ML20059B595
| ML20059B595 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1993 |
| From: | Balmain P, Brian Bonser, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059B519 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-93-26, 50-425-93-26, NUDOCS 9401040192 | |
| Download: ML20059B595 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1993026
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGloN H
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101 MAR!ETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
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ATLANTA, GEORGtA 30323-0199
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Report Nos.:
50-424/93-26 and 50-425/93-26
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201
Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425
License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted: October 24, 1993 - November 20, 1993
Inspector:
47je4////w
/h ' /3 'O
p . R. Qg#ser, Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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R.D.Styey,ResidentInspector
Date Signed
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P'. A. Balmay Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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Approved by:_
p A P. Skinner, Chief
Date Signed
Reactor Projects Section 3B
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, inspection entailed inspection in the following
areas: plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, fire
protection, and followup of open items.
Results:
One violation was identified.
During this inspection period the inspectors noted a declining
trend in housekeeping in the auxiliary building. The licensee
acknowledged this trend and has initiated corrective action
(paragraph 2a).
The violation involved a failure to follow a containment exit
inspection procedure. Maintenance workers after completing work
on a Unit 2 reactor coolant drain tank pump left loose material on
the containment floor when they exited containment. An exit
inspection had been completed, however, documenting that they were
responsible for all areas encountered in containment and that
there was no loose debris present in those areas that could be
9401040192 931214
ADOCK 0500
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transported to the containment sump. The inspectors also-
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concluded that a contributing cause to this violation was a
weakness in the licensee's containment entry / exit program for non-
licensed personnel (paragraph 2d).
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The inspectors identified.a positive trend in procedural
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compliance as part of the followup to recent procedural
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violations. A cause common to these vio11tions was a failure by
personnel to perform a self checking and self verification process ~
associated with their activities.
Plant management has continued
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to communicate their expectations for procedure compliance to
plant personnel and hold them accountable. The licensee has also
adopted a program for self verification and checking when using
procedures. This program has been incorporated in plant training
programs and appears to be having positive effects.
During the
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recent Unit 2 refueling outage there w'~u no violations for
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failure to follow procedures (paragraph ef).
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
J. Beasley, General Manager Nuclear Plant'
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W. Burmeister, Manager. Engineering Support
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S. Chesnut, Manager Engineering Technical Support
- C. Christiansen, SAER Supervisor
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- R. Dorman, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness
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- G. Frederick, Manager Maintenance
- W. Gabbard, Nuclear. Specialist, Technical Support
- J. Gasser, Unit Superintendent
- H. Griffis, Manager Plant Modifications
K. Holmes, Manager Operations ~
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D. Huyck, Nuclear Security Manager
- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
- R. LeGrand,. Manager Health Physics and Chemistry
- G. McCarley, ISEG Supervisor
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- R. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor
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M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor
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C. Stinespring, Manager Administration
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J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning
- T. Webb, Plant Engineer, Technical Support
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- J. Williams, Outage and Planning Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors,
engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors,
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and office personnel.
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Oglethorpe Power Company Representative
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- T. Mozingo
NRC Resident Inspectors
- B. Bonser
D. Starkey
- P. Balmain
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- Attended Exit Interview
An alphabetical list of abbreviations is located in the last paragraph
of the inspection report.
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2.
Plant Operations (71707)
a.
General
The inspection staff reviewed plant operations throughout the
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reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory
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requirements, Technical Specifications, and administrative
controls. Control logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift relief
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records, LC0 status logs, night orders, standing orders, and
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clearance logs were routinely reviewed. Discussior.s were
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conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health
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physics, engineering support and technical support personnel.
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, Daily plant status meetings were routinely attended.
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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts
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and shift changes. Actions observed were conducted as required by
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the licensee's procedures.
The complement of licensed personnel
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on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by TS. Direct
observations were conducted of control room panels,
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instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety.
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Operating parameters were verified to be within TS limits. The
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inspectors also reviewed DCs to determine whether the licensee was
appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective
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actions.
