IR 05000424/1989002

Insp Repts 50-424/89-02 & 50-425/89-02 on 890208-14.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Witnessing Initial Fuel Load of Unit 2 & Review of Proposed Startup Tests for Unit 2

ML20236B756
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/02/1989
From:	Belisle G, Burnett P, John Zeiler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236B752	List: IR 05000424/1989002 ML20236B750
References
50-424-89-02, 50-424-89-2, 50-425-89-02, 50-425-89-2, NUDOCS 8903210264
Download: ML20236B756 (8)

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UNITED STATES -

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3]' '.,

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Report Nos.: '50-424/8'9-02 and 50-425/89-02-

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Licensee t : Georgia- Powers Company x '

P. 0.' Box 1295 Birmingham, AL?35201

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. Docket Nos.: _50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-79 >

Fac:ility Name: Vogtle"1:and 2 .,

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Inspection Conducted: February.8-14, 1989

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Inspeetors: esx:2R7~ e2-:27 8 ,9~

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P Tf. Burfett; ,

Date Signed t- 1 Vl$hckp tw h J. Zeiler . - e /

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'Appr'oved by: JN G. A. Belisle, Chief 3/[6 Date' Signed

' Test Programs _Section: <

.i Engineering Branch

' a Division of Reactor Safet '

.g SUMMARY .

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(3 Scope: This routine, announced inspection . addressed the ' following areas:

F witnessing the initialE fuel load of Unit 2, review - of proposed .

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startup tests for Unit.2, observation of* control room activities fo, . Unit:1, and followup of open item ,

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'Results: : Fuel loading- was .first delayed . and later interrupted, by severall equipment failures. Each was. evaluated conservatively'and thoroughly

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and appropriate . corrective action completed before ' proceeding with fuel . loading. ' Proper functioning of permanent and temporary . neutron

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monitoring channels was checked rigorously throughout 'the activity, including periods when fuel . loading was suspended. (paragraph 2)

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Observation of a hot startup on Unit I revealed that there was poor integration; of : procedures used for calculating estimated critical

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position and for performing the startup proper. Coupled with seem-inglyLslow performance of startup activities, this led to criticality be, low the lower limit of the estimated critical position and,

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potentially, below the power dependent rod insertion limits. The  !

crew response to this situation was acceptable. (paragraph 4)

No violations or deviations were identifie :

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REPORT DETAILS-Persons-Contacted

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Licensee Employees'

, ' J.LAjluni, Operations Superintendent

• G. B. Bockhold, Jr.,; General Manager, Vogtle Nuclear'0perations-

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R. M. Bellamy, Plant Manager

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W. L. Bumeister, Operations Superintendent

J. A.. Dobos, On-shift 0perations Supervisor

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• G. R. Frederick, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations

_*W. C. .Gabbard, Senior Regulatory . Specialist

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• T. V. Greene, Plant Support Manager

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• H. M.'Handfinger,7 Assistant Plant Support Manager  !

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• T. S. Hargis,- On-shi.ft Operations Supervisor -j

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• C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager j

'*W. F.. Kitchens, Operations Manager .

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. *P. D.' Rice, Vice President,.Vogtle Project Director

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Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, .

operators, and of.fice parsonne i

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< Other Organizations  !

R. J. Florian, Southern Company Services i C. B. Holland, Westinghouse j

W. C. Phoenix, Lonsul Tec Y' ny O.-D. Hayes, Consul Tec NRC Resident Inspectors s

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R. F. Aiello, Resident Inspector

• J.. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector, Operations f- , *C W. Burger, Resident inspector i

• Attended exit interview j

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the l last paragrap ;

.1 Witnessing of Initial Fuel Loading (72524) .}

Prior to.the start of fuel loading, the inspectors toured the areas of the !

plant that would be involved in the process, including the Unit 2 control room, where the core status board was installed, the spent fuel pool area, and the Unit 2 containment buildin All areas had appropriate access control and radiation protection procedures in place. Checkout of fuel

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handling equipment in containment was under way, and installation of a

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temporary neutron monitors in the vessel was in progress. The area under the reactor vessel was inspected after determining that a valid confined space entry permit was in force and that an acceptable survey of the atmosphere had been conducted. The under vessel area was clean except for some dust and grease, and no unauthorized materials were in the spac The inspectors noted that two cover plates over the sump were not installed or available in the immediate area. The absence of the cover plates was then reported to the OSOS by the inspectors. It was subsequently determined by the resident inspector that the absent cover plates were a punch list item (RTO 0039) scheduled for corrective action prior to criticalit ,1989, the NRC issued a license authorizing fuel loading and On February (less than 5 percent power) testing at the Vogtle Electric low-power Generating Plant, Unit 2. On February 10, 1989, the licensee commenced fuel loading activities per procedure 2-500-1, Initial Fuel Load Test Sequence, (Revision 1). Procedure 2-500-1 established the conditions under which the initial core was to be installed and accomplished and specified the sequence of events for loading fuel assemblies into the reactor vessel. The inspectors witnessed fuel loading activities from the !

