ML20210S060
| ML20210S060 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210S052 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-97-07, 50-424-97-7, 50-425-97-07, 50-425-97-7, NUDOCS 9709040377 | |
| Download: ML20210S060 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1997007
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION 11
1
Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425
License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81
Report No:
50-424/97-07, 50-425/97-07
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 1 and 2
Location:
7821 River Road
"
Waynesboro, GA 30830
Dates:
July 6 through August 2. 1997
Inspectors:
C. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Widmann. Resident Inspector
K. O'Donohue. Resident Inspector (in training)
P. Harmon. License Examiner (05.1 - 05.3)
G. Kuzo. Health Protection Inspector (R1.1 - R8.1)
L. Stratton Safeguards Inspector (Section S2.1)
Approved by:
P. Skinner. Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 2
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9709040377 970828
ADOCK 05000424
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-424/97-07, 50-425/97-07
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
engineering, maintenance, and plant support.
The report covers a four-week
period of resident inspection.
It also includes the results of announced
inspections by a regional operator license examiner, health physics inspector,
and a safeguards inspector.
Operations
In general, the conduct of operations was professional and
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safety-conscious (Section 01.1).
A violation was identified for entry into the incorrect action condition
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during maintenance on the Unit 1 airlock (Section 02.2).
A poor practice was identified for attempting to start the auxiliary
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building supply fan number 1 with limited troubleshooting guidance
(Section 03.2).
The Requalification Program was adequate to ensure that licensed
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operators are trained to operate the facility safely (Section 05.1).
A program weakness was identified in the documentation of individual
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performance during simulator operating examinations (Section 05.2).
The Written Examination was considered discriminating and valid, and
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closely followed the examination plan (Section 05.3).
The Operating Examination was considered to be marginally adequate due
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to a low discrimination level in the dynamic simulator scenarios and in
Job Performance Measures (Section 05.3).
Plant Review Board (PRB) discussions were thorough and appropriately
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focused on safety (Section 07.1).
Maintenance
Maintenance and surveillance activities were generally completed
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thoroughly and professionally (Section M1.1 and M1.2).
Enaineerina
A non-cited violation was identified for the improper storage of a
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monorail beam immediately adjacent to centrifugal charging pump 2A
(Section E8.2).
Enclosure 2
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Plant Support
Radiation and contamination controls for radwaste processing and storage
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areas, and chemistry laboratory operations were appropriate and in
accordance with TS and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements (Paragraph R1.1).
Doses to workers resulting from contamination events were evaluated
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properly, and were within limits and recorded in accordance with
10 CFR Part 20 requirements (Section R1.2).
Licensee guidance and training incorporated recently revised
49 CFR Parts 100-179 and 10 CFR Part 71 regul6tions (Section R1.3).
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to meet 49 CFR 172.200
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shipping paper documentation details in accordance with 10 CFR 71.5
requirements (Section R1.3).
The primary and secondary coolant chemistry programs were managed and
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implemented effer.tively (Section R1.4).
Chemistry and HP self-assessments were performance based with no
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programmatic issues identified.
Identified issues were tracked by
licensee representatives and resolved appropriately. (Section R1.4).
In general, licensee OC primary and secondary OC activities verified
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accuracy of analytical measurements (Section R7.2).
One Inspector Followup Item was identified to review licensee actions to
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improve chemistry QC data trending and Anomaly Report issuance
(Section R7.2).
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to conduct Containment
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High Range Monitor calibrations in accordance with NUREG 0737 Table
II.F.1-3 as specified in Final Safety Analysis Report Section 7 (Section
R8.1).
A violation was identified for failure to take proper compensatory
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action in response to a degraded vital area barrier (Section S2.1).
Enclosure 2
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Reoort Details
Summary of Plant Status
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Unit 1
The unit began the inspection period at 100% power.
On July 7. power was
reduced to supprt condenser water box maintenance.
On July 8. power was
stabilized at 80% power. At the completion of maintenance activities, on
July-8. 100% reactor power was achieved.
The unit operated at full power for
the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit-2
The unit operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
I.
OoeratioDS
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707. the inspectors conducted frequent
reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general, the reviews indicated
that the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious.
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Safety-Related Walkdowns
a.
Insoection Scooe (7170]l
The inspectors walked down Diesel Generator ESF Heating Ventilation and
Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems for Units 1 and 2 as part of the routine
inspection effort to verify availability and overall condition of the
systems,
b'.
Observations and findinas
The ins)ectors verified proper system configurations both electrically
and mec1anically for the above ESF systems through accessible portions
in the plant, a walk down of main control room boards, and a review of
system drawings and plant lineup procedures.
The inspectors also
observed overall material condition of system components during the walk
downs.
Enclosure 2
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c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the systems reviewed were available to
aerform their design function and that systems were properly aligned.
io discrepancies were noted during these inspections.
02.2 Documentation Associated With Att ock Maintenance
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a.
Insoection Scooe (71707F
The ins)ectors reviewed the licensee's actions associated with repairs
to the Jnit 1 containment airlock on July 8.1997. The inspectors
reviewed Technical Saecification (TS) 3.6.2. Containment Airlocks:
precedure 24905-C. "3ersonnel Air Lock Leak Rate Test." Revision 12:
procedure 25236-C. " Personnel Airlock Maintenance," Revision 10:
3rocedure 10008-C. " Recording Limiting Conditions for Operations."
Revision 19: the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) Log: and Limiting Condition
for Operation / Technical Recuirements (LC0/TR) Status Sheets.
The-
inspectors also interviewec selected operations personnel regarding this
issue.
b,
Observations and Findings
=On July 8. 1997. maintenance personnel had disassembled and reassembled-
the shaft seal assembly on the inner airlock bulkhead, associated with
the inner door operating mechanism.
Log entries indicated that the
repairs started at approximately 1:40 p.m.-and had finished for the day
at 3:25 o.m,
lhe ;nspectors were informed that the shaft seal assembly
leakage h3d not been determined following the reassembly. The licensee--
also indicated that additional repairs to this seal were planned _for
July 9.=1997.
Procedure 10008-C requires documentation of entry into an LC0 acticq
statement which will continue past a shift turnover.
After shift
turnover. the inspectors noted that the licensee had documented entry
into Action Condition "A" of TS LC0 3.6.2 as opposed to Action Condition
"C."
