IR 05000424/1997012
| ML20203K944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203K941 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-97-12, 50-425-97-12, NUDOCS 9803050286 | |
| Download: ML20203K944 (27) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION (NRC)
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REGION 11
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Docket Nos, 50-424 and 50-425-License Nos.
- 4 Report-Nc:
50-424/97-12, 50-425/97-12 q
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Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc..
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Facility:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 1-and 2 Location:
7821 River Road Waynesboro.-GA 30830 Dates:
December 14, 1997 through January 24, 1998
- Ir.spectors:
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector M. Widmann, Ree4 dent Inspector
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K. O'Donohue, Resident Inspector L, Stratton, Reactor Inspector (Sections S1, S2, S3, and S8)
C. Wiseman, Reactor Inspector (Sections F1. F2, F3. FS, and
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F7)
Approved by:
P. Skinner, Chief
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Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Vogtle Electric Generating P'a, units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50 424/t>/-12, 50 425/97-12 This integrated inspection inclnded aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance and plant support.
The report covers a 6 week period of resident inspection.
It also includes the results of announced inspections by regional inspectors in the areas of fire protection and security.
Operations in general, the conduct of operations was professional and e
safety-conscious.
The inspectors discussed with licensee management inconsistencies in the level of quality in the performance of short relief turnovers for the different operator positions.
Shift supervisir., and operations management expectations for short relief turnovers varied and were not clearly delineated (Section 01.1).
Generally, the control room operators properly responded to control room
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alarms and followed the prescribed actions delineated in the applicable alarm response procedures.
The inspectors observed one instance.
however, where an operator did not implement the required actions of an alarm response procedure.
The inspectors concluded that this incident was an isolated case and was identified as a Non-Cited Violation (Section 01.2).
The Component Cooling Water system on both units was properly aligned
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and was being adequately maintai'ed to ensure availability.
No significant items or discrepancies were identified during system walkdowns (Section 02.1).
Maintenance f 4 tine and corrective maintenance activities were performed e
bdtisfactorily.
Two radioactive spills during floor drain tank cleaning activities indicated that personnel did not fully understand the configuration and limitations of the vendor-supplied transfer equipment that was used.
Maintenance activities on the spent fuel pool cooling pump represented an example of maintenance that did not meet the licensee's normal level of performance, in that it was not properly scoped prior to work commencement. the lack of maintenance personnel experience cortributed to pump assembly difficulties, and poor coordination and communication between the licensee and the vendor led to maintenance difficulties and re-work (Section M1.1).
Enclosure
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Surveillance activities were perf" med satisfactorily.
Detailed
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contingency repair plans and eva';ations were performed prior to stroke testing a Residual teat Removal sRHR) pump suction valve that had previously experienced a packing leak. A turbine driven auxiliary feednater pump test had to be reperformed as a result of personnel error in implementing vibration instrument software changes (Section M1.2).
Enoineerino The licensee's short term corrective actions for degraded concrete e
conditions identified with the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) missile barrier exhaust system were satisfactory.
Concrete debris that had fallen into the EDG exhaust piring was removed and root cause and long term corrective actions were being developed.
Although the evaluation of the degradei (.iditions was based on qualitative engineering judgement and some important aspects were not thoroughly supported. the determination that the EDGs would remain operable following design basis events was adequate.
An Intpector Followup Item was identified to review tne root cause of the concrete degradation and licensee long term corrective actions (Section El.1).
Plant Sunnort With minor exceptions, radiological postings in the Radiation Controlled
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Area were properly controlled and accurate.
An inaccurate status sign associated with the Unit 2 RHR Train "A" Pump Room was attributed to aersonnel error in updating the posting following a non-routine survey.
iinor discrepancies were also identified in the update of several local area survey maps.
Tnese discrepancies were adequately resolved (Section Rl.1).
Procedures for implementing compensatory measures for degraded or
inoperable security equipment were a strength (Section S1.1).
Security equipment testing aractices and applicable procedures met the
requirements specified in t1e Physical Security Plan.
The dedicated security maintenance team was identif.ed as a strength (Section S2.1).
The armed repository was well controlled and was cor.sidered a strength
(Section S2.2).
Physical Security and Contingency Plan changes submitted by the licensee
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under 10 CFR 50.54(p) did not decrease the effectiveness of those plans.
One exemption request with respect to abandonment of the Central Alarm Station was not approved by the NRC (Section S3.1).
The fire prevention program was effectively implemented (Section F1.1).
- Enclosure
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3 plant fire barrier penetration seal designs were properly supported by
seal testing documentation, vendor data. installer qualification and training' records, and Quality Assurance inspection records.
The licenste s fire barrier penetration seal engineering evaluations provided for deviations from fire barrier configurations qualified by tests which satisfied the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 86-10 (Section f2.1).
The fire brigade organization and training met the requirements of plant
procedures.
performance by the i re brigade during a drill was very good.
The brigade leader pror.r established a corrniand post, assessed i
the fire area conditions, dep ",,ed the fire brigade personnel, and ef fectively used radio comun1 cations.
The fire brigade exhibited very good fire ground tactics, and victim rescue operations.
The brigade actions met the established drill objectives and clearly demonstrated the capability of ef fectively responding to a fire situation (Section f 5.1).
The licensee's 1997 Safety Audit and Engineering Review assessment of
the facility's fire protection program was comprehensive and effective in reporting fire protection program performance to management.
The licensee's corrective actions in response to the identified automatic sprintler system issues were comprehensive and timely (Section F7.1).
Enclosure
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Reoort Details Sunnary of Plant Status Unit 1 The unit operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
l.! nit 2 The unit operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
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Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongcing plant operations.
In general, the reviews indicated that the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious.
The inspectors discussed a minor problem with management involving inconsistencies observed in operator performance of short relief turnovers for the Reactor Operator (RO) "at the controls" position.
Specifically, control room operators did not perform a joint control panel walkdown prior to assuming the duties of the R0 "at the controls.' The inspectors noted that shift supervision and operations management expectations for proper performance of a short term relief for licensed operations personnel varied and was unclear.
01.2 Inadeouate Operator Resnonse to Control Room Alarm a.
Insoection Scone (71707.)
The inspectors observed operator responses to control room alarms, reviewed alarm response procedures, and discussed operator alarm response expectations with the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS), and operations manager.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed inconsistencies in the quality of operator response to control room alarms.
Generally, operators properly responded to control room alarms and followed the prescribed actions delineated in applicable alarm res)onse procedures.
However, the inspectors observed one instance w1ere an o)erator did not take appropriate actions for a turbine building '1 eating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) trouble alarm.
