ML20216B293

Insp Repts 50-424/87-32 & 50-425/87-23 on 870518-22. Violations Noted:Failure to Classify Security Event Per Emergency Plan Requirements & Inconsistencies Between Classification Procedure Emergency Action Levels & Plan

ML20216B293
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	06/10/1987
From:	Decker T, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216B095	List: IR 05000424/1987032 ML20216B090 ML20216B203 ML20216B293
References
50-424-87-32, 50-425-87-23, IEB-79-18, IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 8706300057
Download: ML20216B293 (12)

See also: IR 05000424/1987032

Text

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UNITED STATES i .Y. ' "

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' NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report No.: 50-424/87-32, 50-425/87-23L U l-

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^ Licensee

- Georgia Power' Company

s 'P.-0. Box,4545. >

l Atlanta, GA 30302 -

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' Docket'Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.:  : NPF-68, CPPR-109'

"- ' Facil.ity Name:- Vogtle Electric: Generating Plant ~

. Inspection Conducted: May 18-22, 1987

. Inspector: h. st-Jp-8 k '4>-/o-87

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A. Goodeh- .Date Signed

. Accompanying-Personnel:. EFD; Testa

Approved by: s. //d b6 /,-/O 67

.T. R. Decker, Chief Date Signed-

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Emergency Preparedness Section: ..

, Division.of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

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SUMMARY.-

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Scope:- This - routine unannounced inspection._ was in the area' of emergency

preparedness : .

Results: . Three violations were identified - (1) failu're to classify 'a security

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event' in' accordance with the Emergency P_lan requirements (2): inconsistencies

between the Classification Procedure . Emergency Action Levels (EALS) and the

EALS in the Emergency Plan, and (3) failure-to provide training 'to 'various

members of-the emergency-response organization in accordance with the Emergency

Plan. .

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REPORT DETAILS- l

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l'. i ! Persons Contacted:

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, LLicensee Employees; .

t*T. -Greene~,.. Plant Manager: .. . f-

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• P.- R. Bemis, Manager, Engineering, Maintenance -and 0perations and

Radiological Safety

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,.*S. C. Ewald, Manager, Radiological. Safety

.*A.:E..Desrosiers, Health Physics Superintendent

-.*W. C. Gabbard, Senior. Regulatory Specialist:

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L*K. W. Whitt, Generation Engineer

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L*D.' Smith, Construction Engineer

• D.' Smith,. Superintendent,. Nuclear. Operations

• C. C. Miller,. Superintendent- of Outages and Planning-

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• R. M. Odom, Supervisor,; Nuclear Safety and Compliance

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• P. D.' Rushton,iTraining.and Emergency Preparedness Manager

*J. N. -Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor

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• L.,E. Mayo, Emergency Preparedness. Specialist

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'*R.cM. Bellamy, Plant.' Support Manager

,' . *W. F. J Kitchens,; 0perations Manager -

• W. E. Mundy Equality _ Assurance' Supervisor:

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• D., F. Hallman, Chemistry Superintendent ~

1*P.1H. Burwinkel . Engineering Supervisor

• C. E. .Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager

• J. .Mb Randolf Plant' Engineer

• '*Si.R. Edwards, Operations-Engineer

*G.s R.- Frederick, Quality Assurance Engineering Supervisor 4

L *M.1Griffis, Maintenance Manager <

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< *W. -L o Burmeister, Operations Supervisor, Startup _

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M. Kurtzman, Supervisor, Health Physics, Chemistry Training- .

. M.iKirkpatrick,: Senior Methods'and Training Specialist ~ 1

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J.:Caldwell, Lead Instructor Wackenhut Training' Institute -l

1* Cure, Plant Health Physicist o

.A.;LBalducci,

E. Radiation' Engineer .

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J. ;Pietro,: Senior Quality Assurance' Field Representative

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P. O'Neel,; Security Shift Supervisor. 1

W. K. Taylor. Security Shift. Supervisor

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D.1 Warren, Nuclear ' Security Specialist for Administration

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, M.. Craven,: Security Manager  !

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H.:.Butterworth, On-Shift.0perations Supervisor j

$ .E.jd.' Kazensky, On-Shift Operations Supervisor  !

"R[Legrand,ShiftSupervisor ,

.E.:M.-Thornton, Jr., Shift Supervisor  !

