IR 05000424/1989008

Insp Repts 50-424/89-08 & 50-425/89-11 on 890204-10.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Nrc Bulletin Followup,Diesel Generator Fuel Oil,Containment Isolation Sys Testing & Followup Actions on Previous Insp Findings

ML20244E220
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	04/07/1989
From:	Belisle G, Tingen S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20244E212	List: IR 05000424/1989008 ML20244E208
References
50-424-89-08, 50-424-89-8, 50-425-89-11, IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, IEIN-87-004, IEIN-87-4, IEIN-88-072, IEIN-88-073, IEIN-88-72, IEIN-88-73, NUDOCS 8904240355
Download: ML20244E220 (14)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll o,

gv.,,,, 101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.: 50-424/89-08 and 50-425/89-11 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-79 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: February 4-10, 1989 Inspector:_S. Tingen bk '

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4 (o f 8Cf Date Signed Team Members: H. Whitener A. Szcze aniec Approved by: . sks [ 7[h Date S'igndd G. Belisle, Chief Test Program Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of NRC Bulletin followup, diesel generator fuel oil, containment isolation system testing, and followup actions on previous inspection finding Results The licensee's actions in response to Bulletin 85-03, Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failure During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings, exceeded the bulletin requirements. The licensee performed diagnostic testing on all safety-related motor operated valves installed in fluid systems. Other strengths in the program included written post maintenance test requirements and routine diagnostic test requirements, paragraph The licensee's documentation of the action performed, in response to Bulletin 81-02, Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure, was untimely. Three inspections were required to obtain the required Unit 2 documentation, and the Unit I documentation is still not available, paragraph The licensee responded to the fuel oil quality information notice issued by the NRC in 1987 in a timely manner. Their program appears to insure that emergency diesel generator fuel and quality is maintained, paragraph I 8904240355 890411 '

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Aufdenkamp, Engineering Supervisor

• R. Bellamy, Plant Manager i

• G. Bockhold, General Manager

1. J. Davis, Senior Plant Engineer

1. C. Eckert, Health Physics Chemistry Manager

• 1. G. Frederick, Quality Assurance Manager, Operations

• 1. W. Gabbard, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

• C. Garrett, Operations Engineer

• K. Glandon, Maintenance Engineer

• 1. T. Green, Plant Support Manager

• M. Griffis, Maintenance Manager J. Guimbelotte, Nuclear Operations Lead Test Supervisor S. Hall, Procedures Superintendent

• H. Handfinger, Project Startup Manager J. Hawley, Project Engineer

• C. Hayes, Quality Assurance Manager G. Johnson, Nuclear Operations Test Supervisor W. Johnston, Control Systems Engineering Group Leader

1. G. Lee, Operations Supervisor

• Mcaffee, Quality Control Specialist

• Morris, Quality Control Specialist

• A. Mosoaugh, Engineering Manager

1. W. Nicklin, Compliance Supervisor

• R. Odem, Plant Engineering Manager

• S. Owen, Project Engineering Manager

• P. Rice, Vice President and Project Director

• J. Sanders, Assistant Project Manager S. Smith, Senior Plant Engineer

• Smith, Senior Plant Engineer

1. K. Stokes, System Engineer

1. J. Swartzwelder, Manager A. Wehrenberg, Deputy Nuclear Engineering Group Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, technicians, and administrative personnel .

NRC Resident Inspectors

1. R. Aiello

• 1. C. Burger

1. J. Rogge j

• Attended exit interview on February 6,1989 j

1. Attended exit interview on February 10, 1989 l

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2 IE Bulletin 85-03 Followup (25573)

(Closed). 50-424,425/85-BU-03, TI 2515/73, Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failure During' Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Setting The purpose of this bulletin is to require licensees to develop and -

implement a program to ensure that switch . settings for high pressure coelant injection and emergency feedwater system motor operated valves (M0Vs), subject to testing for operational readiness in accordance with i 10 CFR 50.55a(g), are properly set, selected, and maintained. The Vogtle l

Unit 1 IE Bulletin 85-03 program was previously discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-424/88-51. In order to evaluate the Vogtle Unit 2 Bulletin 85-03 program, the inspector held discussions with licensee personnel, walked down Unit 2 Bulletion 85-03 MOVs, and reviewed the following:

