IR 05000321/1999005

Insp Repts 50-321/99-05 & 50-366/99-05 on 990711-0821.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20217B554
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	09/16/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217B531	List: IR 05000321/1999005 ML20217B527
References
50-321-99-05, 50-366-99-05, NUDOCS 9910120288
Download: ML20217B554 (11)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll  ;

Docket Nos: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos: DPR-57, NPF-5

. Report Nos: 50-321/99-05, 50-363/99-05 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Lompany, Inc. (SNC)

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Facility: E. I. Hatch Piant, Units 1 & 2 L

l Location: P. O. Box 2010 )

Raxley, Georgia 31515  ;

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Dates: July 11 - August 21,1999 i

l Inspectors: J. Munday, Senior Resident inspector i T. Fredette, Resident inspector  !

R. Chou, Regional inspector (Sections E3.1)

D. Forbes, Regionel Inspector (Sections R1 and R2)

Approved by: P. Skinner, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

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J Enclosure 9910120298 990916 N PDR AnOCK 05000321 8 PDR l

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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Integrated Inspection Report 5G-321/99-05,50-366/99-05 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes inspection in the areas of transportation of radioactivs material, control of radiation areas and radioactive effluents and plant chemistry as well as inspection of Dry Spent Fuel Storage "onstruction activities by regional inspector Ooerations

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The observed performance deficiencies during the emergency exercise conducted on July 21, did not significantly alter the ...itigation strategy for successfu'ly controlling the simulated emergency conditions during the exercise or prevent the successful completion of exercise objectives. Lice'1see management actions to address the performance deficiencies were appropriate (Section 04.2).

Maintenance

. The inspectors concluded that the licensee actions taken for the 2A Residual Heat Removal loop discharge piping pressurization were appropriate. The leakage did not adversely affect safe unit operation (Section M2.1).

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The licensee's engineers and craft personnel performed effectively doring the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation construction, deficiency evaluation, and cask loading preparation. The licensee's engineers were knowledgeable and construction craft personnel were skillful (Section E3.1).

Plant Support

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The licensee effectively labeled, controlled, and stored radioactive material as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1904 and effectively posted radioactive material storage areas as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1902 (Section R1.1).

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Report Details Summarv of K'nt Status Unit 1 operated at Maximum Operating Power (MOP),95 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP),

until July 12 when power was reduced to about 72 percent due to a decrease in main condenser vacuum. The unit was returned to MOP the same day. The unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on August 9, when MOP attained 100 percent RT Unit 2 operated at MOP (98 percent RTP) during the inspection period, except for routine testin . Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

Using inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors cenducted reviews of ongoing plant operations and main control room activities. Several equipment clearances were reviewed and found to be acceptable. The inspectors attended pre-job briefs for selected activities and verified the appropriate procedures were followed. Operator response to annunciators and changing plant conditions were observed and verified to be performed in accordance with applicable procedures. In general, the conduct of i operations observed was safety-consciou l 04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Control Room Obsorvations of Emeraency Diesel Generator (EDG) Surveillances

! Insoection Scoce (61726) (71707) I

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The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures and observed all or portions of control !

l room operator performance of monthly surveillance tests for the 1B and 2C EDG !

I Observations and Findinas  !

l The inspectors attende<t the pre-evolution briefing for the 1B EDG surveillance. The j briefing was thorough and addressed the need for caution, three-part communications l and peer checks during the evolution. A notable precaut.Fon was identified by the lead ;

operator to ensure a peer check to prevent inadvertent operation of either the normal or ;

alternate supply breaker to the 1F emergency bus when closing the EDG output I breaker. Inadvertent operation would have directly caused a plant transient due to the inoperability of the 1B Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) during the current operating j cycl l

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2 Conclusions

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The inspectors concluded that operators conducting EDG surveillance activities provided appropriate precautionary information during pre-evolution briefings and displayed sensitivity to an abnormal electrical line-up due to the inoperability of the 1 B ;

Unit Auxiliary Transforme .2 Control Room Operator Performance Duriro Emeraency Exercise Insoection Scope (71707)

On July 21, the licensee conducted an emergency exercise involving both onsite and l offsite participation. The inspectors observed the actions taken by the operators in the {

control room simulato { Observations and Findinto The inspectors observed that operators implemented the appropriate sections of the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) during the exercise as the conditions

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warranted, with one exception. The operators did not realign the B loop of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system to the suppression pool cooling mode of operation after adequate core cooling was assured as required by EOP Procedure PC-1, Primary Containment Contro i l

In addition, the inspectors noted several other actions taken by operators that were not l in accordance with existing training policy and procedures. The following deficiencies i were observed. The use of three-part communication and repeat-backs for control room operators and emergency communicators diminished as the exercise progressed; )

operators were not always attentive during operator crew briefs; operator aids for j aligning systems were not consistently used and resulted in an incorrect system {

alignment for RHR; the operators were unclear if special emergency teams dispatched I to conduct assigned tasks should be included during a building evacuation; balance-of-plant equipment, specifically the condensate and condensate booster pumps, were not