Action Condition "A" provides required actions in the event that
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an air lock door is rendered inoperable. Action Condition."C" applies
when an airlock is rendered inoperable for reasons other than Condition
A or 8 [ interlock mechanism).
The inspectors determined that since the
repairs were not made to the inner door, entry into Action Condition "C"
was more appropriate.
Following discussions with the Operations Manager and Shift
Superintendent, the licensee commenced repairs to the shaft seal that
evening.
During additional reviews, the inspectors determined that-the
airlock was restored to service on July 9.1997, prior to the expiration
of the Action Statement "C" time limits. At approximately 5:00 a.m. on
July 9.1997, the licensee also documented entry into Action Statement
"C" retroactive to the start of the initial shaft seal' maintenance.
Enclosure 2
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c.
Conclusion
The initial failure to document entry into nction Condition "C" was
contrary to the requirements of procedure 10008-C.
This is identified
as Violation (VIO) 50-424/97-07-01. Failure To Document Entry Into
Proper Action Condition Following Airlock Maintenance.
02.3 Containment Penetrat)ons Walkdown
a.
Inspection Scone (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following
containment penetrations to verify proper valve lineups:
Penetratign
Unit
Title
32
1.2
Boron Injection Line to Cold Leg
56
1.2
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Discharge
to Hot Leg
b.
Observations and Findinas
Proper valve lineups were observed for all penetrations,
c.
Conclusion
No discrepancies were identified.
03
Operations Procedures and Documentation
03.1 Walkdown of C harances (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors walked down the following
clearances:
19700542
Control room HVAC filter units - planned outage
19700554
Diesel oil storage tank pump #2
b.
Observations and Findinos
The inspectors did not identify any problems during these walkdowns.
Enclosure 2
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.03.2 Slave State protection System Slave Relav K614
a.
Insnection Scone (71707)
The inspectors reviewed a performance anomaly (slower than expected
operation) of the auxiliary building supply fan number 1 during the
3erformance of procedure 14655-2. " Solid State Protection System Slave
Relay K614 Train B Containment Ventilation Isolation." Revision 4 on
July 14. 1997. The inspectors reviewed maintenance work order 2971673:
electrical drawing 1-1551-A7-001-M01, elementary diagram auxiliary
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building outside air supply and normal HVAC system: deficiency card (DC)
2-97-195: the Unit 2 Control Room Reactor Operator and Shift Supervisor
log entries; and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.-Inc.
(IEEE) Std 383-1977 " Standard Criteria for Periodic Testing."
Operations and maintenance personnel were also interviewed.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On July 14. 1997. operations personnel performed arocedure 14655-2.
This procedure tests safety related slave relay
(614. to satisfy
portions of the surveillances in TS 3.3.2. 3.3.6 and 3.7.13.
Both
safety related and non-safety related components of the auxiliary
building normal ventilation and piping penetration ventilation area
filtration and exhaust systems are actuated during this surveillance.
During the performance of the test, an operator noted that auxiliary
building supply fan number 1. a non-safety related component, did not
immediately trip as expected.
Instead, the fan tripped approximately
three minutes after the relay actuation. The licensee stated that all
other components repositioned as expected.
During troubleshooting efforts, after reviewing the fan control circuit,
the control room operators attempted to restart the auxiliary building
supply fan number 1 with the K614 relay still energized.
The fan did
not start and an amber trouble-light was received at the control
handswitch for the fan.
The inspectors were informed that this activity
was accomplished to determine the state of the K614 relay contact in the
fan control circuit.
The initial surveillance was signed and logged as completed satisfactory
with comments about the fan stopping after approximately 3 minutes.
0)erations aersonnel then performed procedure 14655-2 a second time.
T11s time t1e auxiliary building supply fan number 1 tripped
immediately, as expected.
The surveillance was again signed off as
completed satisfactorily. The surveillance traveler, used to document
accomplishment of the surveillance for TS tracking, was also signed.
A
DC 2-97-195 was written addressing the failure of auxiliary building
supply fan number 1 to stop immediately during the first performance of
procedure 14655-2. in addition, a work order was written.
Enclosure 2
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The inspectors discussed with licensee management that the inspectors'
review identified that no procedure or other written instruction existed
directing the attempted restart of the auxiliary building supply fan
number 1.
Another point was that the failure of the fan to restart
during this troubleshooting effort provided limited information (i.e. ,
the existing state of the K614 contact in the fan control circuit: it
did not provide any information on why the 3-minute delay in fan
operation occurred).
Management was aggressivt in their efforts regarding this issue the
follcwing day. Additional extensive troubleshooting was performed but
failed to reveal the cause of the delayed operation. The licensee
indicated that they are currently enhancing their procedures regarding
troubleshooting,
c.
Conclusions
Attempting to start the auxiliary building supply fan number 1 with
limited troubleshooting guidance was identified as a poor practice.
05
Operator Training and Qualification (71001)
The inspectors assessed the licensee's Requalification Program using NRC
Inspection Procedure 71001, " Licensed Operator Requalification Program."
The inspectors visited the facility during the week of July 14-18, and
on July 29 and 30. 1997, to further evaluate this aspect of the program.
During the second visit to the facility, the inspectors determined that
operating tests were documented in an adequate manner, but identified a
program weakness in this area (Saction 05.2). A second Exit Interview
was conducted on July 30 with members of licensee management.
05.1 Review of Facility Operating History
a.
Insoection Scoce
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operating history using Licensee
Event Re) orts (LERs), NRC' inspection reports, and the Plant Integration
Matrix (31M).
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's feedback
mechanisms to determine whether deficiencies below the threshold for
generation of an LER or a Notice of Violation were adequately addressed
by the training program,
b.
Qb.servations and Findinos
The plant's operating history did not indicate that operator training
was a factor in identified performance issues. A concern involving
operator performance has been the continued mispositioning of valves and
incorrect equipment operation.
Root cause analysis )erformed by the
licensee concluded that training deficiencies or wea(nesses were not
involved in this area.
Enclosure 2
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The inspectors reviewed lesson plans derived from two LER-identified
performance issues.
The inspectors determined that minor deficiencies
received adequate notice and response by the training program.
Specifically. Management Observation forms, particularly from the
0)eration Department, provided direct feedback to the training program.
T1e inspectors: reviewed lesson plans developed and presented to the
operations personnel to address specific deficiencies identified by this
method.
