IR 05000425/1989004

Insp Rept 50-425/89-04 on 880109-12.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fire Prevention & Protection & Review of Previously Identified NRC Open Items

ML20235N661
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	02/15/1989
From:	Conlon T, Harris J, Ward D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235N653	List: IR 05000425/1989004 ML20235N652
References
50-425-89-04, 50-425-89-4, NUDOCS 8903010322
Download: ML20235N661 (12)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ - - -

:. f $',  "'%       j 3 '"  4   UNITED STATES    ]

j- -j

      .

NUCt. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  '

g * ., REGION ll

  [  101 MARIETTA ST ?g.. ,. , .

ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323 Report No.: ;50-425/89-04 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. 0. Box 1295-Birmingham, AL 35201

'

Docket No.: 50-425 License No.: CPPR-109 Facility Name: Vogtle Inspection Conducted: January.9-12, 1988 Inspectors: . - A4 m , 8[[

       -Date Sf'gned

J. R. . Harris

    -

lAA l$ $9 Date Signed hD.C. Ward Approved by: C /#7/ #2-/69 77 T. - E. Conlon, Chief . Date Signed Plant Systems Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This 4 outine announced inspection was conducted in the . areas of fire prevent'on/ protection and the review of previously identified NRC open fttm Results: In the ataas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie Strengths and weaknesses are summarized below Strengths

   - The licensee has developed Pre-Fire Plans for Unit 2 which provide adequate firefighting guidance to the fire brigade in Ur.it 2 areas. This demonstrates a clear understanding by the licensee of the NRC guidance in this are Weakness
   - Although the licensee's staff was very responsive to NRC initiatives during this inspection, the licensee's actions on l    two previously identified open items (IFI's 50-425-59-07   .

and-10) discussed in Paragraph 3 of this report were not i completed when the inspectors arrived. These items were clearly identified in the previous NRC inspection report; however, the s903010322 s90215 b FDR ADOCK 050cc l l _________.____._____._____________________________j _

__-__- -.

 .- .
       ,
 - .     .l
.  ,
  ,
 ,

inspectors.found that corrective actions had not been implemente The licensee took immediate action to close out' these items, but it is not clear that the licensee was closely ' tracking the status and resolution of these previously identified item l i j

       ;

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ._ _ 1

* '
. .
.
*
.

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

*T. Dobbins, Unit 2 Construction      ,
*C. Garrett, Operations Engineer      l
*J. Greene, Manager, Plant Support
*E. Groover, Manager, Construction QA
*S. Hall, Procedures Support
*H. Handfinger, Manager, Project Startup      ,
*C. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance
*M. Larson, Bechtel, Fire Protection Group Leader
*J. Maddry, Manager, SCS, Fire Protection
*H. Morris, Project Compliance
*W. Nicklin, Supervisor, Compliance
*R. Sprankle, Senior Engineer, Fire Protection
*J. Swartzwelder, Manager, NSAC
*N. Varnadoe, Supervisor, Plant Engin6ering Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspectors
*R. Aiello, Resident Inspector
*C. Burger, Resident Inspector
*J. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector
*J. Hopkins, NRR Licensing Project Engineer Fire Protection / Prevention Program (64704) Fire Prevention / Administration Control Procedures The inspectors reviewed the following fire Prevention / Administrative procedure Procedures  Ti tle 92000-C  Fire Protection Program 920005-C  Fire Response Procedure 92010-C  Inclusion of Unit 2 in Areas To be Inspected 92015C-C  Transient Combustible Control 92020-C  Control of Ignition Sources

-

    . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . - _ _ _ _ . __ _______ ___ _ ________

      - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
.
*
.' .
.
'
.

