IR 05000424/1998005
| ML20236T601 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236T557 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-98-05, 50-424-98-5, 50-425-98-05, 50-425-98-5, NUDOCS 9807280283 | |
| Download: ML20236T601 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION II
Docket Nos.
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.
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Report No:
50-424/98-05, 50-425/98-05 Licensee:
. Southern. Nuclear Operating Company. Inc.
Facility:
.Vogtle Electric Generating Plant'(VEGP) Units 1 and 2 Location:
7821 River Road Waynesboro. GA 30830 Dates:
May 17, 1998 through June 27, 1998 Inspectors:
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector
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M. Widmann, Resident Inspector K.LO*Donohue, Resident Inspector D. Forbes Regional Inspector (Sections R1. R2, R7. and R8)
Approved by:
- P.. Skinner, Chief Reactor. Projects Branch 2.
Division of Reactor Projects l
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Enclosure 2 i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 i
NRC Inspection Report 50-424/98-05, 50-425/98-05
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This integrated inspection included aspects'of licensee operations.
engineering, maintenance, and )lant support.
The report covers a 6-week period of resident and region-Jased inspection.
- Ooerations o.
Operators correctly used Emergency Operating Procedures and took
. appropriate actions following the reactor trip and safety injection on Unit 2 The Root Cause Investigation adequately determined that incorrect tap settings for instantaneous overcurrent relays was the cause of the trip.
Plant recovery actions were comprehensive and-
-restart activities were well controlled and coordinated (Section 01.1).
e A weakness in design documentation resulted in incorrect instantaneous overcurrent relay tap settings which led to-a loss of power to all four reactor coolant pumps. Also, review of a similar industry event did not identify the potential for a rapid plant cooldown as a result of current system configuration and recent design changes completed on the air operated steam supply valves to the Moisture. Separator / Reheaters (Section 01.1).
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~An example of Violation (VIO) 50-425/98-05-01. " Failure To Comply With Technical specification 3.0.4 - Two Examples" was identifed when Unit 2 entered Mode 4 without meeting the Limiting Condition Of Operation of-Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12 (Section 03.1).
e-Another example of VIO 50-425/98-05-01. " Failure To Comply With Technical Specification 3.0.4 - Two Examples." occurred when Unit 2 entered Mode 2 without the turbine trip function operable as required by
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TS (Section 08.1).
i Maintenance-e Maintenance and surveillance activities were satisfactorily performed
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and were completed by personnel knowledgeable of their assigned tasks.
Procedures were present at the work location and being followed.
Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the intended activities (Section M1.1).
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Enclosure 2
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Plant Sucoort The licensee continued to meet 10 CFR 20 requirements for personnel e
monitoring control of radioactive material, radiological postings.
radiation areas and high radiation areas (Section R1.1).
The licensee was effectively maintaining programs for controlling e
radiation exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable and continued to be effective in controlling overall collective dose. All personnel radiation exposures during 1998 to date were below regulatory limits (Section R1.2).
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Reoort Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 The. unit operated at full power until May 22, 1998, at which time power was reduced to 12 percent to remove the turbine generator from service to complete minor maintenance on the main generator, turbine. and miscellaneous secondary valves and controllers.
Full power was attained on May 24. The unit operated at essentially full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 The unit operated at full power until June 9. 1998, at which time an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine generator trip. The turbine generator tripped as a result of an electrical fcult on condensate pump motor 2C which tripped the motor's power supply breaker and the main generator breakers.
On June 10. the unit entered Mode 4 to correct a seal leakoff problem with reactor coolant pump 2B.
The seal leakoff problem was corrected and the unit returned to Mode 3 on June 11. A reactor startu) was initiated on June 14 and full power operation was attained on June 16.
T1e unit operated at essentially full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
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Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 Unit 2 Reactor Trio and Safety In.iection a.'
Insoection Scooe (71707)(93702)
The inspectors reviewed the June 9.1998. Unit 2 automatic reactor trip and safety injection (SI), including operator and equipment response, event cause investigation. post-trip recovery actions. and subsequent startup activities.
b.
