IR 05000321/1980031

IE Insp Repts 50-321/80-31 & 50-366/80-31 on 800610-0714. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Properly Align Valves in Safety Sys & Failure to Correct Seismic Deficiencies in Timely Manner

ML19351D599
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	08/15/1980
From:	Dance H, Rogers R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19351D588	List: IR 05000321/1980031 ML19351D587 ML19351D590 ML19351D593 ML19351D596
References
50-321-80-31, 50-366-80-31, NUDOCS 8010140013
Download: ML19351D599 (7)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 11

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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., sulTE 3100 f

o ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Repgrt Nos. 50-321/80-31 and 50-266/80-31

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Licensee: Georgia Power Company 270 Peachtree Street, N. W.

Atlanta, GA 30303 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 Inspection at Hatch near Baxley, Georgia Inspector

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Date Signed Approved by:_ [ -

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SUKERY

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Inspection on June 10 - July 14,1980 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 110 inspector-hours on site in the areas of technical specification compliance, reportable occurrences, housekeeping, operator perfor-mance, overall plant o pera tions.

quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventative maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities and surveillance activities.

Results Of the eleven areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in nine areas, two items of noncompliance were found in two areas (Infraction - Failure to properly align valves in a safety system, paragraph 9; Infraction -

Failure to correct seismic deficiencies in a timely manner.

paragraph 10.)

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• i DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

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• M. Manry, Plant Manager

• T. Moore, Assistant Plant Manager

• T. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager S. Baxley, Superintendent of Goerations R. Nix, Superintendent of Maintenance l

C. Coggins, Superintendent of Engineering Services

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W. Rogers, Health Physicist C. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

• Attended exit interview.

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Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 27, July 3, and July 18, 1980, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.

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Unresolved Items I'

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspector routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During abnormal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspector conducted

random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that

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l operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift turnovers

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were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedurce.

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Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant l

~ " conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. -The inspector also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established,

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critical clean areac were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material is stored properly and combustible material

and debris were disposed of expeditiously.

During tours the inspector l

looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe l

hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags and component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.

Some tours were conducted on backshif ts and weekends.

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7.

Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)

During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with i

selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO's) and results of selected l

surveillan e tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct obser-vation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, l

and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.

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Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

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l The inspector verified by observation and interview during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-tion of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and

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badging was proper, that search practices were appropriate, and that escorting and communications procedures were followed.

9.

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Minimum Flus Lines Found Isolated (Unit 1)

While preparing to run routine surveillance on the RHR system on June 22, 1980, an operator discovered that the pump minimum flow manual isolation valves E11-F018 B&D for the "B" loop pumps were locked shut. Closure of these valves rendered that loop inoperable for small to intermediate LOCAs when RHR cooling in the LPCI mode was required. The condition was discovered by the licensee and reported in LER 50-321/80-61.

The condition existed l

for 2 1/2 weeks following their closure during a maintenance outage. The failure to have these two valves properly aligned as required by HNP-1-1118, RHR Standby Condition, is a repeat infraction. A similar item was reported in IE Report 50-321/80-24 dated July 25,1980.(321/80-31-01-).

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Failure to Correct a Seismic Deficiency in the Service Water System (Unit 2)

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,0n February 14, 1980, the licensee was notified by Bechtel Power Corporation, the architect engineer, that two seismic restraints associated with the service water system at the intake structute were inadequate and would fail

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during a seismic event. The supports were on a 6" vent line off the RHR and 8" vent line off the PSW pump discharge piping.

The licensee erroneously reported that the minimum flow lines were inade-quately supported in LER 50-366/80-12. During inspector followup on this item, he discovered that these deficiences had actually been reported to the licensee by Bechtel in a January 2, 1979 letter over a year earlier than the LER indicated (Bechtel letter to GPC B-GP-6059 dated January 2, 1979).

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Although a design change request, DCR #79-60, was written to address the original concern, it was not adequately pursued to completion by the licensee.

The timely completion of the DCR apparently fell through the cracks until Bechtel notified the licensee of the same problem a second time a year later. The licensee's failure to correct inadequate supports in a safety system for over a year constitutes inadequate corrective action and is an infraction (366/80-31-01).

11. Licensed Training Staff Qualifications (TI 2515/36)

The inspector verified the license status of instructors engaged in the training of licensed plant operators.

Instructor License Course Taught Dave Lee SRO Systems / Transients Mark Haluni None*

Theoretical / core

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• Will take license exam when ready but probably next year.

The inspector noted that D. Lee taught all courses dealing with plant system, integrated response, and transients. Simulator courses are taught in Chattanooga at the TVA simulator on a contracted basis.

12. Failure to Approve a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) (Unit 2)

On November 27, 1980, during a routine inspection tour, the inspector noted I

that the head had been pulled on "F" filter demineralizer and that filter element retaining clips were being removed. An RWP was not posted at the work place as required by HNP 8008, Paragraph C.4, prior tb the commancement of work.

After notifying health physics personnel of the problem, the inspector then proceeded to the control room and found that the shift foreman was unaware that work had commenced on the filter demineralizer (He

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was aware it was tagged out). This item was the subject of a Notice of i

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Violation in IE Report 50-366/79-41 dated January 17, 1980. The licensee in his response dated February 11, 1980, indicated that, although corrective actions were taken, the severity of the citation (Infraction) was questioned since adequate radiation protection was in place at the time of the incident.