, Procedures Title (cont'd) 92025-C Fire Protection Surveillance Program 92026-C Fire Protection Work Evaluation 92027-C Fire Watch Program 92030-C Fire Drill Program 92035-C Fire Protection Operability Requirements 92040-C Fire Protection LC0 Program This review indicated.that the following procedures were completed, 92000-C, 92005-C, 92020-C, 92027-C and 92030-C, and that the follwing procedures were being reviewed for approval 92010-C, 92015-C, 92025-C, 92026-C, 92035-C and 92040- Based on this review it appears that the above procedures which were completed meet the NRC Guidelines of NUREG 8000, Section 9.5.1. The procedures which were not completed will be reviewed during future inspections, Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures The inspectors reviewed the following Fire Protection System Surveillance Procedures: Procedure N Title 92403-C Hydrant Hose House monthly Insp?ction 92424-C Fire Doors Semi Annual Inspection 92441-C Normally Inaccessible Suppression valves, Eighteen Month Inspection 92447-C Fire Suppression System Eighteenth Month Flush 92431-C Deluge System Annual Visual Inspection and cleaning 92407-C Halon system Monthly Visual inspection 92433-C Fire Hydrant Annual flow check and Hose Hydro Inspection _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

..
*   *
  .  .

t . s

    "
  ..

Procedure N Title (cont'd) 92441-C Normally Inaccessible Suppression Systems valve Eighteenth Month Cycle ,. The above surveillance procedures were reviewed to determine if the F various . test outlines and . inspection instructions adequately implement the surveillance requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications. In addition these procedures were reviewed to determine if the inspection and test instructions followed general industry fire protection practices, NRC fire protection program guidelines and the guide lines of the National Fire Protection Associated (NFPA) Fire Codes. Based on this review it appears that the above procedures were satisfactor Fire Brigade-(1). Organization The total station fire brigade is composed of approximated 85 personnel . from the operations staff. The on duty shift fire brigade leader is one of the licensed operators and the remaining four . fire brigade members are composed of plant equipment operators. The inspectors reviewed the on duty shifts for January 1989 and verified that sufficient qualified' fire brigade personnel were on duty to meet the provisions of the plant's Technical Specifications and VEGP FSA (2) The inspectors reviewed the training and drill records for six - brigade leaders and eleven brigade members for the calendar year 198 The records indicated that each of these leaders and members attended the required training _and had participated in the required number of drills. The inspectors also verified - that a fire brigade drill had been conducted every three months  ; for each shift for the first quarter 1988 through fourth quarter 198 The fire brigade training records which were inspected were found satisfactory (3) Fire Brigade Fire Fighting Preplans 92701-2 Unit 2 Zone 1 Auxiliary Building Level A Spray Tank 92702-2 Zone 2 Auxiliary Building Level D Switchgear l 2AB15 92723-2 Zone 23 Auxiliary Building Electrical Chase Room j

          ,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _

-
*
.' .
 .
 '
.

92764-2 Zone 64 Control Building Level B 92772-2 Zone 72 Control Building Level B 927798-2 Zone 79B Control Building Level B i 92793-2 Zone 93 Control Building Level A 92799-2 Zone 99 Control Building Level A Based on this review the inspector determined that the above fire fighting preplans adequately addressed the fire hazards in the area, the type of extinguishants to be utilized, the direction of attack, systems in the room / area to be managed in order to reduce the fire damage, heat sensitive equipment in the room / area, and Specific fire brigade duties with regard to smoke control and salvag . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702) (Closed) IFI 88-59-0 , Review Three Hour Raceway Fire Barrier and Radiant Energy Shield Installations. The inspectors examined the following raceway fire barrier and radiant shield installations: Raceway Building 2DE4430XJ02 Auxiliary Building 2DE443XXJ01 Auxiliary Building 2CE442RX294 Auxiliary Building 2DE350TXAH Control Building 2DE350TQAG Control Building 2DF350RX142 Control Bui1 ding 2DE350RQ127 Control Building 2DE350RQ210 Control Building 2DE350RX145 Control Building 2BE350TLAM Control Building 2BE350RX286 Control Building 2BE350RR218 Control Building 2BE350RS323 Control Building 2BE350RS077 Control Building 2BE350RS136 Control Building 2CE361HPH01 Control Building 2CE261HXH02 Control Building 2CE340HXH02 Control Building 2CE340HXH02 Control Building 2CE342RX135 Control Bullding 2AE352RL368 Control Building 2BE352RL369 Control Building 2AE53AHXJ95 Containment 2AE53ARX321 Containment 2ARJB0056 Containment . _ . . .

  . _- _  - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ .
 .