Observations and Findinas On June 9. an electrical overcurrent fault in the condensate pump 2C motor connection junction box resulted in a failure of the condensate pump. main generator trip and a turbine trip / reactor tri As a result of an unexpected seal-in of the overcurrent fault signal.p.the supply breaker to the Train B non-1E 13.8 kilovolt (kV) bus and the main L
generator breakers tripped.
Normally, the 13.8 kV electrical bus fast transfers to the offsite power source on a turbine trip.
However, this fast transfer did not occur due to incorrect operation of the overcurrent relay.. As a result all four reactor coolant pumps (RCPs)
lost power. The loss of power to L.ie RCPs resulted in unit operation on natural circulation and reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure Enclosure 2
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and temperature resulting in a SI due to low pressure.
The operators stabilized the' plant in Mode 3.
Forced circulation was restored about 53 minutes after the reactor trip.
e Licensee Root Cause Investigation The licensee determined that the initiating event was an electrical fault of the surge capacitor for the condensate pump 2C motor.
The licensee determined that the cause of the unexpected overcurrent fault seal-in was the im] roper tap setting for the instantaneous overcurrent relay for areaker 2 NAB 03. the normal supply breaker for the Train B non-1E 13.8 kV bus.
The licensee determined that inadequate design documentation resulted in personnel incorrectly setting the instantaneous overcurrent relay tap setting.
Prior to unit restart, the licensee inspected the surge capacitors for the remaining two condensate pump motors, the motor to condensate pump 2C and the associated 13.8 kV bus. No additional problems or damage were identified.
The licensee also inspected all 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV overcurrent relays and found a similar aroblem for the normal supply breaker to the Train A non-1E 13.8 (V bus.
Prior to unit restart, the overcurrent relays for both 13.8 kV bus breakers were corrected and tested to verify proper operation.
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Review of Operator Response Following the reactor trip, the operators entered Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 19000-C. "E-0 Reactor Tri) or Safety Injection." The operators immediately recognized tlat there was a problem in the transfer of electrical power to the offsite source and that power to the RCPs was lost.
Operators also recognized that RCS pressure continued to decrease to the low RCS pressure SI setpoint. Although the operators attempted to control RCS pressure by_' closing the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) an SI signal occurred on low RCS pressure.
e RCS Cooldown The inspectors determined that a contributing factor to the low
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RCS pressure SI was RCS cooldown due to continued steam flow
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through the Moisture Separator / Reheaters (MSRs). Motor operated isolation valves could not be operated due to loss of 13.8 kV l
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In addition, due to modifications during the March 1998 Enclosure 2
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refueling outage. automatic closure of the air operated steam
supply valves to the MSRs on a turbine trip was removed. The l
continued steam flow to the MSRs resulted in an RCS cooldown and subsequent reduction in RCS pressure. The cooldown was terminated when the operators closed the MSIVs; NRC Information Notice 95-04. " Excessive Cooldown and
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Depressurization of the RCS Following a loss of Offsite Power."
and INP0 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) 94-05 described a similar
cooldown event where excessive steam flows contributed to the cooldown and subsequent safety injection before the MSIVs could be l
isolated.
The licensee's evaluation of this previous event identified'that~ the MSR air operated valves would remain open
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during loss of power. The licensee's evaluation also assumed
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that, on a loss of non-1E power, the valves would fail closed due to' loss of instrument air pressure. -However. instrument air
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event. The licensee later informed the inspectors that the
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operating the air operated valves in manual would be reviewed for l
possible changes to ensure the valves close on a loss of power.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the operators correctly used E0Ps and took L
appropriate actions following the reactor trip and safety injection.
' Plant recovery actions were comprehensive and restart activities were well controlled and coordinated.
