IR 05000321/1980035
| ML19339A864 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1980 |
| From: | Dance H, Rogers R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19339A858 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-80-35, 50-366-80-35, NUDOCS 8011050574 | |
| Download: ML19339A864 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W sulTE 3100 o,
o ATLANTA, GEORGIA 3o303 s
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Report Nos. 50-321/80-35 and 50-366/80-35 Licensee: Georgia Power Company 270 Peachtree Street, N. W.
Atlanta, GA 30303 Facility Name: Hatch I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 Inspection at Hatch near Baxley, Georgia Inspector:
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7-//- 80 R. F.
ogers 4-Date Signed Approved by:
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'7 - / / - N H. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on July 15 - August 15, 1980 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 75 inspector-hours on site in the areas of technical specification compliance, reportable occurrences, housekeeping, operator perform-ance, overall plant operations. Quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventative maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities and surveillance activities.
Results Of the eleven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identi-fied in ten areas. One item 'of noncompliance was found in ne area (Infraction -
reactor startups with inoperative scram volume level switche s, paragraph 9).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. Manry, Plant Manager
- T. Moore, Assistant Plant Manager
- T. Greene, Assistant Plant. Manager S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations R. Nix, Superintendent of Maintenance C. Coggins, Superintendent of Engineering Services W. Rogers, Health Physicist C. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 18, August 8 and August 20, 1980, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift logs and operations rer.ords, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspector routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During abnormal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspector conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
6.
Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required,
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equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant
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conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspector-also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly estab-
.lished, critical clean areas were bding controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material is stored properly and conbustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours the the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions equipment caution and danger tags and component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts and weekends.
7.
- Technical Specification Compliance (Units I and 2)
During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO's) and results of selected
surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct obser-vation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions,
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and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as
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8.
Physical Protection (Units I and 2)
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The inspector verified by observation and interview during the reporting
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interval that' measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organi-zation of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, that search practices were appropriate, and that escorting and communications procedures were followed.
9.
Scram' Discharge Volume Testing Per IE Bulletin 80-17 (Units 1 and 2)
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On July 3, 1980, IE issued IE Bulletin 80-17 which described the failure of 76 of 185 control rods to fully insert during a scram at TVAs Browns Ferry i
Unit 3 on June 28, 1980.
The Bulletin required various investigative actions by all BWR facilities. Supplements 1 and 2 to this Bulletin were issued on July 18 and July 22, 1980. They contained additional requirements based on information received from the initial Bulletin 80-17 tests.
The Hatch facility response to Bulletin 80-17 is essentially complete. The Manual and automatic scram tests were performed on July 20 and 21st for
' Unit I and July 26 and 31st for Unit 2.
Procedural revisions were required and operator training has been completed.
The inspector witnessed the t
manual scram test on each unit and verified that the licensee complied with other Bulletin requirements. The inspector also physically inspected the scram discharge systems on both units to attest to its design adequacy.
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One problem was noted during the manual scram test on Unit 2.
Two (2) of the high level scram discharge volume switches, 2C11-N013A&D, failed to signal high water level in the SDV. Furthur investigation revealed that the switch floats were crushed from the top. The licensee's surveillance
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procedures for checking these floats only required a functional test with water every cycle.
This was last performed successfully on Unit 2 on
' April 9, 1980. Subsequent review of computer post trip logs indicated that these switches did not actuate after scrams on June 2, 1980, June 14, 1980, July 11, 1980, and July 26, 1980.
Contrary to technical specification requirements, on protective. instrument operability, the licensee then re-started the reactor on four occassions with these two switches inoper-able. The. failure of the two switches (A&D) on the Post Trip Log should have been detected by the licensee and appropriate corrective action taken at the time. Since this occurrence, the licensee has modified the surveil-lance procedures HNP-1-3004 and HNP-2-3004 to require a functional test with water than an electrical check at Technical Specification required intervals. The licensee also commited to functionally testing these switches after every scram. The licensee's restart of the Unit 2 reactor with less than the minimum number of operable channels of protet tive system instruction on four separate occassions is contrary to Technical Specification 3.0.4 and is an infraction (366/80-35-01).
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