ML20059B595

Insp Repts 50-424/93-26 & 50-425/93-26 on 931024-1120. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Surveillance,Maintenance,Fire Protection & Followup of Open Items

ML20059B595
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	12/13/1993
From:	Balmain P, Brian Bonser, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059B519	List: ML20059B515 ML20059B547 ML20059B595
References
50-424-93-26, 50-425-93-26, NUDOCS 9401040192
Download: ML20059B595 (14)

See also: IR 05000424/1993026

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UNITED STATES

_f#p arc %, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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y *- .-d REGloN H

S 101 MAR!ETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900

7,, cp ATLANTA, GEORGtA 30323-0199

\...../ Report Nos.: 50-424/93-26 and 50-425/93-26

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 1295

Birmingham, AL 35201

Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81

Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 .

Inspection Conducted: October 24, 1993 - November 20, 1993

Inspector: 47je4////w /h ' /3 'O

p . R. Qg#ser, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

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Is. /3 9 s

R.D.Styey,ResidentInspector Date Signed

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A. Balmay Resident Inspector

_L2 13 ' 9%

Date Signed

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Approved by:_

p A P. Skinner, Chief Date Signed

Reactor Projects Section 3B

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, inspection entailed inspection in the following

areas: plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, fire

protection, and followup of open items.

Results: One violation was identified.

During this inspection period the inspectors noted a declining

trend in housekeeping in the auxiliary building. The licensee

acknowledged this trend and has initiated corrective action

(paragraph 2a).

The violation involved a failure to follow a containment exit

inspection procedure. Maintenance workers after completing work

on a Unit 2 reactor coolant drain tank pump left loose material on

the containment floor when they exited containment. An exit

inspection had been completed, however, documenting that they were

responsible for all areas encountered in containment and that

there was no loose debris present in those areas that could be

9401040192 931214 4

PDR ADOCK 0500

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transported to the containment sump. The inspectors also-  !

concluded that a contributing cause to this violation was a  ;

weakness in the licensee's containment entry / exit program for non-  :

licensed personnel (paragraph 2d). l

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The inspectors identified.a positive trend in procedural l

compliance as part of the followup to recent procedural -

violations. A cause common to these vio11tions was a failure by

personnel to perform a self checking and self verification process ~

associated with their activities. Plant management has continued t

to communicate their expectations for procedure compliance to  ;

plant personnel and hold them accountable. The licensee has also  :

adopted a program for self verification and checking when using

procedures. This program has been incorporated in plant training  ;

programs and appears to be having positive effects. During the ,

recent Unit 2 refueling outage there w'~u no violations for j

failure to follow procedures (paragraph ef).  ;

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted [

Licensee Employees  :

J. Beasley, General Manager Nuclear Plant' h

W. Burmeister, Manager. Engineering Support i

S. Chesnut, Manager Engineering Technical Support

• C. Christiansen, SAER Supervisor ,

• R. Dorman, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness  !

• G. Frederick, Manager Maintenance

• W. Gabbard, Nuclear. Specialist, Technical Support

• J. Gasser, Unit Superintendent

• H. Griffis, Manager Plant Modifications  ;

K. Holmes, Manager Operations ~  !

D. Huyck, Nuclear Security Manager

• W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Support

• R. LeGrand,. Manager Health Physics and Chemistry

• G. McCarley, ISEG Supervisor .

• R. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor -

M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor 3

C. Stinespring, Manager Administration l

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J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning

• T. Webb, Plant Engineer, Technical Support _,

• J. Williams, Outage and Planning Supervisor  :

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors,

engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors, .

and office personnel. _

Oglethorpe Power Company Representative l

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• T. Mozingo

NRC Resident Inspectors

• B. Bonser  ;

D. Starkey  ;

• P. Balmain '

• Attended Exit Interview

An alphabetical list of abbreviations is located in the last paragraph

of the inspection report.

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2. Plant Operations (71707)

a. General

The inspection staff reviewed plant operations throughout the ,

reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory j

requirements, Technical Specifications, and administrative  :

controls. Control logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift relief i

records, LC0 status logs, night orders, standing orders, and .

clearance logs were routinely reviewed. Discussior.s were l

conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health  !