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control room, refueling floor, ICRR station (located on the refueling floor), SIGMA refueling machine, and the fuel handling building to verify licensee conformance to license requirements, and to obserg plant !

equipment and operating staff performance. Throughout the tLe1 loading period, the inspectors verified that the following requirements were met: The proper version of the procedure was in use and was being followed; i i Prerequisites and initial conditions were met; Continuous communication was being maintained between the control room, ICRR station, and fuel handling stations; f Continuous monitoring of the source range channels and inverse count i rate ratio calculations were performed; f i

' Boron concentration was verified by proper sampling and analysis and met TS required values;

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' The fuel status tag board was updated following each fuel movement; Personnel access and material accountability contrcls to the refueling floor were established and maintained; Plant conditions were being maintained as required by TS;

. Shift change and test briefings were properly conducted; Minimum crew requirements were met; and I

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' Deficiencies or difficulties encountered were recorded in the test I l

procedure log and appropriate corrective action was taken in their resolutio Before the first fuel assembly was loaded into the core, the licensee experienced several delays resulting from equipment problems. One problem involved a failed proximity switch on the upender. This switch provides )

upender position verification once a fuel assembly has been lowered to the horizontal position and is aweiting transfer to containment. The l licensee decided to bypass this switch and use binoculars to visually (

confirm upender position. The inspectors observed these fuel handling i

activities and noted that safety problems were not posed by this method of upender position verification. Markings, which indicated upender and fuel transfer cart lineup, were clearly visible from the fuel handling machine elevatio The licensee also experienced some delay in fuel loading due to a problem involving the control room HVAC system. This was discovered during a routine control room isolation surveillance test performance. When a control room isolation signal was initiated, control room train A and B ventilation fans were activated. The correct response was for one train to activate followed by the other train only if the first did not activate within a specified time period. A flow switch failure was discovered to be the problem; the switch was replaced and recalibrate .

Hardware problems with a temporary detector occurred just before fuel loading started and the detector was removed from the core. Fuel loading then started with a total of four operable source range detectors. Fue'l loading operations were suspended after fifteen assemblies were loaded due to problems with the fuel handling machine in the fuel building. A faulty relay was found to be the cause of the fuel handling bridge moving on election of direction. Motion should start from the pendent trigger. The relay was replaced and fuel loading was resumed after a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> dela Minor problems concerning source range detector operation occurred early in the fuel loadin Spiking of N-31 and one of the temporary detectors occurred several times. In one instance, the licensee discovered that maintenance work was being performed on the same penetration as that used by the N-31 detector wiring. Temporary detector spiking was attributed to detector movement in the high RHR flow in the reactor core. The inspec-tors noted that the licensee made a demonstrated effort to ensure that more than the minimum number of two detectors were responding at all time Fuel loading was suspended again after 97 assemblies were loaded due to a problem with the fuel transfer car During return of the cart from containment, to pick up the next assembly, one of the two drive chains and pulleys used to move the cart detached from the axle. The licensee discovered that the problem resulted from the failure to instcll the drive pulley retaining ring during the initial equipment installatio The licensee is investigating the cause for this oversigh _ _ - - _ __-_____-_ - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ ___ _-__ _ _______ - -.

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l Also, during this same period, a six inch plastic tie wrap was found in-the reactor vessel. The licensee discussed this matter with the on-site Westinghouse representative and a decision was made to have Westinghouse -

prepare a safety analysis concerning the effects of more tie wraps being

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present in the core during reactor operation. In discussions with the l licensee and Westinghouse, both conjectured that this would not present a j safety problem since the tie wraps would melt at the elevated temperatures I during reactor startu The inspectors did not witness fuel loading resumption. However, fuel handling observi tions and the licensee's fuel handling problem resolutions indicated that the remainder of fuel loading would proceed in a safe and controlled mann i i

During the delays in fuel loading, the licensee continued _to taka and plot ICRR- data as required, RCS boron concentration was sampled at the speci-fied intervals, and neutron response checks were perfunned on responding nuclear monitorir,9 channels. The licensee used four source range (N31, N-32, and two temporary). neutron detectors to monitor neutron . i multiplication during the fuel loading period. A computer program was used to calculate a statistical reliability factor for verifying j acceptable detector response to neutron The inspectors independently i verified the accuracy of the reliability factor at various times during f the fuel loading perio The inspectors determined that fuel loading activities were performed in )'

accordance with licensee procedure Licensee performance throughout the fuel loading period was deliberate and carefully controlle The f inspectors noted that although there were an unusually high number of l equipment problems, the licensee consistly chose prudent and timely i problem resolution No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Review of Proposed Pre-Critical Test Procedures (72564, 72566)

The following approved test procedures to be performed on Unit 2 after fuel load and prior to initial criticality were reviewed for technical content and conformance to FSAR test descriptions and acceptance criteria: (Revision 0), Pre-Critical Test Sequence, (Revision 0), RCS Final Leak Check, (14.2.8.2.1), BB-02 (Revision 0), Pressurizer Heater and Spray Capability and Continuous Spray Flow Verification, (14.2.8.2.2), BB-04 (Revision 0), Reactor Coolant System Flow Measurement, (14.2.8.2.3),

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1 (Revision 0), Reactor Coolant Flow Coastdown, (14.2.8.2.5),

and; f.- 2-5SB-01 (Revision 0), Reactor Protection Test, (14.2.8.2.6).