I

. .

y ,

-
 .
 .-      :
 ,

H 5 Raceway Building

(cont'd)

2AE53ARX323' Containment 2BE53BHXJ01 Containment 2BRJB0050 Containment 2BE532RX065 Containment 2BE52AHXJ98 Containment Review-of the above three hour raceway fire barriers and radiant' energy shield indicated that the Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier Installation was installed in accordance with procedure requirement l (Closed) URI 50-425/88-59-02, Justification of Embedded Conduit for Safety Shutdown Cable Separatio By letter dated December 14, 1988 the licensee submitted a justification for the adequacy of fire barriers separation for embedded' conduits containing safe shut down cable By memorandum dated February 9, 1989, NRC/NRR issued Supplementary Safety Evaluation Report No. 8 for Plant Vogtle - ' regarding this issue. This safety evaluation accepts the licensee's justification 'and evaluation for the adequacy of fire barriers for safe shutdown cables in embedded conduit Therefore,.this item is ,

       '

close (Closed) IFI 50-425/88-59-03, Review of Halon System Discharge Test Dat During the NRC inspection conducted October 17-20, 1988 (Inspection Report 88-59), it was identified that only one of the three halon systems installed in Unit 2 had successfully passed the preoperational test. Therefore the subject item was opene The inspectors reviewed the halon system discharge test data for system 2-2304-R4-001 and 2-2304-R4-003 and found that each protected area reached the minimum five percent (5%) halon concentration and the concentration was maintained for ten minutes. Therefore this item is considered close (Closed) IFI 50-425/88-59-04, FSAR Change to Clarify Statement Regarding Parallel Wiring of Fire Detectors. This item was opened to insure that the statement in section 9.5 1.2.3.2 of the VEGP FSAR regarding parallel wiring of fire detectors is revised to clarify that the statement only applied to Unit l The inspectors reviewed FSAR Change Notice 690 and found the clarifi-cation was added'to the VEGP FSAR as part of Amendment 3 (Closed) IFI 50-423/88-59-05, Verify that Corrective Actions for Batteries A, B, C, and D are complet This item was opened to j ensure the breakers for the A, B, C, and D batte 's sere coordinated with their feeder breaker l - _ _ _ _-

    . _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -

-
*
.' .
.
 .

In response to this item the licensee issued Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 28818364 which recalibrates breakers 2AD1-05, 2BD1-05, 2001-01, 2001-11, 2DD1-01 and 2DD1-08 to provide the necessary breaker coordination. This MWO was completed December 13, 1988. However, in reviewing the preoperational testing on the recalibrates breakers with the inspectors, the licensee identified that breakers 2AD1-05 and 2BD1-05 did not appear to have been tested at the proper curren Breaker 2AD1-05 and 2BD1-05 for Short Time Trip Test were to be conducted at 1000 percent (%) of the Longtime Pickup, 407.5 Amps, or approximately 4000 Amps. However, the test data sheets showed that the test was run at 8000 Amp The licensee issued Operations Deficiency Report (00R) T-2-89-51 to document this apparent deficienc In addition, the licensee conducted a detailed review of the test data in the MW0 package and interviewed the technicians who conducted 'i the tes Based on the information obtained in the review, the licensee believed that the breakers were tested at the correct current, 4000 Amps, but the incorrect value had been inadvertently written on the test data shee In order to confirm this the licensee issued MWO 28820447 to reverify the breaker setting ,

       !

At the time of the exit interview MWO 28820447 had not been complete On January 24, 1989, licensee representative M. Larson  ; contacted the Region II office and notified the inspectors that the ' breakers had been set properly and the test current had been annotated incorrectly. Therefore, this item is considered close , (Closed)IFI 50-425/88-59-07, Review Procedure 17013-C to Insure that Additional PORV DC Circuit Breaker Operations are Identified. At the time of the 88-59 inspection, Procedure 17103-C, Annunciator Response Procedures for Fire Alarm Computer, had not been revised to identify operation actions required for Unit 2 postfire safe shutdown for fires in certain plant area Therefore the subject item regarding the PORV DC circuit breakers operation was identifie In reviewing revision 3 of Procedure 17103-C the inspectors found that the required operators actions for the PORC DC circuit breakers had not been incorporated into the procedure. In response to this finding, the licensee immediately issued a Temporary Change to Procedure Fonn (TCP No. 17103-C-3-89-1) to include the required cperator action In addition during the exit meeting the licensee stated the TCP would be incorporated into the procedure permanently within two weeks. Therefore, this item is considered close (Closed) IFI 50-425/88-59-08, Verify that the DG Frequency Setpoints is set at 57 HM This item was identified to ensure that possibility of spurious signals causing a run back of a diesel generator speed controller during a control room fire was addressed in Unit 2. On Unit 1 a mechanical run back is set to stop when the frequency falls to 57 HMertz (Hz).