Independent assessment of the Requalification Training Program was
provided-by the licensee's Quality Assurance Program. Audits conducted
in August 1996, and July 1997 concluded that the program was adecuately.
implemented.
Minor deficiencies identified in the 1996 audit hac been
addressed and corrected.
c.
Conclusions
The requalification program provided a mechanism for identifying areas
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of operator performance problems. The identified deficiencies were
addressed by appropriate changes in the training curriculum.
05.2 Simulator Evaluation
a.
Insoection Scong
The inspector reviewed the licensee's-evaluation for the dynamic
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simulator examinations on July 15 and July 29.
The crew consisted of
five licensed operators in the
Balance of Plant Operator (RO). position of Reactor Operator' (RO).
Extra or Common Operator (RO). Shift
Supervisor (SRO) and Unit Shift Supervisor (SRO).
The licensee
evaluators consisted of three training staff and one management
-representative.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Dynamic simulator evaluations were conducted in accordance with plant
procedure 60007-C. " Licensed Operator Requalification Examination
Guidelines." Revision 3.
This procedure re
(section 6.4), and Individual evaluations (quired Crew evaluations
section 6.5) during the-
operating test. The licensee recorded only the results of Crew
competencies unless performance deficiencies were noted.
Data sheet 7.
" Team Evaluation Summary." was the. record for performance and documented
grades as (Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory) for six separate crew
competencies matrixed by individuals.
Comments or observations
concerning.an individual were not recorded except for those operators
identified as having deficiencies.
The individual evaluations recorded
performance in eight competencies or categories.
Enclosure 2
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During the week of July 14. the inspectors observed two dynamic
simulator exercises administered to a single crew, and attended the
post-examination critique (debrief) presented to the crew by the
evaluators. The inspector observed several instances of communications
by the individual operators which did not meet the requirements of the
licensee's communications standard, procedure number 00004-C. " Plant
Communications." The standard required the use of repeat backs and
verification that the message was 3roperly received (three-part
communications).
The inspectors oaserved that each of the operators
exhit'ited several deficiencies in performing communications in
accordance with the established site standards.
However, since there
were no instances where communications caused a crew critical task to be
missed, the licensee evaluators marked all operators as " Satisfactory"
for the Communications competency. A satisfactory mark with no comments
implied that there were no deficiencies.
Therefore, there were no
requirements to document comments or observations in the evaluation
records.
The licensee's evaluators * critique did not develop the
specific instances of improper or incom)lete communications, but
generalized that communications should ae improved.
The simulator
examination documentation evaluations did not address improper
communications. The lack of individual evaluations failed to provide
direct. objective feedback to the concerned operators.
The evaluation
process took approximately 15 minutes followed by a debrief of the
crew, which lasted approximately 10 minutes.
The inspectors noted marked improvement in communications by crew
members during the scenarios performed on July 29.
The evaluation
process for the crew evaluated the morning of July 29 took.approximately
1-3/4 hours. The evaluators explained that this evaluation took longer
than the previous evaluations due to an observed deficiency which
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required further analysis and discussion by the evaluators.
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During the scenario a crew critical task, emergency borating in excess
of 30 gpm, was not performed satisfactorily.
The operator had allowed
the flow rate to drift slightly below 30 gpm to approximately 28 gpm for
several minutes.
The evaluators discussed whether the 30 g)m minimum
limit constituted a true limit below which the task should )e considered
as failed. After deciding to mark the operator competency
" Unsatisfactory" in the area of system response, the evaluators agreed
to evaluate the task further.
The inspectors found that the scenarios were not designed to ensure that
neither the Common R0 nor the Shift Suaervisor were sufficiently
challenged in all competency areas. T1ese individuals provided
oversight or supported the three individuals directly concerned with
shift duties and, as a result, there was little opportunity to evaluate
those individuals.
The licensee stated that these individuals are
rotated to one of the more actively involved positions on one of the two
scenarios, allowing ample opportunity for evaluation.
Enclosure 2
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The simulator scenarios were written to test crew competency.
There was
no systematic process to construct the scenarios to ensure that each of
the crew positions could be evaluated to demonstrate competency in each
evaluation category.
This could result in an individual receiving an
incomplete evaluation.
c.
Conclusions
The Requalification Program adequately evaluated licensed crews and
operators during the dynamic simulator portion of the operating tests.
However, the program only required individual evaluation comments and
observations to be recorded in instances where deficiencies were
associated with a crew critical task. This process discriminates
against recording (and tracking and trending) individual performance
deficiencies below the level which would cause an " Unsatisfactory"
competency rating.
The process of evaluating and documenting competencies was not effective
in identifying deficiencies below the threshold which causes a critical
crew task to be missed. When individual mistakes were identified,
developed, and presented at the criticues, documentation of those
deficiencies were not developed to aic in trending.
This precluded
identification of weaknesses or inadequacies until a critical failure
occurred.
The combination of crew-oriented simulator scenarios and
weaknesses in evaluation and documentation could result in an individual
not being thoroughly and objectively evaluated, and does-not provide the
feedback to properly implement the Systems Approach To Training (SAT).
A program weakness was identified in the documentation of individual
performance during simulator operating examinations.
Documentation-did
not include specifics of. minor-deficiencies, nor details that ensured
that all relevant competencies are evaluated for each individual.
05.3 Examination Develcoment
a.
Insoection Scope
The ins)ector reviewed the written examination administered to two R0s
and eig1t SR0s on June 12, 1997.
The examinations consisted of-25.
. questions, and administered with plant reference materials available.
-.The inspectors audited two dynamic simulator (DS) scenarios (2Z and 3Y),
administered to two R0s and two SR0s in one crew on July 15. 1997.
The
inspectors also witnessed DS 11 and DS 33 administered July 29.
On July 16. the inspector accompanied the licensee evaluator who
administered three simulator and four in-plant Job Performance Measures
The seven JPMs constituted a single " set."
Enclosure 2
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The inspector did not attend any sessions involving static simulator
evaluations.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The written examinations were satisfactory and tested on the appropriate
level of comprehension and analysis.
The examination items closely
followed the sample plan. There were no instances of " direct look-up"
identified.
All failed individuals were remediated.
The JPM set contained two JPMs which were not complex enough to
demonstrate an understanding of the operation being performed due to
their simplistic nature. JPM RQ-JP-23101-002-01. " Place Control Room
HVAC in Smoke Purae Mode." only required locating the appropriate
control room Janel, and aligning two switches identified in the
)rocedure.
