Text

Integrated Inspection Report 05000424/2021001 and 05000425/2021001
	ML21126A000
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/05/2021
From:	Alan Blamey; Division Reactor Projects II
To:	Gayheart C; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
	IR 2021001
	Download: ML21126A000 (18)
	v • d • e

May 5, 2021

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 & 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2021001 AND 05000425/2021001

Dear Ms. Gayheart:

On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2. On April 19, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Jesse Thomas and other members of your staff.

The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000424 and 05000425 License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

Enclosure:

As stated,

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000424 and 05000425

License Numbers:

NPF-68 and NPF-81

Report Numbers:

05000424/2021001 and 05000425/2021001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0068

Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.

Facility:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location:

Waynesboro, GA

Inspection Dates:

January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021

Inspectors:

M. Endress, Senior Resident Inspector

C. Safouri, Resident Inspector

Approved By:

Alan J. Blamey, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1

& 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Provide Instructions for Installation of the Lip Seal Results in Inoperability of Unit 1 Train B Nuclear Service Cooling Water Fan #4 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000424/2021001-01 Open/Closed

[P.2] -

Evaluation 71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, and Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.9, Condition B, when the licensee failed to provide instructions for proper installation of the lip seal during preventative maintenance associated with the Unit 1 Train B Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) Fan #4 which resulted in an inoperable fan from September 6, 2020, to November 4, 2020.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000424/2020-001-00 LER 2020-001-00 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,

Unit 1, Safety-Related Electrical Bus Deenergizing Results in Emergency Diesel Generator Starting 71153 Closed LER 05000424/2020-002-00 LER 2020-002-00 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,

Unit 1 Oil Leak causes Ultimate Heat Sink to be inoperable longer than allowed by Technical Specifications 71153 Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 Train B Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) pumps 4 and 6 with pump 2 out of service (OOS) for maintenance, on January 26, 2021.

(2) Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System following Train A Motor Driven AFW Inservice Test, on March 17, 2021.

(3) Unit 2 Instrument Air with the 2B Instrument Air Dryer OOS, on March 23, 2021.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire Zone 144/162/164, Unit 2 Train B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Electrical Tunnel to Control Building, on January 19, 2021.

(2) Fire Zone 530/531, North and South Fire Pump Houses, on January 19, 2021.

(3) Fire Zone 99/104/45/39A, Unit 2 North and South Main Steam Valve Rooms, on February 2, 2021.

(4) Fire Zone 94/95/173/174, Unit 1 Lower Cable Spreading Room, on February 25, 2021.

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on March 15, 2021.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during Unit 1 Main Turbine Valve Stroke Test on March 5, 2021.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a Normal Charging Pump trip followed by a loss of instrument air and steam generator tube leak, on February 9, 2021.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) #1 Plant Level Event due to high shaft vibrations on June 22, 2020.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 1 Train A EDG Operability Run with 1A Motor Driven AFW Pump OOS for planned maintenance, on January 11, 2021.

(2) Unit 2 Train B NSCW Pump #2 system outage with Fan #3 OOS for unplanned maintenance, on January 28, 2021.

(3) Unit 1/2 High Risk Nuclear during Spent Fuel Pool Fuel Assembly shuffles, on February 23, 2021.

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) CR 10764474, Significant Corrosion in Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDG Exhaust Silencer Rooms, on January 5, 2021.

(2) CR 10769016, Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank pump motor breaker 1NBF30-2 phase A shows signs of overheating and insulation damage, on January 25, 2021.

(3) CR 10742675, Unit 1 Train B NSCW Fan #4 excessive oil loss, on February 16, 2021.

(4) CR 10781819, Unit 1 Train A EDG output breaker failure to close, on March 11, 2021.

(5) CR 10785759, Unit 1 Turbine Driven AFW Pump governor valve driver output failure, on March 29, 2021.

(6) CR 10786143, Unit 1 Train B EDG Trouble due to Field Ground Relay 164X, on March 30, 2021.

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Unit 2 Train A Engineered Safety Features Chiller Temperature Control Module Replacement, on December 22, 2020.

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Unit 1 Train B Motor Driven AFW Pump system outage, on January 7, 2021.

(2) Unit 2 Power Range Nuclear Instrument 2NI043 Bistable Module Replacement, on February 16, 2021.

(3) Unit 1 Train B EDG engine driven fuel oil pump repair, on March 3, 2021.

(4) Unit 2 Loop 2 Atmospheric Relief Valve system outage, on March 8, 2021.

(5) Unit 1 Train A Piping Penetration Area Filtration and Exhaust system outage, on March 11, 2021.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

Main article: IP 71111.22

(1)

===14150A-1, Train A NSCW Fan/Spray Valve Surveillance, on February 16, 2021.

(2)24839-1, RCP Undervoltage Response Time Test, on February 18, 2021.

(3)14980A-1, Diesel Generator 1A Operability Test, on March 11, 2021.

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01)===

Main article: IP 14150

(1) Unit 2 Train A NSCW Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, on January 13, 2021.

(2) Unit 1 Train B Motor Driven AFW Valve Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, on January 26,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01)===

Main article: IP 71151

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020).

