IR 05000424/1987013

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Insp Repts 50-424/87-13 & 50-425/87-09 on 870202-06.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Followup on Previous Identified Insp Items & Licensee Identified Items
ML20207T691
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 02/24/1987
From: Conlon T, Merriweather N
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T682 List:
References
50-424-87-13, 50-425-87-09, 50-425-87-9, NUDOCS 8703240249
Download: ML20207T691 (5)


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report Nos.: 50-424/87-13 and 50-425/87-09 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA-30302 Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-61 and CPPR-109 Facility Name:

Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:

February 2-6, 1987 Inspector:

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8-8 Y-[7 N.'Merriweather

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Date Signed Approved by r

/ 9 72 MU 0 - 21{4Y T. E. Conlon, Section Chief Date Signed Engineering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety SUMi4ARY Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection involved follow-up on previous identified inspection items and licensee identified items.

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • T. Greene, Plant Manager
  • R. H. Pinson, Vice President of Construction
  • J. E. Swartzwelder, Deputy Manager Operations
  • C. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
  • E. Groover, QA Site Manager-Construction
  • W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist
  • A. Harrelson, Electrical Discipline Manager
  • R. E. Hollands, Compliance Superintendent
  • M. Sheibani, Senior Plant Engineer
  • G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted included construction engineecs, technicians, security force members, and office personnel.

Other Organizations S. Pietrzyk, Assistant Project Engineer, Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC)

S. Hayter, Project Field Engineering Electrical Supervisor, BPC NRC Resident Inspectors-

  • H. Livermore, Senior Resident
  • R. Schepens, Resident
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 6,1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio _

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3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters a.

(Closed) Violation 50-424/86-109-01, Inaccurate Values for Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) Loading Calculations The licensee responded to this violation in a letter dated January 8, 1987. The inspector reviewed the response and found it to be accept-able. The violation resulted from a misinterpretation by the respon-sible field engineer of the guidance provided in Procedure ED-T-19 relative to EPA moment loading calculations.

It appears that the engineer did not consider the full cable length in determining the weight of the cable for moment load calculations. The licensee took

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the necessary corrective actions during inspection 50-424/86-109 in which the calculation data sheets were revised to ensure that the weight of the full cable lengths connected to the EPAs were included in the moment loading calculations. The loading calculations for Unit 1 EPAs have been completed and checked. The licensee is now in full compliance. This item is closed for Unit 1.

b.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-424/86-45-02, Separation of Tubing Originating from a Common Component Pipe Tap. The inspector identified two examples where redundant instrument sensing lines had been routed from a common pipe tap.

Examples identified were:

(1) The high pressure side of the reactor coolant loop legs, where a single tube is routed from a common tap for approximately 15 feet and then split for routing to individual flow transmitters.

(2) The high pressure tap to the pressurizer vessel where a single tube is routed from a common tap for approximately 200 feet before splitting to individual pressure transmitters.

The inspector questioned the adequacy of these installations as they relate to Regulatory Guide 1.75 requirements and " Single Failure Criteria." The licensee requested the AE (Bechtel) to evaluate these installations for compliance to RG 1.75 and the " Single Failure Criteria." Both installations were evaluated for a postulated line break on the common tubing or if the common line were to plug. The results of the evaluations show that a line break on the common tubing for both installations (RC Flow and Pressurizer Narrow Range Pressure)

would cause initiation of the protective action.

If the lines are plugged there is sufficient diverse instrumentation that could provide pressure indication and loss of loop flow. Based on the above, it is concluded that the requirements of RG 1.75 and the " Single Failure Criteria" are satisfied for the inspector's concern.

This item is closed.

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4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not' identified during this inspection.

5.

Licensee Identified Item (10 CFR 50-55(e))

(Closed) 50-424, 425/COR 86-125, Power Strut Conduit Clamps; Letter GN-1083, dated September 22, 1986.

In a letter dated November 24, 1986, the licensee provided. a. response

. indicating that this condition could not have adversely affected the safety of the plant and is therefore, not reportable as a 50.55(e) item.

