IR 05000424/1998010

Insp Repts 50-424/98-10 & 50-425/98-10 on 981227-990213.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maint & Plant Support.Rept Covers 7-wk Period of Insp & Insps in Area of Health Physica & EP

ML20207J051
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/03/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207J047	List: IR 05000424/1998010 ML20207J043
References
50-424-98-10, 50-425-98-10, NUDOCS 9903160177
Download: ML20207J051 (7)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)  !

REGION ll l

l Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425 ,

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License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81 ,

Report No: 50-424/98-10,50-425/98-10 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In l Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Location: 7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 l

Dates: December 27,1998 through February 13,1999 Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident inspector K. O'Donohue, Resident inspector l W. Sartor, Emergency Preparedness Specialist (Section P2 ) i D. Forbes, Radiation Specialist (Sections R1.1 thru R2.2 )

Approved by: P. Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Brancn 2 Division of Reactor Projects

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9903160177 990303 PDR ADOCK 05000424 G PDR

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. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-424/98-10,50-425/98-10 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineer ng, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 7-week period of resident inspection and inspections in j the area of Health Physics and Emergency Preparedness by region based ir spector j Ooerations e in general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-c anscious. The inspectors noted improved operator routine monitoring of control t';ards as a result of ;

increased emphasis by operations management (Section 01.1).

• The licensee's investigation of a loss of feedwater heating event which caused operation ,

at greater than 100% was thorough. The NRC is concerned witl the duration of time l that operators allowed plant operation at this power level and the 'naintenance activities that led to this event. This is identified as Unresolved item (URI) 50-424/98-10-01: ;

Review of Unit 1 Overpower Event, pending further NRC review (Section 01.2). f Maintenance I

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e The inspectors determined that failure to follow the surveillance procedure constituted a ,

violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 which requires that written procedures be !

implemented for activities recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix j A, including procedures for conducting TS surveillances. This non-repetitive, licensee ,

identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-425/98-10-02, "l&C Personnel Failure to Follow Reactor Trip Response Time Test," -

consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section M8.1).

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Plant Suooort )

i The licensee's emergency program was being maintained in a state of operational i

- readiness. Personnel with dose assessment responsibility demonstrated the ability to I perform dose assessments and analysis of dose projection information for upgrading of emergency classifications (Section P2).

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at full power until December 29,1998, at which time power was reduced to 87 percent in response to a feedwater heater transient. Full power was attained the following day and the unit operated at essentially full power for the remainder of the inspection perio Unit 2 operated 'at essentially full power throughout the inspection perio I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations  !

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- O1.1 General Comments (71707) )

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of 1

ongoing plant operations. In general, the reviews indicated that the conduct of l operations was professional and safety-conscious. The inspectors noted improved I

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operator monitoring of control boards as a result of increased emphasis by operations managemen .2 .U_ nit 1 Feedwater Temperature Transient

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. . Insoection Scooe (40500)(62707)(71707)(72700)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with a feedwater temperature transien Observations and Findinas On December 29, instrument and control (l&C) personnel removed the 4B feedwater heater level transmitter from service for calibration. When the level transmitter was -

removed from service, a high level signal caused isolation of extraction steam to the 4B feedwater heater and subsequent isolation of multiple feedwater heaters due to the initial secondary transient. . Due to the loss of feedwater heating, reactor power began to increase. The reactor operator reduced turbine load about 4% and inserted control rods several steps to keep reactor power from exceeding 100% However, it was later determined that, based on reactor coolant system (RCS) loop temperature indications, reactor power exceeded the licensed power limit for about 50 minutes, peaking at 103.85 %

The licensee conducted a formal investigation of the eveat focusing on the cause of the event and the operators' response. The inspectors attended several working level meetings during the event team investigation and determined that the team was i I

~ thorough in their review of the event and their proposed corrective actions were comprehensive However, the investigation report was not fully reviewed by the inspector before the end of this inspection period. Therefore, the inspectors have not fully assessed the scope of corrective actions planne l l

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, Conclusions

1 The inspectors concluded that the licensees' event investigation was thorough and-proposed corrective _ actions.were detailed. The NRC is concerned with the duration of

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time that operators allowed plant operation at this power level and the maintenance i

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' activities that led to this event. This issue will be identified as Unresolved item (URl) 50-424/98-10-01, Review of Unit 1 Overpower Event, pending additional NRC review.-

3 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

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08.1 ' (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-424. 425/98-06-01: Inadeauate Corrective Actions' for Failure ,

to Properly Document All Acolicable TS LCOs '

The licensee's corrective actions to address this issue were previously documented in j NRC Inspection Report 50-424,425/98-06.- The inspectors verified these corrective !

