IR 05000424/1998007

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Insp Repts 50-424/98-07 & 50-425/98-07 on 980816-0926. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support.Insp Also Addressed 980904 Reactor Trip
ML20155A782
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/15/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20155A753 List:
References
50-424-98-07, 50-424-98-7, 50-425-98-07, 50-425-98-7, NUDOCS 9810290250
Download: ML20155A782 (11)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)

REGION 11 Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

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License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81 Report No:

50-424/98-07,50-425/98-07 Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

J Facility:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 1 and 2

- Location:

7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates:

August 16,1998 through September 26,1998

- Inspectors:

J. Zeiler, Senior Resident inspector M. Widmann, Resident inspector K. O'Donohue, Resident inspector d. Holbrook, Senior Project Engineer (Section O2.1)

J. Munday, Senior Resident inspector, Hatch (Sections 08.3,08.4)

W. Kleinsorge, Reactor inspector (Sections M1.3, M8.2, M8.3)

Approved by:

P. Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure 2 9810290250 981015 PDR ADOCK 05000424 G

PDR I

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l-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-424/98-07,50-425/98-07 l

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, i

and plant support.. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection. It also includes the results of an announced inspection by a regional maintenance inspector, Senior Project i

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Engineer, and Senior Resident inspector, Hatch.

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Operations

l Operator actions to initiate a Unit 2 manual reactor trip on August 24 prior to automatic.

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protection actuation were proactive. The rapid identification and response to decreasing steam generator level was indicative of good operator performance. Licensee actions

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j appropriately addressed the cause of the trip (Section 01.2).

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The licensee's root cause investigation and subsequent corrective actions for a Unit 2 e

manual reactor trip on September 4 were thorough and addressed the cause of the trip, j

Operations personnel were prepared for the possible loss of feedwater and responded i

in a timely and appropriate manner. The preparation, rapid identification, and response j

to the event was an indication of good performance by the operating crew (Section i

01.3).

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The observed Plant Review Board (PRB) committee did not fully discuss the subjects e

presented and several members had not reviewed the material prior to meeting. These i

types of observations had not been typical in past PRB meeting observations (Section J

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. Maintenance i

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A violation was identified for the failure to include adequate instructions in a design

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package which resulted in a significant impact to the function of Diesel Generator 1 A

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(Section M1.2)

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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 The unit operated at full power throughout the inspection period.

Unit 2 The unit began the inspection period operating at full power. On August 24, a manual reactor trip was initiated due to the closure of a main feedwater regulating valve as a result of loss of control power. Following troubleshooting and corrective actions, a reactor startup was initiated and Mode 2 was entered on August 26. Full power operation was obtained on August 27.

On September 4, the unit was manually tripped as a result of the loss of both main feedwater pumps during surveillance testing. After completion of troubleshooting and a root cause evaluation criticality was achieved on September 5, with nominal full power being reached on September 6. The unit remained at essentially 100% power the remainder of the inspection period.

l. Operations

Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the reviews indicated that the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious.

01.2 Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trio a.

Inspection Scope (71707 and 93702)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the Unit 2 manual reactor trip on August 24.

b.

Observations and Findinas A manual reactor trip of Unit 2 was initiated due to loss of the inverter and both primary and backup control power supplies to the Steam Generator (SG) #3 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (MFRV),2-FV-0530. The plant response to the trip was normal with no significant complications identified. The inspectors reviewed the sequence of events report and identified no significant abnormalities. The inspectors determined that the event review team adequately evaluated post-trip data, developed plans to determine the cause of the trip, and actions necessary for plant restart. During the review, the inspectors were informed that the operating crew held a special briefing in the control room to specifically review necessary actions to be taken if a loss of the backup control power supply occurred. This briefing was particularly noteworthy, in that, it enhanced the operators ability and awareness to respond to this even..- - - -. -

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The licensee performed troubleshooting on the inverter and determined that a circuit i

j card had failed.' The licensee also determined that the loss of primary control power

supply was due to a blown fuse that occurred as a result of a loose fuse holder. The

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cause of the backup control power supply failure was determined to be a faulty

. capacitor. Both power supplies were replaced prior to startup. Subsequent checks of j-other control power supplies identified two additional failures as a result of faulty l

capacitors. The licensee plans to address the potential failures of other capacitors by

either replacing the capacitors or replacing the power supplies.

l-c.