The licensee conducted - tests, inspections and evaluations to determine the acceptability of the conduit system.

Based on the tests and. engineering evaluation, the licensee concluded that sufficient safety margins exist for the conduit systems to maintai.n structural integrity and electrical function-during a design based accident.

Had the installation of oversized conduit clamps gone undetected, this condition would not have.affected the safety of the plant. Based on the above, this item is closed.

6.

Inspector Followup Item (IFI)

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(Closed) IFI 50-424/85-20-01, Examine the Corrective Actions Relating to IEEE 384 Separation Concerns To resolve electrical separation concerns the licensee contracted Wyle Laboratories to conduct tests of certain electrical cable configura-tions for reduced separation requirements. The results of the test allows alternate reduced minimum separation distances where separation distances specif) d in IEEE 384 are not achievable.

The reduced separation criteria-is described in FSAR Table 8.3.1-4 (Wyle Test Report No. 48141-02, dated May 30,1986).

The plant raceways and panel wiring were inspected using the guidelines of IEEE 384-1974.

In cases where the guidelines were not met, Fire Separation Barrier Requests (FSBRs) were generated.

The FSBRs were evaluated against the Wyle test report data for acceptability. Walk-down inspections of raceways, exposed cables and internal wiring of cabinets and switchboards were conducted by the licensee in accordance with procedure GD-A-50. Additional walkdowns were performed to verify non-IE unscheduled conduits and circuits that were installed at the end of construction after the safety related raceways had been inspected and/or after completion of the GD-A-50 Finalization Walkdown Program.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's procedures and programs for electrical cable separation the inspector also conducted walkdown inspections of several areas in Unit I to verify compliance with the

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Wyle Test Report for Reduced Cable Separation.

The specific areas examined were: Upper and Lower Cable Spreading Rooms (R225 and RA-44),

Control Building (rooms RA53, RA-50, RA-38, RA-58), Auxiliary Feedwater Pump House and Fuel Handling Building.

The walkdowns identified four separation deficiencies. Three of the four involved aluminum sheathed cable (ALS) lighting circuits and safety-related conduit with spacing less than the required one inch (horizontal or vertical). The fourth involved a safety-related instrument cable exiting a vertical tray and coming in contact with a non-1E conduit (Further investigation by the licensee revealed that this cable was not routed through the correct vertical tray at the bottom of the panel).

The above deficiencies were identified by the licensee on Operation Deviation Reports (Nos. 1-87-579 and 580) for disposition and corrective action. After identifying the above deficiencies, the inspector expanded the sample size to include more areas in the walkdowns.

From these additional areas examined no new separation items were identified. The licensee had conducted walkdowns of all areas of the plant to identify separation problems which did not meet the Wyle Test Report (specifically, aluminum sheathed cables, metal clad and non-IE unscheduled conduit). A total of. 477 separation concerns were identified, 218 of the 477 were determined to meet the Wyle Test Data requiring no action. The remaining 259 required rework. These walkdowns were in addition to the walkdowns conducted as part of the finalization program under procedure GD-A-50.

Based on the results of this inspection, it appears that these separation deficiencies were isolated cases that were not identified by the licensee's walkdowns. The number of deficiencies identified is less than one percent of the total identified by the licensee's walkdowns.

This evidence seems to indicate that the licensee's programs and procedures for electrical cable separation are acceptable. Therefore, this item is considered closed for Unit 1 only. A follow-up inspection will be performed on Unit 2 when sufficient electrical work has been completed.

b.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-109-02, Review Space Requirements in MSIV Junction Boxes for Spliced Conductors The junction box identified in Inspection Report No. 50-424/86-109 was opened and reinspected by the licensee's Electrical Field Engineering and QC staff with no bend radius problems on cables or splices being identified. This was documented in a memorandum from R. E. Hollands to G. A. McCarley dated January 13, 1987.

Based on the above, this item is considered closed.

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