actions to be adequate and complet I 11. Maintenance

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M1 Conduct of Maintenance J i

M1.1 Qaneral Maintenance Work Order and Surveillance Observations (61726) (62707) i The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of selected maintenance and surveillance ,

activities. The observed maintenance and surveillance activities were completed by l

_ personnel knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. Procedures were present at the work location and being followed. Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the ]

intended activitie 'M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-424/98-007-00: Inadeauste Surveillances Due to Imorooerly Performed Response Time Testina This Licensee Event Report (LER) involved the licensee's discovery that Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.01.15, for measuring the reactor trip response time for overpower delta temperature (OPDT) and overtemperature delta temperature (OTDT), was performed incorrectly during the previous 18-month performanc The cause of the Unit 1 response time discrepancy was a 1991 design modification wire mis-landing that resulted from reading a handwritten wiring number incorrectly. The inspectors determined that this was an isolated occurrence and agreed with the

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licensee's determination that no additional corrective actions were necessary for this particular proble ._ _ _

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The licensee determined that the cause of the Unit 2 response time discrepancy was an >

l&C personnel error in properly following the response time procedure, 24831-2, Reactor Trip and ESF Logic Response Time Test. The licensee revised procedures 24831-1(2)

to add a range of acceptable response time values for OPDT and OTDT versus an j absolute maximum acceptable value. The inspectors verified that the revisions to these procedures were complete The inspectors determined that this issue constituted a violation of TS 5.4.1 which requires that written procedures be implemented for activities recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, including procedures for conducting TS surveillances. This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-425/98-10-02, "I&C Personnel Failure to Follow Reactor Trip Response Time Test," consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Polic M8.2 (Closed) LER 50-424/98-009-00: Imorocer Testina Method Results in inadeauate Surveillances This issue involved the licensee's identification that personnel occasionally used valve demand position indication versus valve actual position indication while conducting the quarterly stroke time test of safety injection accumulator tank common vent header valves,1(2)HV-0943A. The root cause of this problem was attributed to an inadequate inservice test procedure. The procedure did not specifically state the means to verify the stroke time. The inspectors reviewed procedures 14825-1(2), Quarterly inservice Valve Test, Revisions 44, and verified that specific instructions were added regarding the use of the valve position indicator to measure the stroke tim The inspectors determined that procedures 14825-1(2) were not appropriate to the circumstances, constituting a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures. This is considered a violation of minor significance in accordance with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is not subject to formal enforcement actio IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R Routine Radioloaical Controlled Area (RCA) Tours (71750. 84750. 86750)

The inspectors periodically toured the RCA during the inspection period. The inspectors identified one container that needed updated radiation levels on the label and two examples of inconsistent radiological postings. The licensee took immediate actions to correct these minor deficiencies. The inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtaining samples from the Unit 1 waste monitor tank #13 and reviewed the release permit. The samples were representative and the analysis met the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) requirement _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _

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The inspectors determined that the licensee was effectively implementing programs for !

y controlling and storing radioactive material and processing effluent ;

R1.2 Transportation of Radioactive Materials (86750) .

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The inspectors evaluated the licensee's programs for implementing the revised I Department of Transportation (DOT) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

transportation regulations for shipment of radioactive materials. The inspectors ;

observed the pre-job radiation work permit briefing and the transfer of a high integrity I container (HIC) of mixed bed resin to a transport cask. The inspectors observed the -

preparation of shipping paperwork and verified the shipment was properly classifie !

The inspectors called the shipment paperwork emergency notification number for the plant shii't superintendent and the health physics foreman and verified that the required emergency information was complete and timel The inspectors concluded that the licensee was effectively implementing a program for shipping radioactive materials in accordance with NRC and DOT regulation R2 Status of Radiation Protection and Chemistry Facilities and Equipment R Radioactive Effluent Monitorina Instrumentation (84750)  !

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The inspectors reviewed the performance of licensee radiation monitors and quantification of liquid and gaseous effluent from release pathways described in the licensee's ODCM and in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).  :

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The inspectors reviewed channel calibrations for eight monitors and determined the calibrations were performed in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors also observed the analysis of a gas sample taken prior to a gaseous effluent release and processing of the associated release permit. The inspectors observed that the analysis and the determination of the gaseous effluent monitor set-points based on the sample results met the chemistry release permit procedure and the ODCM. The inspectors reviewed control room logs and found that the effluent monitors had been maintained at an average of 99 percent availability in 199 The inspectors concluded that radiation and effluent monitors were being maintained in an operational conditio R2.2 Control Room Emeroency Ventilation System (CREVS) (84750)