Procedure No. 29402-C, Revision 7, Work Planning ' Group Work Order

. Processing Procedure No. 26822-C, Revision 0, . Periodic Motor Load Testing of Motor. Operated Valves Procedure No. 400-C, bision 9, Request for Engineering Review Desk Instructions for M0V Test Program Retest Assignment Deficiency Reports filed against Units 1 and 2 MOVs Georgia Power Company's letter dated February 3,1989, Plant Vogtle Unit 2 Final response to IE Bulletin 85-03 Construction Deficiency Reports filed against Unit 2 MOVs Current status of IE Bulletin 85-03 Action . Items a Through Item a required that the design basis for operation of each Bulletin 85-03 valve be reviewed and documented. Vogtle has completed this action for all AC motor driven MOVs. Information, Notice 88-72, " Inadequacies in the Design of DC Motor Operated Valves," and the Limitorque Corporation's Part-21 Notification, dated November 3, 1988, discuss design deficiencies with DC. MOVs that involve operation at elevated temperatures, cable resistance, presence of starting resistors, and high-voltage transients. With the exception of cable resistance contributing to reduced motor terminal voltage and starting current Vogite has determined that the DC MOV deficiencies discussed in Information Notice 88-72 and Limitorque Part 21 Notification do not apply to Vogtle DC motor driven valves. The licensee is evaluating if excessive cable length exists to DC motor driven valves, otherwise Item a is complete.

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Ji '3 l Item b requires correct switch; settings to be establ'ished, and review and revise -as necessary ' the methods for selecting switch setting The review of the program indicates that this has been satisfactorily accomplished, Item c ' requires that switch settings be changed as appropriate based on: the design review performed, and each valve be demonstrated

' operable by testing the valve' at the maximum differential pressure the valve will see. If a valve i.= not differential pressure tested'

then justification ' is required to be ' provided, and valves 'not differential pressure tested a"e required, at a minimum, to be stroke tested at static conditions to verify. switch settings. The licensee has ' satisfactorily completed Item The differential-pressure testing requirement was met by accomplishing one or more of the following; Instrumenting the M0V with M0 VATS equipment to measure actuator thrust while cycling the valve at design or near design differential pressur Valve operability is verified and actuator . thrust output is measured and compared to calculated actuator thrus Cycle the M0V during preoperational testing while at the

. differential pressure' the valve' would be exposed ~to during normal operatio For MOVs - that were required to cycle against low differential pressures, the torque switch settings were maintained significantly higher than the calculated thrust value Utilize test results obtained from similar valve Extrapolation of thrust value Item d requires that procedures be prepared or revised to ensure that switch settings are maintained throughout the life of the plant, that applicable industry standart, be' considered in these procedures, and I that procedures include provisions to monitor valve performance. The  !

licensee has developed the following in order to accomplish Item d:  !

A setpoint document that provides all MOV switch setting Procedures that provide switch setting instructions reference the setpoint document. This greatly simplifies switch settings practices in the field by not requiring personnel to obtain the information from drawing i r

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l Procedures have been revised to ensure that when maintenance is l' performed on a bulletin valve, it is flagged so special I retesting requirements will be assigne Written instructions specifying bulletin valve post maintenance test requirement In order to monitor valve performance, a program has' been implemented to routinely diagnostic test bulletin valves each refueling outage until results indicate the interval can be extende Procedures that trend M0V deficiencie Training courses for station personnel in the areas of M0V electrical and mechanical maintenance, failures, and diagnostic testin Procedures that accomplish mechanical and electrical maintenance, set M0V switches, troubleshoot MOVs problems, and diagnostic test MOV During the initial diagnostic testing of bulletin valves, several valves were found to be overthrusting. The licensee is initiating a program to evaluate any effect this may have had on the valve and its actuato Item e has been completed and is documented in NRC Report Nos. 50-424/88-51 and 50-425/88-6 In response to Item f, the licensee has submitted the final Units 1 and 2 responses to the NRC, During the inspection, the inspector walked down approximately 50 percent of the Unit 2 Bulletin 85-03 MOVs and reviewed deficiency reports filed against MOV Walkdown results indicate that Unit 2 MOVs are in good condition, valve stems were clean and lubricated, all fasteners were installed, and valve stem covers were installed. During the walkdown, the '

inspector noted that the adapter to actuator fasteners on valves 2HV-5113, 2HV-5118, and 2HV-5119 did not have full thread engagement, the actuator to valve fasteners on valves 2HV-811B and 2HV-8508A did not have full thread engagement, and the motor to actuator fasteners on valves 2HV-8814A and 2HV-8821A did not have full thread engagement. Fasteners with less than full thread engagement will be followed up on during a subsequent inspection and identified as Inspector Followup Item 425/89-11-0 MOV deficiencies are required to be documented in deficiency report Review of deficiency reports filed against Unit 1 MOVs indicated that few problems were occurring, the only reoccurring problem was tripper fingers requiring adjustments. Review of deficiency reports filed against Unit 2 MOVs indicated that there were numerous M0V problems. The majority of the