Conclusions 5-l The inspectors determined that operator actions to initiate c manual reactor trip prior to i

automatic protection actuation was proactive. The rapid identification and response to L

decreasing steam generator level was indicative of good operator performance.

Licensee actions appropriately addressed the cause of the trip and plant restart.

01.3 Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trio a.

Insoection Scoce (71707) (71750) (93702)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding a Unit 2 reactor trip that occurred during the performance of a surveillance on September 4.

b.

Observations and Findinas A manual reactor trip of Unit 2 was initiated in response to a loss of both main feedwater pumps during the performance of Surveillance 14601-2," Engineered Safety Feature

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Actuation System Slave Relay And Final Device Train B Block Test," Revision (Rev.) 10.

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Post-trip plant response was normal and no significant complications were identified, l

The inspectors reviewed the sequence of events and observed that the manual reactor trip was performed prior to an automatic roactor trip due to decreasing steam generator I

water levels. Operations personnel stated that the pre-job briefing identified the i

possibility of loss of feedwater and addressed the expected operator responses. The inspectors determined that the event review team adequately evaluated post-trip data, developed plans to determine the cause of the trip, and actions necessary for plant restart.

Licensee troubleshooting activities identified that simultaneously depressing the feedwater pump tripping test circuit pushbuttons resulted in tripping both main feedwater pumps. Instrument and Control (l&C) personnel were unaware that depressing the feedwater pump trip test circuit pushbuttons simultaneously resulted in additive currents in the parallel test circuit which was sufficient to actuate the slave relay for tripping both feedwater pumps. The inspectors reviewed Surveillance 14601-2 and determined that depressing the pushbuttons simultaneously was not prohibited by the surveillance test.

The corrective actions included a procedure revison to address individual manipulation of the test pushbuttons. Other planned corrective actione included modification of the test circuits and a broadness review to identify c.imilar conditions in other solid state protection system test circuits. Additionally, the licensee planned to add guidance on

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the manipulation of Solid State Protection System (SSPS) test pushbuttons to the remaining SSPS surveillance procedures. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions and determined that they adequately addressed the root cause of this event.

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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's root cause investigation and subsequent corrective actions were thorough and addressed the causes of the reactor trip.

Operations personnel had identified and previously discussed the possible loss of feedwater and responded in a timely and appropriate manner. The preparation, rapid identification, and response to the event was an indication of good performance by the operating crew.

Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Enaineered Safetv Feature Walkdown (71707)

The inspectors conducted a review of selected portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) for both units to verify component alignment and assess material conditions of the system and components. The inspectors concluded that the AFW fm both units were properly aligned for operation; material conditions of the system components, and general areas were well maintained with no leaks observed.

Technical Specification (TS) and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR; th requirements were identified in the TS required surveillance procedure. Minor administrative procedure deficiencies were brought to the attentico of the responsible system engineer.

Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Plant Eauipment Operator (PEO) Qualification (71707)

As part of NRC Inspection Procedure 71707, " Plant Operations," the inspectors reviewed the licensee's non-licensed operator qualification program.

The licensee has established the requirements for PEO qualification via a system master plan. Within the system master plan clusters and instructional units were completed to qualify for each specific building (i.e., turbine, auxiliary, and outside area buildingo) plus basic PEO training. Upon satisfactory completion of these requirements, a PEO becomes fully qualified.

The inspectors reviewed classroom lesson plans, completed exam results, completion of instructional units and clusters for each specific building, a review of job performance j

measures, and observations of PEO rounds. The inspectors concluded that the system master plan provided an adequate method to qualify PEOs. The review of completed operator tanks indicated that no operator carried out duties that they were not qualified to perform. Currently qualified PEOs met established program requirements. The inspectors also concluded that trainer / evaluators were adequately qualified to perform evaluations of trainee performance.

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07 Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities a.

Insoection Scope (40500)

The inspectors reviewed the Plant Review Board (PRB) committee responsibilities and activities.