Enclosure
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2 This alarm was on the Unit 2 Annunciator Light Board (ALB) 50 for Panel OHVC. located behind the main control boards.
Alarm Response Procedure 17052 2 " Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 50 on OHVC Parel."
Revision (Rev.) 8. required the operator to dispatch a plant equipment operator to the local turbine building HVAC alarm panel to identify the source of the local alarm and take further actions. as necessary.
The inspectors observed the Balance of Plant (BOP) operator leave the main control board area to acknowledge the alarm, and upon return, the o)erator resumed activities in which he was involved prior to receiving t1e alarm.
The ins)ectors also observed that the 80P operator did not communicate to the 10 or USS which alarm had been received on the OHVC panel after returning to the control room.
The inspectors immediately brought this observation to the attention of the USS and an extra USS. who were in the control room at the time.
The inspectors determined that when the alarm occurred, the B0P operator had not been involved in any critical evolutions that would have justified a delay in taking the alarm response actions.
Following these discussions, the USS requested that a plant equipment operator be dispate.hed to the local turbine building HVAC alarm panel to determine the source of the alarm.
In subsequent discussions with the extra USS the inspectors were informed that this incident was that morning,h the control room staff to emphasize expectations for discussed wit properly responding to all control room alarms.
The inspectors discussed this incident with the Operations Manager, who indicated that each of the Shift Superintandents would be briefed on this incident to ensure that expectations for proper control room alarm response and communications were reiterated to the operators.
The inspectors concluded that this incident was an isolated case and had little safety consequence.
Nevertheless, it is expected that operators properly respond to all control room alarms.
The inspectors determined that the corrective actions for this incident were adequate.
Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a requires that written )rocedures be implemented for the activities identified in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33. Rev. 2.
RG 1.33. Rev. 2. requires that control room alarm response procedures be implemented.
The inspectors determined that the operator's failure to follow the actions in alarm response procedure 17052-2 was a violation of TS 5.4.1.a.
This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy. is identified as Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50 425/97-12-01. " Operator Failure to Implement Actions in Accordance with Alarm Response Procedure."
c, Conclusions Generally, the control room operators properly responded to control room alarms and followed prescribed actions delineated in the applicable Enclosure
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alarm response procedures. However, the inspectors observed one instance where an cperator did not take appropriate actions as required by an alarm response procedure.
The failure to properly follow the alarm response procedure was identified as a NCV.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Safety Related Walkdowns a.
Insocction Stone (71707)
lhe inspectors walked down >ortions of the Com)onent Cooling Water (CCW)
engineered safety feature (ESF) systems on bot 1 units using system drawings to verify availability and overall condition of the systems, b.
Observations and Findinas lhe insaectors verified pro)er system configurations both electrically and mec1anically of accessi31e portions in the plant.
The inspectors also observed overall material condition of system components during the walkdowns.
A review of the maintenance work history of the CCW system components did not identify any unusual performance or significant issues.
A recently completed maintenance activity involved the replacement of a damaged outboard bearing on the Unit 2 CCW Pump Number 1.
The licensee's preliminary investigation attributed the bearing damage to inadequate oil flow due to improper installation of a TRICO bearing oiler, which probably occurred following routine lubrication maintenance.
A Deficiency Card (DC) was written to address the oiler installation problem.
At the completion of maintenance the licensee returned the pump to service without incident.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the CCW systems were properly aligned and were being adequately maintained to ensure availability.
No significant items or discrepancies were identified during these inspections.
Operations Procedures and Documentation 03.1 Walkdown of Clearances (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors walked down the following clearances:
29700417-CCW pump 1 train A: rework outboard bearing 29700432 Positive displacement pump: packing leakage 29800025 Diesel generator fuel oil storage tank transfer pump / motor preventative maintenance Enclosure
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The inspectors did not identify any problems or concerns during those
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walkdowns.
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II.
Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Maintenance Work Order Observations j
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Insoection Scone'(62707 and 92902)
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The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities involving the following maintenance work orders (MW0s):
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C9700189 Clean Unit 1 and Unit 2 Floor Drain Tanks 29701284 Spent fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Tube Sheet Repair
29702230 Hydrogen Monitor 21513P5HMB Power Supply Replacement in Heat l
Trace Cabinet 29703260 Diesel Generator Train "B" Air Compressor No.1 Valve Work
29703334 Positive Displacement Pump Trip Investigation and Handswitch
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Replacement
b.- Observations and Findinas r
The observed maintenance activities were generally com)leted thoroughly
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and professionally.
Personnel were knowledgeable of t1eir assigned tasks.
Procedures were present at the work location and being followed.
Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the intended maintenance activities. Other specific observations and comments for
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the items listed above included the following:
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Activities associated with the removal of radioactive material,
i.e,, sludge, from the Unit 1 and Unit 2 floor drain tanks under MWO C9700189, were' adequately planned and controlled.
The'
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-Temporary Hodification and-associated evaluations to support this
activity were detailed. Good radiological considerations and
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precautions were implemented for this potentially high dose activity, While performing the activities, there were two spills
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. spills.were properly contained and the areas decontaminated by L
health physics personnel.
These incidents indicated that some personnel did not fully understand the configuration and limitations of: the vendor supplied transfer equipment that was used,
- Maintenance personnel experienced problems during performance of
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. maintenance on the. Unit 2 spent fuel )ool pit cooling pump.
' MWO 29701284.was developed to allow tie maintenance personnel to
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replace _ the seal' and packing on the pum) due to excessive leaks.
During performance of the work order, tie shaft was " galled'twice Enclosure
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5 due to improper installation of a shaft key, in addition, maintenance personnel identified a discrepancy between the maintenance ]rocedure instructions, vendor manual, and vendor drawings wit 1 respect to the orientation of the stuffing box bushings. A DC was generated to address the manual and drawing issue.
After discussions with the vendor and twice replacing the pump shaft, work was successfully completed.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that routine and corrective maintenance activities were performed satisfactorily. Two radioactive spills during floor drain tank cleaning activitics indicated that some personnel did not fully understand the configuration and limitations of the vendor supplied transfer equipment that was used. Maintenance activities on the spent fuel pool cooling pump represented an example of maintenance that did not meet the licensee s normal level of performance, in that it was not properly scoped prior to work commencement, the lack of maintenance personnel experience contributed to pump assembly dif ficulties, and poor coordination and communication between the licensee and the vendor led to maintenance difficulties and re-work.
M1.2 Surveillance Observation a.
