IR 05000424/1998008
| ML20198F691 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198F679 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-98-08, 50-424-98-8, 50-425-98-08, 50-425-98-8, NUDOCS 9812280187 | |
| Download: ML20198F691 (11) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION ll Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81 Report No:
50-424/98-08,50-425/98-08 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Location:
7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates:
September 27,1998 through November 14,1998 Inspectors:
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident inspector M. Widmann, Resident inspector N. Merriweather, Engineering Inspector (Sections E1 and E8.1)
B. Holbrook, Senior Project Engineer (Sections 08.5, M8.2, and M8.3)
Approved by:
P. Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
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Enclosure 9812290187 981211 PDR ADOCK 05000424 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-424/98-08,50-425/98-08 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection. It also includes the results of an announced inspection by a regional engineering inspector. A senior project engineer performed a closecut inspection the week of November 16,1998, and the results of that inspection are included in this report.
Operations Freeze protection and heat tracing equipment was in adequate condition, although
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numerous work orders were outstanding for degraded heat trace circuitry problems.
Adequate compensatory measures were being implemented for the degraded conditions (Section 01.2).
Maintenance The licensee's troubleshooting activities for a Loop 3 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve
flow anomaly were well controlled and coordinated. Detailed troubleshooting plans were developed and operations personnel were thoroughly briefed prior to risk involved troubleshooting evolutions. There was good management involvement in coordinating the troubleshooting activities and a strong commitment toward resolving the problem (Section M1.2).
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Enaineerina in general, documentation for design changes and plant modifications and related 10 e
CFR 50.59 safety evaluations was adequate and consistent with requirements of the design change control program (Section E8.1).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at full power until October 9,1998, at which time power was reduced to 25 percent to replace a suspected bad control card for the Loop 3 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve. Full power was attained on October 11, following the card replacement. The unit operated at essentially full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
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l 1. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (40500) (71707)
The inspectors conducted reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the reviews indicated that the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious.
01.2 Cold Weather Preparations Review
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a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's cold weather protection program, the status of heat trace and freez? protection preventive maintenance (PM), and walked down selected heat tracing and freeze protection systems, b.
Qbservations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the status of PM checklists SCL01749, " Freeze Protection," and SCL00424, " Heat Tracing," which are performed annually to maintain the freeze protection and heat trace equipment. The inspectors determined that the PMs were being performed per the scheduled dates.
The inspectors performed a walkdown of several of the freeze protection and heat trace i
control panels and the heat trace annunciator panels in the control room. The inspectors i
noted that there were numerous corrective maintenance work orders outstanding on various heat trace circuits. The licensee had recently begun to prioritize work orders to ensure that the more significant degradations were properly addressed in a timely
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manner. The inspectors also noted that numerous local heat trace alarms were lit on the heat trace annunciator panels in the control room. The inspectors reviewed procedures 17104-1/2, " Annunciator Response Procedures for Heat Tracing Panel 1/2NCQARHT,"
Revision (Rev.) 1, which were recently developed. The inspectors determined that the procedures were detailed and provided good guidance for addressing degraded freeze protection and heat trace conditions. The inspectors verified that for the alarms present, appropriate compensatory actions were implemented in accordance with procedures 17104-1/2. In addition, the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) stated that the plant equipment
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operators were expected to monitor the heat trace local panels once a shift and identify i
any further local alarms present. The inspectors determined that appropriate l
compensatory actions were implemented.
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Conclusions l
l The inspectors concluded that the freeze protection and heat tracing equipment was in l
adequate condition, although numerous work orders were outstanding for degraded heat l
trace circuits. Adequate compensatory measures were being implemented for the I
degraded conditions.
l O1.3 Units 1 and 2 License -Conditions Review
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a.
Inspection Scoce (71707)
As part of a Technical Specification (TS) change, the inspectors reviewed NPF-68 license condition 2.C.(2) and NPF-81 license conditions 2.C.(2).a, and b, to verify that the specific commitments had been satisfactorily met.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the su:veillances associated with each of the license conditions.
The inspectors verified that the procedure and the established acceptance criteria were consistent with the TS surveillance requirements. In addition, the inspectors verified that the completion dates of each surveillance met the stated license condition. All surveillances were completed satisfactorily and within the stated time frame.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee satisfactorily met the requirements of NPF-68 license condition 2.C.(2) and NPF-81 license conditions 2.C.(2).a, and b.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (71707) (92901)
08.1 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-424.425/98-04-01: Failure to Follow Procedure for Letdown Orifice isolation Valve Confiauration in Solid Plant Operatiens The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response dated July 13,1998, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems have been identified.
