IR 05000424/1987023
| ML20205P947 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1987 |
| From: | Decker T, Tabaka A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205P908 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-23, 50-425-87-18, NUDOCS 8704030412 | |
| Download: ML20205P947 (9) | |
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.g>R Mr[q UNITE] ST ATES
'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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,j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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MAR 2 61987
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Report No.: 50-424/87.-23,50-425/87-18
Licensee: Georgia' Power Company P. O. Box 4545,
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'LAtlanta',GAf-30302
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Docket Nos.: 50-424,;50-425 f. ;. p License Nos.: NPF-61, CPPR-109~
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t Facility Name: Vogtle Elec,tric Generating Plant
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Inspection Conducted: ~, March 11-12, 1987 -
Inspector: \\7 Mc 1~
J/JJ/87 r
A. E. Tabaka p
Date Signed l
Accompanying Personnel E..D;Teita JJ/87 XJ49dk
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l Approved by:
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- T. R. Decker, Section Chief-Date Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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i SUMMARY
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Scope:
This special announced inspection involved the observation of the licensee's training drill conducted in conjunction with the Savannah River i
Plant emergency exercise and the evaluation of the licensee's action on the
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Unit 2 siren system.
Results:
Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or
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deviations were identified.
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l 8704030412 870326 i
PDR ADOCK 0500
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- T. V. Greene, Plant Manager
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- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager E. M. Howard, Corporate Manager - Nuclear Training, Emergency Preparedness, and Security
- L. A. Hill, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager - GPC l
- J. N. Roberts, Site Emergency Preparedness Manager
- L. E. Mayo, Site Emergency Preparedness Specialist
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- R. D. Mothena, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Specialist-GPC
- P. D. Rushton, Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
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A. E. Desrosier, Health Physics Superintendent
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W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist
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- C. L. Cross, Senior Regulatory Specialist j
G. Glascock, Electrical Installation Engineer l
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, i
engineers, technicians, mechanics, security office members and office personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- G. M. Nejfelt, Resident Inspector - Hatch
- Attended exit interview
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Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 12, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not
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identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters l
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
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4.
Drill Scenario
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The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) drill was performed in
j conjunction with the full scale Savannah River Plant (SRP) Radiological Emergency Exercise. Although VEGP participated in the exercise, the scope i
and objectives of its onsite activation drill were limited with the j
primary objective being training of emergency organization members.
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The drill objectives had been develcped to demonstrate:
the implementation of Procedure 91801-C in support of SRP; the ability to activate the emergency facilities in a timely manner; the operability of facility equipment; and the staff's ability to assess the potential radiological impact of an incident at the Savannah River Plant on the VEGP site.
The scenario provided for the full activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (E0F), and field monitoring teams with partial activation of the Control Room and Operations Support Center (OSC) staffs.
In general, the licensee met all its drill objectives with the exception of the performance of dose calculations.
Failure to explicitly meet this objective was due to the lack of the needed technical informaticu from SRP during the course of VEGP's participation in the drill.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Control Room (82301)
The participating Control Room staff consisted of the Onshift Operations Supervisor (OSOS) and a communicator. When notified that SRP had declared an Alert, the OSOS appropriately implemented Procedure 91801-C,
" Coordination of Emergency Responses and Planning between Georgia Power Company - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and the U.S. Department of Energy - Savannah River."
Per procedure, he initiated the appropriate response for security, the communicator, and health physics. He was aware of the need to bring the TSC to standby mode, but was prompted to bring all facilities to standby for drill purposes.
PA announcements were made to inform and mobilize site personnel.
Although offsite notifications were not within the scope of this drill, continuous contact was maintained on the Emergency Notification Network (ENN).
The Plant Manager and a second communicator reported to the Control Room in a timely manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Technical Support Center (82301)
The TSC was manned and officially brought to standby status 39 minutes after notification of the SRP Alert. The staffing was as dictated by the Emergency Plan and Procedure. Turnover of the ENN by the Control Room and establishment of the status loop connunications network were both timely and efficient.
A problem was noted with the facsimile machine, and repairs were requested.
The TSC Manager conducted periodic staff briefings.
Security was posted at the TSC entrance for access control, and facility accountability was performed.