Inspection Stone (61726)
The inspectors observed the performance or reviewed the following surveillances and plant procedures:
14230-1 AC (Alternating Current) Source Verification. Rev.12 14415-C fuel Handling Building Post-Accident Ventilation Actuation
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Logic Surveillance Test. Rey, 15 14421-1 Solid State Protection System and Reactor Trip Breaker Train
"B" Operability Test Rev. 9 14546-1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFW) Operability
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Test. Rev. 17 14801-1 Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) Transfer Pump Inservice Test Rev. 13 14810-2 TDAfW Pump and Check Valve Inservice Response Time Test, Rev. 19 14825-2 Quarterly inservice Valve Test Rev. 33 14980 2 Diesel Generator Operability Test Rev. 29 b.
Observations and Findinas The observed surveillance activities were generally completed thoroughly l
and professionally.
Personnel were experienced and knowledgeable of their. assigned tasks. Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the surveillance activities.
Activities were properly authorized and coordinated with operations prior to starting.
Enclosure
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Surveillance tests were performed within their required frecuencies and test results met acceptance criteria contained in the procecure.
Other s)ecific observations and comments for the items listed above included t1e following:
Contingency plans and prelarations for repacking Unit 2 Train "A"
Residual Heat Removal (RIR) Suction Valve 2HV 8812A, were detailed.
These contingency plans were comaleted prior to stroke
testing 2HV-8812A per procedure 14825 2.
W1en 2HV-8812A was stroked, the packinn leakage stopped, and the resultant stroke time was well within acceptance criteria limits.
Based on these results, contingency repair plans were not implemented.
The licensee planned to continue to monitor valve packing leakage until the March 1998 refueling outage at which time permanent valve repairs were planned.
During the performance of the Unit 2 TDAFW pump inservice testing
per procedure 14810 2. a problem was encountered with measuring pump vibration. resulting in the suspension of testing.
Testing was re)erformed with satisfactory results following corrections to the vi] ration instrument software configuration setup.
The licensee determined that the vibration f requency range for the pump had been improperly entered following instrument software setup changes.
The licensee initiated a DC to address the instrument setup error, c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that surveillance activities were performed satisfactorily.
Detailed contingency repair plans were completed prior to stroke testing a RHR suction valve that had previously experienced packing leakage.
III.
Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering El.1 learaded Missile Barrier Enclosure for Emeroency Diesel Generator (EDG)
shaust PiDes a.
Inspection Scone (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluations of degraded concrete associated with each of the EDG exhaust pipe missile barrier enclosures.
The inspectors reviewed the design function of the enclosures, structural drawings construction records of the concrete pours, s
discussed the degraded condition with licensee engineering personnel.
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and visually examined the enclosures. Additionally,theinspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 reporting requirements.
Enclosure
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b.
Observations and Findinas On January 7. 1998, during investigation into the source of higher than expected exhaust leakage into the Unit 1 Train A" EDG building, on site engineering personnel inspected each EDG exhaust pi)e enclosure. These concrete enclosures are located on the roof of the EDG buildings and
)rovide missile )rotection for the EDG exhaust alpes that penetrate the ju11 ding roof.
_icensee personnel performing tie inspections reported that there was concrete damage found inside the 1A EDG enclosure where the exhaust pipe passed through the roof.
Damage was also found on the IB EDG enclosure, but was reported to be less severe.
The following morning, at the daily management meeting, the damage was characterized as minor spalling. An operability evaluation was not initiated at this time to determine if the degradation impacted the missile protection design capability of the EDG exhaust system.
On January 14. 1998, civil engineers from the licensee's corporate engineering office performed a more thorough examination of the 1A and IB exhaust enclosures.
The results of this examination characterized the condition as significant degradation of both concrete enclosures.
Cnnerete had spalled from the inside wall of the enclosures exposing the iaterior layers of rebar which was imbedded at a depth of 4-5 inches.
'Jamage to the 1A enclosure was found to be the more severe: concrete had spalled to the rebar in almost the entire sloped section in the ceiling of the enclosure.
The inspectors reviewed the results of the licensee's evaluation of the degraded conditions as documented in REA 98-V1A601, dated January 19, 1998. The licensee determined that the extent of the degradation indicated that the enclosures could probably not withstand the impact of the most severe design basis missile.
However, the licensee determined that damage from a design basis missile event would not result in the EDGs being incapable of operating properly and performing their inte Ad safety function.
The licensee was concerned that this degraded condition involved the potential for dislodged concrete from the inside of the enclosure to fall into the olen end of the exhaust pipe resulting in exhaust flow blockage, in 11e event of extensive exhaust flow area blockage, the performance of the EDG could be adversely im) acted, it was evident that some concrete had already fallen into each E M exhaust pipe opening:
however, there was no immediate evidence of adverse impact on EDG operability based on recent EDG surveillance test performance data results, in the licensee's judgement, a design basis missile or ealthquake event would not result in additional concrete falling into the exhaust piping to the extent that EDG operability would be impacted.
When the inspectors visually examined the Unit 1 enclosures, it was evident from the large cracks and missing concrete that the integrity of the remaining concrete, both in the slo well as in the sides of the enclosures, ped section of the ceiling, as was potentially compromised.
Enclosure
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l The licensee's evaluation assumed that the worst case scenario event resulted in exhaust flow blockage less than 160 square inches
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(approximately 11.5% blockage).
The licensee's assumption that blockage
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would be bounded at 11.5% was not supported by a technical analysis The licensee had not obtained sufficient information to determine N the i
integrity of the remaining concrete and rebar had been compromised.
The licensee did not estimate the volume of concrete that had already fallen into the exhaust pipe, nor the amount of concrete that was reasonably expected to fall during a design basis missile or earthquake event Based on subsequent discussions with licensee engineering personnel and information from the engine manufacturer, the EDGs would perform their safety function even if blockage exceeded 11.5%.
On January 21. 1998, the licensee identified similar concrete
degradation following inspections of the Unit 2 EDG enclosures.
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licensee determined that the evaluation performed on Unit 1 also bounded i
Unit 2.
Between January 22 23, 1998, the licensee conducted ins)ections inside of each EDG silencer to determine if there was any bloccage or damage i
caused by concrete falling into the exhaust piping.
Access to the
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silencer internals was accomplished by removing a manway cover on the side of each silencer.
Concrete debris of various sizes and amounts was found in all four exhaust pipes at the outlet portion of the silencers.
Approximately 5-7, five-gallon buckets of debris were removed from each (
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No damage to the silencer or exhaust piping was identified.
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Removal of the existing concrete debris resolved any remaining uncertainties that the ins)ectors had regarding the potential for adverse EDG impact from ex1aust flow blockage.
The inspectors concluded
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that the amount of exhaust blockage from any remaining concrete
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susceptible to falling was significantly minimized,
At the end of the re ort period, the licensee was still evaluating the
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j cause of the degraded concrete conditions, as well as long term corrective actions.
