IR 05000321/1999002

Insp Repts 50-321/99-02 & 50-366/99-02 on 990307-0417.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20206Q092
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	05/06/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206Q079	List: IR 05000321/1999002 ML20206Q075
References
50-321-99-02, 50-321-99-2, 50-366-99-02, 50-366-99-2, NUDOCS 9905190058
Download: ML20206Q092 (15)

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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 11 H

Docket Nos: 50-321,50-366  !

License Nos: DPR-57, NPF-5 Report Nos: 50-321/99-02,50-366/99-02 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) .

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Facility: E. l. Hatch Plant, Units 1 & 2 ,

Location: P. O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515 l

Dates: March 7 - April 17,1999 Inspectors: J. Munday, Senior Resident Inspector J. Canady, Resident inspector T. Fredette, Resident inspector P. Fillion, Engineering Inspector, (Section E8.1)

D. Forbes, Health Physics inspector, (Sections R1 and R8)

R. Carrion, Project Engineer, (Section E3.1)

W. Kleinsorge, Reactor Inspector, (Sections M2.2 and M2.3)

Approved by: P. Skinner, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects 9905190058 990506 "

PDR ADOCK 05000321 G PDR ,

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Enclosure

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j Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 remained in a refueling outage for the duration of the report period.

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Unit 2 began this report period at essentially 100 percent maximum operating power (MOP) or l

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98 percent rated thermal power (RTP). Power was reduced to approximately 50 percent RTP on April 17, to repair various steam leaks associated with Balance-of Plant equipment and to perform a control rod pattern adjustment. The plant was returned to 100 percent MOP later the

same da . Operation _3 01 Conduct of Operations '

01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the l- conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious; specific events and -

observations are detailed in the sections belo .2 Unit 1 Fue! Insoection and Fuel Movement Observations (60710) (37551)

The inspectors observed the receipt and inspection of new fuel. The inspectors also observed the movement of irradiated fuel from the core to the spent fuel pool (SFP) and the movement of new fuel from the SFP to the core. The receipt, inspection, and fuel movement activities were in accordance with licensee's procedures and Technical Specifications (TS).

The inspectors observed that housekeeping and foreign material exclusion practices were emphasized by licensee oversight personnel assigned responsibilities for refueling

. floor activities. Health Physics personnel were present and provided guidance and assistance for refueling activitie O1.3 Unexpected Reactor Protection System (RPS) Trio on Unit 1 (71707)

' On April 12, an RPS trip occurred on Unit 1 due to a high Scram Discharge Volume water level. The plant was in the Refuel Mode at the time with all control rods fully inserted. The licensee determined that a clearance placed to isolate instrument air to the outboard Main Steam isolation valves also isolated air to the scram pilot solenoid

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valves. This was an unexpected occurrence. When the air system was isolated the scram valves opened which allowed the scram discharge volume to fill and initiate the RPS trip.-

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The inspectors reviewed the clearance boundary and the associated plant drawings and concluded that the drawings were misleading in that it was not easily identifiable that the instrument air line which was isolated also supplied air to the scram pilot air heade The licensee initiated deficiency card 9903064 to ensure the drawings were revised for clarification.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-321/99-02,50-366/99-02 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes inspection activities in the areas of Health Physics, Independent Spent Fuel Storage construction activities, inservice Inspection, and breaker performance, by region based inspector Ooerations

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Housekeeping and foreign material exclusion practices were emphasized by licensee oversight personnel assigned responsibilities for refueling floor activities. Health Physics personnel were present and provided guidance and assistance for refueling ;

activities (Section 01.2).  ;

i Maintenance

. Inservice inspection activities observed / reviewed were conducted in accordance with procedures, licensee commitments and regulatory requirements. Flow Accelerated Corrosion inspections were conducted and evaluated in accordance with procedure The licensee had implemented an effective program to maintain high energy carbon steel piping systems within acceptable wall thickness limits (Sections M2.2 and M2.3).

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Qualified personnel were assigned to conduct engineering, construction oversight, and Quality Control work associated with the building of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation facilities. Construction drawings were detailed and incorporated appropriate standards for excavation and reinforcing steel placement. Deviations identified during actual concrete pours were documented for disposition by Engineering (Section E3.1).

Plant Sucoort

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The licensee was effectively labeling, controlling, and storing radioactive material as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1904 and effectively posting radioactive material storage areas as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1902. Contamination control practices reviewed were consistent with licensee procedures and have resulted in reduced contamination events (Sections R1.1 and R1.2).

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O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Unit 1 Enaineered Safetv Feature System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible portions of the Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control system.. The inspectors reviewed the system from the main control room and at the local equipmen The inspectors also reviewed procedure 64CH-CAM-001-0S, "KAMAN," Revision (Rev)

1, conducted a walkdown of the plant Accident Range Gas Monitoring system and equipment, and reviewed work history over the previous two years for the KAMAN equipment to verify the system was properly maintained to perform it's safety functio The inspectors determined that the equipment was being maintained, calibrated, and tested in accordance with the applicable procedures. Deficiencies that had been identified were promptly addressed through work orders and corrected in a timely manner based upon significanc O3 Operations Procedures and Documentation O3.1 Review of Temoorarv Modifications (TM) and Operator Workarounds (OWA) (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the TMs for both units to ensure compliance with procedure 40AC-ENG-018-OS, " Temporary Modification Control," Rev. 3, Edition (ED) 1. The inspectors also reviewed the TS and Design Basis to ensure applicable requirements were being met.' The inspectors observed that thirteen TMs were listed as active for Unit i and twenty for Unit 2. Six of the TMs on Unit 1 and ten on Unit 2 were for safety related equipment. The inspectors reviewed selected 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations for the TMs and determined that they satisfactorily supported the equipment modifications. The inspectors did not identify any TM that adversely affected operator or equipment performanc The inspectors noted that the oldest TM was dated October 15,1997, and discussed this observation with engineering management. The licensee stated that plans were being developed to reduce the number of TMs and permanent design changes packages had been developed for several of the older TM The inspectors reviewed the OWAs and departmental instruction DI-OPS-61-1196N, Control and Tracking of Operator Workarounds," Rev. O. The procedure was only applicable to significant operator workarounds which are defined as "any equipment or design deficiencies that require compensatory operator action during a plant transient that is needed to complete and ensure the proper operation of that equipment." There was only one OWA action and it was associated with the drywell oxygen sample system on Unit 1. Design change packages had been developed to correct this degraded condition during the year 2000 fall outag l

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The licensee also tracks issues which hinder operators in the performance of their i duties but does not meet their definition of " operator workaround" or is not corrected by another process, i.e., work order, Design Change Request, etc. These items were classified as " Operator Needs." There was no procedure which controlled what goes on this list. Items were added at Operations management discretion. There were eight items on the Operator Needs list and all issues were being actively pursued by the ,

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l The inspectors concluded that the licensee's control and disposition of TMs and workarounds were in accordance with plant procedure j 04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 0 Inside Rounds Plant Eauioment Operator (PEO) Activities ( 71707)

The inspectors reviewed procedure 34GO-OPS-030-2S " Daily Inside Rounds," Rev. 28, and accompanied the Unit 2 inside rounds PEO on portions of his reactor building and turbine building tour. The inspectors observed that the PEO was deliberate in making observations of equipment status, checking for leaks, and other abnormalities. Safety I related equipment was specifically checked with caution. The PEO accurately read and recorded instrument values relating to TS acceptance criteria and focused on housekeeping issues. The inspectors concluded that the PEO was generally ,

knowledgeable of equipment status and conducted his tour in accordance with the l procedur ;

ll. Maintenance i M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments (62707)

The inspectors observed all or portions of selected maintenance work items. These items included preventive and corrective maintenance as well as urgent work item The inspectors observed that the work was performed in accordance with approved procedures and work packages which were present at the work location. The workers were knowledgeable about the activity and equipment that was being worke M1.2 Unit 1 Refuelina Outaae Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Maintenance (62707)

On March 10, the inspectors observed that the insulation and all of the pilot assemblies associated with the SRVs had been removed. Additionally, three of the main valve assemblies had been removed for testing, refurbishment as required, and certification for reinstallation during the subsequent refueling outage. The inspectors observed that Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) barrier material had been appropriately installed in the openings left by the valve component remova .