08.2 (Closed) VIO 50-424. 425/98-04-03: FME Controls Not Maintained at Unit 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Pools The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response dated July 13,1908, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems have been identified.
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l 08.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-425/98-003-00: Liahtnino Strike Leads to Turbine / Reactor Trio This event was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-424,425/98-04. No new issues were revealed by the LER.
08.4 (Closed) LER 50-425/98-006-00: Leakina Check Valve Renders Essential Chiller Inocerable This LER concerned the performance of a surveillance test that resulted in the Unit 2 train B essential chiller being inoperable due to a failed leak test for a surge tank supply line check valve. Although one purpose of the surveillance test was to demonstrate the operability of check valve 1-1592-U4-192, no specific acceptance criteria for operability was established in procedure 14809-2, "ESF (Engineered Safety Feature) Chilled Water Pump Inservice Test," Rev.12. The results of the surveillance procedure were signed off by the USS as satisfactory. However, upon further review by the inservice test (IST)
engineer four days after the performance of the test, it was determined that the chiller would not have performed its intended safety function and was inoperable due to excessive leakage through the check valve. Maintenance personnel subsequently repaired the leaking valve and returned it to service on June 25,1998.
Procedure 00404-C, " Surveillance Test Program," Rev. 22, states that it is the responsibility of the USS to determine operability of plant equipment based on surveillance test results and other operating conditions. Howcver, on June 19,1998, the USS failed to properly determine that the operability of the train B essential chiller was challenged due to the leakage through check valve 1-1592-U4-192. As such, this non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-425/98-08-0;, "USS Failure to Determire Operability of 2B ESF l
Chiller," consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
As part of the licensee's immediate corrective action the surveillance procedure was revised to establish acceptance criteria for the check valve. The USS was also counseled on the need to request onsite and offsite technical assistance to evaluate system operability. The inspectors reviewed the revised procedures, the corrective maintenance that corrected the check valve leakage, and the broadness review performed to assess if other valves added to the IST program had established
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l acceptance criteria. All valves identified as part of the revised IST program had j
acceptance criteria.
j The inspectors concluded that the licensee corrective actions were satisfactory.
i 08.5 (Closed) Generic Letter (GL) 81-21: Natural Circulation Cooldown (Tl 2515/086)
The inspectors reviewed the concerns identified in the GL and reviewed licensee actions completed to address the concerns. The inspectors reviewed NUREG-1137, Safety
Evaluation Report, (SER) related to the operation of Vogtle, Units 1 and 2 and observed that the SER identified that the Westinghouse Owner's Group submitted a study to the
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NRC, which was subsaquently approved, with respect to void formation in Westinghouse-designed nuclear steam supply systems during natural circulation cooldown/depressurizatbn transients. The inspectors also reviewed initial kcensed i
operator and licensed operator requalification training lesson plans and Emergency Operating Procedures and verified that the documents adequately addressed the concems identified in the GL. Based upon the inspectors review of licensee actions, this item is closed.
ll. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Maintenance Work Order and Surveillance Observations (61726) (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of selected maintenance and surveillance activities. The observed maintenance and surveillance activities were generally completed by personnel knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. Procedures were present at the work location and being followed. Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the intended activities. The inspectors concluded that routine maintenance and surveillance activities were satisfactorily performed.
M1.2 Unit 2 Main Feedwater Reaulatina Valve (MFRV) Flow Control Anomalv a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed and monitored the licensee's troubleshooting actions to address the repeated partial closure of Unit 2 MFRV 2FV0530.
b.
Observations and Findinas On September 3,1998, Unit 2 began receiving feed-flow / steam-flow mismatch deviation alarms in the control room as a result of the momentary partial closure of Loop 3, MFRV 2FV0530. Through the end of the reporting period, the licensee conducted extensive troubleshooting to determine the cause of the anomaly, including the connection of monitoring equipment, replacement of the controller card, tracker driver card, and visual inspections of the controller wiring for MFRV 2FV0530. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee's troubleshooting efforts were still ongoing to identify the cause of the anomalous valve response.
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Conclusions l
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's troubleshooting activities were well controlled and coordinated. Detailed troubleshooting plans were developed and operations personnel were thoroughly briefed prior to risk involved troubleshooting evolutions. Additionally, the inspectors noted good management 4 volvement and a
strong commitment toward resolving the problem.
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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-425/98-002-00: Seismic Qualification Inadecuate for RHR Pumo Electrical Connection The inspectors reviewed this LER and discussed it with the licensee. No additional information was identified.
M8.2 (Closed) LER 50-424/98-004: Inadeauate Calibration Renders Accumulators inocerable i
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions identified in the LER and verified that they were satisfactorily implemented. Based upon the inspectors review of licensee actions, this LER is closed.
l M8.3 (Closed) LER 50-424/98-005: Surveillance Not Performed When Diesel Generator Rendered Inocerab!g The inspectors rev;ewed the licensee's corrective actions identified in the LER and verified that they were satisfactorily implemented. Based upon the inspectors review of licensee actions, this LER is closed, i
111. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Review of Desian Chanaes and Plant Modifications a.
Insoection Scope (37550.)
The inspectors reviewed six design change packages (DCPs) to assess the quality and to determine if the design changes and modifications were consistent with the plant
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design and ficensing bases.
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Observations and Findinas The modifications were being implemented to either resolve system performance problems or to improve system reliability. The inspectors noted that the design change packages had been reviewed and approved consistent with the licensee's change control program. The level of detail in the DCPs were appropriate for proper
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imp!ementation of the modification in the plant, including post modification testing. The l
related 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations were reviewed and found to be technically adequate and of good quality with no unreviewed safety questions being identified. The DCPs, as appropriate, included markups to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and listed affected drawirns and procedures that required revision. For completed modification packages, the inspectors verified on a sampling basis that appropriate procedures and drawings had been revised to incorporate the changes as a result of the modifications. A walkdown of the Unit 1 Diesel Generator Air Start System Air Dryer
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Modifications and the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Overspeed and Reliability Enhancement Modifications confirmed that they had been installed consistent l
with the design change package documentation. The material condition of the l
modification work was satisfactory.
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Conclusions Documentation for design changes and plant modifications and related 10 CFR 50.59
safety evaluations was adequate and consistent with requirements of the design change control program
l E1.2 Backloa of Desian Chanae Reauests (DCRs) and DCPs (37550)
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l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's backlog of open DCRs and DCPs and noted
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there were no negative trends. There were a total of 146 open DCRs as of September 1998. Of this total,70 were in design and the remaining 76 had been issued to the site for implementation. Historical data showed that the average number of open DCRs and DCPs remained stable over the past four years since the licensee instituted the Configuration Control Board. However, the trend of DCPs open greater than three years was increasing. The licensee indicated that several of these DCPs have been scheduled to be worked during the Unit 1 Spring 1999 refueling outage. The inspectors concluded that the open DCRs and DCPs were effectively managed as demonstrated by the effectiveness of the Configuration Control Board and the scheduling of DCPs open greater than three years.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (37550) (37551) (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Inspector Follow-uo item (IFI) 50-424. 425/97-10-05: Samolina Procram forAe i
Unit 2 Eaton Cable Solices The licensee inspected 100% of Eaton cable splices on Unit 2 and found that several
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splices did not meet environmental qualification (EQ) documentation requirements because the transition splice of heat shrink material was not installed. Some of the cable splices were repaired in accordance with the design drawings. The remaining cable splices were determined to be acceptable to "use-as-is." This "use-as-is" disposition was based on new information the licensee received from the cable manufacturer that the cables had been qualified i.) other EQ testing, without the cable jacket. The licensee conducted an audit of the report at the vendors facility and confirmed that it supported qualification for their cables in EQ applications. The licensee subsequently procured a
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copy of the test report for their EQ files and incorporated this information in Rev.16 to the EQ Documentation Package (EQDP) X3AJ04, Eaton Cables. The inspectors reviewed a draft of Rev.16 of EQDP X3AJ04 along with the new Eaton (now Furon i.
Corporation) test report 558-1088C1 dated August 7,1998, and related EQ Calculstion l
X4 CPS.0075.081, Rev. 3. and verified that the documentation adequately demonstrated qualificetion for the non-jacketed Eaton cable splices. Based on the inspectors review of
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i licensee actions, this item is closed.