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physics, engineering support and technical support personnel.

, Daily plant status meetings were routinely attended. l;

Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts

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and shift changes. Actions observed were conducted as required by ,

the licensee's procedures. The complement of licensed personnel i

on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by TS. Direct  ;

observations were conducted of control room panels, l

instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety. l

Operating parameters were verified to be within TS limits. The ,

inspectors also reviewed DCs to determine whether the licensee was

appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective '!

actions. '

Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine -

basis. They included, but were not limited to the turbine

building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, (

cable spreading rooms, NSCW towers, DG buildings, AFW buildings, l

and the low voltage switchyard. i

During plant tours, housekeeping, security, equipment status and ,

radiation control practices were observed. During this inspection l

period the inspectors noted a generally declining trend in ,

housekeeping in the auxiliary building. The inspectors identified  ;

several areas of poor housekeeping on level 2 of the auxiliary

building on both units. The inspectors identified several bags of

radioactive waste, HP stanchions, several ladders, an electrical *

cord, and unlabeled scaffolding in the CCW heat exchanger rooms.

The inspectors identified unsecured ladders adjacent to normal

ventilation equipment. Throughout the level there were areas of i

poor lighting due to numerous burned out light bulbs. The

inspectors also observed an increase in the number of contaminated i

areas throughout the auxiliary building. In many of these areas

housekeeping was poor. The licensee acknowledged these ,

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observations and initiated corrective action.

The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics

policies / procedures were followed. This included observation of

HP practices and review of area surveys, radiation work permits,

postings, and instrument calibration. ,

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The inspectors verified that the security organization was .,

i properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing

their assigned functions. Inspectors observed that persons and ,

packages were checked prior to entry into the PA; vehicles were

properly authorized, searched, and escorted within the PA; persons

within the PA displayed photo identification badges; and-personnel

in vital areas were authorized.  :

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b. Unit 1 Summary -

The unit began the period operating at 100% power and operated at t

full power throughout the inspection period. I

c. Unit 2 Summary -

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The unit began the period operating at 100% power and operated at

full power throughout the inspection period.

d. Inadequate Containment Exit Inspection '

On October 27, 1993, with Unit 2 at 100% power, Operations

personnel performing a containment inspection for a potential i

accumulator nitrogen leak observed several pieces of insulation ,

and other material on level C of the containment adjacent to the l

RCDT pumps. Level C is the lower level of containment and l

l- includes the RHR system and C3 system emergency sumps. The

material was placed in a bag and removed from containment. The i

debris consisted of a Scotch Brite pr.d (9"x 6") several stainless  !

!. steel jacketing insulation covers (approximately 3.52 square l

feet), a threaded pipe (2.5"x 1.75") and approximately.5.57 square )

feet of 1-1/2" thick pad (Nukon) of insulation.  !

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L The licensee's investigation identified that on October 16 with

Unit 2 in mode 4 maintenance personnel had entered containment and

l performed a routine MWO on a RCDT pump. .When-the job was

l completed the workers left the debris on the floor with the

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understanding that their foreman would get the insulation

reinstalled and the work area cleaned. The foreman, however,

I failed to follow-up and the debris remained on the C level floor

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until discovered on October 27. .

The inspectors review identified that the licensee has established I

adequate controls for containment entry. Administrative procedure i

00303-C, Containment Entry, provides guidelines for control of. l

entry to the containment during normal, emergency and cutage .!

conditions, and contains criteria to ensure personnel sign in and i

out on procedure 14900, Containment Exit Inspection. The purpou

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of 14900 is to verify no debris or other loose material is present

in the containment building which could be transported to the

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containment sump and cause restriction of ECCS pump mctions

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surveillance requirements for a visual inspection after each

containment entry.

On October 16, the maintenance workers, before entering

containment, signed a containment entry form verifying that they

had read and understood procedure 00303-C. They also signed Data

Sheet 2, Containment Exit Inspection, of procedure 14900-2, upon -

entering and exiting containment. By this procedure, their

signature indicated that they were responsible for all areas

encountered in containment and that their exit signature signified

that there was no loose debris present in those areas that could i

be transported to the containment sump. Upon exiting, however,  !

the material was left on the containment floor.