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j removed from service as required by procedure; and operators did not demonstrate the !

most conservative approach to dec. ease reactor power during control rod movement

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following a sirnulated automatic transient without scram conditio The inspectors discussed these observations with Operations and Emergency Planning (EP) managernent and the emergency exercise controllers. The inspectors were informed that these deficiencies would be discussed and included in continued training for licensed operators and EP pensonnel. Management perso inel stated they would l reemphasize the expectations for exercise controller performance and stress the {

importance of performance problem identification and resolutio j Conclusions The inspactors concluded that the observed performance deficiencies did not significantly alter the mitigation strategy for successfully controlling the simulated emergency condition during the exercise or prevent the successful completion of J

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exercise objectives. Licensee management actions to address the performance deficiencies were appropriat Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)

- 08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-366/99-007: Personnel Error and inadeauate Corrective Action Cause Automatic Reactor Shutdown This LER was discussed in section 01.3 of Integrated Inspection Report (IR) 50-321, 366/99-04. Corrective actions are identified in the licensee's corrective action program .

as Significant Occurrence Reports (SOR) C09905243 and C09905347. No new issues

were revealed by the LE . 08.2 '- (Closed) LER 50-366/99-006: Loss of Condenser Vacuum Leads to Manual Reactor Scram and Enaineered Safety Feature Actuations The event addressed in this LER is discussed in Special Team IR 50-321,366/99-1 The inspectors concluded that, although minor errors and inconsistencies were identified in the LER, no new issues were identified which warrant further evFuatio The inspectors verified that corrective actions were identified in the licensee's corrective action program under SORS C09905008, C09904885, C09904889, C09905090 and i

C09904897.

l II. Maintenance

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M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments (61726) ( 62707)

The inspectors observed all or portions of selected maintenance activities. In addition, the inspectors observed several surveillances performed by maintenance personnel. In general, proper procedures were at the job site and being used, the work performed was appropriately documented and the maintenance personnel were familiar and knowledgeable about the work being performe M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment i

M2.1 Pressurization of the 2A RHR Looo Discharae Pioina l Insoection Scope (62707)(71707) l l

Due to leakage past the reactor vessel injection valves causing the 2A RHR loop )

discharge to pressurize, the inspectors reviewed the annunciator response procedure, l operating procedure, instrument calibration procedure, technical specifications (TS), !

technical requirements manual (TRM) and appropriate sections of the Updated Final i Safety Analysis Repcrt (UFSAR).

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4 Observations and Findinas i

The inspectors observed that the 2A RHR loop discharge piping required venting approximately once per each 12-hour shift. The pipe was pressurizing because the t eactor vessel injection valve, 2E11-F015A, and injection check valve, 2E11-F050A, ,

were leaking past their seat. The inspectors reviewed plant logs and determined that l the leakage began after the loop was secured from service on June 22,1999. The inspectors concluded that although the leaking valve,2E11-F015A, is a primary containment isolation valve, no actions were required to be taken as long as the piping remained in tact. The inspectors also verified that the necessary control room alarms and instrumentation to indicate increased RHR piping pressure were operable. The inspectors concluded that the leakage did not adversely affect safe unit operation The inspectors discussed this issue with control room operators and all demonstrated satisfactory understanding of the condition and the response to an increased pressure in the RHR piping. The inspectors identified minor deficiencies between the system operating procedure and the annunciator procedure used to reduce the RHR pressur The licensee subsequently cocrected the annunciator procedure. The inspectors noted that the licensee had initiated work orders to ensure the leaking valves were repaired during the next refueling outage, Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the actions taken by the licensee in response to the 2A i Residual Heat Removal loop discharge piping pressurizing due to leakage past the !

reactor vessel injection valves were appropriate. The "alve leakage did not affect safe {

unit operatio M6 Maintenance Organization and Administration 1

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M6.1 Measurina and Test Eauioment (M&TE) Proaram Insoection Scoce (62707)

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l The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures and examined various aspects of the )

l maintenance and instrumentation and control (l&C) program for control and administration of M&TE. The findings were compared to the requirements of the i licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) progra , Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed procedures 50AC-MNT-002-03, " Control of Measuring and Test Equipment," Revision (Rev.) 4,51GM-TOL-002-OS, " Control of l&C Measuring and i Test Equipment," Rev. 4, and 51GM-TOL-001-OS. " Maintenance Shop Measuring and Test Equipment Control," Rev. 5, and examined the licensee's processes for M&TE recordkeeping, labeling, storage, issuance and recall. Calibration records for selected M&TE used on recent safety-related surveillances was reviewed. All documentation was complete. The metrology laboratory documentation included a certification that

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calibration standards used maintained an accuracy ratio of 4:1 as specified by the

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licentee's OA' Progra >

The inspectors observed that the storage of M&TE included segregation of defective or suspect equipment to preclude inadvertent issue. The inspectors reviewed the process for test gage issue for l&C technicians and observed the use of shop bench calibration equipment for these gages. The metrology records for this equipment was also reviewed and no discrepancies were identifie Conclusions The licensee's H&TE control process satisfied the requirements of the QA Progra Ill. Engineering

' E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation E Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storaae Installation (ISFSI) Construction Insoection Scope (60853)

l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's construction records, Commitment Reports (COs), Field Change Requests (FCRs), and Engineering Judgment (EJ) documents for the ISFSI construction. In addition, the inspectors observed conctruction in progress, toured the spent fuel cask movement route, and discussed the licensee's preparation for the spent fuel cask loading with engineers.