The inspectors will continue to review the
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licensee's root cause evaluations and long term corrective actions.
Pending completion of these reviews, this issue was identified as Inspector followup Item (IFl) 50 424, 425/97-12 02, " Complete Review of EDG Missile Enclosure Degradation."
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b The inspectors reviewed the NRC reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.72.
A 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> report to the NRC is required by-10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)
for any event or condition that results in the plant being in a
condition outside its design basis. The inspectors' initial was ap)licable,pon review of the degradation, was that a 1-hour report determination u in that, the EDG exhaust systems were no longer ca)able of Wit 1 standing the worst case design basis missile scenario for w11ch they were originally designed.
In addition, Updated Final Safety
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Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 3.5.1.4. " Missiles Generated by Natural Enclosure t
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Phenomena." states that safety related systems and components are protected by missile barriers (which included the EDG exhaust systems)
that have concrete exterior walls and roofs which are at least 21 inches thick.
The licensee had identified conditions where this minimum concrete thickness was no longer met for the EDG exhaust system.
The licensee determined that the degraded condition did not represent a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.
The basis for this position was the determination that the EDGs were still ca)able of performing their intended safety function following the design Jasis missilt event even though the exhaust system itself was degraded. On January 20, 1998, during a phone call between the licensee and NRC Region 11 and NRR management, the licensee indicated that a courtesy 30-day Licensee Event Report would be submitted on this issue.
This issue is identificci as Unresolved item (URI) 50 424, 425/97 12-03.
"Reportability per 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 of Emergency Diesel Generator Exhaust System Degradation," pending additional review of the reportability requirements by the NRC.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that licensee short term corrective actions for degraded conditions associated with the EDG exhaust system were satisfactory.
Concrete debris that had fallen into the EDG exhaust
)iping was removed and root ca'Jse and long term corrective actions were
)eing developed. Although the evaluation of the degraded conditions was based on qualitative engineering judgement and some important aspects were not thoroughly supported, the determination that the EDGs woulc'
remain operable following design basis events was adequate.
An IFI was identified with respect to the licensee's root cause evaluation and long term corrective actions.
JL Plant Suppgr_t R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls Rl.1 Radioloaical Postinos a,
Jnspection Scope (71750)
The ins)ectors periodically conducted tours of the Radiation Controlled Areas (RCA) to verify that radiological postings of radiation and contamination areas were properly established and controlled in accordance with NRC requirements and licensee procedure 43005 C.
" Establishing and Posting Radiation Controlled Areas and High Radiation Area Access Control." Rev. 17.
Additionally, the inspectors verified that routine radiation and contamination surveys were performed at their prescribed frequency and in accordance with procedure 43000 C.
" Radiation and Contamination Survey." Rev. 13.
Enclosure
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b, Observations and findinos The inspectors determined that radiological postings for the RCA, Radiation High Radiation, and Locked High Radiation Areas were properly established.
Locked High Radiation Areas were properly secured to prevent unauthorized entry. With one exception involving an inaccurate radiological " Status Sign," radiation and contamination surveys of local
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areas in the RCA were accurate and were performed at their required
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frequency.
During a routine tour, the inspectors identified an inaccurate status sign posted at the entrance to the Unit 2. Train "A" RHR Pump Room.
The status sign indicated that the maximum contamination level in the room was less tban 1000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters (dpm/100cm'): however, the local room survey map, also posted at the room entrance, indicated tha a smear measurement obtained from valve 2HV 8812A was 3000 dpm/100cm}.
The inspectors notified health physics personnel who later updated the status board to reflect the higher contamination.
The inspectors attributed this problem to human error, in that, health physics persoonel forgot to update the RHR room status sign following a non routine survey conducted in preparation for upcoming work on valve 2HV 8812A, The inspectors determined that the radiological consequences of this error was minimal since valve 2HV-8812A had been enclosed in plastic when the non routine survey was performed.
Therefore, the potential for personnel contamination h^1 been minimized.
lhe inspectors noted that procedure 43000-C did not specifically require health physics personnel to update area status signs following the aerformance of non-routine surveys.
However, based on discussions with lealth physics technicians and managers, this expectation was clearly understood and was being performed, The health physics manager indicated that 43000-C would be enhanced to add a step requiring personnel to update status signs following the performance of non-routine surveys.
The inspectors also noted that the Train "A" RHR Pump Room local area survey map contained other outdated information from previously performed surveys.
Local area survey maps are posted at the entrance to most Emergency Core Cooling System pump and valve rooms, Survey maps are considered to be for "information only," Status signs provide the official radiological conditions, However, management expectations are that the survey maps be kept up-to date and accurate to prevent miscommunication of actual area radiological conditions. The licensee corrected this survey map, as well as four others that were identified, following additional licensee reviews of all survey maps in the auxiliary building, The inspectors concluded that adequate licensee corrective actions were taken for this minor problem.
Enclosure
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Conclusions lhe inspectors concluded that, with minor exceptions, radiological
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postings in the RCA were properly controlled and accurate. An i
inaccurate status sign associated with the Unit 2 RHR Train "A" Pump Room was attributed to >ersonnel error in updating the posting following a non routine survey.
11nor discrepancies were also identified in the update of local area survey maps.
These discrepancies were adequately
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resolved by the licensee.
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Comnensatory Measures a.
Insoection Scone (81700)
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The inspectors reviewed procedures for implementation of compensatory measures in the event of degraded or inoperable security equipment.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 90106 C. " Compensatory Measures for Degraded Security Systems " Rev. 22.
The inspectors considered the procedure to be a strength in that it was clear and concise.
Compensatory measures for various security system degradations and proposed contingencies were accurately outlined.
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Conclusions The licensee's procedure for implementing compensatory measures for degraded or inoperable security equipment was a strength.
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Testino and Maintenance
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Insnection Scone (81700)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's processes and procedures fcr the testing and maintenance of security related equipment, b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures for testing security equipment for operability on a seven day basis, as required by the licensee's NRC approved Physical Security Plan (PSP).
All procedures reviewed accurately reflected the requirements and were thorough.
Enclosure
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Procedure 90204 C. "X Ray Equipment Test Procedure." Rev. 10, required that X ray ecuipment be operability tested on a daily basis.
The inspectors icentified that although the X-ray equipment at the Plant Entry and Security Building (PESB) was tested daily, the X ray equipment used at tne warehouse was only tested prior to use.
The inspectors i
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determined that X-ray equipment located at the warehouse was operability tested every seven days in accordance with the PSP. The licensee agreed
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to revise the wording in the procedure to specify daily operability testing at the PESB and warehouse.