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Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine
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basis. They included, but were not limited to the turbine
building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms,
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cable spreading rooms, NSCW towers, DG buildings, AFW buildings,
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and the low voltage switchyard.
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During plant tours, housekeeping, security, equipment status and
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radiation control practices were observed.
During this inspection
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period the inspectors noted a generally declining trend in
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housekeeping in the auxiliary building. The inspectors identified
several areas of poor housekeeping on level 2 of the auxiliary
building on both units. The inspectors identified several bags of
radioactive waste, HP stanchions, several ladders, an electrical
cord, and unlabeled scaffolding in the CCW heat exchanger rooms.
The inspectors identified unsecured ladders adjacent to normal
ventilation equipment. Throughout the level there were areas of
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poor lighting due to numerous burned out light bulbs. The
inspectors also observed an increase in the number of contaminated
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areas throughout the auxiliary building.
In many of these areas
housekeeping was poor. The licensee acknowledged these
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observations and initiated corrective action.
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The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics
policies / procedures were followed. This included observation of
HP practices and review of area surveys, radiation work permits,
postings, and instrument calibration.
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The inspectors verified that the security organization was
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properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing
their assigned functions.
Inspectors observed that persons and
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packages were checked prior to entry into the PA; vehicles were
properly authorized, searched, and escorted within the PA; persons
within the PA displayed photo identification badges; and-personnel
in vital areas were authorized.
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b.
Unit 1 Summary
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The unit began the period operating at 100% power and operated at
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full power throughout the inspection period.
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c.
Unit 2 Summary
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The unit began the period operating at 100% power and operated at
full power throughout the inspection period.
d.
Inadequate Containment Exit Inspection
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On October 27, 1993, with Unit 2 at 100% power, Operations
personnel performing a containment inspection for a potential
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accumulator nitrogen leak observed several pieces of insulation
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and other material on level C of the containment adjacent to the
RCDT pumps.
Level C is the lower level of containment and
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includes the RHR system and C3 system emergency sumps. The
material was placed in a bag and removed from containment. The
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debris consisted of a Scotch Brite pr.d (9"x 6") several stainless
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steel jacketing insulation covers (approximately 3.52 square
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feet), a threaded pipe (2.5"x 1.75") and approximately.5.57 square
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feet of 1-1/2" thick pad (Nukon) of insulation.
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The licensee's investigation identified that on October 16 with
Unit 2 in mode 4 maintenance personnel had entered containment and
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performed a routine MWO on a RCDT pump.
. hen-the job was
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completed the workers left the debris on the floor with the
understanding that their foreman would get the insulation
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reinstalled and the work area cleaned. The foreman, however,
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failed to follow-up and the debris remained on the C level floor
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until discovered on October 27.
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The inspectors review identified that the licensee has established
adequate controls for containment entry. Administrative procedure
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00303-C, Containment Entry, provides guidelines for control of.
entry to the containment during normal, emergency and cutage
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conditions, and contains criteria to ensure personnel sign in and
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out on procedure 14900, Containment Exit Inspection. The purpou
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of 14900 is to verify no debris or other loose material is present
in the containment building which could be transported to the
containment sump and cause restriction of ECCS pump mctions
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during accident conditions. This procedure also fz ..ils the TS
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surveillance requirements for a visual inspection after each
containment entry.
On October 16, the maintenance workers, before entering
containment, signed a containment entry form verifying that they
had read and understood procedure 00303-C. They also signed Data
Sheet 2, Containment Exit Inspection, of procedure 14900-2, upon
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entering and exiting containment. By this procedure, their
signature indicated that they were responsible for all areas
encountered in containment and that their exit signature signified
that there was no loose debris present in those areas that could
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be transported to the containment sump. Upon exiting, however,
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the material was left on the containment floor.
The inspectors had two concerns. The first concern being the
affect of the loose material on the operability of the containment
sumps. The second area of conce n involved the exit inspection
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and the signing of a procedure as being completed with no
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discrepancies when in fact loose material remained on the
containment floor.
