IR 05000321/1980017

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IE Insp Repts 50-321/80-17 & 50-366/80-17 on 800308-0411. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Maintain Secondary Containment Door Integrity & to Meet NRC Reporting Requirements
ML19321A851
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 05/19/1980
From: Dance H, Rogers R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19321A829 List:
References
50-321-80-17, 50-366-80-17, NUDOCS 8007240292
Download: ML19321A851 (5)


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$6 so UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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o ATLANTA, G EORGIA 30303

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Report Nos. 50-321/80-17 and 50-366/80-17 Licensee: Georgia Power Company 270 Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, GA 30303 Facility: Hatch I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia Inspector:

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H. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed EUMMARY Inspection on March 8 through April 11, 1980 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 90 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of technical specification compliance, reportable occurrences, housekeeping, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventative maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities and surveillance activities.

Results Of the eleven areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations l

were identified in nine areas; two items of noncompliance were found in two I

areas (infraction-failure to take effective corrective action on secondary containment doors (this is a repeat item), paragraph 9; Infraction-failure to report to the NRC, paragraph 10).

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • M. Manry, Plant Manager

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  • T. Moore, Assistant Plant Manager
  • T. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations

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R.' Nix, Superintendent of Maintenance C. Coggins, Superintendent of Engineering Services W. Rogers, Health Physicist / Radiochemist

  • C. Bellflower, QA Site Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
  • Attended exit interviews.

2.

Exit Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 28 and April 22, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.

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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Items s

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspector routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During abnormal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.

The inspector conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level.f Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures. The inspector had no further comments other than those in Paragraph 10.

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6.

Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.

The inspector also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material is stored properly and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags and component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.

Some tours were conducted on backshifts and weekends. Within the area inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7.

Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)

During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO's) and results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct obser-vation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as

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they happened. The inspector had no further comments other than those in paragraph 9.

8.

Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspactor verified by observation and interview during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-tion of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, that search practices were appropriate, and that escorting and communications procedures were followed. Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9.

Inability to Maintain Secondary Containment Door Integrity (Units 1 and 2)

The licensee submitted a report dated April 1,1980, which describes several inadvertant losses of secondary containment integrity in violation of technical specification section 3.7.C.1 which states in part that the integrity of the secondary containment shall be maintained.,this typ The report (LER 50-321/80-28) referenced numerou's other occurrances of e since 1976.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI and implemented by plant Hatch Quality Assurance Manual Section 16, Paragraph 16.1, states in part that, measures shall be established to assure that conditions.' adverse to quality...

are promptly identified and corrected, and in case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition f

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is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. An infraction was issued for this item in IE Report No. 50-321/79-11 and 50-366/79-15, dated May 18, 1979. At that time, approximately 17 violations of secondary containment doors had occurred.

In response to that citation in a letter dated July 23, 1979, the licensee committed to a solution to this problem by October 1, 1979. As that date passed, the inspector received another written committment that effective modifications to the doors would be installed by January 1, 1980.

In the year since the first citation, there have been approximately 16 additional violations.

The most recent committment date for resolution of this problem is now October 1, 1980, a full year past the original committment date. The licensees continued failure to provide effective measures to assure that Technical Specification requirements are met is an infraction and a repeat item (321 and 366/80-17-01).

10.

Failure to meet Reporting Requirements (Units 1 and 2)

Lack of Seismically Qualified RHR Piping Supports (Unit 2)

a.

The licensee issued an LER (50-366/80-12) dated February 26, 1980, which described certain seismic support anchors on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and RHR service water pump minimum flow piping that would fail under design seismic loads due to the improper location of the original anchors. The licensee was aware of this condition on Februa ry 14, 1980, but failed to notify the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Technical specification 6.9.1.8.i requires that the performance of systems or components that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed is reportable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the NRC.

b.

Failure of "C" Diesel Generator Voltage Regulator in the Manual Mode (Unit 1)

The Licensee issued a Licensee Event Report (LER) (50-321/80-24) dated March 17, 1980 which described a failure of the

"C" diesel generator manual control feature due to faulty diodes that supplied voltage to the manual adjusting motor. The problem was found on February 29, 1980 while performing Procedure KNP-1-3801, Diesel Generator Manual Start, a required surveillance to test operability. The report further states that this is the second occurrence of this nature on Unit I and that the original occurrance was in 1977 (LER 50-321/77-59).

Both occurrences were correctly reported in accordance with the require-ments of Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

In following up of this item, the inspector found that according to Deviation Report No.

1-80-101, the manual voltage control had also failed on February 26, 1980, 3 days prior to the reported occurrence, whil'e' performing HNP-1-3801 on "C" diesel generator. The inspector could find no record of the February 26, 1980 performance of this surveillance in plant records nor any indication that it had been reported as required by technical specifications.

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Failure of Standby Plant Service Water (PSW) Pump During HNP-1-3801 c.

(Unit 1)

On January 30, 1980, the licensee performed surveillance on the standby Plant Service Water (PSW) Pump to determine its operability because 1A diesel generator (DG) was inoperable for maintenance.

The standby PSW pump serves IB DG which is required to be tested when another Unit 1 DG is inoperative. The PSW pump failed the surveillance, test, HNP-1-3801 (diesel generator manual start), and was declared inoperative on the

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test document.

Pump differential pressure was found to be in the

" action" range. A subsequent performance of this test on January 31, 1980 (following flow adjustments to the pump) was satisfactory and it was determined that the discharge valve had not failed. This occur-rance was documented in deviation report number 1-80-56 to the Plant Review Board (PRB). The PRB erroneously determined that the pump remained operable because the surveillance performed on January 31, 1980 (following flow adjustments) was satisfactory. Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

requires that conditions Leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a Limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation be reported within 30 days. This the licensee failed to do.

i The three above examples of the licensee's failure to report events consti-tutes an infraction (321 and 366/80-17-02).

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