L. P. Lane, Shift' Clerk

T. B.. Jones,! Shift Clerk

J. J. Gilmarten Supervisor Engineering Staff ,

.M. A. Deinhardt, Quality' Concerns Coordinator  !

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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, security office

members and office personnel.

Other Organizations

J. ' Purucker, Nuclear Group Supervisor, PFE-0/Bechtel

J. D. Hurd, Deputy Manager, PFE-0/Bechtel ,

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• J. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector

• R. Schepens, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview  :

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 22,'1987, with '

those persons indicated.in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the f

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. Station

management did not agree with the inspection findings, consequently no

commitments were given by the licensee regarding the findings. The

following new items were identified during this inspection:

One unresolved item * described in Paragraph 7 (verify that Plan and l

procedures are being submitted to NRC within 30 days of the effective

date, and that appropriate personnel and organizations were sent copies of

Plan and procedural changes) and three violations discussed in

Paragraphs 4 and 8. The violations involve: (1) failure to classify a

security event in accordance with Emergency Plan requirement,

(2) inconsistencies between the classification procedure and the EALs in

the Emergency Plan, and (3) failure to provide training to members of the

emergency organization.

The inspector telephoned the Station Emergency Preparedness Supervisor on

May 26, 1987, to inform the licensee that a Region II review of the report

details presented in Paragraph 4 below resulted in the identification of a

violation of Technical Specifications (Procedures shall be established,  ;

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implemented, and maintained covering the Emergency Plan implementation) as

compared to an Inspector Followup Item as discussed during the exit

meeting. In addition, the licensee representative was informed that

recent guidance from NRC headquarters recommending evacuation as an

immediate protective action recommendation following a General Emergency

declaration (as compared to sheltering recommendation in IE Information

Notice No. 83-28) resulted in acceptance of Table 1' recommendations from

Implementing Procedure 91305-C, " Protective Action Guidelines," rather

than an inspection finding as discussed during the exit meeting. The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to

or reviewed by the . inspector during this inspection.

• Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters q

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4. EmergencyDetectionandClassification(82201) )

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Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Sections IV.B j

and IV.C; and Section D of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this program

area was inspected to determine whether the licensee used and understood a

standard emergency classification and action level scheme.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's classification procedure titled  !

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" Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions," Revision No. 4.

The event classifications in the procedures included the four classes

specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Part IV.C and the Emergency Plan. The

classification procedures appear to be user friendly consisting of

initiating conditions from Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, and the symptomatic i

approach involving the loss of fission. product barriers. The procedures l

did not appear to contain impediments or errors which could lead to  !

untimely. classification. However, it was noted during the procedural

review that selected emergency action levels (EALs) were inconsistent with

the initiating events specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654 and Table D-2

of the Vogtle Emergency Plan. Examples of the inconsistencies are as-

follows:

a. The loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power is listed as an Alert

in the Vogtle Emergency ~ Plan (Tabled-2) and Appendix 1 of

HUREG-0654. However, Figure 4 of the licensee's classification

procedure (91001-C) lists this event as a Site Area Emergency. 1

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b. Most of all alarms (annunciators)'or indicators lost is listed as a

Site Area Emergency in the Emergency Plan (Table D-2) and Appendix 1

of NUREG-0654. However, Figure 4 of the classification procedure

does not include this event under any of the four emergency

classifications.  !

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Licensee representatives took exception and acknowledged this finding as a j

demonstration of conservative EALs to assist . Control Room personnel in '

recognizing and properly classifying events. This item is identified as a

violation of Technical Specifications Section 6.7.1.d., which requires

that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained

covering the Emergency Plan.

Violation (50-424/87-32-01, 50-425/87-23-01): Emergency Plan Implementing

Procedure No. 91001-C is inadequate for implementing the Emergency Plan

event classification due to inconsistency between the Plan and

Implementing Procedure EALs.

Selected emergency action levels (EALs) specified in the classification

procedures were reviewed. The inspector noted that some of the EALs were

based on parameters obtainatile from Control Room instrumentation.

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OThe Linspector7 verified that the- licensee's notification

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.includedi criteria for ! initiation ~ of Toffsite notificationsE and for -

'developmenti of ' protective : action recommendations. 'The ' notification : .

' procedures? required that offs 1te notificationsibe .made promptlyc after'

declaration"of an' emergency.. '

s The'; inspector? discussed with licensee representatives. the coordination ofc

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EALs:with State'and local. officials. Licensee! documentation showed that'

the blicensee had. discussed the' EALs during July and September 1986 with

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State 1andflocaliofficials, and that these officials agreed with the.:EALs.

used by the.' licensee.