The licensee evaluated the effect of the loose material found on
the containment floor. An original calculation was used that
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addressed the effect of debris buildup on emergency sump
performance. The objective of the calculation was to determine
the maximum quantity of insulation debris generated considering
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the limiting case high energy line break impinging on nearby
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insulation, the subsequent transport to the containment emergency
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sumps, the resulting head losses, and the effect on the CS and RHR
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pump NPSH margins. Using the data in the calculation, the
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additional insulation found loose in containment was added to the
calculation volumes and the impact on sump performance determined.
The licensee found that the loose debris identifirJ in the
containment would not have had a significant affect on the
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containment sump performance such that the RHR or CS pump
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performances would have been effected. The inspectors reviewed
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the licensee's calculations and agreed with their judgement that
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ECCS performance would not have been significantly affected. The
inspectors, therefore, concluded that this ECCS sub-system
remained operable.
The inspectors were also concerned that the containment exit
inspection data sheet had been signed as completed when insulation
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was left on the floor.
Signing this procedure as complete and
satisfactory when the required actions had not been taken, could
have resulted in an unnecessary challenge to ECCS operability.
The inspectors reviewed procedure 14900 and were satisfied that it
clearly stated the requirements and was adequate. The inspectors
learned, however, that the licensee's investigation found that the
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maintenance workers involved were not knowledgeable of the purpose
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of the exit inspection and the requirements to remove all loose
material, the potential consequences of loose material in
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containment, and that this inspection was a TS requirement. The
maintenance workers had informed their supervisor that the
material was in containment and were under the impression that
their actions were satisfactory.
The licensee also found after
reviewing other containment exit inspection data sheets that other
personnel may have similar weaknesses in their understanding of
the containment exit inspection.
This is identified as VIO 425/93-26-01, Failure To Follow
Containment Exit Inspection Procedure. The inspectors concluded
that a contributing cause to this violation was weakness in the
licensee's containment entry / exit program for non-licensed
personnel, in that personnel failed to understand the significance
and potential consequences of loose material in containment.
One violation was identified.
3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
a.
General
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify
procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed
were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions,
acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection,
independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies
noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed,-in
whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved
procedures were available, equipment was calibrated, prerequisites
were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test
results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.
The surveillances reviewed are listed below:
SURVEILLANCE NO.
TITLE
28719-2
24754-1
Steam Generator Level Protection Channel I
IL-551 ACOT
14805-1
RHR Pump and Check Valve IST
14980-2
Diesel Generator Operability Test
The inspectors did not identify any problems or concerns during
the observation of these surveillance activities,
b.
Review of Bypass Test Instrumentation Operation
During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the
licensee's implementation of BTI panel operation for TS required
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surveillances. The BTI is a new modification which allows
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bypassing of RPS and ESFAS actuation channels. The inspector
performed this review to verify that the licensee was implementing
adequate controls for BTI panel operation.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's administrative controls to
verify that operation of the BTI system was conducted according to
TS requirements. The BTI controls were implemented in procedure
13509-C, Bypass Test Instrumentation-(BTI) Panel Operation. The
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inspector reviewed the procedure and witnessed
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during an I&C ACOT (procedure 24754-1). The inspector verified
that procedure 13509-C implemented adequate key controls for the
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BTI panel enable keys, that it contained appropriate cautions, and
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verified that the procedure directs personnel to verify the
appropriate annunciators and indications when channels are
bypassed.
Based on this review, the inspector concluded that the licensee's
administrative controls for BTI are adequate and within TS
requirements as approved by the NRC in recent TS amendments.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
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General
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Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the
reporting period to verify that work was conducted in accordance
with approved procedures, TSs, and applicable industry codes and
standards. Activities, procedures, and work orders were examined
to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire,
cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to
service, and that limiting conditions for operation were met.
