IR 05000424/1987017

Insp Rept 50-424/87-17 on 870223-27.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Followup on Open Items & Precritical Test Witnessing

ML20206D435
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/24/1987
From:	Bernhard R, Jape F, Matt Thomas, Tingen S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206D421	List: IR 05000424/1987017 ML20206D417
References
50-424-87-17, NUDOCS 8704130337
Download: ML20206D435 (6)

Text

, ,p"849 UNITED $TATES d %- NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION

[ o REGION il 3 .g 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SulTE 2900

• 8 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

'5 9 . . . + ,o Report Nos.: 50-424/87-17 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket No.: 50-424 License No.: NPF-61 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 Inspection Conducted: February 23-27, 1987 Inspectors: 6 Qv& , hWL 3 h!8'7 M. Thomas 6 Mate Signed

1. Ic M - :~ M - slauls, R. Bernhard Date Signed hV g/ Tingen (W/ Y 5l#VI )

Date Signed Approved by: d [614- ?R 3/2 }

F. Jape, Chief, Test Programs Section' '

Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, followup on open items, and precritical test witnessin Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000424 o PDR i

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• C. E. Belflower, Operations QA Site Manager

• H. M. Bellamy, Plant Support Manager W. L. Burmeister, Operations Supervisor

• E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager

• W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist

• W. Gover. Engineering Supervisor

• T. Greene, Plant Manager

• E. D. Groover, Construction QA Site Manager

• A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant Plent Support Manager Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, techlicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne Other Organizations S. W. Ashworth, Southern Company Services (SCS)

J. D. Hurd, Bechtel S. C. Khwrana, Bechtel F. D. Kuester, Southern Company Services C. R. Myer, Bechtel NRC Resident Inspectors H. H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction

• J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector, Operations R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 27, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection i findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The i licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to i or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio l l

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Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (0 pen) Violation 424/86-118-02, concerning the failure to adequately document and evaluate diesel generator (DG) performanc The inspectors reviewed. the licensee's corrective. actions which were discussed in the response to the violation dated February 5, 1987. Questions were raised in two areas with regard to implementation of the corrective action The first area of concern involved the amount of information being recorded on the forms was not adequate for some of the DG start attempt The forms are included in Vegtle operating procedure 13145-1, Diesel Generators, and surveillance procedure 14980-1, Diesel Generator Operability Test. The concern was identified through review of. selected completed forms and from discussions with plant engineering personnel responsible for reviewing the completed forms. During discussions of this matter with licensee personnel, the inspector stated that it should be emphasized to operations personnel responsible for completing the forms that, per the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.108, the information recorded for each DG start attempt should be in sufficient detail to allow for independent review and verificatio .

The second area of concern involved the evaluation of DG start attempts by operations personnel. The procedures which implement the requirements for documenting the results of each DG start attempt do not specify who is to evaluate the results of the start attempts. The procedures imply that the evaluation is performed by the shift supervisor (who holds a senior reactor operator's license) in that it is stated on the form that the information is being sent to the Engineering Support Superintendent' from the shift superviso During the review of completed forms, the inspectors noted examples where the only signatures on the forms indicated that some _

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start attempts were reviewed by either a licensed reactor operator or a non-licensed plant equipment operator. Licensee personnel stated that the results of all DG start attempts performed per surveillance procedure 14980-1 are reviewed by the shift supervisor since he signs all completed surveillance procedures. DG start attempts other than those performed per procedure 14980-1 may not all be reviewed by the shift supervisor. The licensee further stated that while some of the evaluations may be performed by licensed reactor operators, none of the DG start attempts should be evaluated by non-licensed plant equipment operatcrs. The inspectors stated that the procedures need to specify who will evaluate the results of DG start attempt During the exit meeting, licensee personnel stated that the atove two concerns will be reviewed and the necessary actions taken. TMs item remains open and will be reviewed during a later inspection alom) with any additional corrective actions taken by the license No violations or deviations were identified.

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3 Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . . Precritical Testing (72300) Procedure Review 4 The inspectors reviawed startup test procedures 1-5AL-01, Auxiliary Feedwater System, and 1-500-04 ATT 10.7, MSIV Fast Closure Hot Functional Testing. These startup tests were performed prior:to initial criticality in order to retest the systems which were either not successfully tested or have been modified since the preoperational (preop) hot functional test. These tests, along with other preop tests that were not completed prior to initial fuel load, are discussed in the licensee's letters dated January 2 and January 16,

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198 Questions raised by the inspectors during the review of procedure 1-500-04 ATT 10.7 are discussed in paragraph 6.a. of this inspection repor Test Witnessing The inspectors witnessed portions of startup test 1-5AL-01 which was being performed on February 25, 1987. The test was witnessed to

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verify that the correct revision of the procedure was available and

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in use by plant personnel; test prerequisites and initial conditions were met; and the data were collected for final analysis by the proper personne The test performance was interrupted due to an automatic actuation of the AFW system. Licensee personnel stated that the actuation occurred when plant maintenance I&C personnel exercised the high vibration circuits on the main feedwater pumps. The main feedwater pump circuits were being calibrated by vendor and plant maintenance personnel. The main feedwater pumps had been placed in reset (per a change to the AFW test) in order to perform the AFW system testin The high vibration signals caused the main'feedwater pump circuits to tri When both main feedwater pump circuits tripped, the AFW pumps started. The Train A AFW pump was already running due to the testing, i