Interviews 'wereL held ,with. two On-Shift ' Operations Supervisors, and two

Shift Supervisors to verify that they~ understood.theLrelationship between

core status Lande such core damage indicators as containment' high-range -

monitor inadequate-core-cooling ' indicator, : high-range effluent monitor,- <

fuel 3 temperature in_dicator,: and containment hydrogen, monitor. With the; .j'

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s_ exception of'one On-Shift. Operations ~ Supervisor, all intervie'wees appeared ;

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knowledgeable.of:the:various core-damage indicators and their relationship

tocorestatusf(see'paragraphbelow).-

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The' responsibility and ' authority. for: classification . of emergency. events

and initiation of. emergency actions were prescribed in: licensee procedures-

and. int the Emergency' Plan. Interviews' with : selected key. members of the-

licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel understood;

their responsibilitiesRand authorities in; relation (to ~ accident

classification,' notification,'and protective action" recommendations.

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LThe. inspector reviewed the sequence of; events resulting from' the_ discovery

ofl a' suspected -bomb device, interviewed selected . personnel: involved in the

event, reviewedLthe Vogtle Security Plan', Emergency, Plan- and Implementing

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L Procedure, and . licensee documentation (Security Department' report and the,

Unit.1^ Shift . Supervisor's ' Log) regardingithe; incident of < May 13,1987.

Based on.the review of licensee documentation (which included pictures of:

the device), interviews with licensee personnel, and the actions that were

taken by111censee personnel in response-to'the device',1 1t appears that the

' licensee responded as though the ' device' posed a . real. . security threat.

Some of'the actions that were taken included: (1)Levacuationoflevels 3

and 4 'of the Unit 1 Control Building,- (2) area was. cordoned off, (3)

offsite' support was requested from a Military Explosive Ordinance Disposal-

. (E0D) . Unit,' and - (4) a security alert was declared. According to..the

~11censee's : Emergency Plan (Section D. Tabled-1) and Implementing

Procedure No. 91001-C, " Emergency Classification and Implementing

Instructions," ~ Revision 4, Figure 4, under : Security EALS, a security

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. threat:or attempted sabotage should be classified as a Notification of

Unusual . Event (N00E). Although the licensee took exception to this

incident as being a bonafide security threat, the inspector informed the

licensee that this finding is identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)

.which requires a licensee to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans

which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E.

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Violation (50-424/87-32-02, 50-425/87-23-02): Failure to classify a  ;

security event in accordance with the Vogtle Emergency Plan, Section D, {j

Table 0-1, Item 7.

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Selected Emergency Operation Procedures. (E0Ps) were reviewed t,y the

inspector and discussed with licensee personnel. The E0Ps provided d

directions to users concerning timely classification of accidents. All  ;

personnel interviewed appeared to be familiar with the classification

information in the E0Ps. I

Walk-through evaluations involving accident classification problems were

conducted with two On-Shift Operations Supervisors, and two Shift .

Supervisors. With the exception of one On-Shift Operations Supervisor,  !

all interviewed personnel promptly and properly classified the' i

hypothetical accident situations presented to them, and appeared to be

familiar with appropriate classification procedures. One On-Shift

Operations Supervisor incorrectly _ classified an incident regarding a

potential release of large amounts of fission products. The walkthrough

scenario involved a reactor coolant leak and core melt sequence in which

significant releases from containment had not taken place. However, the ,

post accident monitoring system indicated that containment. failure leading

to a direct atmospheric release was imminent. The interviewee incorrectly i

declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) for a reactor coolant leak

of 55 GPM, which is the EAL for an Alert classification. In addition, i

following a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the interviewee ,

failed to upgrade from the incorrect classification of N00E to the Site l

Area or General Emergency classification. Thit mattar -is further

discussed in Paragraph 8 regarding training.  !

Two violations and no deviations were identified.

5. Protective Action Decision-making (82202)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and (10); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

Section IV.D.3;,and Section J of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this area l

was inspected to determine whether the licensee' had 24-hour-per-day ,

capability to assess and analyze emergency conditions and make j'

recommendations to protect the public and onsite workers, and whether

offsite officials had the authority and capability to initiate . prompt

protective action for the public.