The inspectors had two concerns. The first concern being the

affect of the loose material on the operability of the containment

sumps. The second area of conce n involved the exit inspection >

and the signing of a procedure as being completed with no '

discrepancies when in fact loose material remained on the

containment floor.

The licensee evaluated the effect of the loose material found on

the containment floor. An original calculation was used that '

addressed the effect of debris buildup on emergency sump

performance. The objective of the calculation was to determine

the maximum quantity of insulation debris generated considering '

the limiting case high energy line break impinging on nearby '

insulation, the subsequent transport to the containment emergency i

sumps, the resulting head losses, and the effect on the CS and RHR .

pump NPSH margins. Using the data in the calculation, the  :

additional insulation found loose in containment was added to the

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calculation volumes and the impact on sump performance determined.  :

The licensee found that the loose debris identifirJ in the

containment would not have had a significant affect on the  !

containment sump performance such that the RHR or CS pump j

performances would have been effected. The inspectors reviewed  !

the licensee's calculations and agreed with their judgement that -

ECCS performance would not have been significantly affected. The

inspectors, therefore, concluded that this ECCS sub-system

remained operable.

The inspectors were also concerned that the containment exit

inspection data sheet had been signed as completed when insulation ,

was left on the floor. Signing this procedure as complete and  :

satisfactory when the required actions had not been taken, could

have resulted in an unnecessary challenge to ECCS operability.

The inspectors reviewed procedure 14900 and were satisfied that it

clearly stated the requirements and was adequate. The inspectors

learned, however, that the licensee's investigation found that the i

maintenance workers involved were not knowledgeable of the purpose '

of the exit inspection and the requirements to remove all loose

material, the potential consequences of loose material in

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containment, and that this inspection was a TS requirement. The

maintenance workers had informed their supervisor that the

material was in containment and were under the impression that

their actions were satisfactory. The licensee also found after

reviewing other containment exit inspection data sheets that other

personnel may have similar weaknesses in their understanding of

the containment exit inspection.

This is identified as VIO 425/93-26-01, Failure To Follow

Containment Exit Inspection Procedure. The inspectors concluded

that a contributing cause to this violation was weakness in the

licensee's containment entry / exit program for non-licensed

personnel, in that personnel failed to understand the significance

and potential consequences of loose material in containment.

One violation was identified.

3. Surveillance Observation (61726)

a. General

Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify

procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed

were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions,

acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection,

independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies

noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed,-in

whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved

procedures were available, equipment was calibrated, prerequisites

were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test

results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.

The surveillances reviewed are listed below:

SURVEILLANCE NO. TITLE

28719-2 IST Torque Wrench Exercise

24754-1 Steam Generator Level Protection Channel I

IL-551 ACOT

14805-1 RHR Pump and Check Valve IST

14980-2 Diesel Generator Operability Test

The inspectors did not identify any problems or concerns during

the observation of these surveillance activities,

b. Review of Bypass Test Instrumentation Operation

During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the

licensee's implementation of BTI panel operation for TS required

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surveillances. The BTI is a new modification which allows r

bypassing of RPS and ESFAS actuation channels. The inspector

performed this review to verify that the licensee was implementing

adequate controls for BTI panel operation.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's administrative controls to

verify that operation of the BTI system was conducted according to

TS requirements. The BTI controls were implemented in procedure

13509-C, Bypass Test Instrumentation-(BTI) Panel Operation. The '

inspector reviewed the procedure and witnessed II operation

during an I&C ACOT (procedure 24754-1). The inspector verified

that procedure 13509-C implemented adequate key controls for the '

BTI panel enable keys, that it contained appropriate cautions, and '

verified that the procedure directs personnel to verify the

appropriate annunciators and indications when channels are

bypassed.

Based on this review, the inspector concluded that the licensee's

administrative controls for BTI are adequate and within TS

requirements as approved by the NRC in recent TS amendments.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Maintenance Observation (62703) ,

a. General

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Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the

reporting period to verify that work was conducted in accordance

with approved procedures, TSs, and applicable industry codes and

standards. Activities, procedures, and work orders were examined

to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire,

cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to

service, and that limiting conditions for operation were met.