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and the Train B AFW pump started, causing water to be supplied to

all four steam generator During the actuation, the inspectors observed that the operators took appropriate actions to maintain steam generator level within the operating band. The licensee has reported this event to the NRC and a Licensee Event Report (LER)

will be submitte No violations or deviations were identified, i

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6. Inspector Followup (92701,92703) (0 pen) Inspector followup item (IFI) 424/86-65-03, Review Final Resolution to MSIV Coil Failure and Subsequent Retest. The licensee has submitted CDR-M130 which provides a suninary of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) coil failures, evaluation of failures and

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corrective action. Corrective action for MSIV coil failure had been completed except for the subsequent retest. The licensee has issued Test Procedure 1-500-04 AT.T10.7, MSIV Fast Closure Hot Functional -

Testing, to perform MSIV retesting at plant normal operating tempera-ture and pressure. The inspectors' review of T/P 1-500-04AT.T.1 revealed that the MSIV manual hydraulic system shut off valves (#45 on drawing IX4AR17-112) were not returned to their normal position of locked open following completion of the test. Paragraph 1.3.15 of the MSIV Maintenance Manual requires these valves to be locked open

to assure redundant MSIV closure capability. The licensee has

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changed T/P 1-500-04AT.T.10.7 to require the manual hydraulic system shut off valves. be locked open following completion of the test. As a follow up, the inspector questioned the licensee concerning whether the main steam system valve line up sheets required checking the positions of the MSIV manual hydraulic system shut off valves. The licensee responded that the valve line up sheets did not address these valves. A change was initiated to change the main steam valve

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lineups to address these valve The inspectors -expressed a concern that during past operation with MSIVs in the open position, problems have been encounterad. Although the licensee has taken significant corrective action to resolve these

problems, there are no written instructions to maintain the MSIVs in the open position and monitor system operation in order to verify that all the problems have been resolved. This item remains open

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pending completion of the retesting.

' (0 pen) Construction Deficiency Report (10 CFR 50.55(e)) CDR 86-130, Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure. This item was reported to the NRC on November 4,1986, and concerned the malfunction of some pilot

solenoid valves associated with the MSIV actuators. The inspectors

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reviewed this item in conjunction with IFI 424/86-65-03, which is discussed in paragraph above. Licensee actions to close this item will be reviewed in conjunction with the IFI. This item remains open.

1 (Closed) IFI 424/86-121-01, " Review of Revised NSCW Pump Surveillance Test Procedures." The inspectors reviewed maintenance work order

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(MW0) 18702845 and the guidelines for gathering data on the NSCW system flows "NSCW System Component Flow Verification." The inspectors observed pressure drop measurement for Loop A Reactor Cavity Cooling Coil Flow Orifice, FE2186. A meeting was held with representatives from GPC, SCS, and Bechtel to review the engineering i

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calculations performed to determine adequacy of as tested NSCW flow The performance of the flow verification, timely performance of ASME

, Section 11 Pump Surveillance Baseline, and the engineering review

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performed to verify adequate component cooling to the NSCW loads, satisfied the inspector concern The licensee indicated changes to the FSAR, Section 9.2, based upon the engineering calculations for NSCW, would be submitted to update the ut.9tmum flows currently listed for the NSCW system. The Licensing Document Change Request Number is FS87014. This item is considered close (Closed) IFI 424/87-08-01, concerning clarification to the startup manual (SUM) regarding acceptance of test procedure results. During review of this item, the licensee stated that the section of the

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startup manual applicable to the preap test program (SUM-12-C) was no longer in effect for Unit 1 af ter initial fuel loa In a memorandum dated February 25,1987 (File #X7BH15), the licensee stated that the SUM-12-C was being revised to clarify the handling of deficiency reports written against test results that do not meet test acceptance criteri The licensee further stated that SUM-12-C, along with all other sections of the SUM applicable to the preop test program, are being revised for implementation during Unit 2 preop testing in order to incorporate lessons learned from the Unit 1 test program. This item is considered close (Closed) IE Bulletin 86-01, Static 0 Ring Differential Pressure Switches. During previous review of this item the inspectors raised questions concerning the licensee's initial response (October 15, 1986) which only addressed whether any of the switches were used in safety-related applications, and did not address important to safety applications. The licensee submitted a supplemental response to the bulletin (January 9,1987) which states that the terms safety-related and important to safety are considered to be synonymous. The licensee stated that the switches are only used in non safety-related applications. This item is considered close (0 pen) TMI action item II.E.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater System Initiation and Flo This item was reviewed and discussed in NRC inspection report 424/86-90, with testing being the only item remaining to be verified. As discussed in paragraph 5.b. above, AFW testing was in progress but had not been completed at the conclusion of this inspection. The inspectors will review the results from the AFW system startup test during a later inspectio This item remains open pending completion of the AFW system testin J h

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