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020).

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020).

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020).

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020).

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020).

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Emerson, Rosemount Nuclear Part 21 associated with internal temperature rise potentially impacting calculated qualified life, Condition Action Report 277826.

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

Main article: IP 71153

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000424/2020-001-00, Safety-Related electrical bus deenergizing results in Emergency Diesel Generator Start Signal (ADAMS Accession No.

ML20134J102). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section.

(2) LER 05000424/2020-002-00, Oil Leak causes Ultimate Heat Sink to be inoperable longer than allowed by Technical Specifications (ADAMS Accession No.

ML20330A317). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Provide Instructions for Installation of the Lip Seal Results in Inoperability of Unit 1 Train B Nuclear Service Cooling Water Fan #4 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems

Green NCV 05000424/2021001-01 Open/Closed

[P.2] -

Evaluation 71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, and Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.9, Condition B, when the licensee failed to provide instructions for proper installation of the lip seal during preventative maintenance associated with the Unit 1 Train B Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) Fan #4 which resulted in an inoperable fan from September 6, 2020, to November 4, 2020.

Description:

On September 29, 2020, during a quarterly preventative maintenance oil level inspection, the licensee discovered a low oil level condition for Unit 1 Train B NSCW Fan

4. The licensee determined the 1B NSCW Fan #4 gearbox had lost approximately 10 gallons of oil, which was enough to consider the fan inoperable. The licensee added oil to restore level, however, did not perform any corrective actions to resolve the cause of the loss of oil. Maintenance performed a visual inspection of the gearbox after discovery of the low oil level and reported there was no visual evidence of an oil leak. The capacity of the gearbox is 18.5 gallons of oil, which meant at the time of discovery there was only approximately 8.5 gallons of oil in the gearbox. Historical operational experience for NSCW gearboxes shows that gearbox failures occur due to lack of lubrication when oil loss exceeds 9 gallons of oil. After 10 gallons of oil was added to the gearbox to return oil level to full, the 1B NSCW Fan #4 was returned to service.

However, because the cause of the oil loss was never identified and corrected, the failure mechanism for oil loss to occur still existed. On November 2, 2020, the licensee conducted a troubleshooting plan to identify the source of the leak and quantify the leak rate by completing a 24-hour operational run. The troubleshooting plan demonstrated the gearbox had a minimal leak rate when it is not in operation and a 1.14 gallons per day leak while in operation. During disassembly of the gear reducer, the licensee discovered the lip seal showed that the nitrile rubber lip, which encases the seal spring, was pulled back over a continuous section for approximately half of the seal. The causal analysis determined the most likely cause of the lip seal failure was due to inadequate work instructions. The deficient condition was likely introduced during lip seal assembly reinstallation over the driveshaft, where an interference occurred between a section of the driveshaft and lip seal which initiated the condition to cause the nitrile lip to lift off the seal spring. The lip seal is on a replacement preventative maintenance frequency of 36 months. The lip seal replacement was accomplished under Work Order SNC888845, which utilized Vogtle procedure 27445-C, Marley (NSCW) Cooling Tower Fan and Gear Reducer Maintenance, Version 17.1. The instructions for installation of the lip seal are covered in Step 4.7.1.10 and 4.7.1.11 which states the following respectively, Install Pinion Shaft Oil Seal into Pinion Cage Cap and Install Pinion Cage Cap along with gasket to Pinion Cage. The lip seal was installed in February 21, 2020, which totals approximately 8 months prior to failure. However, during this period, the gearbox was only in operation for a total of approximately 14 days.

The licensee performed a past operability determination with the information acquired from the troubleshooting plan. The NSCW fans support the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) safety function, where the number of fans required varies between three and four fans depending on the environmental and basin inventory conditions through wet bulb temperature and initial basin temperature. The oil level was last verified to be satisfactory during the previous quarterly oil level inspection which occurred on July 7, 2020. The last time the 1B NSCW Fan

4 was satisfactorily run was on September 6, 2020, which presumably had the same oil level as was identified on September 29, 2020. As previously stated, the low oil condition was discovered on September 29, 2020. However, the system was not restored to fully operable until November 4, 2020, after the failed lip seal had been replaced following the troubleshooting plan executed on November 2, 2020. The mission time of the NSCW fans are 30 days. Based on the oil leak rate exceeding the maximum allowed leak rate, and the oil level being below acceptable levels at the time of discovery, 1B NSCW Fan

4 was considered inoperable from September 6, 2020, to November 4, 2020. Since the environmental and basin conditions during this timeframe required the UHS to be in the four fan region, Vogtle Unit 1, TS 3.7.9, Condition B, requires the fan to be restored to operable within 7 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program. Therefore, Vogtle Unit 1 was in a condition prohibited by TSs from September 13, 2020, to November 4, 2020. This resulted in Licensee Event Report 05000424/2020-002-00.

Corrective Actions: The licensee identified and corrected the failed lip seal on the 1B NSCW Fan #4 gearbox as well as revised the work instructions associated with replacing the lip seal.