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deficiency reports were generated during MOVATS testing of the safety related and balance of plant valves following construction of Unit Review of the corrective action contained in the deficiency reports indicated that the licensee was determining root cause of problems when appropriat Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identifie . IE Bulletin and Supplement 81-02 Followup (92703)

(0 pen) 50-424/81-BU-02, (Closed) 50-425/81-BU-02, Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure. The purpose of this bulletin and supplement is to request all licensees to investigate and correct the failure for motor operated gate valves to fully close at design differential pressure. In letters dated March 1, 1981, April 21, 1981, May 1, 1981, and November 20, 1981, from Georgia Power Company to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Georgia Power identified the valves affected by Bulletin 81-02 and Supplement 1. The corrective action described in these letters was general in nature and not specific in regards to what actiors would be taken for the affected valves. In NRC Inspection Reports Nos. 50-424, 425/83-02, 50-424/88-51, and 50-425/88-66, NRC inspectors followed up on Bulletin 81-02 actions. These inspection reports document that Bulletin 81-02 actions were believed complete, but verifying documentation was not available. A letter dated February 3, 1989, from Westinghouse Electric Corporation to Bechtel Power Corporation summarizes the corrective action taken in response to Bulletin 81-02 and Supplement 1 for Electro-Mechanical Division motor operated gate valves supplied to Georgia Power Corporation, Vogtle Unit 2. The inspector verified that valves identified in the Westinghouse letter encompassed valves previously identified by Georgia Power in 1981. The inspector also reviewed the corrective action taken for specific valve In some cases, valves were shipped after Bulletin 81-02 was issued; therefore, corrective action was taken prior to delivery of the valves to Vogtle Unit 2. Other corrective actions included increasing torque switch settings, replacing the spring pack with a stiffer spring pack, increasing actuator gear ratios, and setting up valves to limit close in lieu of torquing clos The inspector considered that actions taken in response to Bulletin 82-01 to be adequate for Unit 2; however, the licensee has not provided documentation for Unit I corrective actio Bulletin 81-02 and l Supplement 1 is closed for Unit 2 but will remain open for Unit 1 until the licensee provides adequate documentation that corrective actions have been take During the exit interview the inspector questioned the licensee when documentation for completing the Unit 1 IEB 81-02 corrective actions would be availabl The licensee responded that this was still under investigatio Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.

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6 4.- Diesel Generator Fuel Oil An inspection was conducted of' the licensee's program to maintain adequate quality of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel Oil (F0) stored on sit The inspection was performed in accordance with Temporary-Instruction (TI)

2515/100. A ~ requirement of the TI is to complete a questionnaire that is

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attached to the TI as Appendix The inspector reviewed licensee's ,

responses to the questionnaire and verified the following:

The licensee routinely determines the quality of stored fuel oil with effective scheduled analyse '

The licensee can detect degradation of stored fuel oil qualit ,

The licensee routinely monitors and cleans- filters, strainers, and

! other' components subject to fouling in the fuel oil syste The licensee routinely reviews and evaluates Nuclear Regulatory Commission information on this subjec Procedure 30080-C, Diesel Fuel Chemistry Control, outlines the sampling and analyses requirements to ensure that the fuel in the storage tanks and new fuel shipments meet Technical Specifications. Other procedures are i referenced therein that actually perform the analytical analysis. As stated in the Final Safety Analysis Report, the licensee is not committed to Regulatory Guide 1.137, Fuel-0il Systems for Standby Diesel Generators; however, sampling is performed in accordance with established standards ASTM D975-81, Standard Specifications of Diesel Fuel Oils, and D2276-78, Standard Test Methods for Particulate Containment in Aviation Turbine Fuels. Procedure 30080-C includes truck top sampling (new fuel), storage !