l l - _ _ _ ___ _ _ . __. __

 . . .
 ,  ,
 . .
  .
  , *
 ,
      .7 In response to this item, Field Change Request (FCR) M-FCR-19d7 was issued to set the frequency limits for the motor operated pctentio-meter to 57.3 Hz on the Unit 2 diesel generator This item is considered close (Closed) UNR 50-425/88-59-09, Review Single Failure Criteria.for the VCT Outlet Valve This item was opened to address the concern that a spurious. closure of the VCT outlet valve in a control room fire-concurrent with a ' Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) could result in damages to the centrifugal charging pumps. With a LOP both charging pumps'

start and with a spurious closure of the VCT outlet valve .the pumps would be operating without a suction suppl Region . II inspectors discussions with NRR indicate that in Supplement No. -4- to the Vogtle, Units 1 and 2 Safety Evaluation Report (3SER'4), the scenario of a fire induced spurious closure of an isolation valve between the VCT and the charging pumps, coupled with simultaneous loss of offsite power (which signals both charging pumps to. start) was specifically identified and evaluated. The NRC, staff accepted the Vogtle Appendix R alternate shutdown proposal thatLthe potential consequences of the VCT outlet valve spurious closure can be mitigated by swithover to Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) prior to control room evacuation, and the low probabilit of the . isolation valve closure prior to swithover from the remote shutdown' panels if the action could not be performed in the control

   . room before evacuation. As identified in SSER 4, the licensee's procedures were to identify that if the action is not performed before leaving the control room, the action should be done at the remote shutdown panel on a timely basi Based on this. information the  inspectors verified that Abnormal Operating Procedure (A0P) 18038-2, Operation From Remote Shutdown Panels, contained a step to realign the charging pump suction from the VCT to the RWST prior-to control room evacuatio Step 2.a of A0P 18038-2 instructs the control _ room operators to realign the charging pump suction from the VCT to RWST. Therefore, this item is considered close (Closed) IFI 50-425/88-59-10 Review of Identified Marginal Emergency Lighting for Safe Shutdow In following up on this item the inspectors verified that the emergency lighting was installed in the following locations:

'

   (a) Aux. Bldg Room C25 to allow opening HV-0006 and locally shutting HV-88044 and FV-061 (b) Aux Bldg Room C26 to allow locally opening FV-0611 and HV-0607 and locally shutting HV-8804B and FV-0619 (c) Aux' Bldg Room C27 to allow throttling 1205-V4-019 and access to rooms C25'and C26 I

i

        >

C__m__._____________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

_ _ _ . _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

 .

y

 ..  .

c ._s

   (d) Aux Bldg: Room C27 to allow throttling 1205-U4-020 and access to
     .

rooms C25 and C26

    '

   .(e) . Readjust light in Control Bldg Room 826 to allow better lighting in RHR valve inverter to perform 18038-2 step.49 (f) Readjust light in Control . Bldg Room B31 to allow better lighting to HR valve inverter to perform 18038-2' step 49
   '(g) Readjust light in Control Bldg Room A79. to allow better lighting to RHR valve breaker to perform 18038-2 step 49
    ~
   (h)~ Readjust light in Control Bldg Room 801 to allow better lighting  !

in RHR valve breaker to perform 18038-2 step 49 (i) Add lights in Control Bldg MS valve room A09 to allow locally ' 1 closing Hv-5132 and Hv-5134 as required in 17103-2 Tabl l The inspector walked down. the above areas to verify that the above emergency lighting was properly installed. During the inspection the-inspector noticed that the emergency lighting was not installed in room A09 of the control buildin The licensee , indicated thi lighting would be installed and the NRC Resident Inspector indicated- i that he would inspect the emergency lighting to verify its- proper