The Root'Cause Investigation adequately determined the cause for the turbine trip / reactor trip and failure of the fast transfer to the offsite power source. A weakness in design documentation resulted in incorrect instantaneous overcurrent relay tap settings. Also, the l
licensee's review of a similar industry event did not identify the potential for a plant cooldown as a result of current system j
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configuration and recent design changes completed on the air operated steam supply valves to the MSRs. The inspectors will further review-this issue during review of Licensee Event Report-(LER) 2-98-005.
j 03l Operations Procedures and Documentation 03.1 Cold Overpressure Protection System (COPS) Relief Valve Inocerable Durina Mode 4 Entry p
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Insoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's entry into Mode 4 on June 10,
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with pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) PV-456 unavailable for cold overpressure protection.
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Observations and Findinas
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i On June 10. Unit 2 was in Mode 3 im)lementing recovery actions from the reactor trip and safety injection tlat occurred on June 9.
The licensee determined that it was necessary to enter Mode 4 to correct a seal leakoff problem with RCP 28.
I RCS wide range pressure channel, PI-403, was declared inoperable due to erratic indication during the previous week.
Because PI-403 inauts to the COPS circuit for operation of pressurizer PORV PV-456, the RCS pressure relief function for PV-456 was also inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12. " Cold Overpressure Protection Systems."
required the COPS to be o)erable in Modes 4. 5. and 6.
The Limiting Condition for Operation (_CO) for TS 3.4.12 required two RCS relief valves to be operable.
The TS identified that the two RCS relief valves may be two PORVs with lift settings within the limits specified in the plant Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR). or two decay heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves in service, or one PORV and one RHR suction relief valve.
The licensee determined that PORV PV-456 could not be used for COPS RCS 3ressure relief due to the problem with RCS wide range pressure channel
)I-403. The licensee entered Mode 4 with only one PORV operable and in
Action Condition D of TS 3.4.12 for one PORV being inoperable, by j
invoking an exception to TS 3.0.4.
However. TS 3.0.4 stated that when an LC0 is not met, entry into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability shall not be made except when required by the actions of another TS or if the condition that would be entered has an associated action of an unlimited time.
Exceptions to TS 3.0.4 were required to be identified on the individual TS as a note in the ACTIONS.
The inspectors noted that TS 3.4.12 did not contain an exception to TS 3.0.4.
The licensee believed that TS 3.0.4 could be invoked because of a statement in the Bases for TS 3.0.4 that indicated that TS 3.0.4 should not prohibit a normal shutdown.
However. TS 3.0.4 did not contain this statement.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that Unit 2 entry into Mode 4 without meeting the LCO for TS 3.4.12 was prohibited by TS 3.0.4.
This issue is identified as an example of Violation (VIO) 50-425/98-05-01. " Failure To Comply With Technical Specification 3.0.4 - Two Examples."
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' Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-425/98-04-02: "Comolete Review of Turbine Trio Inocerability in Mode 2"
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I JClosed) LER 50-425/98-004: ' Defeat of Turbine Trio Function leads To
- morocer Mode Entrv~
The URI and LER was initiated when Unit 2 entered Mode 2 on April 19.
1998, with the turbine trip and feedwater isolation engineered safety feature actuation function inoperable.
The inspectors determined that opening the links, which made the turbine trip from a reactor trip function inoperable, met the conditions for an
"information only" limiting condition of operation (Info LCO) which should have been documented in accordance with plant procedures.
However, operations personnel failed to document the Info LCO.
The inspectors noted that the failure to document the Info LCO was similar to a previous violation documented in Inspection Report 50-424. 425/98-02.
Since the licensee's corrective actions for this previous issue was
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in the process of being implemented, no' enforcement action for this
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~TS 3.0.4 states that when an LC0 is not met, entry into a MODE or other l
s)ecified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when l
tie associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited
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period of time. TS Table 3.3.2-1 does not include a statement that TS
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3.0.4 was not applicable and the applicable condition (H) action com)letion time was limited; therefore, entry into Mode 2 with the tur]ine links open was not allowed. This is identified as another example of Violation 50-425/98-05-01. " Failure To Comply With Technical l
Specifications 3 0.4 - Two Examples. "
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Maintenance
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M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Maintenance Work Order and Surveillance Observations (61726) (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities.
195025641 Com]onent Cooling Water Pump #2 Seal Replacement 29703185 Meclanical Preventative Maintenance on 2A Engineered Safety Feature Room Coolers 29801425 Investigate Diesel Generator " Failed to Start" Annunciator 29801608 Diesel generator 2A annunciator troubleshoot: ALB035-B05, trip low pressure turbo oil, and ALB035-C07, trip low pressure Jacket water Enclosure 2
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29801661 Troubleshoot Condensate Pump "C" Surge Capacitor Failure
'14546-1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Operational Test. Rev. 17 14616-1
! Solid State Protection System Slave Relay K609 Train "A" Test Safety Injection. Rev. 5 14802-1 Nuclear Service Cooling Water Pumps and Check Valve-Inservice and Res)onse Time Tests. Rev. 17 14804-2 Safety Injection ) ump Inservice and Response Time Tests.
Rev. 12 14980-2 Diesel Generator Train "A" Operability Test. Rev. 30 The observed maintenance and surveillance activities were generally
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Procedures were present at the work location and being followed.
Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the intended activities.
The inspectors concluded that routine maintenance and surveillance activities were satisfactorily performed.
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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902) (40500)
M8.1 (Closed) URI 50-424. 425/98-04-04: "Comolete Review of ECCS Accumulator
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level Error issue" Following_ the licensee's discovery of an error in the calibration procedures affecting the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
accumulator level transmitters for both units, immediate corrective actions were implemented. The corrective actions included procedure revision and recalibration of each ECCS accumulator level instrumentation. The licensee also ccnducted a review of other l_evel instrumentation procedures to identify any similar errors. plant
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The inspectors reviewed the scope and results of the review and determined that it was thorough and detailed. The inspectors verified that other licensee identified errors from the review were incorporated in the condition report program.
This licensee identified violation is
identified as Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-424, 425/98-05-02.
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" Inadequate Procedures for ECCS Accumulator Level Calibrations."
consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
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Enoineerina E8-
. Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903) (37551)
E8.1 (Closed) URI 50-424/96-05-03: " Inconsistent UFSAR and Core Offload l
Practices" The inspectors concluded that the previous USFAR description of spent fuel offload practices did not represented a specific commitment to limit the frequency with which full. core offloads are conducted during end-of-cycle refueling outages.
The practice of offloading the full core during each refueling outage did not represent a change to the Enclosure 2 L-
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m facility or a change to the prcadare described in the FSAR and thus did I
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On this basis this URI
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is closed.
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.1L 21910L.5L%011
R1
? Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
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R1.'1~ Iqu_r_.gL8adioloaica1 Pngtecle D m s'
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Ia. 1MD?J&i2D k9MAH591 l
1The inspectors reviewed implementation cf selected elements of-the
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n licensee's radiation protection program. The review included
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observations of radiological protecticn ctivities inciuding control of
radioactive material. radiological surveys /postingt aM ndiation area /high radiation area controls.
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ObittyJ1imLand QDdiE91
During tours of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliery Buildings end storage
Land handling facilities, the inspectors reviewed survey ' data and i
observed attivities in progress.
The inspectc s determined that the licensee had effectively posted areas where radioactive material was i
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stored, radioactive material observed was properly labeled, and Locked
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,High Radiation Areas were locked as required. Radiologicci surveys i
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' reviewed were well documented.
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As of April 30. approximately 38. Personnel' Contamination Events (PCEs)
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had occurred during 1998 which included both particles and dupersed
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i contamination svents for clothing and skin contaminations.
The licensee
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defines a PCE as greater than or. equal to 1.000 and 10.000 i
disintegrations per pirute-(DPM).
Approximately 33 Personnel
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Contarnnation Reports.(PCRs) had occurred to date in 1998. A PCR is
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. initiated by the licensee for events involving 10.000 DPWor greater.