The inspector discussed responsibility and authority for protective action

decision-making with licensee representatives and reviewed pertinent

portions of the licensee's Emergency Plan and Procedures. The Plan and

Procedures clearly assigned responsibility and authority for accident

assessment and protective action decision-making., Interviews with members

of the licensee's emergency organization showed that these personnel ,

understood their authorities and responsibilities with respect to accident I

assessment and protective action decision-makira.

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Walk.through evaluations involving protective action decision-making were i

conducted with two On-Shift Operations Supervisors and two Shift i

Supervisors, all of whom appeared to be cognizant of appropriate onsite l

protective measures and aware of the range of protective action i

recomendations appropriate for offsite protection. . Personnel interviewed

were aware of the need for timeliness in making initial protective action

recommendations to offsii.e officials. Interviewees-demonstrated adequate

understanding of the requirement that protective action recommendations be

based on core condition and containnent status even if no release is in

. progress.  ;

Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting respnnsible offsite -

authorities on a 24-hour basis. Backup communications links with offsite

authorities were available via commercial phone and two-way radios. The

inspector independently confirmed during a communicator walkthrough  ;

(d3scussed in Paragraph 8 below) that offsite decision-makers with  ;

aut'iority for emergency response activities could be contacted via the  !

Emergency Notification Network (ENN) by observing a communications drill

with Burke County and Georgia Emergency Management Agency from the

Technical Support Center.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Notification cod Communication (82203)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50,47(b)(5) and (6); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

Section IV.D; and Section E of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this area

was inspected to detemine whether the licensee was maintaining a

capability for notifying and comwnicating (in the event of an emergency)

among its own personnel.

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/ The inspector discussed with a licensee representative actions that were

[. / taken in response to IE Bulletin No. 79-18, " Audibility Problems i

Encountered On Evacuation of Persunnel From High-Noise Areas." The

/ inspectur was informed that testing had not been completed at this time to

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determine wriat, if anyx corrective actions will be necessary to assure

audibility throughout t.he high-noise areas of the plant. The licensee was

informed that this item is considered an inspector followup item pending

completion of the testing and a review of the test results of-

Procedure No. 1-6QF-01 from the startup and test program.

Inspector Followup Item (50-424/87-32-03, 425/87-23-03) Complete testing

and verify audiMlity of alarms in high-noise areas.  ;

The inspector reviewed the licensee's automatic computer based telephone

' notification system for Emergency Plan augmentation. The notification  ;

system will, upon initiation, automatically dial and redial if necessary

telephone numbers from preset telephone lists. Results from the 5/11/87

. ulephone test were reviewed and it appears that an adequate number of i

emergency response personnel were successfully contacted. The inspector

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observed - that there was no .hard copy backup. of the computer based

telephone call-out list immediately available at the' telephone

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notification point should the automatic system fail to perform.

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Inspector Followup Item (50-424/87-32-04, 425/87-23-04) Pro'ide;a

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hard copy back up. of.the. computer based -telephone call out list at the

telephone notification point. _,

Additional elements. in this area will be reviewed during. a' future  !

inspection..  :

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No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Changes to the. Emergency. Preparedness Program (82204) a

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16); 10 CFR 50.54(q); aad .10 CFR Part 50 ' i

Appendix E, Sections IV and V, this area was' reviewed to determine whether j

<hanges were made to: the progrum since the operating license was . issued ' i

-(March 1987) and to note how these changes affected the overall state'of

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emergency : preparedness. j

T,The inspector. discussed the licen'see's: program for. making changes to the; ,

Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. 'he inspector. reviewed the.

t . licensee's- system (delineated in Emergency Hs Implementing Procedure

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'No. 91701-C " Preparation and Control of Emergency planning Documents") for

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review and, approval of: changes to the Plan ano Procedures.1. The inspector ,

1. vdrified that changes to the' Plan and Procedures. were reviewed and

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' approved by management. -However, it could not be determined if Plan and

Procedural changes were' submitted to NRC within 30 days of the effective <

L/ \ date, ai required by regulations. At the time.of the inspection, document

controi records were being microfiched.. As a result,- the records' were ,

inau# table. :This item was discussed with the licensee as being l

unr:esolved and will be reviewed during a . subsequent inspection. j

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. Unr'e sb1ved Item (50-424/87-32-05, 425/87-23-05): Verify that Plan and i

_A. Procedures are being submitted to' NRC within 30 days of the effective i

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date,4and appropriate personnel and organizations were sent copies of Plan

and Proadural changes.

' Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that no significant

modifications to facilities, equipment, or instrumentation were completed  !

since the last inspection.- j

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The organization and management of the emergency preparedness program were f

reviewed. The inspector verified that there had been no significant l

changes in the organization or. assignment of responsibility for the plant

and corporate emergency' planning staffs since the last inspection.

However, the. inspector's discussion with a licensee representative l

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disclosed that the . position of Director for Burke County Emergency l

Management Agency had been reassigned since the last inspection. (

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for distribution of changes

to the Emergency Plan and Procedures. Document control records were not

auditable at this time, but will be reviewed during a subsequent j

inspection. l

No violations or deviations were identified. 1

8. Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)

Pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(15) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

Section IV.F, this area was inspected to determine whether emergency

response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could

perform their assigned functions. j

The inspector reviewed the description (in the Emergency Plan) of the  !

training program, training procedures, and selected lesson plans, and

interviewed members of the instructional staff. Based on these reviews ,

and interviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had established I

a formal emergency. training program.

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Records of training for key members of the emergency organization for the

period December 1,1985 to May 20,1987, were reviewed. The training

records revealed that some personnel designated as part of the 60 minute

augmentation . call out list or given interim responsibilities in the

emergency organization were not provided with appropriate training.

According to the training records, 5 of 62 people on the 60 minute

augmentation call out list were not current in their training, and one of

those five individuals had not received any required specialized Emergency  ;

Plan training prior to assignment in the Emergency Response Organization.

The failure to ensure that all personnel expected to respond to an

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emergency receive the required training was identified as a violation of

10 CFR 50.54(q).

Violation (50-424/87-32-06, 425/87-23-06), Failure to provide training to j

emergency response personnel in accordance with the Emergency Plan. l

In response to IE Information Notice No. 85-80, " Timely Declaration of an

Emergency Class. Implementation of An Emergency Plan, and Emergency

Notifications," the inspector interviewed two Shift Clerks who may be

designated as an Offsite Communicator for the Control Room. The Offsite

Communicator is responsible for initial communications to the offsite

l- agencies (State and county) via the emergency notification network (ENN).

l The inspector conducted walkthrough evaluations with each of the i

The communicators were asked to demonstrate information

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transmission via the ENN using a drill message. During one walkthrough

the communicator demonstrated information transmission via the ENN with

the State of Georgia and the Burke County Warning Points. The final i

walkthrough was simulated using commercial phones. The interviewees

demonstrated familiarity with the Control Room communication systems

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(primary and backup) and the responsibility as a communicator during an

emergency. Although no problems were observed during walkthrougt.s,

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interviewees had not completed the required training (violation as stated ..

above). )

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The inspector conducted walkthrough evaluations with selected key members ,

of the emergency organization. During these walkthroughs, individuals )

L were given various hypothetical sets of emergency conditions and data and l

asked to talk through the response they would make if such an emergency 1

actually existed. With the exception of one On-Shift Operations  !

Supervisor, all interviewees demonstrated familiarity with emergency l

procedures and equipment, and no problems were observed in the areas of. i

emergency detection and classification, notifications, . assessment action j

(including plant conditions), dose calculation, and protective ' action l

decision-making. One.0n-Shift Operations. Supervisor (0S05) was provided q

initiating conditions for the Alert classification; however the OSOS

incorrectly classified the event as a Notification of Unusual Event and i

failed to upgrade the classification to Site Area Emergency. The 1

interviewee's training records were reviewed and verified that required I

training had been provided. Based on the records review and walkthrough, j

it appears that additional training may be needed for the interviewee on )

emergency detection and classification. 1

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One violation and no deviations were identified. I

9. Dose Calculadon and Assessment (82207)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), this area was inspected to determine

whether there was an adequate method for assessing the consequences of cn

actual or potential radiological release.

The inspector reviewed 91304-C, Computerized and Manual Back-up Methods {

for Release Rate and Dose Calculations. The procedure had provisions for j

calculating doses for ground, monitored and unmonitored pathways such as j

the plant building vents, containment leakage, and steam releases. . The i

procedures allowed for refinement of dose projections through j

incorporation of feedback from field monitoring. q

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The inspector reviewed a report attached to an Interoffice Memorandum i

dated October 3,1986, titled " Comparison of the Vibrant Computer Code."