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance
activities:
MWO NOS,
WORK DESCRIPTION
29303683
2FT0511 Steam Generator Loop 1 Feedwater Control
System - 6 Month Calibration
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19350361
Vibration Data and Oil Analysis - RHR Pump A
19303164
Battery Cell 17 On The 1A Battery Requires A 72
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Hour Single Cell Equalize Charge
29303127
Perform PM Checklist For 18 Month Calibration -
Feedwater Temperature
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The inspectors did not identify any problems or concerns during
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the observation of these maintenance activities.
b.
Review of Single Cell Charging for Cell #17 of the 1A Battery
On November 15, the inspector reviewed the installation of a
single cell charger to cell #17 on the 1A safety-related battery
and observed cell voltage and current measurements taken for the
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cell. The inspector verified that the charger cables and leads
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were installed properly as required by procedure 27915-C, General
Battery Maintenance. The inspector also reviewed data collected
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and verified that measurements were taken at the required
intervals and remained above TS limits during the single cell
equalizing charge.
The inspector reviewed historical trending data for this cell with
system engineering personnel and observed that this cell had
relatively stable weekly voltage readings at greater than 2.20
volts from January 1993 through August 1993.
In August, the cell
voltage was measured at 2.18 volts. Through September and October
the cell voltage was erratic but remained above the TS required
voltage of 2.13 volts. On November 11, during the weekly
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surveillance, the cell voltage was measured at 2.14 volts and che
single cell equalizing charge was subsequently initiated.
Based
on this review, the inspector concluded that the single cell
charging activity was properly performed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Fire Drill Observation (64704)
On November 19, the inspector observed an announced fire drill which
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simulated a fire in the Unit 1 AFW pump house in the sump pump room.
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The drill was conducted with offsite assistance from the Burke County
Fire Department.
In addition, the drill was performed in an area where
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full area automatic fire suppression was not provided. An IFI was
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identified previously in this area in NRC IR 424,425/93-08.
The inspector evaluated the readiness of the fire brigade to fight the
simulated fire by verifying proper composition of the brigade and
verifying operability of protective equipment and breathing apparatus.
During the drill, the inspector observed that additional assistance from
the shift was available to assist the fire brigade in replacing
malfunctioning or expended equipment. The inspector reviewed procedure
92875A-1, Zone 157A - Auxiliary Pumphouse - Train C Firefighting
Preplan, and identified that safety-related train A and B CST level
transmitters were not include in the procedure. The inspector informed
fire protection personnel of this discrepancy. The inspector did not
have any concerns following this review.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Follow-up (90712) (92700) (92701) (92702)
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The Licensee Event Reports and follow-up stems listed below were
reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
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The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of TS
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compliance and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken,
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existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements
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satisfied, and relative safety significance of each event.
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a.
(Closed) VIO 50-424,425/93-16-03, Failure to Follow Procedure
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Involving Indoor Storage of Flammable / Combustible Liquids.
The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated
September 15, 1993. The violation involved improper storage of
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flammable / combustible liquids in a safety-related structure. The
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licensee took prompt action to clean out the flammable liquids
storage cabinets. Transient Combustible Permits were affixed to
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the cabinets listing their contents. Signs were also posted on
the cabinets informing plant personnel to notify the Fire
Protection Technicians prior to placing any material in the
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storage caoinets. Additional signs were also affixed to the
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cabinets describing allowable and prohibited materials. Daily
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inspections of the storage cabinets are being conducted until
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plant management evaluates the effectiveness of the corrective
actions taken.
The inspector verified the implementation of the licensee's
corrective action and concluded that flammable / combustible liquids
are now being properly stored in safety related buildings. This
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violation is considered closed.
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b.
(Closed) LER 50-424/91-015, Rev.1, Valve Manufacturing Defect
Leads to Containment Isolation Valve Failing Open
The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's inspections
of similar Unit 2 check valves in safety-related applications.
During refueling outage 2R3 the licensee disassembled and
inspected a sample of six valves out of a total of 20 which are
not disassembled and inspected under the licensee's normal
inspection programs. The licensee did not' identify any similar
instances of binding during these inspections.