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.The inspectors reviewed the documentation for approximately 20 KEs ano
20 PCRs. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's metnodolcgy for
calculating shallow dose equivalent (SDE) exposures resultkg fron, skin contaminations and also reviewed the licensee's'procedre and methodology. for calculating total activity in microcurie-hours from i
exposures to hot particles. Based on this review, the mspec. tors
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L deteroined these methodologies were appropriate. R e inspect 9rs l
verified the licensee's equipment for performing gama pectretcopf and
whole body counting had been calibrated to meet thie calibration
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frequency required by licensee procedures.
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Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) established for performing wort wem reviewed for adequacy of the radiation ?rotection requirements based on j
work scope, location, and conditions. Workers were required to review and understand applicable RWPs prior to entering the Radiatico Control i
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Area (RCA). For the RWPs reviewed, the inspectors noted that appropriate protective clothing and dosimetry were required.
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tours of the plant, the inspectors observed the adherence of plant workers-to the RWP requirements.
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Conclusions Based on observations and 3rocedural reviews, the inspectors determined
.that the licensee met'10 C R 20 requirements for control of personnel
monitoring, radioactive material. radiological postings, radiation areas
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controls, and high radiation areas.
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R1.2 (ccuoational Radiation Exrapure Control Proaram p
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Insnection Scoce (83750)
l The ins)ectors reviewed tha implementation of the licensee's As Low As
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-Reasona)1y Achievable (ALARA) program.
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Observations and Findinos The inspectors review of the licensee's ALARA program determined the l
licensee h6d established an annual exposure goal of approximately 185
- e person-rem which included a Unit 2 outage of 154 person-rem. At the n,
time of the inspection, the licensee was tracking approximately 162.
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. person-rem through-April-30, 1998.- which was on target with previous L
estimates. -The licensee had continued to track and trend outage exposures for purposes of future outage preplanning and it was determined that exposures continue to trend downward based on ALARA (-
initiatives.
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Several ALARA initiatives reviewed during the inspection that contributed to lower. personnel ~ exposures included: 1) modifications on L
the Unit-1 and Unit 2 reactor coolant system filters to permit micro
/c filtration to reduce source term activity, which, combined with a successful crudburst during shutdown, resulted in general area dose rate H
reductions between 26 and 47 percent: (2) use of a centralized remote monitoring station outside of the containment to improve quality of Radiation Protection (RP) coverage and reduce RP personnel exposures by J
J0 percent: and, (3) using a robot:to vacuum the refueling cavity prior e
.to cavity decontamination with an estimated dose savings of 2-3 person-A rem.
Improvements to the ALARA suggestion program generated approximately 199 ALARA suggestions during-1998. All personnel un-radiation exposures during-1998 to date were below regulatory limits.
l-l During tours of the facility, the ins)ectors also observed RP E
technicians controlling access to worc areas to minimize personnel b,
exposure and briefing workers in the work area as radiological conditions changed during refueling floor activities.
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Conclusions-The inspectors determined the licensee was maintaining programs for controlling exposures ALARA and continued to be effective in controlling L
overall. collective dose. All personnel radiation exposures during 1998
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to-date were below regulatory limits.
R2-Status of Radiation Protection (RP) Facilities and Equipment-R2.1 Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors
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Insoection Scooe (84750)
l The inspectors reviewed performance of radiation monitors for licensee effluent release pathways described in the licensee's Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
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Report (UFSAR).
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors toured the facility.to observe the physical operation of selected process and effluent radiation monitors.
The inspectors
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reviewed and discussed availability trending records for both safety t
related and non-safety related monitors with the radiation monitor system engineer. The most recent system status report available, which
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l covered the period January through April 1998, indicated that the overall. availability for the Radiation Monitoring System remained at greater than 95 percent operability.
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Conclusions-
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Based on the above reviews, the inspectors determined the licensee had maintained an overall high level'of operability for radiation monitors in 1998 and was effectively tracking monitor performance.