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After the SRVs had been reinstalled, the inspectors verified that the insulation was !

installed in accordance with the requirements of the vendor manual and the licensee's procedure. The inspectors identified that the flexible conduit on one of the SRV's was ;

broken at the entrance to a junction box. This observation was reported to the licensee I

' and a deficiency card was initiated. The inspectors observed during a subsequent drywell entry that the broken flexible conduit had been repaire i The inspectors concluded that proper FME control was maintained for the SRV repair !

activity. The va!ve insulation was installed in accordance with the vendor manual and applicable procedure M1.3 Flow Testina and Installation of Unit 1 Recirculatina Pumo Seal (62707)

The inspectors observed the pre-installation flow testing of the Unit 1 Recirculating l Pump Seal in accordance with corrective maintenance procedure 52CM-831-006-OS, j

" Reactor Recirculating System Recirculating Pump Flowserve Mechanical Seal l Overhaul," Rev.1, ED 2. The inspectors observed that the seal flow test met the i acceptance criteria specified in the procedure. The inspectors also observed the l removal of the old seal and installation of a new seal on the 1 A recirculating pump. Due l to interferences that preclued me use of hoisting devices directly over the pump, the l inspectors observed a four , smo', am physically remove and subsequently install the 1 435 pound seal by han l The inspectors noted effective teamwork and work practices for the accomplishment of this task. Health Physics personnel provided oversight and assistance with radiological controls and personnel contamination protection. Quality Control personnel were present and provided the necessary support for the activit M1.4 Review of Unit 1 Standby Liauid Control (SBLC) Pumo Overhaul and In-Service-Testina (IST) (62707)

The inspectors reviewed maintenance work order (MWO) 1-99-0086, procedure 52PM-C41-104-1S, " Standby Liquid Control System Pump Major inspection / Overhaul," Rev. 2, and observed work activities for the "A" SBLC pump. The licensee identified a decreasing trend in the IST discharge flow rate which was approaching the TS requirement of 41.2 gallons per minute (gpm). The inspectors verified that the clearance was properly established in the control room, at the pump motor control center, and locally at the pump. Additionally, the inspectors observed the functional and in-service testing of the pump following the maintenanc The inspectors observed that the IST program identified a degrading condition and the licensee took appropriate actions. The pump met the acceptance criteria of surveillance procedure 34SV-C41-002-1S, " Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability Test," Rev.12, following the pump overhaul. The inspectors also observed that personnel established ,

new IST baseline data as required by the IST progra l l

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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Westinahouse 4 kV Cubicle Eauioment Failure i Inspection Scope (62707)(37551)

l The inspectors monitored and reviewed licensee actions in response to a failure of a 4160-volt emergency switchgear circuit breaker to close on deman , Observations and Findinas I On March 5, Operations personnel attempted to start the 2B Control Rod Drive (CRD)

pump and received a "CRD PUMP B BREAKER TRIP alarm, indicating that the breaker had tripped. Subsequent troubleshooting revealed that the breaker Mechanism ;

Operated Cell (MOC) switch operating rod and pantograph assembly was slightly i damaged and had become mechanically bound, preventing the breaker from closin The licensee's Event Review Team concluded that the breaker had not actually operated after receiving the start signa The inspectors observed that the licensee initiated an inspection of the MOC switch assemblies of all other safety-related breakers. No other deficiencies were identifie This failure was attributed to 4kV cubicle equipment (MOC switch and mechanical linkage) rather than the 4kV breaker itself, and appeared to be a new type of failure mode for this equipment. The licensee also initiated an aggressive, comprehensive plan, as a conservative mer.sure, to refurbish or perform an enhanced preventive maintenance on all 63 existing safety-related 4kV circuit breakers by mid-May,199 The inspectors observed that planning and coordination for this refurbishment effort was undertaken immediately, and included a series of breaker changeouts, Westinghouse support for preventative maintenance activities, and complete refurbishment by qualified electricians in the maintenance departmen During the refueling outage, two additional breaker failures on the 1 A and 1D Plant Service Water pumps were experienced during logic system functional testing (LSFT).

These failures were attributed, respectively, to a procedure deficiency which left the control switch in " PULL-TO-LOCK," and excess " play" in the breaker floor tripping mechanism (when breaker racked to test). In neither case was the failure a result of a breaker problem. The licensee corrected these deficiencies and satisfactorily completed the LSF Conclusions The licensee's actions in response to the 2B CRD pump breaker failure to close were appropriate. Subsequent actions to initiate a 4kV breaker refurbishment program were both conservative and aggressiv M -

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M2.2 inservice insoection (ISI) Insoection Scone (IP 73753)

i The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ISI program and the program's implementation, including the review of procedures, and selected records.

l Observations and Findinos Observations were compared with applicable procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and ASME B&PV Code Sections V and XI,1989 Edition, No l Addenda (89NA). j l Specific areas examined included observing video tapes of in Vessel Inspections VT-1/3 examinations of reactor vessel internals including the shroud, steam dryer, Jet pumps; and review of selected records of completed ISI examinations of the reactor vessel

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welds, piping welds and pipe supports. The inspectors performed an independent 1 review of the licensee's ISI evaluation The inspectors reviewed records for the nondestructive examination (NDE) personnel

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and equipment utilized to perform ISI examinations. The records included: NDE equip-ment calibration and materials certification; and records attesting to NDE examiner

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l The inspectors determined that the procedures reviewed were concise and well written.

I inservice examinations observed / reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, by qualified and certified examiners using appropriately certified / calibrated l

equipment and material Conclusion I

l Inservice inspection activities observed / reviewed were conducted in accordance with procedures, licensee commitments and regulatory requirement M2.3 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Proaram (49001)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Program and the program's implementation. The inspectors reviewed procedures, records, and documents related to the monitoring of FAC in secondary piping systems and both

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planned and consequential piping replacement. Observations were compared with

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EPRI NSAC-202L-R1 1301-01 Final Report dated November 1996, licensee procedures and the UFSAR.

l The Unit 1 FAC inspection included approximately 86 initial inspection locations and four expansion locations. During the outage the licensee replaced one carbon steel component, with FAC resistant Cr-Mo piping materials and made a weld overlay repair to a second component.

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l The inspectors concluded that the FAC inspections were conducted and evaluated in !

accordance with procedures. The licensee had implemented an effective program to j maintain high energy carbon steel piping systems within acceptable wall thickness limits 111. Enaineerina E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation E3.1 Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storace Installation (ISFSI) Construction Insoection Scoce (60853)

l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, specificatiors, i drawings, deviation reports, and observed portions of the initial concrete construction activities associated with the 1SFS Observations and Findinas The licensee's specification SC-DS-98-08, " Specification for independent Spent Fuel Storage installation (ISFSI) Pads," included four sub-specnications covering the entire project, including: site preparation; temporary controls; eatinwork; and concrete. The 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was determined to be thorough, addressing all pertinent item The drawings for the project were of good quality and detail. Field Change Request (FCR) 98-024-003 had been generated to resolve problems encountered by the vendo The most significant issue addressed by the FCR was the fact that the fine aggregate to be used in the concrete mix did not meet the American Society for the Testing of Materials (ASTM) Specification C33, " Standard Specification for Concrete Aggregates,"

acceptance criteria for gradation and fineness modules. However, the ASTM specification allowed the vendor to make three trial batches of concrete using the non-complying fine aggregate and to test their respective compressive strengths. The vendor did this and, upon completing the compressive strength tests of the trial batches, the evaluation showed that the non-complying fine aggregate was acceptable for us The inspectors reviewed the work completed in the field in preparation for the concrete placement. The reinforcing steel was of the correct type and size and was placed in accordance with the construction drawings. The formwork was properly placed and i brace Training and qualification records of the contractor staff responsible for overseeing the work were reviewed by the inspectors. In addition to industrial experience, including experience with ASTM specifications and the American Concrete Institute (ACl) Code, four personnel from the contractor's . staff had completed training provided by the licensee with respect to reinforced concrete construction for nuclear-grade application '

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The inspectors observed portions of several concrete pours for the ISFSI pad Implementation engineers provided good oversight of pour activities. Deviations from pour specifications, including weight test and slump test results, were appropriately documented in deficiency cards and submitted to the architect / engineer (A/E) for ;

disposition. Concrete pours were considered acceptable pending results of 28-day l compression (strength) tests of concrete specimens set aside from each pou I Conclusions  !

The inspectors concluded that the licensee had qualified personnel in place to conduct s engineering, construction oversight, and Quality Control work associated with the j building of the ISFSI pads. Construction drawings were detailed and incorporated ACI l standards for excavation and reinforcing steel placement. Deviations identified during actual concrete pours were documented for disposition by the A/ i E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903) l l

E8.1 (Closed) IFl 50-321. 366/98-08-01: Review Lona Term Resolution of Circuit Breaker )

Maintenance Weaknesses and issues I l

A specialinspection of medium-voltage and low-voltage power circuit breaker maintenance was conducted in March 1998, by NRC Headquarters and Regional staf The staff identified weaknesses and issues in the following areas:

e Refurbichment program "

• The RMS-9 digital trip device used on low-voltage circuit breakers exhibited spurious tripping when intermittent ground faults appeared on the ungrounded system, but the resolution remained in the development stage .

e Maintenance procedures l e Unique identification (labeling) of each circuit breaker k

• DC control voltage e Vendor interface The inspectors followed up on all these areas. The inspectors also reviewed six breaker failures to close on demand related to medium-voltage circuit breaker The inspectors found that the corrective actions for the maintenance procedures, unique identification, and vendor interface items had already been completed in a satisfactory

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implemented in the current refueling outage, should effectively address the causes of l the past failure I I

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9 The RMS-9 and DC control voltage issues were addressed with definite resolution plans in place, and were being monitored to completion. The RMS-9 issue was being monitored by Significant Occurrence Report (SOR) 9801029. The licensee was in the process of performing verification and validation of the software in conjunction with the manufacturer and electromagnetic interference testing. This work should be completed by the end of summe The inspectors agreed that the root cause evaluations for the six failures of medium-voltage circuit breakers since March 1998, deterrnined the true root causes and effective corrective actions were implemented. The two most recent failures were determined to i

be due to the operator too quickly resetting a lockout switch during a surveillance test rather than an internal breaker proble R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Tour of Radioloaical Protected Areas (83750)

The inspectors reviewed implementation of selected elements of the licensee's radiation protection program as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 20.1902, and 1904. The review included observation of radiological protection activities for control of radioactive material, personnel frisking, postings and labeling, and the use of survey instrumentation during the ongoing Unit 1 refueling outag The licensee had documented a significant occurrence report (SOR) C09902115 and initiated an investigation to address two pieces of wood timbers found March 18,1999, outside the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA), contaminated with low levels of fixed radioactivity on the g-flex (herculite material) covering the wood. Surveys determined the wood itself was not contaminated. One piece of contaminated material was found in l the onsite landfill and the other piece was found on a truck located in the protected are '

The inspectors concluded that management corrective actions to control the l contaminated material found, search for any other similar material outside of the RCA, and to review existing procedures and worker practices was appropriate. This failure to comply with procedures for adequately surveying radioactive material prior to release from the RCA as required by licensee procedure 62RP-RAD-017-0S, Release Surveys, Rev. 8, was identified as a violation of minor safety significance and was not subject to formal enforcement actio The inspectors performed radiation and contamination surveys of material storage locations outside of the RCA. Surveys were also performed at the onsite landfill. Wood and other debris being placed into the landfill were surveyed for contamination. Results of surveys of the locations and material were consistent with established background levels. All material observed was appropriately labeled. During tours, radiological housekeeping was observed to be adequate. Contamination controls for work on the Moisture Separator Reheater tube bundles and the refueling floor were observed to be adequate. Licensee actions to reduce personnel contaminations were positive. The

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licensee had incurred approximately 52 personnel contaminations as compared to i approximately 82 for the same period in 1998. This was also a significant reduction when compared to 1997 calender year in which over 1200 personnel contaminations had occurre During plant tours, the inspectors verified the adequacy of calibration and source checks j for various types of instrumentation in use for frisking material and personnel as required 'l by licensee procedures. Survey documentation was adequate and areas were surveyed to meet the procedural requirement frequencies. For observed outage work, personnel ;

complied with protective clothing and dosimetry specified in applicable Radiation Work

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Permits. High Radiation Areas observed were locked and controlled as required by >

licensee procedure R1.2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)(83750)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of 10 CFR 20.1101(b) which requires that the licensee shall use, to the extent practicable, procedures and i engineering controls based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve ,

occupational doses and doses to members of the public ALAR l t

For 1999, the licensee's ALARA program established an annual collectivo site dose goal of 315 person-rem which included the Unit 1 refueling outage dose estimate of 1 approximately 210 person rem. The inspectors discussed ALARA planning procedures l with the ALARA staff, reviewed ALARA packages for several outage work evolutions, and

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observed and discussed planned ALARA initiatives. The licensee had implemented l

ALARA procedures for those work evolutions reviewed. As of April 9,1999, the licensee was above Unit 1 outage projections by approximately nine person-rem. The licensee attributed some of the increase in total outage dose to additional inservice inspection work. All personnel radiation exposures during 1999 to date were below regulatory limit R8 Miscellaneous Radiation Protection and Chemistry issues (92904)

R (Closed) Inspection Followuo item (IFI) 50-321. 366/97-11-05: Adeauacy of Revised Liould Effluent Release Procedures i

The IFl was opened to review the procedural adequacy of the source check of the Liquid

Radwaste Effluent Monitor prior to relearc. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's completed actions and this IFl is closed.

l R8.2 (Closed) Violation (VlO) 50-321. 366/97-12-07: Failure to Dispose of Licensed Material in Accordance With 10 CFR 20.2001(A)

This issue addressed license material not disposed of in accordance with 10 CFR 20 requirements in that seven pieces of rubble contaminated with low levels of radioactivity was improperly released to the onsite landfill. The inspectors reviewed licensee corrective actions and this violation is closed.

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R8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-321. 366/97-12-09: Failure to Follow Procedures-Multiple Examples This issue addressed examples of failure to follow procedures. The examples included one failure to maintain survey records as required by procedure and not initiating deficiency cards in a timely manner. The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions and this violation is close R8.4 (Closed) VIO 50-321. 366/97-12-10: Failure to Maintain Decommissionina Records In Accordance With 10 CFR 50.75(G)

This issue addressed the licensee's failure to maintain records of information relating to an unusual occurrence of radionuclide contaminants which may have been buried in the onsite landfill prior to June 4,1997. The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions and this violation is close l R8.5 (Closed) VIO 50 321. 366/98-01-04: Failure to Follow Procedures for Entrv Into a Hiah Radiation Area This issue addressed the failure of a worker to log in on an RTP and to notify health physics personnel as required by procedure prior to entering a posted High Radiation Area. The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions and this violation is close R8.6 (Closed) VIO 50-321. 366/98-01-06: Failure to Conduct Adeauate Surveys to Evaluate the Radiation Levels and Potential Hazards for Workers Conductina Unit 1 Condensate Pumo Vibration Analysis Measurements l

This issue addressed a failure by health physics personnel to perform adequate surveys l of areas prior to the performance of work activities. The inspector reviewed licensee l corrective actions and this violation is close R8.7 Closed N 60-321. 366/98-01-07: Review of Mav-June 1998 Main Control Room Ventilation Coolina Capacity Test Results and Evaluate Material Condition of System l Comoonents The cooling capacity test results were review and documented as satisfactory in Inspection Report 50-321,366/98-03. The inspectors walked down the system and verified that the material conditions were satisfactory following maintenance activities to replace system insulation and this IFl is closed.

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V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas X1 Exit Meeting Summary I

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 21,1999. Interim exit meetings were held on April 9, to discuss the findings of Region based inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection j should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie i

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Betsill, J., Assistant General Manager - Operations ,

Curtis, S., Unit Superintendent {

Davis, D., Plant Administration Manager Fornel, P., Performance Team Manager Fraser, O., Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor Hammonds, J., Engineering Support Manager Kirkley, W., Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager Madison, D., Operations Manager Moore, C., Assistant General Manager- Plant Support Roberts, P., Outage and Planning Manager Thompson, J., Nuclear Security Manager Tipps, S., Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager Wells, P., General Manager - Nuclear Plant

!N_SPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 Onsite Engineering l iP 49001 Inspection of Erosion / Corrosion Monitoring Program l

IP 60710 Refueling Activities l

IP 60853 On-Site Fabrication of components and Construction of and ISFSI IP 62707 Maintenance Observations

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IP 71707 Plant Operations l IP 73753 Ir' service Inspection l IP 83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure IP 92903 Followup - Engineering IP 92904 Followup - Plant Support

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l ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Closed l

50-321,366/98-08-01 IFl Review Long Term Resolution of Circuit Breaker Maintenance Weaknesses and Issues (Section E8.1)

50-321,366/97-11-05 IFl Adequacy of Revised Liquid Effluent Release Procedures

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(Section R8.1). l 50-321,366/97-12-07 VIO Failure to Dispose of Licensed Materialin accordance with i 10 CFR 20.2001(A) (Section R8.2) l 50-321,366/97-12-09 VIO Failure to Follow Procedures - Multiple Examples (Section R8.3)

l 50-321,366/97-12-10 VIO Failure to Maintain Decommissioning Records in accordance with 10 CFR 50.75(G) (Soction R8.4)

50-321,366/98-01-04 VIO Failure to Follow Procedures for Entry into a High Radiation i Area (Section R8.5) {

50-321,366/98-01 06 VIO Failure to Conduct Adequate Surveys to Evaluate the Radiation Levels and Potential Hazards for Workers Conducting Unit 1 Condensate Pump Vibration Analysis ,

Measurements (Section R8.6) I 50-321,366/98-01-07 IFl Review of May-June 1998 Main Control Room Ventilation ,

Cooling Capacity Test Results and Evaluate Material Condition of System Components (Section R8.7)

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