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Based on this review, this item is closed.
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c.
(Closed) LER 50-425/91-009, Rev. 1, Safety Injection Pump Start
During Surveillance Testing
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The licensee determined that the unplanned safety injection pump
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start occurred due to the intermittent failure of reset switch
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S-921. The inspector verified, by reviewing signed off Shift
Briefing Book Routing Sheets, that all shifts were briefed on
actions to take during the performance of SSPS slave relay testing
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to ensure that slave relays are reset prior to restoration. The
inspector reviewed documentation for MWO 292000621 and verified
that switch S-921 was replaced during 2R3.
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The inspector also reviewed the licensee's listing of similar
slave relay test procedures which were revised to incorporate
additional confirmation that reset has occurred prior to
The inspector reviewed a sample of
these procedures and verified that revisions were incorporated as
specified in the corrective actions.
Based on this review, this item is closed.
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d.
(Closed) LER 50-425/92-014, Rev. O, Main Feedwater Isolation While
Performing Maintenance on Reactor Trip Breakers
The main feedwater isolation occurred due to inadequate scheduling
of a preventive maintenance activity on reactor trip switchgear
and an inadequate procedure used to perform the PM. The inspector
reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and verified that PM
checklist SCLOO202 was revised to require verification that the
plant is in Mode 5 or 6 and the SSPS is in test prior to
performing procedure 27767-C, Reactor Trip Switchgear Checkout and
Maintenance. The inspector reviewed revisions to procedure 27767-
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C and verified that revisions were added to the procedure to
verify that SSPS is in the test position prior to beginning work.
Corrective action 3 in the LER stated that a review found no
similar procedures with the potential for causing unnecessary ESF
actuations. The licensee did not document this review and the
inspector was unable to independently verify that the review was
adequate. However, due to the minor significance of this event
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and the review of corrective actions discussed above, the
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inspector is closing this item,
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(Closed) VIO 50-424,425/93-09-01, Inadequate SSPS Operating
Procedure Results In Safety Injection; and LER 50-424/93-06,
Safety Injection Initiated During Slave Relay Testing
The licensee responded to the violation .in correspondence dated
June 3, 1993. The violation involved an inadequate SSPS operating
procedure which did not contain appropriate instructions to
operators to caution them that control board indications may not
reflect actual safety injection block conditions when the SSPS is
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in Test. This lack of guidance contributed to a safety injection.
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The Operations manager reminded control room personnel to request
assistance when operational questions arise and take sufficient
time for review prior to changes in plant configuration. The
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licensee also revised' procedure 13503-1/2, Reactor Control Solid-
State Protection System, to make operators more aware of SSPS
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status when aligning the system for normal operation. The
inspector reviewed the current revisions of these procedures to
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verify the licensee's corrective action. The details of this
event were also reviewed as part of " Current Events" training in
licensed operator requalification training.
Prior to the recent
Unit 2 refueling outage the licensee issued guidance to operators-
to strengthen their ability to enhance control and focus of key
plant activities. During the recent Unit 2 refueling outage there
were no similar events.
Based on this review of the licensee's corrective actions the
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violation, and the LER are closed.
f.
(Closed) VIO 50-424,425/93-04-01, Failure To Follow Procedures,
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and LER 50-424/93-01, Inoperability Of Both ECCS Subsystems
The licensee responded to the violation in correspondence dated
May 18, 1993. This violation involved four examples of failures
to follow procedure. The first example involved a failure to
follow procedure and improper independent verification during an
RHR system sucelllance test that resulted in rendering both
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trains of the RHR system inoperable. The R0.and B0P operators
responsible for this event were disciplined concerning their
actions which contributed to this event. The licensee also held
shift briefings to discuss this event and the importance of
maintaining an awareness of the status and control of systems
important to plant safety.