J)M RQ-JP-60322-001-01. " Establish SFP Feed Path Following
_oss of CCW." only required the operator to locate and manipulate two
valves.
The remaining JPMs were appropriately discriminating, and
constituted a minimally adequate examination tool.
One individual
failed a JPM set.
The failed individual was remediated.
The simulator scenarios met the minimum standards for demonstrating
operator competency.
Scenario DS #13Y contained only two events that
effectively challenged the crew: " Charging Flow Control valve FV 121
Fails Closed", and a " Steam Generator Tube Rupture" complicated by a
loss of a single Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump. The scenario's single
required instrument failure. " Turbine : Impulse Channel Failure." did not
initiate a transient requiring action by an operator.
In effect, the
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failure only disabled the Steam Dumfs arming circuit.
This only
required that the operator select tle Steam Dump Control to " Steam
Pressure-Mode" to allow the system to respond to any future load
reduction transients. Another scenario event. " Failure of the Safety
' Injection System to Automatically Actuate." was addressed by activating
a manual actuation switch. This problem involved fairly simple
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recognition and response. Another weakness in the developed scenario
involved the lack of a challenging malfunction after entering the E0P.
There was a malfunction. but the malfunction did not create a condition
which influenced the operators' choice of mitigation strategy.
An E0P
transition was not required.
In effect, the exercise did not provide an
opportunity to evaluate the crew's ability to determine which mitigation
strategy should be used, which E0P should be used, or to transition
between E0Ps.
Since the dynamic simulator evaluation was biased toward crew
evaluations, scenarios were not developed with a full consideration of
ensuring that the Shift Supervisor and Common RO receive challenges
which were adequate to fully evaluate them while in that position.
This
required careful consideration in rotating assignments and full
documentation of how those competencies are observed.
The inspectors
considered the dynamic simulator scenarios deve'oped as part of the
Enclosure 2
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operating examination to be minimally adequate.
No crew critical tasks
were failed,
Four R0, three shift SRO, and 2 Staff SR0 individual
failures were identified and remediated.
c.
Cta.clusions
The written portion of the Requalification examination was considered
discriminating and valid.
The JPH set observed by the inspector contained examples of JPMs that
were not sufficiently discriminating to ensure that individuals with
performance deficiencies could be identified.
The JPM portion of the
examination was considered minimally adequate, but did not contain a
high level of difficulty or discrimination.
The simulator scenarios were considered minimally adequate, but did not
contain a high level of difficulty or discrimination.
Each scenario was
not fully developed to adequately evaluate each crew member's
competency, but together they were adequate as long as rotation of
assignments between scenarios was carefully controlled.
07
Quality Assurance in Operations
07.1 Plant Review Board (PRB) Meetinas (40500)
The inspectors attended PRB meetings on July 8 and 11, 1997.
The
meeting on July 8 was a normally scheduled PRB and the majority of the
items discussed were routine in nature,
included in the July 8 PRB
meeting was a review of an NRC question regarding lowering the
pressurizer safety valve setooint and the resultant effect on the plant
analysis concerning bulk boiling.
The meeting of July 8 also discussed
the licensee's proposed response to inspection report violations 50-424,
425/97-05-01 and 50-424, 425/97-05-02, concerning the unexpected
behavior of the Unit 2 containment sump level transmitter and the
appropriate LCO entered by the USS.
The-PRB discussions were thorough and appropriately focused on safety.
In particular, ine inspectors noted that questions raised by the PRB
enhanced the quality of the reviews.
Enclosure 2
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II.
Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 Maintenance Work Order Observations
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a.
Insoection Scoce (62707)
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The. inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities involving the
following work orders:
196015B6
Heater contact cutoff switch verification of proper
installation on control room heating, ventilating and
air conditioning (HVAC) filter unit
19602419
Inspect / lube air filter air handling unit
11531N7001M01
19702189
Spent fuel pool skimmer pump replacement
29502715
Auxiliary feedwater heat trace troubleshoot
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29701262
Motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) discharge to
steam generator number 2
29701673
Auxiliary building sup)ly fan
29701735
Replace handswitch on )oron thermal regenerative
system
29701802
Changeout power supply on 2RE12444: plant vent
radiation monitor
b,
Observations and Findinas
The observed maintenance activities were satisfactorily performed.
M1.2 Surveillance Observation
a.
Insnection Scone (61726)
The inspectors observed the performance or reviewed the following
surveillances and plant procedures:
14415-C
Fuel handling building post accident ventilation
actuation logic test
14546-2
Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump operability
test
14805-1
Residual heat removal inservice test (IST) and
response time test
14809-2
Engineered safety feature chill water pump IST
b.
Observations and Findinas
The observed surveillance activities were satisfactorily performed.
Enclosure 2
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III.
Enaineerina
E3
Engineering Procedures and Documentation (37551)
E3.1 h stina of Containment Soray (CS) Pumo Loaic
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's disposition of Deficiency Card
(DC) 1-97-311.
This DC was generated to address potential shortcomings
in the surveillance testing of the CS Jumps identified during the
licensee's review pursuant to Generic _etter (GL) 96-01. " Testing of
Safety-Related Logic Circuits." dated January 10, 1996.
The DC
documented several sequencer contacts in the CS pump control circuit
e
which were not tested by the licensee,
These contacts represented
supplemental starting times after the first sequencer starting time for
the pumps,
The inspectors reviewed documentation provided by the licensee which
documented that these contacts were not required and that there was no
'
impact in terms of the licensee's accident analysis.
No additional
followup is planned,
j
i
E8
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (37551)
'
E8.1
(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-424/95 27-02: Adequacy of Nuclear
Service Cooling Water (NSCW) Valve as Closed System Isolation Valve
Following additional review of this issue in response to Task Interface
Agreement (TIA) 96-05, this item is closed.
E8.2 (Closed) URI 50-425/97-06-01:
Monorail Beam Stored On 2A Centrifugal
.
Charging Pump (CCP)-Bedplate,
-
a.
Insoection Scoce
This item documented inspectors' concerns associated with the July 3,
1997, identification of a portion of the overhead monorail beam placed
4
,
in close proximity to the CCP 2A motor.