The inspectors reviewed operability test records for security related equipment for the period of November 17 23, 1997.
Teste, on vital doors: X ray, metal, and explosive ecuipment; turnstiles; microwaves:
gates: vehicle barrier equipment: anc duress alarms were conducted according to established procedures for this period. On January 7.
1998, the inspectors observed operability testing on the perimeter intrusion detection equipment located in zones 6 and 7.
Tests observed were in accordance with procedures and met the requirements of the PSP.
The inspectors reviewed documentation and 6)plicable procedures to ensure that cameras, lighting, and vehicle Jarrier walkdowns were conducted on a cuarterly basis.
All documents were accurate and reflected procecural requirements.
Procedures also clearly addressed the post maintenance testing process.
The security organization was being sup]orted in its maintenance efforts by a dedicated maintenance team, which us resulted in minimal outstanding work orders. Typically, security related work orders were completed within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, unless parts were on order.
This was a strength.
On January 6,1998, the licensee conducted performance testing on microwaves 17, 18. and 19 along with the associated components.
The inspectors reviewed computer hardcopy, and verified that the test was completed in accordance with procedure 23657-C. " Microwave Intrusion Detection System. Rev. 7.
c.
Conclusions Security testing practices and a)plicable procedures met the requirements specified in the PS).
The dedicated security maintenance team was a strength.
Enclosure
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S2.2 Security Eauinment Storace a.
Insnection Scone (81700)
The inspectors toured the armed repository to determine if security equipment was being appropriate'./ controlled.
b.
Qhservations and findinos lhe ins)ectors toured the licensee's armed repository located in the PLSB, witch was formerly the badging island prior to the installation of hand geometry.
The inspectors noted that the repository was secure, locked, bullet resistant, and steel enclosed.
All arms were secured and locked within the repository.
The area was well controlled by the licensee and was a strength, c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the armed repository was well controlled and was considered a strength.
S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.1 Securitv Proaram P1ans a.
Insoection Scone (81700)
The inspectors reviewed PSP and Contingency Plan (CP) changes to determine if they met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and to verify those changes incorporated did not decrease the effectiveness of the PSP and CP.
b.
Observations and findinos The inspectors evaluated PSP and CP Amendments 30 through 34.
Amendment 30 This PSP /CP amendment pertained to the implementation of the newly installed vehicle barrier system (VBS), non designated vehicles, organizational changes, searchina of of ficers, and required containment posts.
The inspectors determined the changes incorporated did not decrease the effectiveness of the PSP /CP.
Amendment 31 and Rev. I to Amendment 31 Under the provisions of 10 CfR 50.90, the licensee requested an exemption to the PSP /CP to abandon the Central Alarm Station (CAS)
under certain contingency situatiora.
This exemption request was not approved by the Commission.
Enclosure
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Mredment 32 Amendment 32 to the PSP /CP basically incorporated contingency and compensatory measures in the event of a degradation of the VBS and also documented organizational changes.
The inspectore determined the changes implemented did not decrease the effectiveness of the PSP, Amendment 33 The licensee determined, in Amendment 33 to the PSP /CP that designated or non designated vehicles under 10.000 pounds did not have to be secured or escorted inside the protected area.
The inspecto-reviewed and evaluated the engineering analysis that resulted in this determination.
The inspectors concluded that there was ro decrease in the effectiveness of the plan.
Amendment 34 This PSP /CP amendment was administrative in nature and met the requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.54(p).
c.
Conclusions The PSP /CP amendments submitted under 10 CFR 50.54(p) did not decrease the ef fectiveness of those plans.
One exemption request with respect to abandonment of the CAS was not approved by the NRC af ter being reviewed.
S8 Hiscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues (92904)
58.1 LC]psed) Viola 11on (VIO) 50 424/97-03-03:
" Failure to Establish and Maintain Security Procedures to Imnlement the PSP " Under the provisions of 10 CFR 60.54(p) the licensee outlined a contingency measure in their Response Plan. Revision 3. Phase 2. which allowed the CAS to be unmanned during certain contingencies, resulting in a violation of NRC requirements.
The licensee's response dated May 27.
1997, outlined corrective actions that were immediately implemented.
The inspectors identified that compensatory measures to implement a contingency strategy in lieu of abandonment of the CAS were in place at the time of the inspection.
The inspectors also verified that the Response Plan, Revision 4. dated March 6. 1997, had been revised to exclude abandonment of the CAS.
By letter dated April 30, 1997, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, the licensee submitted Amendment 31 to the PSP /CP to request an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1), which was outlined in the PSP.
The exemption request wes denied.
Enclosure
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58.2 LClosed)VIO 50-424. 425/97 06 05:
"f ailure to Sico fitness for Duty OfD) Sion-In Sheets at an fmeroency Dril'
The inspectors reviewed
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the following procedures to evaluate the '1censee's corrective actions as documented in 6 response to the NRC dateo August 27, 1997:
91104-C, " Duties of the OSC Manager " Rev.13.
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91106 C. "Outies of the TSC Support Coordinator." Rev. 8.
e 91023-C. " Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations
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facility." Rev. 16.
All procedures reviewed were revised to reflect that an individual was required to be present at each emergency response facility to ensure personnel responding to an emergency signed the applicable roster.
Also reviewed was " Lessons Learned Emergency Drill May 27. 1997." dated July 9. 1997.
Under lessons learned for all personnel, the licensee clearly stressed the requirements of 10 CFR 26, with respect to answering questions related to staff's ffD status.
Through discussion with licensee representatives and review of applicable procedure, the inspectors determined that the licensee implemented their corrective action to Violation 50-424, 425/97 06-05.
58.3 (Closed) V10 50-424. 425/97 07-07:
" Failure to Compensate a Dearaded V1tal Area Barrier. "
In a response dated September 25. 199/. the licensee determined that the violation occurred because a shift captain failed to follow procedural requirements for the removal of a vital area barrier and to retain established compensatory measures The inspectors determined that the following corrective actions were completed by September 10. 1997:
the responsible shift captain was coached.
e department shift supervision was instructed on the need to follow e
established procedures, and, shift supervision was directed to elevate all decisions regarding e
degraded vital area barriers to department management prior to discontinuing compensatory actions.
Additionally. the inspectors determined that a Request for Engineering Review (97-0264) was initiated on July 16. 1997, to determine whether all protected and vital area barriers currently in place were required by security commitments.
The review would also ensure that appropriate plant drawings reflected actual barrier locations.
The review was ongoing at the time of the inspection.