The second example involved a failure to follow procedure and
properly restore a charging pump miniflow valve following a
surveillance. The operators responsible for this event were
disciplined. The licensee has also continued to place emphasis on
self-verification and attention to detail during procedure
performance.
The third example involved a failure to change plant vent gaseous
monitor filters as specified in procedures when dose equivalent
iodine increased by more than a factor of three. The personnel
responsible for this event were disciplined. Three procedures
were revised to enhance the use of the PERMS status board, to
include more specific requirements for foremen's log review during
turnover and sign-off requirements. The inspector reviewed
procedures 35110-C, Chemistry Cortrol Of The Reactor Coolant
System; 49100-C, Health Physics And Chemistry Department Shift
Briefing Books And Shift Turnover; and 31045-C, Chemistry
Logkeeping, Filing, and Record Storage; to verify the licensee's
corrective actions. The licensee also placed a summary of this
event in the Chemistry department shift briefing book. The
inspector confirmed that the event summary was reviewed.
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The fourth example of a failure to follow procedure involved an
operator placing the wrong FHB radiation monitor in block
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resulting in a FHB isolation.
Procedure 13431-1,120V AC IE Vital
Instrument Distribution System, was revised to include
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identification of the instrument channel as etched on the
handswitch nameplate and to include independent verification.
Operator requalification included a review of this event and a
summary of this event was placed in Operation required reading
book. The inspector reviewed training records and Operations
reading book records.
A cause common to these violations as a failure by personnel to
self check and verify.
Plant mana himnt has continued to
communicate their expectations for , acedure compliance to plant
personnel and hold them accountable. The licensee has also
adopted a program for self verification and checking when using
procedures. This program has been incorporated in plant training
programs and appears to be having positive effects. During the
recent Unit 2 refueling outage there were no violations for
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failure to follow procedures.
Based on this review of the licensee's corrective actions, the
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violation and the LER are closed.
7.
Exit Meeting
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 19,
1993. with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection
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findings listed below.
No dissenting comments were received from the
licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
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material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the
inspection.
Item No.
Description and Reference
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VIO 425/93-26-01
Failure To Follow Containment Exit
Inspection Procedure
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Abbreviations
- Alternating Current
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ACOT
- Analog Channel Operational Test
- Auxiliary Feedwater System
B0P
- Balance Of Plant
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BTI
- Bypass Test Instrumentation
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- Central Alarm Station
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- Centrifugal Charging Pump
- Component Cooling Water
CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations
- Condensate Storage Tank
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- Deficiency Card
- Diesel Generator
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- Emergency Core Cooling System
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- Engineered Safety Feature
- Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
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FHB
- Fuel Handling Building
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- Final Safety Analysis Report
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GL
- Generic Letter
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- Health Physics
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- Instrumentation and Controls
IFI
- Inspector Followup Item
- Institute for Nuclear Power Operations
IR
- Inspection Report
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ISEG
- Independent Safety Engineering Group
- Inservice Test
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LC0
- Limiting Condition for Operation
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LDCR
- Licensing Document Change Request
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LED
- Light Emitting Diode
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LER
- Licensee Event Repcrt
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- Loss of Coolant Accident
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- Motor Operated Valve
MWO
- Maintenance Work Order
- Non-Cited Violation
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NIS
- Nuclear Instrumentation System
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NPF
- Nuclear Power Facility
HPSH
- Net Positive Suction Head
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NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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- Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
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- Nuclear Steam Supply System
- Protected Area
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PERMS
- Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System
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- Preventive Maintenance
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- Reserve Auxiliary Transformer
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- Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
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- Residual Heat Removal System
- Reactor Operator
- Refueling Water Storage Tank
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SAER
- Safety Audit And Engineering Review
- Safety Injection
- Southern Nuclear Company
SR0
- Senior Reactor Operator
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SSPS
- Solid State Protection System
TAD 0T
- Trip Actuating Device Operational Test
TS
- Technical Specifications
- Unresolved Item
USS
- Unit Shift Supervisor
- Violation
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2R3
- Unit 2 Third Refueling Outage
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