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Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed six PRB committee meetings during this period. Several were i

normally scheduled PRB meetings and the majority of the items discussed were routine in nature. However, some meetings were called to address specific items such as the removal of fuel handling building post-accident ventilation ductwork and emergent issues with the diesel generator missile barrier exhaust structure modification. In addition, supplemental meetings were called to complete various reviews prior to the issuance of licensee event reports (LER) in response to plant events.

The inspectors observed that some discussions were not adequately focused on the agenda items being discussed. An example of this was the failure of PRB members to question an incomplete root cause and corrective action of an LER. The inspectors also observed that some of the PRB members had not reviewed the material disseminated prior to the meeting and several members had been engaged in other activities that had distracted them from reviews before the board.

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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the observed PRB committee did not fully discuss the subjects presented and several members had not reviewed the material prior to meeting. These types of observations had not been typicalin past PRB meeting observations.

Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

O8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-424. 425/97-045-01014 and VIO 50-424/97-045-02014 (Escalated Enforcement item 50-424. 425/96-14-03): Confiauration Control Deficiencies involvina Miscositioned Components The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated April 17,1997. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and determined that all of the actions were completed satisfactoril. _ _ _ _ _ -

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08.2 (Closed) VIO 50-425/97-05-01: Anomalous Containment Sumo Level Transmitter Behavior Not Identified by Licensee The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated July 18,1997. The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response.

However, the licensee planned to complete only a portion of the work during the upcoming outage, and has rescheduled completion of the work during the following Unit 1 outage. Based on the revised plan, the inspectors concluded that the licensees' plan was adequate to address the identified containment sump level transmitter issues.

08.3 (Closed) LER 50-424/97-008-00: Turbine Stoo Valves' Closure Setooints Not Properly B2et Guidance was added to procedure 28717-C, " Main Steam Stop Valve Limit Switch Location Verification," Rev. 5, to ensure the setpoint was established with the valve traveling a the closed direction. The inspectors reviewed the procedure and verified the revision was adequate to prevent recurrence.

I 08.4 (Closed) LER 50-424/97-009-00: Containment Ventilation isolation When Rad Monitor

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Not Blocked This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-424,425/97-10. No new issues j

were revealed by the LER.

II, Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Maintenance Work Order and Surveillance Observations (61726) (62707)

The inspectors observed all or portions of various selected maintenance and surveillance activities. The observed maintenance and surveillance activities were generally completed by personnel knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. Procedures were present at the work location and being followed. Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the intended activities. The inspectors concluded that routine maintenance and surveillance activities were satisfactorily performed.

M1.2 Emeraency Diesel Generator (DG) Exhaust Missile Barrier Modification a.

Inspection Scope (62707)(37551)

The inspectors observed portions of the licensee's implementation of Design Change Package (DCP) 98-V1N0011 to replace the Unit 1 DG concrete exhaust missile barriers.

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Observations and Findinas The DCP required that the existing concrete missile barrier be partially demolished and a temporary cover placed over the DG exhaust opening to prevent concrete debris from entering. The temporary cover was a metal box approximately 48 inches in width, height, and depth with solid sides except for the front side which was open with a screen to allow a flowpath for the DG exhaust. However, the licer see did not have sufficient controls in place to remove debris at a set interval. On August 24, the inspectors observed that debris had accumulated to a height of approximately 30 inches. This resulted in a major portion of the exhaust opening being blocked. Once aware of the issue, the licensee stopped work, declared the DG inoperable, and removed the debris.

Work was completed on DG 1 A missile barrier without further significant incidents. On September 1, the licensee determined that DG 1 A would not have been able to perform its intended safety function in the condition observed. The licensee entered the appropriate TS Limiting Condition For Operation at the time of discovery.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actic'

The licensee replaced the temporary cover with a different design that does not lens itself to the vulnerability of being blocked by debris; personnel responsible for the development of the DCP were counseled on their responsibilities and monitoring of field installation; and management expectation for controlling work on safety-related systems was re-emphasized.

Procedure 00400-C, P: ant Design Control, Rev. 26, requires that during implementation of DCPs that controls be established and maintained to ensure that physical changes to the plant are controlled and the functions of safety related equipment are not impacted.