The inspectors reviewed
procedure 00352-C " Control of In-Process Materials " Revision 6. the
resulting DC, and an engineering evaluation of the as found condition,
b. 10bservations and Findinos
The beam was documented as being returned to its storage location
shortly after the inspectors * observation.
Tha inspectors independently
confirmed that the beam was removed from the motor area during a later
tour of the auxiliary building. The licensee's review of the event
failed to conclusively determine how the beam came to be placed by the
motor.
Enclosure 2
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The engineering evaluation concluded that the CCP remained operable with
the beam in its as-found condition.
The inspectors reviewed the b sis
-for this-conclusion and found it to be adequate.
Procedure 00352-C required actions-to protect against damage to safety-
related equipment during seismic events.
The procedure requires an
engineering evaluation or restraint / separation of equipment stored
adjacent to safety-related equipment.
The licensee was unable to
provide documentation that the observed beam location was previously
. evaluated.
Likewise, the separation of the beam did not meet the
restraint / separation requirements of procedure 00352 C.
c.
Conclusion
Storage of the monorail beam in close proximity to CCP 2A was contrary
to the requirements of procedure 00352-C.
However, consistent with
Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy this was identified as Non-
Cited Violation (NCV) 50-425/97-07-02, Improper Storage of Monorail Beam
Adjacent to CCP 2A Motor. Based on this action, URI 50-425/97-06-01 is
closed,
E8.3 (Closed) URI 50-424. 425/97-06 02: Testing of Parallel Circuits For Main
Steam isolation Valves (MSIVs)
This issue documented a potential-deficiency in the testing of MSIV
circuits identified during a review conducted pursuant to GL 96-01.
Based on a review of the MSIV electrical circuit design, the ins
determined that each valve handswitch (1/2-3007-A and 1/2-30078)pectors
contains two redundant parallel control circuits that close four MSIVs
(a total of eight valves per unit).
However, a review of system design
requirements indicated no requirement to have redundant circuits for
closure of the MSIVs. Technical Specifications (TSs) required that the
MSIVs close within a specified time and do not consider the method by
which they close.
However, as a result of this issue the licensee plans
to revise procedure 14240-1, " Manual Trip Actuation Device Operability
Test (TAD 0T)." Revision 1 and procedure 14240-2, " Manual Steamline
'
Isolation," Revision 2.
Based on this review, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's
actions are appropriate, This item is closed.
E8.4 Unclanned/Unmonitored Release from Unit 1 Eauioment Buildina
On July 28. 1997, an unplanned /unmonitored release from the Unit 1
equiament building occurred.
The release was due to an opening in the
fan 3elt housing of the containment mini-purge exhaust system.
Due to
sampling being performed on the volume control tank, elevated levels of
Enclosure 2
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activity were present in the plant ventilation ductwork.
The mini-purge
system exhausts to the plant ventilation.
However, due to system
operation with positive pressure and a resultant back flow through the
plant ductwork, the activity was released at the mini-purge fan opening.
This-release was recognized by thz licensee as a result of an alarm on a
portable monitor located inside the equipment building. A release
permit was subsequently generated as a result of this event.
This issue is identified as inspection Followu) Item (IFI) 50-424/97-07-
03. Unplanned /Unmonitored Release from Unit 1 Equipment Building.
IV.
Plant Suppott
R1
Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R1.1 Radioloqical Controls
a.
Insoection Scone (83750. 84750. 86750)
Radiological controls associated with radwaste processing and storage
areas, and primary chemistry laboratory facilities were reviewed and
evaluated by the inspectors.
The reviewed controls included area
)ostings, radioactive waste (radwaste) and material container labels.
ligh and locked-high radiation area controls and procedural guidance.
Established guidance and physical controls were compared against Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section (S) 12 details and documented
recairements in applicable sections of Technical Specifications (TSs)
anc 10 CFR Part 20.
The inspectors made tours of the radiologically controlled areas (RCAs)
associated with radwaste processing and storage facilities.
Procedural
guidance for on-going activities and associated survey records also were
reviewed and discussed with responsible Health Physics (HP) staff. The
inspectors directly observed technician Jerformance and discussed
radiation and contamination controls witlin the primary chemistry
laboratory,
b.
Observations and Findinas
Physical controls associated with radwaste storage areas were in
accordance with TS requirements. Area postings were proper and in
accordance with TS or 10 CFR 20 Subpart J requirements.
Containers
holding radwaste contaminated materials and equipment were labeled in
accordance with 10 CFR 20.1904 requirements.
Pro)er contamination and
radiation control practices were observed for teclnicians conducting
analyses within the priwy chemistry laboratory.
Enclosure 2
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c.
Conclusions
Radiation and contamination controls for radwaste processing and storage
areas and primary chemistry laboratory operations were appropriate and
in accordance with TS and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements.
R1.2 Dose Assessments
a.
Insnection Scooe (83740)
Licensee assessments and assignment of whole body or extremity shallow
dose equivalent (SDE) associated with selected contamination events from
January 1. 1996 through July 25. 1997, were reviewed and discussed.
Applicable records of exposure assumptions. radionuclide gamma
spectroscopy data and com)leted euluations fw the five maximum SDEs
assigned to workers for t1e reviewed period were evaluated and discussed
with cognizant licensee representatives.
In addition, dose records for
individuals involved in the reviewed contamination events were evaluated
for completeness and accuracy.
Licensee actions, assigned SDEs and records were compared against
established procedural guid6nce and 10 CFR-Part 20 dose limits and
reporting requirements.
~
b.
Observations and Findinas
The SDE assessments were conducted in accordance with procedure 44019 C.
" Dose Assessment Font F 9tamination and Immersion in Noble Gas."
Revision 10. dated l'ay 44, 1997.
Licensee assumptions regarding
location of radioactivt contamination or particles. shielding. exposure
times and radioisotope mixtures were appropriate.
Assigned doses for
the five maximum calculated SDEs were with 10 CFR Part 20 limits and
ranged from 2451 to 24.098 millirem (mrem).
The maximum doses were
associated with outage work conducted during the fall of 1996.
The
inspectors verified that the individuals' assigned SDEs were included in-
the appropriate NRC Form 5 records.
c.
Conclusions
The SDEs to workers from contamination events were evaluated properly,
were within 10 CFR Part 20,1201 limits and were recorded in accordance
with 10 CFR 20.2106. requirements.