The inspectors toured the CREVS equipment rooms and observed that the trains were maintained structurally and that there was no apparent physical deterioration of the equipment or duct work sealants and flexible joints. The inspectors performed an inspection of the Unit 1 A train CREVS system. The inspectors entered the plenum and observed the inspection of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, the charcoal absorber beds, pre-filters, and heaters. The inspectors verified the flow paths were consistant with the system diagram. The inspectors also observed a Unit 2 A

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train flow and leak test of the HEPA filters and the charcoal beds. The inspectors verified the test frequencies and acceptance criteria were consistent with Technical Specification requirements. The inspectors also verified that the licensee's most recent test results were acceptabl The inspectors concluded that the licensee was maintaining the CREVS in an operable condition and performing the required operability surveillance P2 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Program a. Inspection Scope (82701) -

Inspection objectives were to determine whether the licensee's emergency preparedhess program was maintained in a state of operational readiness, and to determine whether changes to the program since the last inspection met commitments, NRC requirements, and affected the licensee's overall state of e.mergency preparednes b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed Revisions 26 and 27 to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Emergency Plan. The submitted changes to the Plan did not adversely effect the licensee's overall state of emergency preparedness. Emergency facilities, equipment, I instrumentation, and supplies were being suitably maintained. The 47 sirens provided by the licensee for alerting the public had a reliability factor of 99.02 percent for calendar year 1998. A significant equipment improvement in progress was the installation and testing of a new automatic system for an enhanced recall capability. The manual backup call-tree system to the automated system was successfully demonstrated on December 11,199 Organizational changes since the last inspection did not negatively affect the emergency response organization. The day-to-day management of the emergency preparedness (EP) program had remained with the same EP coordinator since May 1,1997, and an assistant who had recently completed required training. The inspectors observed that both individuals were knowledgeabl The in'spectors reviewed the training program and conducted a walk-through interview with personnel assigned dose assessment responsibilities. The personnel demonstrated the ability to input the proper parameters into the MIDAS dose assessment code and provide correct dose assessment projections. Additionally, the personnel demonstrated the capability of analyzing the dose projection information for upgrading of emergency classifications. The inspectors also reviewed the exercise / drill packages and determined 1 that personnel were receiving periodic opportunities for drill participation in addition to the required classroom trainin .- _. - _ . . .. ._ --- . -. .

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The licensee's Safety, Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) Department conducted the required annual audit of the EP program in January through February 1998. The audit I was thorough. The inspectors also noted that the licensee's corrective action program for EP was effective for providing timely and complete corrective action for items identified during a drill conducted on August 21,199 , Conclusion i

The licensee's emergency program was being maintained in a state of operational readiness. Personnel with dose assessment responsibility demonstrated the ability to perform dose assessments and analysis of dose projection information for upgrading of j emergency classification S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities j S Routine Observations of Security and Safeauards Activities (71750)

During the inspectors' periodic tours of the protected area the inspectors assessed security effectiveness. The inspectors observed that the security fence was intact the, i isolation zones were being adequately maintained free of objects, and the perimeter and ;

protected area were illuminated. Visitor escorting, and special purpose detectors were used as applicable, prior to persennel or package entr :

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V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas X1 Exit Meeting Summary )

a The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at i the conclusion of the inspection on February 16,1999. The licensee acknowledged the !

findings presente l PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee  !

R. Brown, Manager, Training and Emergency Preparedness S. Chesnut, Plant Operations Assistant General Manager G. Frederick, Manager Operations J. Gasser, Nuclear Plant General Manager K. Holmes, Manager Maintenance l P. Rushton, Plant Support Assistant General Manager l M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor l C. Tippins, Jr., Nuclear Speciakst i 1

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I INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: 'Onsite Engineering l lP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls In identifying, Resolving, and Preventing {

Problems l-IP 61726: Surveillance Observation  !

IP 62707: Maintenance Observation l lP 71707: Plant Operations

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IP 71750: Plant Support  ;

lP 82701: Operational Status of Emergency Preparedness Program i IP 84750: . Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring i IP 86750: , Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive l Materials IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

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Facilities j lP 92901: Followup - Operations j IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance '

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED l

ITEM NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION Opened -

50-424/98-10-01- URI . Review of Unit 1 Overpower Event (Section 01.2)

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50-425/98-10-02 NCV l&C Personnel Failure to Follow Reactor Trip Response Time Surveillance (Section M8.1)

50 424,425/98-06-01 VIO Inadequate Corrective Actions for Failure to Properly Document All Applicable TS LCOs (Section 08.1)

50-424/98-0 '7-00 LER Inadequate Surveillances Due to improperly Performed Response Time Testing (Section M8.1)

50-424/98-009-00 LER Improper Testing Method Results in inadequate Surveillances (Section M8.2)

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