The severity of this item has been reviewed again. Since the noncompliance

- -= constituted a breakdown in the required administrative controls which surround an adequate health physics program the severity level was deemed

appropriate.

13. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Failures (Unit 1)

On June 26, 1980, at approximately 0750 hours0.00868 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.85375e-4 months <br />, the Unit I reactor tripped false high water level signal. The resultant problems with the HPCI on a and RCIC turbines and the licensee's program for short and long term correc-tive actions follows below.

At' 0750 hours0.00868 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.85375e-4 months <br />, reactor water level spiked high indicated by reactor water level recorder and "A" and "C" high level trip indicating lights. A high level trip was also received to the RCIC and HPCI system. Reactor scram was received from a turbine trip stop valve fast closure. Reactor recircu-lation pump trip occurred from turbine trip over 30% power. The HPCI high level trip auto reset, but operators could not manually reset the RCIC trip and throttle valve. Several attempts were made to reset the valve but the indication for the trip and throttle valve indicated closed. The turbine speed would increase and come up to speed when the trip and throttle valve operator was operated open.

The RCIC injection valve would open, but reclosed automatically due to the trip and throttle valve limit switch and logic indicating it was closed.

At this time water level had dropped below -38" from instrument zero.

MSIVs closed and HPCI auto initiated. About two minutes later, six relief valves lifted and relieved reactor pressure to point of automatic reclosure of relief valves.

"H" and

"J" relief valves were subsequently manually operated three times to maintain RX pressure less than 1045 psig.

On or about the same time HPCI auto initiated, the HPCI system auto isolated and tripped.

The HPCI steam line differential pressure high alarm had annunciated, but had cleared. The alarm was considered to have been spurious

so the operator reset the auto isolation. The operator then closed the F001 valve and opened the F003 outboard isolation and started throttling

the inboard isolation F002 open. Upon reaching rated pressure, the operator fully opened F002 and F001 auto opened from initiation. Water level returned to a +30" At this time, the operator reset the initiation signal for

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HPCI. About this time the group I isolation was reset and the MSIVs were reopened, and RFPT reset and placed in service to maintain level. The HPCI

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system was returned to standby. Reactor recirculation pumps were reset and

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restarted.

Relief valve operation was no longer required with the main condenser available. Torus cooling was initiated to cool the torus due to HPCI and steam relief valve operation.

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As a result of this occurrence, the IE Regional Office placed a hold on l

Unit 1 operation until a satisfactory test program to assure operability of both HPCI and RCIC was agreed upon. Following several meeting between GPC

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,,and NRC management at the regional office and satisfactory initial testing at the site.

the hold was lifted, and the unit returned to service. A test program is continuing which included reduced surveillance intervals

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for HPCI and RCIC, additional cold start testing, additional instrumentation.

l design modifications, and technician training have been scheduled. GPC has

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also established a committee from the corporate office to overview this effort. Significant vendor participation from Terry Turbine and General

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l Electric has been included. The resident inspector will continue to follow

developements in the testing program.

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14. Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 and 2)

l The following licensee events reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic problems, to detect possible trends, and to determine whether l

corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immedi-ately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications were being met and that the public health and safety were of utmost consideration. Asterisk items were followed up in the plant.

LER No.

Date of Report Description 50-321/80-51 6/8/80 Instrument line not seismically supported 50-321/80-52 6,ill/80 HPCI speed Osscillations 50-321/80-56 6/27/80 Failure to review a temporary change W/I 14 days 50-321/80-57 6/13/80 RHR suction valve failure 50-321/80-59 7/3/80 Torus to Drywell vacuum breaker Inoperable 50-321/80-60 7/1/80 Seismic hangers on sprinklers inadequate 50-321/80-60 7/1/80 RHR minimum flow isolated i

50-321/80-63 7/3/80 Pressure switch out of calibration 50-322/80-63 7/8/80 RCIC speed control failure

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50-321/80-65'

6/24/80 Low nitrogen tank level 50-321/80-68 7/8/80 High oxygen analyzer reading 50-321/80-71 7/8/80 Faulty Drywell temperature recorder

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LER No.

Date of Report Description 50-321/80-72 7/2/80 Reactor b1dg.

sample pump failure a,50-321/80-73 7/8/80 Drywell to torus temperature recorder inop 50-366/80-81 6/13/80 MSIV failed to close

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50-366/80-84 6/17/80-RCIC overspeed trip *

i 50-366/80-85 6/11/80 Inoperable RHR pumps 50-366/80-86 6/10/80 High Drywell temperature 50-366/80-87 6/19/80 RCIC level switch inoperable j

50-366/80-88 6/19/80 LPCI level switch out of calibration 50-366/80-89 6/24/80 Torus suction valve failure 50-366/80-90 6/24/80 HPCI auto recet high i

50-366/80-91 6/30/80 CMFLPD high l

50-366/80-92 6/24/80

"B" RBM failure

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50-366/80-93 7/11/80 High Drywell temperature 50-366/80-94 6/26/80 Torus to Drywell vacuum breaker failure 50-366/80-95 7/7/80 MSIV Blower failure 50-366/80-98 7/14/80 HPCI suction pressure gage out of calibra-tion

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