R7 Quality Assurance in Radiation Protection and Chemistry
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R7 1 'Ouality Assurance Audits a.
Insoection Scoce"(83750)
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10 CFR 20.1101 requires that the licensee periodically review the RP program content and implementation at least annually.
Licensee periodic
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i reviews of the RP program were reviewed to determine the adequacy of problem ~ identification and corrective actions.
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Enclosure 2
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b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the licensee's most recent audit reports in the area of radiation protection, including OP02-97/24 Log: VSAER-97-157, dated December 1. 1997, and the checklist used during the performance of the audit.
The scope of the audit included: ALARA program, personnel qualification. posting, respiratory protection system, source control, radiation work permit system radiation area control, dosimetry, and instrumentation.
The report identified items of substance that were deviations from program requirements.
Four recommendations for corrective actions were included in the audit report.
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Conclusions The inspectors determined the licensee's most recent formal Quality Assurance Audit identified items of substance and auditors used checklists to effectively assess the radiation protection program as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1101.
R8 Miscellaneous Radiation Protection and Chemistry Issues (83750) (84750)
R8.1 (Closed) Insoector Follow uo Item (IFI) 50-424. 425/97-07-05: " Actions to Imolement Chemistry Laboratory Ouality Control Proaram Details for Identifying Anomalies" After further review of this issue it was determined that the licensee l
had initiated actions to track instrumentation anomalies on quality control charts as required by licensee procedure 33037-C. " Daily Quality Control of Gamma Spectroscopy." Revision 5.
Based on information reviewed, this item is closed.
l S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 General Comments (71750)
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.The inspectors periodically toured the protected arer. noting that the perimeter fence was intact. isolation zones were maintained on both
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The in.cpectors periodically
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observed personnel, packages, and vehicles entering the protected area and verified that necessary searches, visitor escorting, and saecial purpose detectors were used as applicable prior to entry.
Lig1 ting of the perimeter and of the protected area was acceptable.
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Enclosure 2
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V.
Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas j
X1-Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee l
management at tie conclusion of the inspection on July 3.1998.
Interim l
exit meeting was conducted on May 22, 1998.
The licensee acknowledged f
the findings presented.
Licensee management expressed dissenting l
comments regarding the violation presented in Sections 03.1'and 08 1 of L
this report L
l PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED o
Licensee.
J. Beasley, Nuclear Plant General Manager
l S. Chestnut, Manager. Operations G. Fredrick. Plant Support Assistant General Manager J. Gasser, Plant Operations Assistant General Manager l-K. Holmes. Manager. Maintenance M. Sheibani. Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor l
C. Tippins.1r.. Nuclear Specialist I INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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l IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726:
Surveillance Observation IP 62707:
Maintenance 00ser'!ation IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 83750:
Occupational Exposure l
IP 84750:
Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Tailsportai.lon of i
Radioactive Materials IP 92901:
Followup - Operations IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power keactors
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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
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Opened
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TyAq Item Number Description and Reference l
VIO 50-425/98-05-01 Failure To Comply With Technical Specification
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3.0.4 - Two Examples (Sections 03.1 and 08.1)
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12 Closed Tyng Item Number Description and Reference URI 50-425/98-04 02 Complete Review of Turbine Trip Inoperability in Mode 2 (Section 08.1)
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URI 50-424, 425/98-04-04 Complete Review of ECCS Accumulator Level Error I
Issue (Section M8.1)
]
URI 50-424/96-05-03 Inconsistent UFSAR and Core Offload Practices (Section E8.1)
IFI 50-424, 425/97-07-05 Actions to Implement Chemistry Laboratory Quality Control Program Details for Identifying Anomalies (Section R8.1)
NCV 50-424. 425/98-05-02 Inadequate Procedures for ECCS Accumulator Level Calibrations (Section M8.1)
i LER 50-425/98-004 Defeat of Turbine Trip Function Leads to Improper Mode Entry (Section 08.1)
i-Enclosure 2
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