Status boards were maintained to include habitability, meteorology, field team status, and sequence of events. Radiological assessment personnel verified the operability of the dose assessment computer as well as updated the TSC Manager on meteorological conditions.
The facility stood down after activation and equipment checkout objectives had been met.
No violations or deviations were identifie *
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Operations Support Center (82301)
The inspector did not directly observe the activation of this emargency response facility; however, communications to the TSC indicated that it was brought to standby status 28 minutes after receipt of the SRP notification.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Operations Facility and Field Deployment and Control (82301)
The EOF was brought to official standby mode 62 minutes after the initial notification of the SRP emergency. The staffing and set-up of the E0F was performed according to procedure.
SPDS terminals, ccanunications equipment, and dose assessment computers were verified to be operational.
One SPDS terminal was found inoperable; however, sufficient terminals remained available until the problem was resolved.
Security personnel were posted for access control and maintained accountability throughout the course of the drill.
The E0F Manager conducted staff briefings as appropriate.
The Radiological Assessment Manager coordinated radiological information among key E0F personnel.
Radiological assessment personnel monitored and posted meteorological data throughout the exercise.
Although no dose calculations were performed (as discussed in Paragraph 4), these personnel did consider protective actions and potential radiological hazards based on the limited information.
In addition, E0F habitability surveys were periodically performed.
Field monitoring teams were initially mustered at the OSC. Upon request, these teams were dispatched to the EOF for briefing and deployment.
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Although several minor problems were encountered, they arrived at the EOF in a timely manner.
The teams were briefed, authorized for KI use,
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reviewed for allowable exposures and deployed.
Field team equipment appeared operable and calibrated. Communications were maintained with the deployed team via the base radio, and team locations were posted.
No violatior.s or deviations were identified.
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Drill Critique (82301)
At the conclusion of the drill the licensee conducted facility / player critiques and a controller / evaluator critique.
Drill coments indicated that an adequate and objective evaluation was performed.
The licensee dCknowledged the following areas for correction or improvement:
Several procedure packets in the TSC and OSC were found to be
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incomplete or containing old revisions.
The need for more timely and complete information from Savannah River
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Plant to Vogtle - technical, meteorological, and source term dat.-...
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l The need to establish specific points of contact for obtaining
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technical information from Savannah River Plant.
General improvement in the deployment of field monitoring teams to
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the E0F including:
location of response vehicles and keys, and
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exiting the protected area.
Consider the need for similar activation drills on a quarterly basis.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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InspectorFollowup(92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/87-22-01, 50-425/87-21-01 -
Allegation RII-87-A-0035.
Verify operation and adequacy of the site emergency notification signal within Unit 2 power block, including system l
control, procedures, and required training.
The licensee had installed
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approximately 70 alert sirens within the Unit 2 power block to include the
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Turbine Building, Containment Building, Auxiliary Building, Control
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Building, and various outside areas.
The inspector observed tests of the
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system on March 11 and 12, 1987; the.latter was conducted during normal
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working hours. No audibility problems were encountered. The system is to
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be actuated from the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) which is manned on a 24-hour basis.
Implementing Procedure 91704-C, " Actions for Security
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during a Radiological Emergency," was revised to include instructions on the use and operation of the Unit 2 siren system. The procedure had been
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distributed, and security officers at the SAS were familiar with its
contents.
In addition, the licensee distributed a notice to station j
personnel informing them of the new system and actions to be taken upon
its actuation.
During the actuation tests, the inspector confirmed that personnel were cognizant of the siren's meaning and the personnel actions
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to be taken.
The licensee had also provided for a weekly test of the
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system. The inspector had no further questions.
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I VEGP EMERGENCY DRILL 3/12/87 SCOPE:
Facilities Activate all on-site Emergency Response Facilities TSC, OSC, EOF, Control Roon
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No Emergency SRP problems warrants activation of Declared
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TSC, EOF & 06C Send out Field monitoring teams, check out all
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communications and support equipment
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i OBJECTIVES:
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Activate all on-site ERF facilities l
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Check out all ERF facility equipment
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Demonstrate ability to dispatch and control Field monitoring teams
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Evaluate radiological hazard to VEGP of SRP release. Perform Dose Assessment, j
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Consider protective actions for VEGP personnel.