         '

installatio Discussions with the . NRC Resident Inspector on - January 17 indicated that 'the emergency lighting' was properly _ installe (Closed) IFI 50-425/88-59-11, Review of Licensee's Actions . for Discrepancies Between A0P Safe Shutdown Controls and Equipment Lis ! This item was opened to review the basis for differences between manual operator action locations described in the. safe shutdown . equipment list (FSAR Table 9.5-1 or the Bechtel SSD Control Station) and those in A0P 18038- In response to this item, the licensee evaluated the differences in the list and A0P. .This evaluation is documented in a Georgia Power memorandum dated January 12, 1989, Log No.'N0P-00:05. The licensee's evaluation states that all operator actions required by the safe shutdown equipment. list are incorporated in the A0P. Additional steps are provided in the procedure which are considered " prudent" if the equipment to be operated is available. These additional steps are not required to bring the plant to hot standby and if they cannot be performed will not affect the ability to achieve safe shutdow In addition the licensee's staff determined if' adequate emergency , lighting is provided for those " prudent" steps which are not at the ' discretion of the shift supervisor to perfor j Based on the inspectors review of the licensee's evaluation, this ! item is considered close ' ' ' ' ' ' '

 -_-_--._.--__----.a  -.

..
.  .
..
  .
   
                '

i (Closed) DEV 50-425/88-32-01, Failure to Maintain Manual Fire Hose Suppression Capability for the Unit 2 Control Room. The licensee had made a written commitment to maintain the Unit 2 fire hose cabinet, 197, immediately adjacent to the control room entrance operable during Unit 2 construction. This hose station was found to not be maintained and therefore a Notice of Deviation (N00) was issued to the license In their response to the N0D, the licensee committed to perform ( weekly inspections of this hose station to insure it was properly i

                '

maintained. The inspectors reviewed a sample of these inspections for November 1988 and found that hose station 197 had been inspected weekl In addition the inspectors inspected the hose station and h found that it appeared to be properly maintained. Therefore, this l I item is considered close . (Closed) CDR 88-145, Unit 2 Foam Penetration Seals found Not to be Water Tight. As a result of penetration seal leakage identified on Unit 1 upper cable spreading room floor, Georgia Power Company performed a series of water leakage tests on the Unit 2 upper cable spreading room seals. These tests combined with the Unit I tests demonstrated that water could leak between the concrete and the embedded angle around the penetration, that water could seep between the foam and the structures in the corners of square or rectangular penetrations, and that water could seep between a tight group of cables penetrating the seal. As a result of this CDR all floor penetration seal assemblies in the Unit 2 upper cable spreading room have been repaired to a watertight condition. This includes approxi-mately 110 seals. Other potentially affected seals outside the upper cable spreading room included sealing of penetration in the Unit 2 Control Building During this inspection the inspector verified that the following penetrations in the Unit 2 upper cable spreading room and control building were properly sealed and reviewed records verifying that the work was done properl NE399HRSLO2 Upper Cable Spreading Room 2NE399HRSLO3 Upper Cable Spreading Room 2NE399HRSL04 Upper Cable Spreading Room 2NE399HRSL05 Upper Cable Spreading Room 2NE343TQLA Upper Cable Spreading Room 2NE399HRSL06 Upper Cable Spreading Room 2NEC43TXNAVA Upper Cable Spreading Room 2BE349 HRS 07 Upper Cable Spreading Room 211-262B Unit 2 Control Building 211-2658 Unit 2 Control Building 211-2558 Unit 2 Control Building 211-2598 Unit 2 Control Building 211-2668 Unit 2 Control Building i _ - - - - - _ _ . - - - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ _

i

,

,
. ,

211-2698 Unit 2 Control Building 211-270B Unit 2 Control Building 211-28SB Unit 2 Control Building 211-288B Unit 2 Control Building 211-2898 Unit 2 Control Building 211-2928 Unit 2 Control Building 211-2958 Unit 2 Control Building 211-2998 Unit 2 Control Building i Unit 2 Control Building i 211-302B Review of the above installed penetrations and records indicated that proper corrective actions were taken on CDR 88-145. This item is close . Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 12, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . }}