IR 05000321/1980023

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IE Insp Repts 50-321/80-23 & 50-366/80-23 on 800605 & 06. No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas inspected:safety-related Mechanical Snubbers
ML19327A426
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 06/26/1980
From: Ang W, Herdt A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19327A423 List:
References
50-321-80-23, 50-366-80-23, NUDOCS 8008060186
Download: ML19327A426 (4)


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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e

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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, CEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-321/80-23 and 50-366/80-23 Licensee: Georgia Power Company 270 Peachtree Street Atlanta, GA 30303 Facility Name:

E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos. DPR-56 and NPF-5 Inspection at E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant near Baxley, Georgia Inspector: _ D

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Date Signed Approved by:

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e'rdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch Date Signed

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SUMMARY Inspection on June 5-6, 1980 Areas-Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 10 inspector-hours on site in the area of safety-related mechanical snubbers.

Results Of the area inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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o DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • M. Manry, Plant Manager
  • C. Locke, Engineering Supervisor
  • C. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor
  • C. Miles, Jr., QA Field Supervisor
  • D. McCusker, QC Supervisor
  • L. Sunner, Engineering Supervisor NRC Resident Inspector
  • W. H. Barron
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 6, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Safety-Related Mechanical Snubbers On May 31, 1980, the licensee reported that during a random visual inspec-tion of mechanical snubbers on Unit I safety systems, six were found to be

" locked-up". Subsequent inspections revealed a total of 42 of 63 mechanical snubbers inspected were " locked-up". Discussions with the licensee indicates the following:

Both International Nuclear Safeguards (INS) Corporation and Pacific a.

Scientific type rechanical snubbers were installed and inspected.

l Only International Nuclear Safeguards Corporation type mechanical snubbers were found to be inoperable.

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Both older (carbon steel internals) and newer (stainless steel) type

INS mechanical snubbers were installed and inspected.

Inoperable l

snubbers of both types were identified.

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.e-2-e Inoperable snubbers were found throughout the plant with no apparent c.

area / atmosphere preference.

As noted on RII's confirmation of action letter dated June 3,1980, and the lisansee's report of May 31, 1980, the licensee has committed to take the following action:

Inspect all INS mechanical snubbers Unit I safety-related systems and a.

take corrective action as necessary prior to re-start.

b.

Inspect all INS mechanical snubbers in Unit 2 safety-related systems and take corrective action as necessary prior to system synchronization.

c.

Functionally test 20% of the INS mechanical snubbers installed in safety-related systems during each Unit I and Unit 2 outage of five days or greater and more than thirty days since the last inspection.

d.

Replace all INS mechanical snubbers during the next refueling outage of Units 1 and 2.

An inspection was conducted to verify compliance with licensee commitments.

The licensee indicated that.33 INS snubbers were installed in Unit 2.

All 33 were inspected and tested. Three snubbers were found te be defective

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and were replaced.

The licensee also indicated that 63 INS mechanical snubbers were installed in Unit 1.

All.were inspected and tested.

42,

snubbers were found to be defective.

The defective snubbers are being replaced..The licensee stated that where replacement Pacific Scientific type snubbers were available, they were being installed. However, if new INS type snubbers were the only ones available for replacement, new INS type snubbers were being inc.talled and would be replaced with Pacific

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Scientific. type snubbers during the Units next refueling outage.

The replacement snubbers were being inspected and tested prior to installation.

Maintenance surveillance sheets for the inspection of the following supports were reviewed:

Unit 1 B21-F22 Item 4 - MS system B21-F23 Item 5 - MS system X32-1F6. Item 34 - Recirc system B21-107 Item 54 - MS system i

B21-110 Item 66

.MS system j

Unit 2 B21-S148 Item 1 - MS system B21-S143 Item 12.- MS system

.B31-S14 Item 30 - Recirc system B21-S67 Item 24 - MS system B21-S67 Item 20 - MS system

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Snubber replacement detail sheets for the following Unit 1 snubbers were reviewed: B21-F22 Item #4 - Main steam system B21-F23 - Item #5 - Main steam system Installed snubber RT-48-F30 Item 23 was visually inspected.

Defective snubbers that had been removed from Units 1 and 2 were visually inspected.

. Extensive corrosion was visible on most of the defective snubbers. However, two snubbers that were " locked-up" did not appear to have any visible significant corrosion..One of the two was sectioned by the licensee and visually examined but the cause of the binding or " locked-up" condition could not be determined - no significant quantity of internal corrosion was evident.

The replacement of snubbers in some cases may result in modification of supports.

The licensee was reminded that all necessary documentation of

. design engineering evaluations replacement and inspection activities had to be completed.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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