The licensee failed to provide sufficient controls in DCP 98-V1N0011 to ensure that the demolition of the DG 1 A concrete missile barrier precluded impact on the safety-related operation of the diesel, c.

Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not include adequate instructions in a j

design package used by field craftsmen which resulted in a significant impact to the operation of DG 1 A. This issue was identified as VIO 50-424/98-07-01, " Diesel Generator 1 A Inoperable Due to Exhaust Piping Blockage."

M1.3 Freeze Seal Activities (62707)

The inspectors observed installation of a freeze seal and maintenance activities associated with the replacement of Valve 2-PSV-8118. The freeze seal was properly installed and the replacement of the valve was successfully completed. The inspectors concluded that freeze seal and maintenance activities were completed thoroughly and professionally and in accordance with procedure _

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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Insoector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-424. 425/98-02-03: Review of Surveillance Procedure Seauencina The licensee initiated a procedure review under commitment tracking number COOO38258. The review included identifying surveillances and procedures that were, or may be, performed concurrently. The licensee plans to revise identified procedures to address the procedure sequencing when perforrned concurrently. The inspectors revie"ted the screening process and found it was thorough and resulted in the appropriate procedures being identified and prioritized prior to the next refueling outage.

The inspectors concluded that the procedure review was adequate.

M8.2 (Closed) IFl 50-424. 425/98-01-02: Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment (MRPS)

The licensee conducted the MPA June 1-5,1998. This assessment covered: the Unit 1 portion of Operating Cycle No. 7 after July 1,1996 and the portion of Operating Cycle No. 8 before May 1 ;998, and the Unit 2 portion of Operating Cycle No. 5 after July 1, 1996 and the portion of Operating Cycle No. 6 before May 1 1998. The MRPA was conducted by a team of twelve personnel, including a PRA consultant and

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representatives from the Farley, Hatch, Robinson and Sequoyah nuclear power plants.

The MRPA team's findings were presented to plant management on June 5,1998. The MRPA was issued by memorandum dated August 10,1998.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's report. The assessment was comprehensive; identified approximately 33 issues,16 strengths,31 weaknesses; and made 64 recommendations. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's MRPA met the requirements of the Maintenance Rule.

M8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-425/98-03-04: Failure of Contractor Examiner to implement a PT Procedure Reauirement The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated June 8,1998. To evaluate the effectivness of the licensee's corrective actions, the inspectors examined selected records, examined PT examination sites, and interviewed licensee personnel.

The inspectors determined that tha licensee took appropriate corrective actions and conducted an adequate survey to determine the extent of the problem.

V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas X*

Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection resuits to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 29,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

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J. Gasser, Nuclear Plant General Manager i

S. Chestnut, Plant Operations Assistant General Manager i

P. Rushton, Plant Support Assistant General Manager

G. Frederick, Manager Operations K. Holmes, Manager Maintenance M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor C. Tippins, Jr., Nuclear Specialist i INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:

Onsite Engineering

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Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726:

Surveillance Observation a 62707:

Maintenance Observation j 71707:

Plant Operations IP 71750:

Plant Support IP 92901:

Followup - Operations IP 92902:

Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance IP 93702:

Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-424/98-07-01 VIO Diesel Generator 1 A Inoperable due to Exhaust Piping Blockage (Section M1.2)

Closed 50-424,425/97-045-VIO Configuration Control Deficiencies involving 01014 Mispositioned Components (Section 08.1)

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50-424,425/97-045-VIO Configuration Control Deficiencies involving 02014 Mispositioned Components (Section 08.1)

50-425/97-05-01 VIO Anomalous Containment Sump Level Transmitter Behavior Not Identified By Licensee (Section 08.2)

50-424/97-008-00 LER Turbine Stop Valves' Closure Setpoints Not Properly Set (Section 08.3)

50-424/97-009-00 LER Containment Ventilation isolation When Rad Monitor Not Blocked (Section 08.4)

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50-424,425/98-02-03 IFl Review of Surveillance Procedure Sequencing (Section M8,1)

50-424,425/98-01-02 IFl Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment (Section M8.2)

50-425/98-03-04 VIO Failure of Contractor Examiner to implement a PT Procedure Requirement (Section M8.3)

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