IR 05000424/1987008
| ML20211P466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1987 |
| From: | Bernhard R, Jape F, Larry Nicholson, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211P427 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-08, 50-424-87-8, NUDOCS 8703020371 | |
| Download: ML20211P466 (6) | |
Text
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. 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W. SUITE 2900
ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323 's, p ..... Report No.: 50-424/87-08 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket No.: 50-424 License No.: CPPR-108 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 Inspection Conducted: January 12-16, 1987 Inspectors: YlfC O bpm 1-M-U ' ,pL.E.Nicholsdh Date Signed kCf4.iW'g,, P. Thomas
' 2 -//-[7 w Date Signed 4^.-PMb M 2/ d ?? y . Bernhard V V Date Signed Approved by: // M S/4/[[ F. Jape, 3ection Chief (/ / Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of review of preoperational (preop) test program, and preoperational results.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
8703020371 G70217 PDR ADOCK 05000424
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. . REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Aufdenkampe, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- J. A. Edwards, Senior Nuclear Specialist
- W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist
- T. Greene, Plant Manager
- C. W. Hayes, Quality Assurance Manager
- R. E. Lide, Engineering, Support Superintendent
- A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant Plant Support Manager
- W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
- R. E. Spinnato, Plant Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engi-neers, technicians, operators, and office personnel.
Other Organization
- H. M. Handfinger, Assistant Startup Manager - Bechtel NRC Resident Inspector
- R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 16, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dis-senting comments were received from the licensee.
During a telephone conversation with licensee representatives on February 5, 1987, the inspectors discussed questions arising from an NRC in-office review of the Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) preoperational (preop) test results and IFI 424/86-121-01. This is discussed in paragraph 5.
The following new item was identified during this inspection.
Inspector Followup Item 424/87-08-01, Review Clarification Regarding Acceptance of Test Procedure Results - Paragraph 6.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio. .
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Preoperational Test Results Review (70322, 70325, 70326, 70324, 70329, 70311) The inspectors reviewed the results of the preop tests listed below.
The test results were reviewed to verify that: Test changes were approved in accordance with administrative - procedures.
Test changes did not change the basic objective of the test.
- Actions required by test changes had been completed.
- Test deficiencies had been resolved, including retesting where - required.
Individual test steps and data sheets were completed properly.
- Test data were within the acceptance criteria specified.
- Evaluation and approval of the test results had been completed by - appropriate engineering and management personnel.
The following tests were reviewed: 1-300-02, Reactor Trip System and ESFAS Process Channel and Logic Response Time Test 1-300-19 Response Time Data Compilation 1-3XJ-06, Diesel Generator Train B Synchronization, Load Rejection, Five Air Starts, and 35 Consecutive Starts 1-300-07, Reactor Coolant System Hot Functional Test 1-300-01, Integrated Safeguards and Load Sequencing Test 1-3EF-01, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System The inspectors reviewed in detail the method used to disposition deficient items identified during the performance of Procedure 1-300-01.
Vogtle Startup Manual (SUM) 12-C allows for the final acceptance of a completed test results package with outstanding items not meeting the acceptance criteria, provided these items are transferred and tracked on a deficiency report.
The SUM further states that in lieu of signing the acceptance
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criteria signature block the test supervisor shall-enter the deficiency report (DR) number in the signature block. The inspectors noted that while - the deficient items are then transferred to the DR no method exists for accepting the remaining results.
For the case of Procedure 1-300-01, the deficiency reports involve only a small fraction of the original scope of the acceptance signature block.
The licensee stated that the listing of a DR number in the signature block implies that the remaining data are accept-able, and agreed to revise the startup manual to reflect this policy.
This item will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 424/87-08-01, Review Clarification Regarding Acceptance of Test Procedure Results.
The inspectors expressed a concern that operations personnel were not aware of component deficiencies such as those identified on the deficiency reports generated from the 1-300-01 data.
Operations personnel interviewed by the inspectors believed that either no LC0 required actions existed because the integrated safeguards test was not a Technical Specification item or that the test results.must be acceptable since the preop was closed.
The licensee acknowledge that a potential loop hole existed during the system transition period and immediately performed a detail review to evaluate this situation.
The results of this review indicated that a major problem did not exist.
The inspectors performed an in-office review of the final approved results of preoperational test 1-3EF-01, " Nuclear Service Cooling Water System." The review was a partial review which concentrated on the sections of the procedure verifying the NSCW flow balance.
Deficiencies in the approved results were noted as follows: Test Data Sheet 7.9, Sheets 4 and 5, Component Cooling Water Heat - Exchanger,1203-E4-001, had a calculated flow value below the FSAR required minimum flow rate for accident conditions. The NSCW basin was full at the time of testing. At minimum basin levels the flow would be lower than the test value.
Operations Deficiency Report No. T-1-86-4209 addressed this deficiency and four other components whose test values were above FSAR listed minimum values. These values would also not be acceptable at minimum basin levels.