En:losure
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58.4 (Closed) V10 50-424 425/97 09-03:
" Failure to Search Cateaory 111 Material." Corrective action was outlined in a res)onse to the NRC
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dated November 14. 1997.
The inspectors verified tlat the Category 111 material that was not originally searched, had been searched by the licensee upon notification of the non compliance.
The inspectors reviewed procedure 90019 C. " Warehouse Materials Access Controls."
Rev. 18, 1his )rocedure was revised to reflect that all Category 111 material would se searched prior to entering the protected area.
In the event the material cannot be searched outside the protected area, it would be positively controlled and searched upon opening.
On January 6.
1998, the inspectors observed a shipment of Westinghouse fuel being delivered to the site.
The fuel shipment was escorted to the storage location and was secured with security locks.
The following day, the inspectors observed security search the contents of the fuel shipment upon opening the shipping containers, as required by the newly revised procedure.
S8.5 (Closed) Lice,see Event Report (LE U 50 425/97-501:
"Securit y Syste!D Degradations )ue to inclement Weat ler."
On August 16. 1997, the licensee experlenced severe weather conditions which resulted in a failed multiplexer for several vital area doors.
The licensee was unable to compensate for the degraded vital area doors within the ten
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minute specified timeframe due to personnel safety concerns in such severe weather.
Additionally, due to the number of f ailures that occurred, nor'nal shift operations could not compensate for all the failures.
Through discussion with licensee representatives, the inspectors determined that compensatory posts were established as promptly as concerns for personnel safety permitted.
Additional security personnel were called to compensate for the losses.
A protected area patrol was established.
Following completion of repairs
>
and testing of the degraded security components, a search of the affected protected and vital areas was conducted, with no evidence of unauthorized intrusion.
The inspectors determined that the PSP and applicable procedures were followed as permitted by the circumstances.
F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities F1,1 Fire Reoorts and Investications a.
Inspection Scooe (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the plant fire incident reports for 1997 and selected operator logs for November and December 1997, to assess maintenance related or material condition problems with plant systems and equipment that. initiated fire events.
The inspectors verified that plant fire protection requirements were met in accordance with procedure 00601-C. " Fire Investigation Report Procedure". Rev. 7, when fire related events occurred.
Enclosure
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b.
Observations and Findinos The fire incident reports and selected operator logs indicated that there was only one incident of a fire within a safety related plant area in 1997, which required fire brigade response and the licensee's fire protection staff investigation.
This indicates that the fire prevention
program was ef fectively implemented.
A small welding fire occurred on July 15. 1997. but had been extinguished by the wolder's fire watch prior to the arrival of the fire brigade. Also a non safety related warehouse fire occurred at the A. B. Wilson combustion turbine )lant near the Vogtle site on December 2. 1997, and is discussed in IRC Event Notification33338, c.
Conclusions The fire prevention program was effectively implemented.
F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities ana Equipment Passive Fire Barriers Fire barriers include penetration seals, wraps, walls, structural member fire resblant coatings doors, and dampers, etc.
Fire barriers are used to prevent the s) read of fire and to protect redundant safe shutdown equipment.
_aboratory testing of fire barrier materials is done only on a limited range of test assemblies.
In plant installations can deviate from the tested configurations.
Under the provisions of Generic letter (GL) 8610. " Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements." licensees are permitted to develop engineering evaluations justifying such deviations.
F2.1 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals a.
Insoection Scope (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the fire barrier penetration seal designs and testing.
The inspectors compared selected as built fire barrier penetration seals to fire endurance test configurations to verify that those seals were qualified by appropriate fire endurance tests and representative of the design and construction of the fire endurance test specimens.
During plant walkdowns the inspectors observed the installation configurations of selected fire barrier penetration seals to confirm that the licensee had established an acceptable design basis for those fire barriers used to separate safe shutdown functions.
Enclosure
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b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the silicone foam fire barrier seal design records, quality assurance installation records. testing records, and engineering evaluations for sever mechanical and electrical fire barrier seal penetrations.
The inspectors reviewed Vogtle Specification No. X1AGil
"S)ecification for Penetration Sealing for the Vogtle Electric Generating )lant Units 1 and 2." Rev. 9; Evaluation Report. "Vogtle Unit 2. Penetration Seal Evaluation No. 2X45 001." dated September 23. 1988: Evaluation Report.
"Vogtle Unit 1. Penetration Seal Evaluation No. X7BD108." dated August 21, 1989: Insulation Consultant and Management Service (ICMS)
vendor data concerning NRC Information Notice (IN) 88 56, dated October 12. 1988: fire protection surveillance procedure 29144-C. " Fire Area boundaries and Fire Rated Penetration Seals 18 Month Visual Inspection." Rev. 8: Calculation X4C 2301 S255. " Penetration Seal Engineering Evaluation." Rev. 0: Calculation X4C-2301 5020. " Evaluation of Seismic Gaps and Boot Seals Between Safety Related Buildings."
Rev. 2. UFSAR Section 98, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) to determine the location and description of fire areas; and assessed the licensee's supporting technical justifications and available engineering evaluations for the sampled silicone foam type penetration seals.
The inspectors' review focused on verifying that the following design and installation parameters for the as built configurations were adequately bounded and justified by the licensee's engineering evaluations:
penetration type and opening sizes.
e seal material type and depth.
e damming material type and orientation.
- thermal mass of penetrating items.
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clearances of penetrating items, and.
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fire test results for unexposed surface temperatures.