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E8.2 (Closed) IFl 50-424.425/98-03-01: Reactor Trip Switchoear Seismic Determination i
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's engineering seismic evaluation of the reactor trip bypass breaker as found racked-out versus disconnect configuration. The engineering evaluation concluded that during a seismic event, the bypass breakers would have moved freely inside of the respective breaker cubicle resulting in considerable impact to the compartment in which it was mounted. In addition, a bypass breaker in this configuration would cause chatter of relays and auxiliary contacts in adjacent cubicles, but would not impede the primary reactor trip breakers from performing its intended safety function of tripping the reactor.
Also, the operators and electricians were provided hands-on training to be able to identify and independently verify the breakers in either the racked-out or disconnect position.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's actions were satisfactorily developed and implemented.
R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Routine Radioloaically Controlled Area (RCA) Tours (71750)
The inspectors periodically toured the RCA during the inspection period. The inspectors concluded that radiation control practices observed were proper.
R8 Miscellanious, Radiological Protection and Chemistry Control lasues (92904)
R8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-425/9%06-02: Failure to Properly Secure Door to Locked Hiah Radiation Area This violation and the licensee's corrective actions were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-424,425/98-06. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions documented in Deficient Condition 21980490 and determined that all of the actions were satisfactorily completed.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750)
S1.1 Routine Observations of Security and Safeouards Activities The inspectors periodically toured the protected area for adequate lighting and security control functions, observed visitor escorting, and the use of special purpose detectors at the protected area entrance, and observed personnel, packages, and vehicles entering the protected area. The inspectors determined that the security fence was intact and the isolation zones were being adaquately maintainec' free of objects. Lighting of the perimeter and protected area was acceptable. Visitor escorting, and special purpose detectors were used as applicable, prior to personnel or package entry.
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S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues (71750)(92904)
S8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-425/98-03-06: Failure to Properly Escort Individual inside EDG Buildina
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The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response dated June 8,1998, were reasonable and complete. Although a similar violation (see Section S8.2) did occur since the time of this event, the inspectors concluded that the corrective i
i actions for this violation would not have reasonably prevented the subsequent violation.
S8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-424. 425/98-06-03: Failure to Properly Escort Individuals in anql I
Around Electric Boiler Buildina This violation and the licensee's corrective actions were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-424,425/98-06. The inspectors verified the licensee has adequately implemented corrective actions.
V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 20,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
S. Chestnut, Plant Operations Assistant General Manager G. Frederick, Vaaager Operations J. Gasser, Nuclear Plant General Manager K. Holmes, Manager Maintenance P. Rushton, Plant Support Assistant General Manager M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supentisor C. Tippins, Jr., Nuclear Specialist i INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37550:
Engineering IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls In Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726:
Surveillance Observation IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support IP 92901:
Followup - Operations
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IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance l
lP 92903:
Followup - Engineering l
IP 92904:
Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Closed
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50-424,425/98-04-01 VIO Failure to Follow Procedure for Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve Configuration in Solid Plant Operations (Section 08.1)
50-424,425/98-04-03 VIO FME Controls Not Maintained at Unit 1 and 2 Spent Fuel
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Pools (Section 08.2)
50-425/98-003-00 LER Lightning Strike Leads to Turbine / Reactor Trip (Section 08.3)
50-425/98-006-00 LER Leaking Check Valve Renders Essential Chiller inoperable
(3ection 08.4)
50-425/98-08-01 NCV USS Failure to Determine Operability of 9.B ESF Chiller (Section 08.4)
50-425/98-002-00 LER Seismic Qualification inadequate for RHR Pump Electrcal Connection (Section M8.1)
i 50-424/98-004 LER Inadequate Calibration Renders Accumulators Inoperable (Section M8.2)
50-424/98-005 LER Surveillance Not Performed When Diesel Generator Rendered inoperable (Section M8.3)
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50-424,425/97-10-05 IFl Sampling Program for the Unit 2 Eaton Cable Splices (Section E8.1)
50-424,425/98-03-01 IFl Reactor Trip Switchgear Seismic Determination (Section E8.2)
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50-425/98-06-02 VIO Failure to Properly Secure Door to Locked High Radiation Area (Section R8.1)
50-425/98-03-06 VIO Failure to Properly Escort Individual inside EDG Building (Section S8.1)
50-424,425/98-06-03 VIO Failure to Properly Escort Individuals in and Around
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Electric Boiler Building (Section S8.2)
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