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Enclosure 2
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R1,3 Radioactive Waste and Material Transnortation Activities
a.
Insnection Stone (86750. T12515/133)
The inspectors evaluated and discussed the licensee's current guidance
for radioactive material and waste packaging and transportation
arogram
activities.
Selected procedures and records associated with paccaging
and shipping of radioactive material and waste to either vendor
processing facilities or directly to a licensed burial facility were
reviewed and evaluated against recently revised 10 CFR Part 20,
49 CFR Parts 100 179 and 10 CFR Part 71 regulations.
Copies of shipping
records for the following transportation activities were reviewed in
detail.
Radwaste Shipment (RWS) Number (No) 97 001. Reportable Quantity
.
(RO) Radioactive Material, Low Specific Activity (LSA). n.o.s 7
UN-2912, Fissile Excepted, containing dewatered Ion Exchange Resin
(Bead) from Plant Demineralizer System, shipped July 14, 1997.
Radwaste Volume Reduction Shipment (RWVS) No.97-007. Radioactive
.
Material. Low Specific Activity. n.o.s.
7. UN 2912, 14 Drums of
High Rad trash, paper cloth, metal and filter media in a Type A
Package, shipped February 7, 1997.
RWVS No.97-015. Radioactive Material. LSA, n.o.s 7: UN-2912. Non-
.
compacted trash: shipped June 13, 1997.
Radioactive material shipment 97-01 002. Radioactive material.
.
Surface contaminated object, n.o.s. 7: UN-2913: Reactor coolant
pump, shipped January 10. 1997.
Radioactive material shi) ment 97-06-004. Radioactive material.
.
SCO 2, n.o.s 7. UN2913:
RCP Box: shipped June 19, 1997
Radioactive material shi > ment 97-07-002. Radioactive material.
.
SCO 2 n.o.s 7 UN2913: _ong-handled tools: shipped July 8. 1997.
The inspectors noted that for five of the six shipments reviewed,
licensee documentation did not meet the detailed shipping paper
requirements as specified in 49 CFR 172.200,
Identified documentation
errors included an example of failure to consecutively number shi) ping
pages; inconsistencies in shipment volume and in listed isotopes Jetween
separate pages of a shipping document: incorrectly including "LSA-2" and
"SCO 2" as part of the proper shipping names contrary to 49 CFR 172.101,
and failing to document LSA-Il for one shipment.
The inspectors
verified that for all shipments with documentation errors. the proper
isotopes and their quantities, material volumes, and radiation and
contamination surveys were used in determining transportation
categories, shipping containers and waste classifications, as
applicable.
From review of procedures and discussion of training with
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Enclosure 2
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responsible licensee representatives, the inspectors determined the
recent revisions to 49 CFR Department of Transportation (DOT)
regulations were incorporated appropriately into the transportation
program activities and that the identified issues resulted from
personnel errors in updating licensee computerized database spreadsheet
programs.
The inspectors identified the failure to complete shipping
paper documentation in accordance with-49 CFR 172.200 as a violation of
10 CFR 71.5 requirements. However, the inspectors noted that these
failures constituted a violation of minor safety significance and
consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement-Policy are being
identified as NCV 50 424.425/97 07 04. Failure To Meet 49 CFR 172.200
Shipping Paper Documentation Details in Accordance with 10 CFR 71.5
Requirements.
Licensee representatives reviewed additional shipments made since
January 1997 and found no significant document errors affecting
transportation or wast classification,
in addition, the licensee was
implementing use of an approved vendor computerized system to generate
radioactive material / waste ship)ing documents and burial manifest
records.
Initial training on t1e system was scheduled for August 7.
1997.
In addition, the licensee stated that the accuracy of shipment
records would be double verified for all shipments until the
computerized system is fully implemented.
c.
Conclusions
Licensee guidance and training incorporated recently revised
49 CFR Parts 100-179 and 10 CFR Part 71 regulations.
NCV 50 424.425/97-07-04 taas identified for failure to meet
49 CFR 172.200 shipping paper documentation details in accordance with
10 CFR 71.5 requirements.
R1.4 Primary and Secondary Coolant System Cold Chemistry
a.
Insnection Scone (84750)
Licensee activities for monitoring and managing primary and secondary
coolant cold chemistry parameters were reviewed and discussed.
The
inspectors toured primary and secondary chemistry laboratories,
secondary chemical addition room, and directly observed technicians
completing selected chemical analyses.
In addition, selected January 1.
1997 through July 25, 1997, primary and secondary cold chemistry data
trends were reviewed and discussed.
Parameters reviewed included Unit 1
(U1) and Unit 2 (U2) reactor coolant system (RCS) dissolved hydrogen.
lithium, dissolved oxygen, feedwater hydrazine. and steam generator
sodium and sulfate concentrations.
Licensee program activities and results were reviewed against applicable
TS. procedural requirements and industry standards.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
Housekeeping and cleanliness of the primary and secondary chemistry
laboratories and within the secondary chemical addition room were
adequate.
As required, secondary system on line analytical chemistry
instrumentation was verified to be operable.
Technicians in both the
primary and secondary chemistry laboratories were knowledgeable of
procedures and demonstrated proficiency in completing the selected
chemical analyses observed,
in general, the inspectors verified that primary and secondary coolant
analysis results were reviewed by technicians and management with
appropriate actions taken to maintain the chemical concentrations within
established limits.
Licensee representatives discussed chemistry
program initiatives and presented chemistry trend data demonstrating
improvements for steam generator sodium to chloride molar ratio control,
and reductions in potassium, sodium and iron transport,
c.
Conclusions
The primary and secondary coolant chemistry program was managed
appropriately and activities were implemented effectively.
R7
Quality Assurance in Radiation Protection and Chemistry Activities
R7,1 Audits and Self assessments
a,
Irdoection Stone (83750. 84750)
The inspectors reviewed and discussed results of health physics and
chemistry program assessments conducted since January 1, 1997.
The
inspectors evaluated the scope, thoroughness and status of corrective
actions for selected issues identified.
Health Physics (HP) and
Chemistry self-assessments. HP weekly area status checklists; chemistry
internal assessments, and performance monitoring reports were revieu d,
In particular, the inspectors reviewed and discussed the HP Department
February 3-7, 1997 Self-assessment and followup actions,
b,
Observations and rind _i_0_qi
The assessments consisted of interviews, record review and direct
observations by qualified personnel.