- The following penetration seals were inspected and the quality assurance records for these seals were reviewed:
nariannom esa suomenn esa
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Weer1940ATIDII lIteBS DESIGN 00PTH l TVM TYM i 08merTATIDII NE T
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tl CTR6 CAL CABLE CON RO Suit 440 E0114 9'* SILICONE FittR RAX FMR 2 24 7 PfMETRATION ROOMS RA66 AND 1* BOTTOM SIDE CTL 6 3 82 V 21121348 A-ht7S Enclosure
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RAAftsmAL thAftsuAL sab8ffMCAfical 110038 DleseII DIFfMtT M T m / OsuestiAftoss HRE TEST s
"
i (LtCTRICAL CAhlt CONTROL BUILDING (0101 9'. SILICONt flNRFRAM f MR 2-24 77 1 RAY
/ WALL NTWIIN FOAM HOTt0ARD
$WRI S 28 79 PINT 1RAfl0N ROOMS M870 AND 1* TWO stDi8 CTL 6 3 82 V121121201 5001 RS6e MICHANICAL PIPt DetStt otNERATOR M0101 7". $1LICONE flMRT RAM FMR22477 M Nt TRAfiON SVILDINQl WALL FOAM H0190ARD CTL l 20 82 SLt t VE 1-07-0231 NTWitN 1 A DittfL 1*.TWO SIDI$
CTL 319'82 ROOM AND f UtL Olt DAYiANKROOM i
MtCHANICAL PDPt CONTROL SUILDING M0101 7'. SillCONt fibt RF RAE FMR 2 24 77 MNt1 RAT 10N
/ WALL NTWIIN FOAM H01DOARD Cil 6 20 82 i
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1>11 1070 B ROOMS Rett AND 1*.TWO $1Di8 CTL 319 82 Reb 4 MICHANICAL PlPt CONTROL BUILDWO M0101 7*. SILICONt Flet hf RAM CTL 319-82 PE Nt1 RAT 10N
/ DOOM TRANSOM M0007 FOAM WITH H0iDOARD CTL 127 88 WiiH E NitNSION NTWilN ROOMS WALL 1*.TWO $1 DES CTL 6-13 86 SLt(Vt 1111279 RA44 AND RA34 t XilNSION CTL 3 3188 1 11 1280 SLttVE 1 11 1281 No discrepancies were identified by the inspectors in the review of the licensee's fire barrier penetration seal installation procedures, ICMS vendor data, the seal installers' qualification and training records, the quality assurance inspection records associated with those seals
inspected, and the visual inspection of the seal installations.
The
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inspectors concluded that the fire barrier penetration seal designs were l
properly supported by seal testing documentation, vendor data, installer i
qualification and training records and quality assurance inspection
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records.
The licensee's fire barrier penetration seal engineering evaluations provided for deviations from fire barrier configurations
!
qualified by tests satisfied the guidance of NRC GL 86-10.
Also, the inspectors did not identify any degradation of seal integrity or missing
seals.
The inspectors' review of the fire barrier surveillance procedure i
29144-C, noted that procedure section 5.3, " Acceptance Criteria for Penetration Seals " allowed penetration seal shrinkage gaps at interfaces of up to 1/4" wide and 50 percent of the seal depth.
This information differed from the seal manufacturer's criteria of 1/8" wide or less and not more than one-third of the seal's thickness as outlined in NUREG-1552, " Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear Power Plants,"
dated July 1996.
Durinn plant visual inspections of sample seal foam shrinkage gaps a'p6ctors did not observe any examples of silicone installations, the ins the fire f arrier penetration seal interfaces.
Enclosure
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After discussions with the licensee. Procedure Rev. ER 98 007 was initiated to revise the surveillance procedure acceptance criteria for interface gaas to a9ree with that recomended by the seal manufacturer outlined in 1UREG 1552.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that fire barrier penetration seal designs were properly supported by seal testing documentation, vendor data. Installer qualification and training records, and quality assurance inspection records.
The licensee's fire barrier penetration seal engineering evaluations provided for deviations from fire baeer configurations qualified by tests satisfied the guidance of NP
- l 86-10.
F3 Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation F3.1 Surveillance Procedures for fire Protection Seismic Dry Stando10e System a.
Insnection Scone (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the scope of the design, maintenance, and surveillance testing procedures for the seismic dry standpipe system which was System No. 2.303.
The review examined the licensee's compliance with UFSAR Section 9.5.1.2.2. Procedure 92025-C. " Fire Protection Surveillance Program." and Technical Specifications.
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors selected the inspection and surveillance requirements from the UFSAR for the independent seismic dry standpipe system designed and installed to be operable for manual fire control following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) to verify that the components that provide this function had been incorporated into the appropriate surveillance procedures.
The inspectors reviewed UFSAR Section 9.5.1.2.2. " Fire Protection (Active Systems):" UFSAR Section 9.5.1.2.2.7. " Seismic Dry Standpipe 9< stem;" and UFSAR 9B. Section C.6.c.(4). " Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems." These UFSAR sections describe the functional interface of the NSCW and the fire protection dry standpipe system to provide post SSE manual fire protection capability in areas required for safe plant shutdown.
The inspectors reviewed procedure 92000-C. " Fire Protection Program."
Rev. 12; procedure 92025 C. " Fire Protection Surveillance Program."
Enclosure
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Requirement." procedure 92035 C. ' Tire Protection OperabilityThe inspe Rev. 11: and Rev. 10.
protection surveillance testing procedures existed wit 11n the fire
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protection surveillance program to verify the functional operability of the seismic fire protection dry standpipe system.
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The inspectors also reviewed system 2303 drawings X4DB174-6. Revs. 12 and 10. for Units 1 and 2 respectively.
Seismic dry standpipe system
.i components identified on these drawings included six seismically
qualified manual isolation valves per unit.
These valves provide the
NSCW supply to the seismic standpipe system which is independent of the
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normal fire protection water standpipe distribution system which may have failed during the seismic event. Also included in the system are a number of standpipe hose valves and associated restriction orifices in
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the control, containment, auxiliary, and diesel generator buildings.
The inspectors discussed this issue with licensee operations and engineering management.
On January 13. 1998, the licensee's operability review determined that the dry standpipe system isolation valves were
operable based on their indoor protected locations and not being exposed
to harsh environments.
The inspectors, during walkdowns of the dry
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standpipe system isolation valves, observed that the valves were in good material condition with their hand wheels locked in the " Closed" position.
On January 13. 1998, the licensee issued DC No. 2 98 012 which identified that some Unit 2 seismic standpipe hose connections were not equipped with restriction orifices as indicated on plant drawings.
Technical Specification 5.4.1.d and Regulatory Guide 1.33. Appendix A.
Section 8.b.1.h. require written procedures for fire protection functional tests.
The licensee's initial review was unable to locate documentation for: (1) the design basis calculation that established flow restriction orifice settings: (2) the performance of routine system component maintenance: or. (3) the preoperation testing of the seismic
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fire protection dry standpipc system. The licensee stated that additional review of this issue would be required to establish whether this documentation was available.
Pending further review by the licensee to determine if design, maintenance and testing requirements for the seismic fire protection i
dry standpipe system are necessary: and subsequent review by the NRC.
this issue will be identified as URI 50 424, 425/97-12-04. " Determine If
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Design. Maintenance, and Testing Requirements for the Seismic Fire Protection Dry Standpipe System Are Necessary."
Enclosure
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Conclusions i
An Unresolved item was identified regarding the licensee's design.
l maintenance, and testing documentation of the seismic fire protection dry standpipe system that provides a fire protection function and NSCW system integrity following a SSE.
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F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification F5.1 Fire Bricade
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a.
Insnection Stone (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the fire brigade organization and training program for compliance with plant procedures and NRC guidelines and
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requirements, b.