tank sampling for the emergency diesel, fuel oil analysis (new oil and t

storage tank oil), monitoring for corrosiveness to coatings, checking for j and removing accumulated water,- and microbe contro Sampling is performed periodicall Noted during the inspection was that the licensee's Technical Specifications refer to total contaminant determination in accordarce with ASTM D2276-78, Method Method A is a subsection in the ASTM which j concerns total contaminant determination. However, the subsection also j l

specifies a method for taking a fuel oil sample called the field monitoring metho The ASTM, elsewhere, allows an alternate method to the j

field collecting method and describes it in ASTM appendix A2. The licensee routinely uses the alternate method. After discussions between the inspector and the Performance and Quality Evaluation Branch of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, it was decided the use of the alternate method was acceptable, in that, the reference to Method A was redundant in its intent to specify " total contaminant determination" and not to specify the method for taking the sampl During the diesel generator operating log review by the inspector, it was '

l observed that the data sheets for the strainer did not specify which of

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i the dual strainers was on-lin Additionally no instructions were available addressing switching strainers when neede The filter data sheet specifies which filter was on-line and instructions were available for changing filter The procedure does state that the strainer and filter are to be switched when the maximum value of the expected range is reached. However, the inspector noted that this value for the filter is also the alarm setpoint for high filter dp which annunciated in the control room. The strainer identification and filter alarm setpoint concerns were discussed with licensee management at the exit and the licensee committed to reviewing the applicable procedures and make appropriate revision The licensee had evaluated its fuel oil quality program in 1987 when the NRC issued IE Information Notice 87-04, Diesel Generator Fails Test Because of Degraded Fuel . The inspector reviewed their Operation Assessment Program Evaluation Summary which was prepared in response to the IE notice. The inspector found that the licensee addressed all the major issues in a timely manner and found the review to be adequate and acceptabl . Containment Isolation System (Unit 1 and Unit 2) (61720, 70323, 92700, 92701)

Areas reviewed during this inspection included: the local leak rate test results for the Unit 1 1988 refueling outage, the final local leak rate test results for the Unit 2 preoperational test, the preliminary analysis report of the Unit 2 preoperational integrated leak rate test, the status of open items relating to the containment isolation system, and corrective action taken in regard to a 50.55(e) report, dated December 22, 1988, on Valcor solenoid valves in the containment isolation boundar The containment isolation system was inspected to the requirements specified in Section 6 of the FSAR, Appendix J to 10 CFR 50, ANSI N45.4 and to the recommendations of ANSI /ANS 5 Review of Outstanding Items (92701)

Seven outstanding items were resolved as indicated below:

(Closed) IFI 425/88-73-01 related to a lack of detailed system and penetration draining instructions in the Unit 2 integrated leak rate (Type A) test procedure, ST-45. During this inspection the licensee identified that revision of both Unit I and Unit 2 integrated leak rate test procedures is entered into the Action Item Tracking Syste Followup review of the procedures will be performed as a part of the routine leak rate test inspection (Closed) UNR 424/88-59-01 and 425/88-73-02 concerns the failure to I pressure test a piping loop in the Hydrogen Monitoring System, which l is external to the containment and open to the containment post accident, during the Unit 2 Type A test. The inspector requested the

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licensee to verify that this system was pressure tested on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. During this inspection the inspector reviewed test documentation provided by the licensee and verified that the external loops of the Hydrogen monitor system had been pressure tested to at least 90 psig in the period June - October 1986, during Unit 1 preoperational testin Also, the external loops of the Hydrogen Monitor on Unit 2 were pressure tested at 90 psig on February 5-6, 1989. The inspector reviewed the valve alignments and test boundaries and concluded that an adequate test had been performed on that portion of the Hydrogen Monitoring System outside containment on both units. These tests included penetrations 70A, 708, 71A, 71B, and 86 (Closed) IFI 425/88-73-03 concerns a lack of detailed penetration draining instructions in the Unit 2 local leak rate (Type C) test  ;

ocedure 2-300-04. Engineering personnel stated that it was only tne preoperational test procedure which lacked the detailed draining instructions. Surveillance test procedures have now been implemented on Unit 2 which contain draining instruction Followup review of the procedures will be performed as a part of the routine leak rate test inspection (Closed) UNR 424/88-59-03 and 425/88-73-05 concerned the potential )

for a non-conservative Type C test on the containment purge valves waen the test pressure was applied between the valve The possibility of a nonconservative test when the inboard valve is pressurized in a director opposite the accident pressure relates to the orientation of the valve in the system and is described in NRC Information Notices 88-73 and 88-73, Supplement 1. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the results of Type C tests performed in the accident direction on the inboard purge valves for Unit 1 (December 14-15,1988) and Unit 2 (November 10-12,1988).