In particular, the inspectore
noted that the HP self-assessment team consisted of qualified site and
outside personnel, and involved review of separate HP program areas
including ALARA, contamination control, external radiation, personnel
dosimetry, Radiation Work Permit, Posting, labelling, solid radioactive
waste, and surveys and documentation.
The assessment was performance
based and the contents were appropriate sam)les of the program
attributes.
The inspectors verified that t1e findings were
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Enclosure 2_
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characterized appropriately % the report and were being tracked to
closure.
The inspectors noted that no programmatic issues were
identified within either the HP or chemistry self assessment activities,
c. -Conclusions
Chemistry and HP self assessments were performance based with no
programmatic issues identified.
Identified issues were tracked by
licensee representatives and resolved appropriately.
R7.2 Primary and Secondary Chemistry 00ality Control Activities
a.
Insoection Scone (84750)
The inspectors reviewed selected calibration and January 1. through
July 25. 1997, quality control (0C) data records associated with primary
and in-line secondary system chemistry measurements.
Program
implementation and adecuacy of results were compared against
specifications detailec in approved procedures and schedules,
b.
Observations and Findinas
in general, licensee activities to verify analytical instrument accuracy
were conducted in accordance with approved schedules and procedures
31001-C. " Chemistry Control Charts.
Revision 5. 34000-C. "0)eration and
Calibration of Process Monitors." Revision 8, and 31010-C. ")rocess
Analyzer Calibration Scheduling Program." Revision 12.
Completion of
acceptable calibrations of selected analytical instruments used for
oxygen, hydrazine and sodium analyses were verified.
To demonstrate in-
line instrument accuracy comparisons of in-line monitors with grab
sample bench-top analysis results were conducted at the required
frequencies or subsequent to instrument recalibration.
However, during
review of QC trend data records for the primary chemistry and laboratory
counting room, the inspectors noted that OC trending and anomaly reports
were inconsistently implemented by the technician staff.
For example,
in use boron analyses control charts were missing data and selected
gamma-spectroscopy systems QC trend data which trended above the
established mean did not result in Anomaly Reports being issued on a
consistent basis.
From review of selected data and discussions with
technicians and supervisors. the inspectors verified that the required
OC analyses and re analyses were Jerformed and met estchlished
procedural acceptance criteria,
lowever, the inspectors identified the
lack of consistently implementing all details of the QC program as an
area for improvement.
The inspectors informed licensee representatives
that OC program implementation would be considered an IFl 50 424.425/97-
07-05. Review Licensee Actions to Improve Implementation of Chemistry QC
Program Details.
Enclosure 2
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c.
Conclusions
in general, licensee OC primary and secondary OC activities verified
accuracy of analytical measurements.
One IFl was identified to review
implementation of chemistry QC data trending and Anomaly Report
issuance.
R8
Hiscellaneous Radiation Protection and Chemistry Issues (84750)
R8.1
(Closed) URI 50-424.425/97-02-03: evaluate commitments and radiation
monitor sensitivity to meet NUREG 0737 Table ll.F.1-3 Containment High
Range Monitor Requirements.
Licensee audit findings documented in Safety Audit Engineer Review
(SAER) audit report VSAER 97-016, dated February 7, 1997, documented
that electronic calibrations of the containment high range monitors were
not conducted for all range decades above 10 Roentgens per hour (R/hr)
as specified in NUREG 0737, Table ll.F.31.
Subsequent reviews also
identified that the strength of the in situ calibration source exceeded
the specified range of 1 -10 R/hr, and the inspectors cuestioned whether
the monitors met the required sensitivity, (i.e.,1 rac per hour,
s )eci fied. ) The inspectors noted that FSAR Section 7,5,4-2 specified
t1at containment area radiation monitors were in conformance with
NUREG-0737, ll.F,1, Attachment 3.
From review and discussion of
applicable vendor documents, the inspectors verified that the
containment high range monitor sensitivity met NUREG 0737 Table ll.F.1-3
requirements and the calibration source was in accordance with vendor
specifications. Although, documentation errors in electronic signal
limits were noted, data for completion of electronic signal calibration
testing were accurate and testing was completed successfully in February
1997 for both units.
Current revisiens to surveillance procedures
24625-1, " Containment High Range Area Monitor 1RX-005 Analog 0)erational
Test and Channel Calibration." and 24625 2. " Containment High
Range Area
Monitor 2RX-005 Analog Operational Test and Channel Calibration,"
'
specify the appropriate electronic calibration limit values.
The
licensee initiated licensing Document Change Request FS97-047. which
would update FSAR Table 7,5,4-2 to allow source calibration of the CHRMs
in accordance with the vendor recommendations.
Consistent with Section
IV of the Enforcement Policy and based on corrective actions taken prior
to the end of the inspection, the identified issues regarding the
containment high range monitor calibration was identified as a non-cited
violation (NCV) 50-424.425/97-07 06. Failure to Meet NUREG-0737
Requirements for Containment High Range Monitors.
Enclosure 2
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S2
Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
S2.1 Vital Area Barriers
a.
Insoection Scone (81700) (71750)
The inspector evaluated the licensee's com)ensatory actions for a
degraded vital area barrier at the Unit 1 Jiesel Generator (DG)
Building.
The inspector reviewed the Physical Security Plan (PSP).
specific building drawings, and security procedures associated with the
DG building.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On July 7, 1997, maintenarce activities on the DG controls inadvertently
caLsed a fuel oil spill to occur.
Maintenance Work Order 19702156 was
generated on July 8, 1997, to request support and equipment to clean up_
the fuel oil outside DG 18 and from inside the IB day tank vent room.
The licensee's PSP, Amendment 34, dated April 28, 1997, Table 4 1,
designates the Unit 1 and 2 DG buildings and their controls as vital
areas.
Licensee Drawing AX1002FA06, Revision 0, dated 1988, designates
the outermost boundary of the Unit 1 and 2 OG buildings as a vital
barrier.
Licensee procedt're 90106-C. Revision 22. dated August 6,1996,
Section 4.7 states in part, that decreased effectiveness of physical
barriers shall be compensated for by posting armed nuclear security
officers.
On July 8, a vital area barrier to the IB day tank vent room was removed
to allow efficient cleanup of the fuel oil in this area.