Observations and Findinas The organization and training requirements for the plant fire brigade were established by the fire protection program procedure, 92000 C.
" Fire Protection Program." Rev. 12.
The fire brigade for each shift was composed of a fire brigade leader and at least four brigade members from operations.
The fire brigade leader was a shift supervisor or shift support supervisor. The other members from operations were plant equipment (non licensed) operators.
Each fire brigade member was required to receive initial, quarterly and annual related training and to satisfactorily complete an annual medical evaluation and certification for participation in fire brigtJe activities.
In addition, each member was required to participate in at least two drills per year.
A review of the qualification and training status report for the fire brigade members indicated that the training, drill, respiratory and physical examination requirements for each active member were up to date and met the established site training procedural requirements.
On January 15, 1998, the inspectors witnessed a fire brigade drill involving a simulated fire in the Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Pump No. 1 on level A of the auxiliary building. The response of the fire brigade to the simulated fire was very good, The fire brigade leader properly established a command post, assessed the fire area conditions, deployed the fire brigade personnel, and effectively used radio communications. A room search was conducted by the brigade members and a practice injured victim was successfully retrieved and treated.
The fire brigade exhibited very good fire ground tactics. and victim rescue operations.
The brigade actions clearly demonstrated the capability of Enclosure
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effectively responding to a fire situation.
A drill critique was conducted following the drill to discuss the drill participants'
performance.
The critique verified that the established drill objectives were met.
During the critique both challenges and successes were discussed.
Areas of brigade challenges were ident4fied and were being addressed by the training staffs.
c.
Conclusions lhe fire brigade organization and training met the requirements of the site procedures.
Performance by the fire brigade during a drill was very good.
The brigade leader properly established a command post.
assessed the fire area conditions, deployed the fire brigade personnel, and offectively used radio communications.
The fire brigade exhibited very good fire ground tactics, and victim rescue operations.
The brigade actions met the established drill objectives and clearly demonstrated the capability of effectively responding to a fire situation.
F7 Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities F7.1 Fire Protection Audit Reports
a.
Inspection Scope (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER)
Audit Report OP-20/97 12. " Fire Protection Program." dated May 29. 1997, and the status of the corrective actions implemented for the Audit Finding Reports (AFRs) initiated for the audit report, b.
Observations and findinas The licensee's Safety Audit and Engineering Resir. organization performed an evaluation of the fire protection p.ogram during the tioe period from May 5 through 23. 1997.
The report for this assessment was Report No. OP 20/97-12.
This report included an oversight assessment of the fire protection program as applied to fire protection systems and barriers, fire loading, fire protection equipment, maintenance and surveillance procedures, training and qualification, transient combustible controls, and plant modification.
The inspectors reviewed the final audit report and the licensee's response to AFR-653. dated July 31. 1997.
The SAER assessment of the facility's fire protection program was comprehensive and effective in reporting fire protection program performance to management.
The evaluation team determined that the fire protection program was adequate and there were no programmatic problems.
Enclosure
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j The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response and corrective actions f
to AFR 653, dated July 31, 1997.
The licensee corrective actions In
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response to the identified automatic sprinkler systems issues were comprehensive and timely.
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I c.
Conclusions
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The licensee's 1997 SAER assessment of the facility's fire protection
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program was comprehensive and effective in reporting fire protection l
program performance to management.
The licensee's corrective actions in i
response to the identified automatic sprinkler systems issues were l
comprehensive and timely.
!
L,_ Manaoement Meetinas and Other Areas X
Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
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A recent discovery of a licensee o)erating its facility in a manner t'
contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or
parameters to the UFSAR descriptions.
While performing the inspections
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discussed in this re) ort, the inspectors reviewed the applicable
- portions of the UFSAt that related to the areas inspected. The observed plant practices, procedures and/g was consistent with the inspectors verified that the UFSAR wordin r
or parameters.
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X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at tle conclusion of the inspection on January 27, 1998.
The e
licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was -identifled.
X2 Other NRC Personnel On Site On December -18,1997. P. Skinner was onsite to meet with the resident-inspectors and licensee management.
On January 9 and 16, 1998. A. Belisle. Chief. Special Inspections
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Branch. Division of Reactor Safety, Region 11, was onsite to attend pre-exits conducted-for fire protection and security-inspectors.
F
n Enclosure
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On January 13. 1998, the following personnel from the office cf NRR were onsite to discuss with the licensee recent NRR Project Manager position changes:
H. Berkow. Director. Project Directorate PD 11-2. NRR D. Jaffe. Senior Project Manager. PD 11-2 Vogtle Site L. Olshan. Senior Project Manager. PD 11-2. Match Site L. Wheeler. Senior Project Manager. Non Power Reactcrs and Decomissioning PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Beasley, Nuclear Plant General Manager-S. Chestnut. Manager. Operations G. Fredrick. Plant Support Assistant General Manager J. Gasser. Plant Operations Assistant General Manager K. Holmes. Manager. Maintenance M. Sheibani. Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor C. Tippins. Jr.. Nuclear Specialist 1 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observation IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation IP 64704:
Fire Protection Program IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Ar.tivities IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance IP 92904:
Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED 022D2d lyng item Number Status Descriotion and Reference NCV 50-425/97-12 01 Open Operator Failure to Implement Actions in Accordance with Alarm Response Procedure (Section 01.2)
IFI 50 424, 425/97-12 02'
Open Complete Review of EDG Missile Enclosure Degradation (Section El.1)
Enclosure
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URI 50 424, 425/97-12-03 Open Reportability per 10 CFR 50.72 and
10 CFR 50.73 of Emergency Diesel Generator Exhaust System Degradation (Section El.1)
URI 50-424. 425/97-12-04 Open Determine if Design, Maintenance, and Testing Requirements for the Seismic Fire Protection Dry Standpipe System are Necessary (Section F3.1)
Closed Tyne Item Number Status Descriotion and Reference NCV 50-425/97-12-01 Closed Operator Failure to implement Actions in Accordance with Alarm Response Pr ocedure (Section 01.2)
VIO 50-424, 425/97-03-03 Closed Failure to N a??lsh and Maintain Security Proceow es to Implement the PSP (Section S8.1)
VIO 50-424, 425/97-06-05 Closed Failure to Sign FFD Sign-In Sheets at an Emergency Drill (Section S8.2)
c VIO 50-424, 425/97-07-07 Closed Failure to Compensate a Degraded Vital Area Barrier (Section S8.3)
VIO 50-424, 425/97-09-03 Closed Failure to Search Category III Material (Section 58.4)
LER 50-425/97-S01 Closed Security System Degradations Due to Inclement Weather (Section S8.5)
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1-w Enclosure
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