(Closed) IFI 425/88-65-01 relates to 21 nominal 0.75 inch diameter test, vent, or drain volves identified in FSAR Table 6.2.4-1. With the test, vent or drain (TDV) valves listed with the isclation valves, it appears that Type C tests are required. The licensee stated that the implication that the TDV valves will be Type C tested is inadvertent. The intent was only to identify all valves in each

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penetration. The licensee has submitted a letter to the NRC dated January 31, 1989, which states that TDV valves less than one inch in  !

diameter will not be Type C tested but will be maintained under i administrative control. An FSAR amendment will be submitted, Valcor Solenoid Isolation Valves (92700)

On December 22, 1988, the licensee submitted a report in accordance I with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e) that identified six Valcor solenoid operated containment isolation valves which would not seal against containment accident pressure. These valves are nominal one l

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inch' diameter or less ' globe valves. Contact with ' the vendor determined that the six Valcor valves, Model V526-5295-XX, are not designed to be leak tight with 45 psig under the seat. The deficiency occurred as a result of a design oversight. The specifications and installation drawings for _these valves did not identify a requirement for these valves to' be leak tight against containment accident pressur The valves, Model V526-5295-XX, in the sample return lines for the radiation monitoring, hydrogen monitoring, and post accident sampling systems were corrected to ensure that. containment accident pressure is applied over the seat and will assist in sealing the valve against containment air leakage in both Unit 1 and Unit The licensee's review of the valves in the containment boundary -

identified an additional 18 globe valve Of these 18 valves, containment pressure will tend to seat 13 valves. The five remaining

' valves which would have containment accident pressure under the disk are designed to close and seal against differential pressures of 1200 psi and 2500 psi. The inspector concluded that the licensee had performed an adequate evaluation and implemented appropriate corrective action Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test Report - Unit 2(70323)

The licensee had received a preliminary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) report from the leak rate test consultant. This i

report contained the final leak rate values and a description of the test sequence and instrumentation. - The leak rate values are in agreement with those observed and calculated by the inspectors while witnessing the performance of the CILRT. The inspectors calculations were reported in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-425/88-7 Additionally, the sequence of events are consistent with events observed by the inspectors during the CILR The final report will be reviewed when received in the Region, Local Leak Rate Testing (61720)

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the final "as left" preoperational local leak rate summation for Unit 2. Procedures and individual data sheets were previously reviewed. The local leak rate acceptance limit for total Type B and C leakage (0.6 Le) is 263206 SCC The total compensated measured leakage for Type B and C tests is 18594 SCCM. This is only 7 percent of the allowable leakage. The licensee has achieved a very low local leakage which is well below the allowable leakag The summation of total Type B and C "as left" leak rates was also reviewed for the Unit 1 October - November 1988 refueling outag __ - _____-___-______

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.The "as left" Type B and C was 21924 SCCM. This value is well below the 0.6La' limit of 263206 SCC The inspector selected certain Unit 1 penetrations which had demonstrated a high leakage rate and reviewed records to verify that the local leak rate test program is being adequately implemente Penetrations selected included:

Penetration Procedure 81 - Instrument Air 24954-1 67A - Pressurizer Steam Sample Lir! 24920-1 24 - Hot Leg Sample Line 24924-1 138 - Containment Air Monitor Outlet 24914-1 Personnel Airlock Leak Rate Summations 28916-1 Documents reviewed included:

Task Sheets (initiates, tracks, and confirms surveillance)

24954-101-7229 24954-102-8861 24920-101-7225 24920-102-8858 24924-101-7213 24924-102-9313 24914-101-7143 j The 101 designation in the task sheet number indicates notification for routine outage surveillance: the 102 designation indicates a special surveillance condition. In this case the 102 represents retest of valves after maintenance has been performe ;

Maintenance Work Orders 18807799 Personnel Airlock 18808140 18807604 Penetration 67A i 18806014 18808066 Penetration 24 18808102 18807610 Penetration 13B 18807609 From the above review, the inspector concluded that the licensee had implemented the test, maintenance, and retest requirements of the leak rate progra This was also reflected in the leak rate summation _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ -

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, Other Areas of Leak Rate Testing Reviewed At the request-. of the NRC, the licensee performed an evaluation to