Corrective Action References: 10742675, 278614

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires that Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. The licensee failed to provide instructions for proper installation of the lip seal during preventative maintenance associated with the Unit 1 Train B NSCW Fan #4.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Utilizing Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Att. 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," issued December 20, 2019, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because although the degraded condition resulted in one train of a multi-train TS system to exceed its TS allowed outage time, the condition did not result in a loss of the PRA function since three out of four fans are required to meet the PRA function.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. The licensee had an opportunity, but did not properly evaluate and resolve the 1B NSCW Fan #4 low oil condition when the licensee originally discovered the deficiency on September 29, 2021.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires that Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Based on the environmental and basin temperature conditions, Vogtle Unit 1, TS 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink, required four NSCW Fans to be operable in Modes 1 through 4; if a train is inoperable, it shall be returned to operable status within 7 days or the Risk Informed Completion Time, otherwise the unit shall be shut down and in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and Mode 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to provide instructions for proper installation of the lip seal on the 1B NSCW Fan #4 gearbox, which resulted in the failure of the lip seal and inoperability of the 1B NSCW Fan #4. Additionally, as a result of the past operability determination, from September 13, 2020, to November 4, 2020, the licensee operated in a condition prohibited by TSs because the unit had not been placed in Mode 3 and Mode 4.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Minor Violation 71153 Minor Violation: On March 21, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, the licensee was performing procedure 14667-1, Train B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Test, section 4.1 for the Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP). The testing configuration requires the 1B EDG to be running and supplying sole power to the Unit 1 Train B 4160V Safety-Related Bus, 1BA03. Section 4.1, step 35 verifies the EDG will not trip during the LOSP test by actuating the lockout relay associated with the EDG feeder breaker to 1BA03. However, due to human performance errors, operations performed steps out of sequence and reset the Safety Injection signal prior to actuating the lockout relay. This resulted in the EDG bus feed breaker 1BA03-19 to trip open, de-energizing 1BA03, followed by a subsequent 1B EDG auto-start due to a loss of voltage signal on the safety-related bus.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with procedures. Specifically, the licensee inappropriately performed steps out-of-sequence in procedure 14667-1, which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 Train B 4160V Safety-Related Bus.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The performance deficiency is associated with the cornerstone attribute of Mitigating Systems to Human Performance, however it did not adversely affect the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. With Unit 1 in Mode 6 and the redundant train being fully operable, Train B was not required by Technical Specifications and moreover, the human performance error that challenged the safety-related systems occurred during surveillance testing where the system was expected to be inoperable during various portions of the test.

Enforcement:

This failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On April 19, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Jesse Thomas and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.04

Drawings

1X4DB161-1

P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System Condensate

Storage & Degasifier System - System No. 1302

46.0

1X4DB161-2

P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System - System No. 1302

29.0

1X4DB161-3

P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump System (Aux

Feedwater Pump Turbine Driver) - System No. 1302

2.0

71111.05

Procedures

2794-1

Zone 94 - Control Building - Level A Fire Fighting Preplan

2795-1

Zone 95 - Control Building - Level A Fire Fighting Preplan

2844-2

Zone 144 Diesel Generator Building - Electrical Tunnel -

Train B - Fire Fighting Preplan

2.2

2862-2

Zone 162 Diesel Generator Building Fire Fighting Preplan

1.1

2864-2

Zone 164 Diesel Generator Building - Train B DFO Day Tank

Fire Fighting Preplan

0.2

2873-1

Zone 173 - Control Building - Level A Fire Fighting Preplan

2.2

2874-1

Zone 174 - Control Building - Level A Fire Fighting Preplan

2.2

2930F-1

Zone 530 - North Firewater Pump house -Fire Fighting

Preplan

3.2

2931B-1

Zone 531 - South Firewater Pump house -Fire Fighting

Preplan

3.2

71111.11Q Corrective Action

Documents

10388066,

10387427

Procedures

14540-1

Main Turbine Valves Stroke Test

31.5

17020-1

Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 20 on Panel 1B2

on MCB

57.1

71111.12

Corrective Action

Documents

10725885,

278047, 278269

Miscellaneous

EVAL-V-1201-

05147

Unit 2 RCP #1 (a)(1) Evaluation

08/13/2020

71111.13

Miscellaneous

eSOMS Unit 1/2 Control Logs on January 11, 2021

01/11/2021

Procedures

NMP-GM-031

On-Line Configuration Risk Management Program

8.0

NMP-GM-031-

001

Online Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Risk Calculations

6.0

NMP-GM-031-

Risk Management Actions for 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and the

1/13/20

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

003

Risk Informed Completion Time Program

NMP-OS-010-003

Vogtle Protected Equipment Logs

10.0

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

1074866,

10742315,

10742502,

10742675,

10773494,

278614,

10781819,

10786143,

10786118

Drawings

1X3D-AA-B05A

One Line Diagram - Unit Aux. System Synchronization

1X3D-BA-D02D

Elementary Diagram Electrical System - 4160V Inc. Brkr 152-

1AA0219 from Emergency Diesel Gen. 1A

13.0

1X3D-BA-M10B

Elementary Diagram Electrical System - Class 1E Train A

Manual Synchronization

1X3D-BH-G03M