bechtel Power Corporation issued Deviation Report (DR) CD-07500, dated March 27, 1985. The DR noted in an engineering evaluation on Attachments 6 and 7,

_

-- . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

that based on the review of the installation records, the bolts were indeed tensioned by jacking, as required by the Williams Form Engineering and PPP Procedures IX-1, Section 8.0, GPC Specification, GO-T-26, Section 7.2 and DC-1000C, Appendix G. This method precluded any damage that might occur to the plate in the absence of an hardened washe All parties that are responsible for the installation and inspection of Rock Bolts have been reinstructed in the proper configuration and requirements of Williams Rock Bolts, to preclude any further improper inst:11ation of the Rock Bolt This matter is considered closed.