The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance

activities:

MWO NOS, WORK DESCRIPTION

29303683 2FT0511 Steam Generator Loop 1 Feedwater Control

System - 6 Month Calibration j

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19350361 Vibration Data and Oil Analysis - RHR Pump A  ;

19303164 Battery Cell 17 On The 1A Battery Requires A 72 ,

Hour Single Cell Equalize Charge l

29303127 Perform PM Checklist For 18 Month Calibration - l

Feedwater Temperature

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The inspectors did not identify any problems or concerns during  !

the observation of these maintenance activities.  ;

b. Review of Single Cell Charging for Cell #17 of the 1A Battery

On November 15, the inspector reviewed the installation of a

single cell charger to cell #17 on the 1A safety-related battery

and observed cell voltage and current measurements taken for the l

cell. The inspector verified that the charger cables and leads l

were installed properly as required by procedure 27915-C, General

Battery Maintenance. The inspector also reviewed data collected

i and verified that measurements were taken at the required

intervals and remained above TS limits during the single cell *

equalizing charge.

The inspector reviewed historical trending data for this cell with

system engineering personnel and observed that this cell had

relatively stable weekly voltage readings at greater than 2.20

volts from January 1993 through August 1993. In August, the cell

voltage was measured at 2.18 volts. Through September and October

the cell voltage was erratic but remained above the TS required

voltage of 2.13 volts. On November 11, during the weekly .  !

surveillance, the cell voltage was measured at 2.14 volts and che

single cell equalizing charge was subsequently initiated. Based

on this review, the inspector concluded that the single cell

charging activity was properly performed.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Fire Drill Observation (64704)

On November 19, the inspector observed an announced fire drill which '

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simulated a fire in the Unit 1 AFW pump house in the sump pump room.

The drill was conducted with offsite assistance from the Burke County

Fire Department. In addition, the drill was performed in an area where .

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full area automatic fire suppression was not provided. An IFI was

identified previously in this area in NRC IR 424,425/93-08.

The inspector evaluated the readiness of the fire brigade to fight the

simulated fire by verifying proper composition of the brigade and

verifying operability of protective equipment and breathing apparatus.

During the drill, the inspector observed that additional assistance from

the shift was available to assist the fire brigade in replacing

malfunctioning or expended equipment. The inspector reviewed procedure

92875A-1, Zone 157A - Auxiliary Pumphouse - Train C Firefighting

Preplan, and identified that safety-related train A and B CST level

transmitters were not include in the procedure. The inspector informed  ;

fire protection personnel of this discrepancy. The inspector did not

have any concerns following this review.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Follow-up (90712) (92700) (92701) (92702)

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The Licensee Event Reports and follow-up stems listed below were

reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. -

The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of TS <

compliance and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, '

existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements

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satisfied, and relative safety significance of each event.  !

a. (Closed) VIO 50-424,425/93-16-03, Failure to Follow Procedure -

Involving Indoor Storage of Flammable / Combustible Liquids.

The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated

September 15, 1993. The violation involved improper storage of i

flammable / combustible liquids in a safety-related structure. The i

licensee took prompt action to clean out the flammable liquids

storage cabinets. Transient Combustible Permits were affixed to ,

the cabinets listing their contents. Signs were also posted on

the cabinets informing plant personnel to notify the Fire

Protection Technicians prior to placing any material in the j

storage caoinets. Additional signs were also affixed to the i

cabinets describing allowable and prohibited materials. Daily .l

inspections of the storage cabinets are being conducted until t

plant management evaluates the effectiveness of the corrective

actions taken.

The inspector verified the implementation of the licensee's

corrective action and concluded that flammable / combustible liquids  ;

are now being properly stored in safety related buildings. This l

violation is considered closed. l

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b. (Closed) LER 50-424/91-015, Rev.1, Valve Manufacturing Defect

Leads to Containment Isolation Valve Failing Open

The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's inspections

of similar Unit 2 check valves in safety-related applications.

During refueling outage 2R3 the licensee disassembled and

inspected a sample of six valves out of a total of 20 which are

not disassembled and inspected under the licensee's normal

inspection programs. The licensee did not' identify any similar

instances of binding during these inspections.