No questions arose in the review of these proposed tests, and no violations or deviations were identifie , Unit 1 Operations (71715)

Unit 1 tripped at about 2:00 am on February 10, 198 The inspector ,

observed the restart during the period midnight to 4:00 am on i February. 11, 198 To. support the restart, an ECP was calculated for midnight, using procedure 14940-1, Estimated Critical Condition Calculation, (Revision 6). Control rod withdrawal' to criticality was started at about 2:00 am. Criticality was achieved in a well controlled manner under the guidance of procedure 12003-C, Reactor Startup, Mode 3- to Mode 2, (Revision 12)- A positive startup rate was established to increase power

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to the level for recording -critical data,10-8 amperes on the IRNIs. It became clear to control room personnel.that, by the time the unit could be stabilized at- that power, the critical rod position would be below the

. lower limit of the-ECP prediction and that it might be lower.than the PDIL, which assures the shutdown margin is maintained. Therefore, pursuant to procedure 12003-C, control rods were . inserted to bring the reactor subcritical by 500 pcm, and a new ECP was calculate l

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.The subsequent return to criticality at 5:10 am was not observed, but the records show acceptable rod position. The C at criticality was 1293  !

ppmB, an increase of 55 ppmB from the earlieh attempt. The log books  !

recorded continuing additions of boron until power escalation bega The inspector concluded that missing the ECP was solely a function of starting up later than planned during a time of significant xenon deca The ECP procedure (14940-1) did not define the limiting time period of validity of the calculation. Also, approaching the PDIL was a weakness in procedure 14940-1 and its application.' The procedure provides clear cautions to avoid criticality below the PDIL or above the withdrawal  ;

limits necessary to ensure a negative MTC. However, it does not provide guidance on avoiding those conditions. The procedure does provide two predictive methodologies: an ECC in which the boron concentration to achieve a user-specified critical rod position is calculated and an ECP which predicts the critical rod position for the existing or specified boron concentration. When to use which method is not specified. One approach would seem to be that, with xenon increasing, an ECP should be performed to assure there is sufficient rod withdrawal capability to attain criticalit But, with xenon decreasing, an ECC should be used to assure withdrawal and insertion limits are observed with reasonable margin.

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,6 Procedure ~ 12003-C requires there be- a reactor engineer present in the control room'during startup and requires continuous prediction of criti-cality_ by plotting the ICRR against control rod position -as the control

. rods are withdrawn. One reactor engineer interpreted the presence re- -

quirement to preclude leaving the control room to observe the changin'g count rate on the scalers and based the ICRR on ratemeter data, which.are'

clearly inferior to the integrated scaler ' observations for thcc. gurpos The. relief engineer made a 'different interpretation and left the centrol room for brief periods to collect the necessary data. The latter inter--

pretation seems preferable to the inspector, but in either case the licensee needs to ' provide better guidance in the procedur These observations were discussed with members of management before and '

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during the exit interview. The inspector characterized the problems observed as a result of poor integration of people' ond pr.ocedures,-which led first to delay in starting up the reactor and then to the continuing use of an ECP when tina and xenon decay had. reduced its validity. Manage- '

ment made a commitment to revise the procedures to obtain better organiza-tion of activities within each procedure and better integration between the procedures. (IFI 50-424 and 425/89-02-01)

No '!iolations or deviations were identified in this are , Followup on Items of Noncompliance (92702)

(Closed) ' Violation 50-424/87-24-01: Failure to perform an adequate sur-veillance of reactor coolant system leakag (Closed) Violation 50-424/87-27-02: Identified RCS leak rates were improp-erly and non-conservatively calculate The licensee responded to these violations in a letter dated June 18,.198 The inspector reviewed the response and found it to be acceptable. Revision 20 to procedure 14905-1, RCS Leakage Calculation, completed.the corrective actions  ;

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for both violations. These violations are close , Exit Interview (30703) ,

i The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 14, 1989 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector de- i scribed the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection find-ing Dissenting comments were not received from the license Management ;

Proprietary information confirmed the conmitment discussed in paragraph 4 IFI 50-424 and is not contained in this rep (or '

425/89-02-01).

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i 7. Acronyms and Initialisms Used in This Report C -

boron concentration E0C -- estimated critical' condition ECP -. estimated critical position ;

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FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report HVAC - heating ventilating and air conditioning ICRR -- inverse count rate ratio IFI - inspector followup item IRNI - intermediate range neutron detector MTC - moderator temperature coefficient OSOS - on-shift operations superintendent pcm - percent millirho PDIL - power dependent insertion limit ppmB - parts per million boron RCS - reactor coolant system RHR -

residual heat removal SRNI - source range nuclear instrument TS - technical specifications

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