Results from the licensee's Vibrant code were compared to results from

codes used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (IRDAM), Savannah River

Plant,. Georgia Department of Natural Resources (GDNR), and South Carolina

Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Thirteen 1

scenarios were developed from NUREG/CR 3012 Vol. III guidance and each of j

the models generated the associated doses for comparisons. Whole body and  !

thyroid doses were compared and the tabular and graphed results presented, j

Although some differences existed between the individual methods, the 1

overali comparisons of results showed the difference to be within '

acceptable limits.

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The licensee procedures made provision for timely incorporation of dose j

assessment results into the offsite protective action recommendation )

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process. However, during interviews with key licensee emergency response

personnel, they all appeared to recognize the uncertainties associated

with dose projections and the importance of making protective action

recommendations based on plant conditions.

An inspection and operability check was made of selected equipment and

support items used for dose assessment at the TSC. No problems were

observed.

The inspector requested and observed dose assessment walk-throughs by

selected ' licensee personnel designated as responsible for dose projection i

during an emergency. The individuals demonstrated the ability to make

such calculations using both manual and . computerized methods. Each

individual observed was able to produce acceptable results by either

method.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Licensee Audits (82210)  ;

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and (16) and 10 CFR 50.54(t), this area

was . inspected to determine whether the licensee had performed an

independent review or audit of the emergency preparedness program.

Records of audits of the program were reviewed. The records showed that

an independent audit of the program was conducted by the Quality Assurance

Department under the direction of the Quality Assurance Site Manager from

February 9-20, 1987 and was documented in Audit Report No. OP-12-84/02,

dated March 16, 1987. This audit fulfilled the 12-month frequency

requirement for such audits. The audit records showed that the State and

local government -interfaces were evaluated, and that findings concerning

the interfaces were made available to State and local government

authorities. Audit findings and recommendations were presented to plant

and corporate management.

Licensee Emergency Plans and Procedures required critiques following

exercises and drills. Licensee documentation for the March 12, 1987 ,

Savannah River Plant drill showed that critiques were held following

periodic -drills as well as the annual exercise. The records showed that

deficiencies were discussed in the critiques, and recommendations for

corrective action were made.

The licensee's program for followup action on audit, drill, and exercise l

findings was reviewed. Licensee procedures required followup on deficient

areas identified during audits, drills, and exercises. The licensee had

established a tracking system as a management tool in following up on

actions taken in deficient areas.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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11. Allegation Followup

a.. Allegation (RII-87-A-0059)

No PA outside: Unit 2 to alert workers in an emergency.

Discussion

Cognizant members of the licensee's Quality Concerns Department were

contacted to determine the status of the Unit 2 site warning system.

The inspector reviewed licensee documentation which indicated that an

, alerting system for the Unit 2 construction workers had been

-. installed, and was being tested on a weekly basis.. The~ inspector

observed' the weekly test of the Site Warning System on May 20, 1987.  ;

NRC personnel were stationed at two different locations on the Unit 2 l

construction . site: (1) Coating Facility and (2) Field Support '

Building.- In addition, licensee personnel observed the test from

' Level D. of the Auxiliary Building, and an area near thel Pullman

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Trailers. No problems were noted with:the audibility of sirens or  ;

the.' Unit 1 PA system. Discussions with licensee personnel disclosed. i

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that an Emergency Response Procedure (GD-A-55) had been'developedLand.

issued . for the Unit 2 construction site.- According to licensee

representatives, this procedure addressed an orderly, rapid and safe

evacuation of the Unit 2 site.

Conclusions

Dur.ing the weekly site warning system test conducted on May 20, 1987,

it was noted .that the PA system speaker was audible to the Unit 2

construction ' site. . Discussions with licensee personnel disclosed t

,that drills. are being planned for construction . personnel once

training . has been completed. on the Unit 2. emergency response

procedure.

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Inspector Followup Item (50-424/87-32-07, 425/87-23-07): Complete

training' for; all Unit 2 construction personnel and Georgia Power

personnel outside Unit 1 protected area boundary (PAB) regarding the

Unit 2 Emergency Response Procedure (GD-A-55).

12. Inspector Followup (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI)' 86-12-76: Apparent discrepancy

.-between HP-210 detector iodine detection efficiencies used onsite/inplant

and offsite iodine air activity determination should be resolved (5.4.2). .

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Documentation: indicates that detector efficiencies have been removed from

procedure body.

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