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Based on this review, this item is closed. )

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c. (Closed) LER 50-425/91-009, Rev. 1, Safety Injection Pump Start  :

During Surveillance Testing i

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The licensee determined that the unplanned safety injection pump j

start occurred due to the intermittent failure of reset switch 1

S-921. The inspector verified, by reviewing signed off Shift

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Briefing Book Routing Sheets, that all shifts were briefed on

actions to take during the performance of SSPS slave relay testing  ;

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to ensure that slave relays are reset prior to restoration. The

inspector reviewed documentation for MWO 292000621 and verified

that switch S-921 was replaced during 2R3. '

The inspector also reviewed the licensee's listing of similar

slave relay test procedures which were revised to incorporate

additional confirmation that reset has occurred prior to

reconnecting ESFAS leads. The inspector reviewed a sample of

these procedures and verified that revisions were incorporated as

specified in the corrective actions. *

Based on this review, this item is closed. ,

d. (Closed) LER 50-425/92-014, Rev. O, Main Feedwater Isolation While

Performing Maintenance on Reactor Trip Breakers

The main feedwater isolation occurred due to inadequate scheduling

of a preventive maintenance activity on reactor trip switchgear

and an inadequate procedure used to perform the PM. The inspector

reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and verified that PM

checklist SCLOO202 was revised to require verification that the

plant is in Mode 5 or 6 and the SSPS is in test prior to

performing procedure 27767-C, Reactor Trip Switchgear Checkout and

Maintenance. The inspector reviewed revisions to procedure 27767- '

C and verified that revisions were added to the procedure to

verify that SSPS is in the test position prior to beginning work.

Corrective action 3 in the LER stated that a review found no

similar procedures with the potential for causing unnecessary ESF

actuations. The licensee did not document this review and the

inspector was unable to independently verify that the review was

adequate. However, due to the minor significance of this event ,

and the review of corrective actions discussed above, the >

inspector is closing this item,

e. (Closed) VIO 50-424,425/93-09-01, Inadequate SSPS Operating

Procedure Results In Safety Injection; and LER 50-424/93-06,

Safety Injection Initiated During Slave Relay Testing

The licensee responded to the violation .in correspondence dated

June 3, 1993. The violation involved an inadequate SSPS operating

procedure which did not contain appropriate instructions to

operators to caution them that control board indications may not

reflect actual safety injection block conditions when the SSPS is ,

in Test. This lack of guidance contributed to a safety injection. '

The Operations manager reminded control room personnel to request l

assistance when operational questions arise and take sufficient ..

time for review prior to changes in plant configuration. The j

licensee also revised' procedure 13503-1/2, Reactor Control Solid-  !

State Protection System, to make operators more aware of SSPS 1

status when aligning the system for normal operation. The

inspector reviewed the current revisions of these procedures to

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verify the licensee's corrective action. The details of this

event were also reviewed as part of " Current Events" training in

licensed operator requalification training. Prior to the recent

Unit 2 refueling outage the licensee issued guidance to operators-

to strengthen their ability to enhance control and focus of key

plant activities. During the recent Unit 2 refueling outage there

were no similar events.

Based on this review of the licensee's corrective actions the i

violation, and the LER are closed.

f. (Closed) VIO 50-424,425/93-04-01, Failure To Follow Procedures, j

and LER 50-424/93-01, Inoperability Of Both ECCS Subsystems

The licensee responded to the violation in correspondence dated

May 18, 1993. This violation involved four examples of failures

to follow procedure. The first example involved a failure to l

follow procedure and improper independent verification during an l

RHR system sucelllance test that resulted in rendering both  !

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trains of the RHR system inoperable. The R0.and B0P operators

responsible for this event were disciplined concerning their

actions which contributed to this event. The licensee also held

shift briefings to discuss this event and the importance of

maintaining an awareness of the status and control of systems

important to plant safety.

The second example involved a failure to follow procedure and

properly restore a charging pump miniflow valve following a

surveillance. The operators responsible for this event were

disciplined. The licensee has also continued to place emphasis on

self-verification and attention to detail during procedure

performance.