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determine if testing the inboard purge valves by pressurizing in a direction opposite to the accident pressure is a conservative tes These valves are the Fisher 9200 Series butterfly valves discussed in NRC Information Notice 88-7 Prior to the Unit I startup (November 1988), the licensee incorrectly. concluded that the reverse direction test is conservative. From discussions with administrative and technical personnel it l appears that the error resulted because L the licensee did not have the latest vendor information, Fisher ,

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Anomaly Notice (FAN) 88-2, which' discussed certain' design details and identified appropriate vendor contacts for information. FAN 88-2 had been ~ sent to a corporate address and not received at the plan Since the licensee stated that the plant is receiving and routinely processing other vendor information such as GE or Westinghouse notices, this error appeared to be an isolated case rather than a program breakdown. At the exit interview management stated that to pr event recurrence of this condition, 'a review was already in progress to verify that vendors have the correct mailing address.

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During operating Cycle 1, the licensee performed Type C tests on a number of penetrations at power because the. surveillance interval was expiring. The system for calculating-the summation of Type B and C leak rates is designed for plant shutdown conditions. The transfer of data and assessment of total leakage would normally take hours or ;

even days. The test engineer. was aware of this problem and, during the Type C tests performed at power, calculated the new value- of i total leakage as soon as test data became available. At the exit interview licensee management stated that a "Special Condition" procedure would be developed to alert test personnel to perform an immediate total leakage assessment when a leak rate test is performed at powe The corrective actions discussed above will be reviewed during '

performance of future routine leak rate inspection . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702) (Closed) Violation 424/87-57-01: Failure to Test Diesel Generator IA and Diesel Generator 1B in Accordance with the Test Interval Specified in Technical Specification Table 4.8- The licensee's response dated December 9, 1987, was considered acceptable by Region II. The inspector reviewed procedure 55038-C, Diesel Start Log, Revision 2 which provided the tracking mechanism required to evaluate the reliability of diesel generator units, and f the feedback required to adjust tracking intervals. The procedure also provided the mechanism to report failures when they occur. The inspector observed that although the terminology used in the procedure is now consistent with the Technical Specifications

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regarding diesel generator starts, failures, and validity, when properly completed, the logs can be easily followed and will provide

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the means to adequately document, evaluate, and adjust testin The inspector concluded that the licensee had determined the full extent of the violation, taken action to correct current conditions, and developed corrective actions needed to preclude recurrence of similar problems. Corrective actions stated in the licensee response have been implemente b. (Closed) Violation 424/87-57-02: Failure to Report Nonvalid Diesel Generator Failure During discussions with Region II staff on March 25, 1988, the licensee's response was considered acceptbale to Region II. The inspector reviewed procedure number 55038-C, Diesel Start Log, Revision 2 which provided the tracking mechanism required to evaluate the reliability of diesel generator units, and the feedback required to adjust testing interval It also provided the mechanism to report failures when they occur. The procedure is clear in specifying which diesel generator starts are failures, and that all failures, valid or nonvalid are to be reported. A special report was submitted for the diesel generator failures specified in the violatio The inspector concluded that the licensee had determined the full extent of the violation, taken action to correct current conditions and developed corrective actions needed to preclude violation recurrence of similar problems. Corrective actions stated in the licensee response have been implemente (Closed) 424/86-118-01: Failure to Adequately Document and Evaluate Diesel Generator Performance The licensee's response dated March 2, 1987, was considered acceptable by Region I The inspector reviewed procedures 13145-1/2, Diesel Generators, 14980-1/2, Diesel Generator Operating Test; and 11885-C, Diesel Generator Operating Logs, in addition to procedure 55038-C discussed in paragraphs a and b. The current revisions were all dated December 1988. These procedures now provide clearer instructions and evaluation criteria. In reviewing these procedures, the inspector noted several areas of potential improvement. These were 'iscussed with licensee personnel and they agree The licensee has agreed to have both operations and the responsible system engineer evaluate these areas of improvements and make changes based on their evaluatio The inspector concluded that the licensee had detennined the full extent of the violation, taken action to correct current conditions, and developed corrective actions needed to preclude recurrence of

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i similar problem Corrective actions stated in the licensee responses have been implemente . Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on February 6 and 10, 1989, with those persons ':dicated ia paragraph 1. The inspector I described the areas inspected anJ discussed in detail the inspection results listed above. i'roprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Inspector Fol';cwup Item 50-425/89-11-01, M0V Fasteners With Less Than Full Thread Engagement, paragraph 2.

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