FSAR subsection 14.2.8.1.33 "NSCW System Preoperational Test," part D requires the NSCW system to operate within design limits as described in subsection 9.2.1.
Table 9.2.1-1 lists the minimum required flows for each component at accident conditions, assuming changes in basin levels.
The licensee evaluated the preoperational test data and determined it to be acceptable.
However, at the time of the inspection the licensee had not submitted a FSAR change or an evaluation justifying changing NSCW flow requirements to some of the components listed in FSAR Table 9.2.1-1.
Total system flow and pressure values were not recorded at the time the - individual component flows were recorded when the preop was performed in preop tables 7.9 and 7.10.
A commitment was made by licensee representatives on November 21, 1986, and documented as IFI 424/86-121-01, to use preop system flow data at the time of flow balancing for
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determining pump operability in the surveillance instruction (SI).
System operability cannot be ascertained using the flow balance section of the preop as a basis without system flow values.
This section of 1-3EF-01 does not demonstrate the design of the system as described in FSAR subsection 9.2.1.
The above items were discussed during a telephone conversation with licensee personnel on February 5,1987.
During this discussion, the licensee was unable to resolve the NRC concerns regarding IFI 424/86-121-01.
This item will continue to be reviewed during a future inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
6.
Inspector Followup (92701) a.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (10 CFR 50.55(e)) CDR 87-136, ESFAS Load Sequencer Board.
This item was reported to the NRC Region II Office on-January 7,1987, and concerned the centrifugal charging pump feeder breaker lockout during engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) preoperational testing.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's letters dated January 10 and 14,1987, which discussed this item. The January 14, 1987 letter addressed other loads which were affected, but had been inadvertently omitted from the January 10, 1987 letter.
The corrective actions stated in the letters were verified during ESFAS testing.
This problem and the licensee's corrective actions were discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 424/86-118 and 424/86-132. This item is considered closed.
b.
(Closed) IFI 424/86-121-02, concerning ultimate heat sink testing.
In a letter dated January 10, 1987, the licensee submitted a test abstract , j to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation describing how the heat rejection capability of the ultimate heat sink will be tested.
The test will be performed during the power ascension test program.
The inspectors will review the test procedure and witness the test during i future inspections.
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c.
(Closed) CDR 86-98 concerning failure of the worm gear sectors of some , l manually operated butterfly valves.
The licensee, in a letter dated ! June 26, 1986, stated that this condition is not reportable per the criteria of Parts 10 CFR 50.55(e) or Part 10 CFR 21.
The inspectors i reviewed the licensee evaluation and concur that the failure of the actuators has no impact on plant safety.
This item is considered
j closed.
> d.
(Closed) CDR 86-127 concerning the actual air flow from the containment
! cooling units.
The licensee reported in a letter dated October 31, l 1986 that this condition is not reportable pursuant to the requirements i l !
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p . - of 10 CFR 50.55(e) or 10 CFR 21. The inspector reviewed the results of engineering evaluations which indicate.that for both normal and'acci . ' , dent conditions: , H.. ,r ' " e-t ,7 , (1) 'The original design flow:ratesmere significantly higherfchan the flows required to conform to the required dasign criteria; and, '~ L.
t , (2) The change in the containment cooler performance (h' eat removal 7f d capacity) due to a reduction in~ air flow is insignificant.
f ,. , v- ! a , ' ' 4: This item is considered closed.
- \\ e.
(Closed) CDR 86-128'concerning the actual air flow delivered'by the $', c emergency diesel generator. building ventilation system. The. licensee's ,, evaluation of this item is similar to CDR 86-127 above.
This item is ' ;e h considered closed.
, f.
(Closed)UNR 86-132-01 concerningtheinadequateapprovalo! chang $,to test procedure acceptance criteria. The inspectors reviewed all changes made to-the completed test procedure 1-300-01.
Althoughethere were some major procedure revisions processed as minor changps, the final technical review for proceduro completeness appears to hwa edcquately addressed and evaluated these revisions.
This item is ' considered ,s closed.
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(Closed) IFI 86-52-01 concerning the loss of of fnte power 'thatroc- < ' curred by tne misoperation of auxiliary protective ~relaji for: tr.e l reserve auxiliary transformers (RATS).
This item was updated 60-424.46-90. pnth' ' The proposed corrective action in Inspection Report inspectors reviewed all correspondencs; and corrective octions performed t i to date. This item is considered closed.
, 7' .,; h.
(Closed) IFI 86-118-02 concerning the failure of 4.1GkV sats,ty. elated
switchgear.
The inspectors reviewed in detail all subseqsunt swicch, I gear failures. The results of a management committee fortred to.nwritor and evaluate these problems as they occur appear to be successt'ul with the decrease in the number of failures. The licensee stated that they f intend to maintain this comittee in place throughout the startup phase. This item is considered closed.
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