The barrier
consisted of steel louvers and rebar,
The inspector determined that on
July 8. prior to removing the day tank vent room vital area barrier,
security pre posted the area with an armed officer. However,
approximately 15 minutes later, upon inspection by the licensee, it was
determined that "no unauthorized entry could be gained to the components
of the building," The compensatory post was released upon this
determination.
However, increased surveillance checks were initiated on
the building.
Subsequently, the licensee failed to compensate for a
decrease in effectiveness of a vital area barrier for approximately 19
hours with an armed security officer.
On July 24 the inspector performed a walkdown of the Unit 1 DG building
and verified there were no openings in the IB day tank vent room greater
than allowed by the PSP.
The inspector noted that the area was secured
and all barriers were in place.
The licensee initiated a Request for Engineering Review (97-0264) dated
July 16.-1997. to determine whether all protected and vital area
barriers currently in place were required by security commitments in
addition to ensuring appropriate plant drawings reflect actual barrier
locations.
Enclosure 2
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c.
Conclusion
Through observation. discussion with licensee representatives, and
document review the inspector identified a violation for failure to
compensate for a decrease in effectiveness of the IB day tank vent room
barrier.
This is identified as VIO 50 424/97-07-07. Failure To Take
Compensatory Actions For A Decrease in Effectiveness Of A Vital Area
Barrier.
Y. Manacement Meetinas and Other Areas
X
Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
A recent discovery of a licensee o)erating its facility in a manner
contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a special
focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or
parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections
discussed in this re) ort. the inspectors reviewed the applicable
portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected.
The
inspectors verifled that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the
observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters.
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on August 7.1997.
The
licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified.
X2
Other NRC Personnel On Site
On July 16 and 17. Mr. L. Wheeler and Mr. H. Berkow of NRR. met with the
licensee to discuss various topics.
X3
NRC Interface Meeting with Southern Nuclear
On July 31. 1997, the NRC met with representatives of Southern Nuclear
Company (SNC) management in Birmingham. Alabama, to discuss the plant
status and major issues for the three nuclear power plants: Farley.
Hatch, and Vogtle.
In addition.
Mr. L. Reyes, presentations by the NRC Regional Administrator.
and the Director of Reactor Projects. Mr. J. Johnson, were
made.
Enclosure 2
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X4
Local Public Document (PDR) Review
On July 9, 1997, the inspectors visited the Vogtle PDR located at the
Burke County Public Library in Waynesboro, Georgia.
During the visit,
the inspectors reviewed the status of the collection and discussed the
operation of the PDR with the local custodian.
Using available indexes in the PDR, the inspectors retrieved several
randomly selected documents,
The microfiche printer was in good working
order and produced legible copies. The inspectors noted that there were
five unopened envelopes from the NRC on the shelves of the collection.
The oldest envelope was postmarked June 27, 1997.
The inspectors also
noted ten unfiled NRC weekly accession lists. The custodian indicated
that she files NRC documents as time permits and that there was no other
unopened mail.
She also indicated that visitors to the PDR are rare and
are usually NRC personnel.
The custodian indicated that she contacts
NRC headquarters personnel responsible for the PDR when questions arise.
-The custodian demonstrated the library's internet link to the NRC home
page.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
J. Beasley. Nuclear Plant General Manager
J. Gasser, Plant Operations Assistant General Manager
S. Chestnut, Operations Marager
W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support
K. Holmes, Manager Maintenance
1. Kochery, Health Physics Superintendent
A. Parton, Chemistry Superintendent
K. Duquette, Plant Health Physicist
M. Sheibani, Supervisor, Nuclear Safety and Compliance
C. Stinespring Manager Plant Administration
M. Griffis, Manager P1 ant Modifications and Maintenance
C. Tippins, Jr., Nuclear Specialist 1
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls In Identifying,
Resolving, and Preventing Problems
'
IP 61726:
Surveillance Observation
IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
IP 81700:
Physical Security Program For Power Reactors
IP 83750:
Occupational Radiation Exposure
Enclosure 2
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IP 84750:
Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental
Monitoring
IP 86750:
Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of
Radioactive Materials
Tl 2515/133:
Implementation of Revised 49 CFR Parts 100-170 and
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Onened
50-424/97-07-01
Failure to Document Entry into Proper Action Condition
following Airlock Maintenance (Section 02.2).
50 425/97-07-02
Improper Storage of Monorail Beam Adjacent to CCP 2A
Motor (Section E8.2).
50 424/97-07 03
IFl
Unplanned /Unmonitored Release From Unit 1 Equipment
Building (Section E8.4).
50 424, 425/
Failure To Meet 49 CFR 172.200 Shipping Paper
97-07 04
Documentation Details in Accordance With 10 CFR 71.5
Requirements (Section Rl.3).
50 424. 425/
IFl
Review Licensee Actions To im
Chemistry QC Program-Details prove implementation Of
97 07 05
(Section-R7.2).
50-424, 425/
Failure To Meet NUREG 0737 Requirements For
97-07 06
Containment High Range Monitors (Section R8.1).
50-424/97 07-07
V10
Failure to Take Compensatory Actions For A Decrease In
Effectiveness of A Vital Area Barrier (Section S2,1).
Closed-
50-424/95-27-02
URI .
Adequacy of Nuclear. Service Cooling Water Valve as
Closed System Isolation Valve (Section E8.1).
50-425/97 06-01
Monorail Beam Stored On-2A Centrifugal Charging Pump-
(CCP) Bedplate (Section E8.2).
50-425/97-07-02
Improper Storage of Monorail Beam Adjacent to CCP 2A
Motor (Section E8.2).
50-424. 425/
Testing-of Parallel Circuits For MSIVs (Section E8.3).
97-06 02
50-424. 425/
Failure To Meet 49 CFi,172.200 Shipping Paper
97-07-04-
Documentation Details In Accordance-With 10 CFR 71.5
Requirements (Section R1.3).
Enclosure 2
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.
.
4
4
l
25.
50-424. 425/
Evaluate Licensee Commitments And Monitor
97 02 03
Sensitivity To Meet NUREG 0737 Table II.F.3-1
Containment High Range Monitor Requirements
(Section R8.1).
50 424. 425/
Failure To Meet NUREG 0737 Requirements For
97-07-06
Containment High Range Monitors (Section R8.1).
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Enclosure 2
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. _ _ _ _ .
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.
.