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Demonstrate ability to notify VEGP personnel of SRP Emergency.
Duration about 3 Hours 8:45 - 12:15 I
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SRP DRILL TIMELINE - MARCH 12, 1987
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TIME (EST)
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
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0845 SRP declares and " Alert" and notifies all offsite agencies on the ENN.
0850 OSOS makes a page announcement to activate the TSC and EOF and for designated personnel to report to the OSC.
OSOS must also ensure that the Visitors Center, Training Center, Plant Wilson, Construction Management and Corporate Management are notified (He should use the notification procedure to accomplish these notifications.)
0930 All facilities are now activated and engaged in check-out of equipment and training on procedures.
0930 The EOF Dose Assessment Manager requests the OSC form four (4) Field Monitoring Teams and dispatch them to the EOF with field monitoring hits.
0945 OSC dispatch Field Monitoring Teams to the EOF.
Vehicles inside the protected area should be used
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to collect the field monitoring kits from the
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Service Blds. and transport them to the EOF.
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Vehicles should be available from HP, Chemistry,
Building and Grounds, I & C and Training (located at the Training Center).
Keys are available in the OSC.
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i 1000 SRP declare a " SIRE AREA EMERGENCY " and commences
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notification of all offsite agencies.
1015 Dose Assessment Manager should dispatch Field Monitoring Teams to verify plume is not coming toward VEOP.
1020 SRP will communicate wit the Dose Assessment Manager and pass technical information via the telepnone and
hard copy via facsilile.
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1025 The Dose Assessment Manager should analyze the i
technical information from a Radiological view point and advise VEGP management of any protective actions recommendations for VEGP personnel, j
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1030 TSC, EOF, and OSC facility managers should start dismissing unnecessary personnel as they complete
training, equipment check out and restoration of the facility.
Conduct a critique prior to releasing
personnel.
1200 Recall field monitoring teams when they are no longer
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1230 Terminate drill, inform all personnel, ie, page j
announcement, Plant Wilson, Visitor Center, GPC Corp.,
and Construction.
Conduct critique with key
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personnel.
Ensure all objectives are critiqued as a minimum.
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Controller Briefins
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Allow no messages to offsite NRC.
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Allow no Emergency Declaration.
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Allow no offsite notification except to GPC.
Communications with offsite agencies is permitted, but not initial notification unless requested by SRP.
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Prompting and assistance is permitted but do not act so soon as to preclude players using their own knowledge.
Direct players to
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use procedures, then proper procedure, then to specific spot in procedure.
Encourage players to use player resources to correct problems, ie. call OSC for telephone repairs if required.
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If an actual emergency develops terminate the drill with FA announcement and telephone call to facilities.
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Do not operate plant systems or interfere with plant operations.
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Minimize simulation.
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Safety is paramount and shall not be compromised for drill
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purposes.
No speeding in vehicles.
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Security procedures shall not be violated for any reason.
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10. Follow all Health Physics rules and postings, i
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Playern Briefinn SRP DRILL March 12. 1987 Respond to SRP ENN Call EPIP 91801-C executed by OSOS Notify - PA announcement, telephone call Activate - All facilities HP Field Monitoring & Assessment Met Data Facsimile Machine Transmittal (phone #'s in phone directory)
All ERO personnel report to their assigned Emergency Facility -
Activate all facilities Facility Managers sort out people - Review Accountability Procedures Conduct -
Check out of all equipment Status loop bridge Hotlines to Corp All telephones, Facsimile, copy Documents available Status board
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Forms Pencil & Paper Computers Etc.
Emergency Kits Review all applicable procedures TSC-EOF Notifications - NRC phones TSC-EOF Use of ERF Computer All Transfer of info Management Bridge TSC PAS 6 OSC-EOF Field Monitoring Teams - Actual EOF-TSC-OSC Internal Distribution of information OSC HP Control Pt OSC Forming teams in OSC Search & Rescue First Aid Maintenance - Spare Part Security Accountability Site Evacuation Dispatch of key people, ie., ENN Comm, OSC Driver, Guards, TSC, EOF -
Release personnel with permission of Plant Manager when checkout completed & Facility Restored.
Kits inventored except for Dose Assessment and Field Monitoring Teams.
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Critique of key personnel with Controller 4