The third example involved a failure to change plant vent gaseous

monitor filters as specified in procedures when dose equivalent

iodine increased by more than a factor of three. The personnel

responsible for this event were disciplined. Three procedures

were revised to enhance the use of the PERMS status board, to

include more specific requirements for foremen's log review during

turnover and sign-off requirements. The inspector reviewed

procedures 35110-C, Chemistry Cortrol Of The Reactor Coolant

System; 49100-C, Health Physics And Chemistry Department Shift

Briefing Books And Shift Turnover; and 31045-C, Chemistry

Logkeeping, Filing, and Record Storage; to verify the licensee's

corrective actions. The licensee also placed a summary of this

event in the Chemistry department shift briefing book. The

inspector confirmed that the event summary was reviewed.

l The fourth example of a failure to follow procedure involved an

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operator placing the wrong FHB radiation monitor in block

resulting in a FHB isolation. Procedure 13431-1,120V AC IE Vital

Instrument Distribution System, was revised to include

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identification of the instrument channel as etched on the

handswitch nameplate and to include independent verification.

Operator requalification included a review of this event and a  ;

summary of this event was placed in Operation required reading

book. The inspector reviewed training records and Operations

reading book records.

A cause common to these violations as a failure by personnel to

self check and verify. Plant mana himnt has continued to

communicate their expectations for , acedure compliance to plant

personnel and hold them accountable. The licensee has also

adopted a program for self verification and checking when using

procedures. This program has been incorporated in plant training

programs and appears to be having positive effects. During the  :

recent Unit 2 refueling outage there were no violations for

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failure to follow procedures.

Based on this review of the licensee's corrective actions, the ,

violation and the LER are closed.

7. Exit Meeting i

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 19,

1993. with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector

described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection -

findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the

licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the -

material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the

inspection.

Item No. Description and Reference

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VIO 425/93-26-01 Failure To Follow Containment Exit

Inspection Procedure

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8. Abbreviations

AC - Alternating Current .

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ACOT - Analog Channel Operational Test

AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater System

B0P - Balance Of Plant ,

BTI - Bypass Test Instrumentation '

CAS - Central Alarm Station -

CCP - Centrifugal Charging Pump

CCW - Component Cooling Water

CFR - Code of Federal Regulations

CS - Containment Spray

CST - Condensate Storage Tank ,

DC - Deficiency Card l

DG - Diesel Generator i

ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System  ;

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ESF - Engineered Safety Feature  :

ESFAS - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System .

FHB - Fuel Handling Building  !

FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report  !

GL - Generic Letter l

HP - Health Physics -,

I&C - Instrumentation and Controls  :

IFI - Inspector Followup Item

INPO - Institute for Nuclear Power Operations

IR - Inspection Report  !

ISEG - Independent Safety Engineering Group  :

IST - Inservice Test i

LC0 - Limiting Condition for Operation 4

LDCR - Licensing Document Change Request i

LED - Light Emitting Diode l

LER - Licensee Event Repcrt  !

LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident '

LOSP - Loss of Offsite Power i

MOV - Motor Operated Valve

MWO - Maintenance Work Order  ;

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NCV - Non-Cited Violation

NIS - Nuclear Instrumentation System i

NPF - Nuclear Power Facility *

HPSH - Net Positive Suction Head t

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NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSCW - Nuclear Service Cooling Water System i

NSSS - Nuclear Steam Supply System

PA - Protected Area j

PERMS - Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System '

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PM - Preventive Maintenance i

RAT - Reserve Auxiliary Transformer j

RCDT - Reactor Coolant Drain Tank j

RCS - Reactor Coolant System l

RHR - Residual Heat Removal System

RO - Reactor Operator  :

RPS - Reactor Protection System l

RWST - Refueling Water Storage Tank i

SAER - Safety Audit And Engineering Review

SI - Safety Injection

SG - Steam Generator

SNC - Southern Nuclear Company l

SR0 - Senior Reactor Operator l

SSPS - Solid State Protection System l

TAD 0T - Trip Actuating Device Operational Test

TS - Technical Specifications

URI - Unresolved Item

USS - Unit Shift Supervisor

VIO - Violation i

2R3 - Unit 2 Third Refueling Outage

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