I Observations and Findinas The licensee had completed the pour and curing for all four cask concrete pads. The l licensee also completed backfill and compaction for the cask crawler path. The inspectors observed the crawler path compaction and soil sampling by using the Sand-Cone method for testing the soi! compaction efficiencv. The inspectors concluded that the soil compaction was adequate and the sampling technique was skillfu The inspectors measured reinforcement bar (rebar) size, spacing, splice length, and <

clearance to the form and the foundation installed for lighting poles, emergency diesel

. generator foundation, and conduit trench in preparation for the concrete pour. The i inspectors also measured dimensions and spacings of the cask storage concrete pads which were already completed. All measurements taken for the construdion installation complied with the drawings. The inspectors concluded that the work performed was l

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satisfactory. The following drawings were reviewed to verify elements installed or completed were in accordance with specifications and work instructions:

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S-98-024-C203," Dry Cask Spent Fuel Storage Facility, Phase ll Storage Area, Miscellaneous pads and Foundations - Plan", Rev. D l

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S-98-024-C204, " Dry Cask Spent Fuel Storage Facility, Phase ll Storage Area, Sections", Rev. C

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S-98-024-C206, " Dry Cask Spent Fuel Storage Facility, Phase ll Storage Area, Miscellaneous Foundations", Rev. C

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S-98-024-C207, " Dry Cask Spent Fuel Storage Facility, Phase ll Storage Area, Miscellaneous Pads - Sections", Rev. C The inspectors toured the plant with the licensee's engineers from the refueling floor to the ISFSI site in order to understand the cask loading preparation, operation, transportation path, and any modifications associated with cask movement. The licensee was in the process of preparing or revising current procedures for the cask loading, testing, operation, and transporting to the ISFSI are The inspectors reviewed the construction documentation for cask concrete pads already'

completed. The documents reviewed included FCRs, EJs, COs, Pre-Pour Checklists, Quality Control Inspection Reports, Concrete Strength Tests, and Batch Tickets. The Pre-Pour checklists verified the rebar size, spacing, grade, splice length, coverage clearance, and formwork clearance. The elements contained in the Quality Control Inspection Report included slump test, air content, subgrade, crawler path base, .

concrete unit weight, and concrete wet cur During the first concrete pour, the licensee found that weights of the concrete mix were between 140 and 142 pounds per cubic yard. The weight did not meet the specification requirements of 145 to 150 pounds per cubic yard. The licensee reduced the amount of sand and increased the amount of concrete to increase the weight. However, the weight still was not within the specifications. The licensee evaluated the discrepancy and a decision was made to accept the new mix weight if the strength of the concrete compression test exceeded 3000 pounds per square inch (psi). Some of the concrete compression tests had a strength of approximately 2800 psi when tested at 28 days and did not meet the design requirements of 3000 psi. However, all samples not meeting )

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the requirements were tested again at 56 or 90 days by using spare samples and exceeded 3000 psi. The licensee's engineers evaluated the final results and accepted them for meeting the design strength requirements. The inspectors determined this to be satisfactor Conclusions

. The licensee's engineers and crafts performed effectively during the ISFSI construction, l deficiency evaluation, and spent fuel cask loading preparation. The licensee's I engineers were knowledgecble and the construction crafts were skillfu i i

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IV. Plant Support l

R1 Radiological Protection and Chem'stry Controls R1.1 Tour of Radioloaical Protected Areas (83750)

The inspectors reviewed implementation of selected elements of the licensee's radiation protection program as required by 10 Coda of F-ederal Regulations (CFR) Parts

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20.1902, and 1904. The review included observation of radiological protection activities

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for control of radioactive material, personnel frisking, postings and labeling, and the use of surveyinstrumentatio The inspectors performed radiation surveys of material storage locations inside the plant !

and surveyed selected radiation and high radiation boundaries. Results of surveys of the locations and material were consirtent with licensee survey results reviewed. All material observed was appropriately labeled. During tours, radiological housekeeping was observed to meet licensee procedure requirement ;

i During plant tours, the inspectors also verified the adequacy of calibration and source checks for various types of instrumentation in use for frisking material and personnel as required by' licensee procedures. Suivey documentation and frequency of area surveys

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met procedural requirements. For observed work, personnel complied with protective i clothing and dosimetry specified in applicab!e Radiation Work Permits. High Radiation Areas observed were locked and controlled as required by licensee procedures. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's locked high radiation area key control processes and all keys were accounted fo The inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively labeled, controlled, and stored radioactive material as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1904 and effectively posted l radioactive matenal storage areas as required by 10 CFR Part 201902.

l l R1.2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) (83750)

l l . The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of 10 CFR 20.1101(b) which I l requires that the licensee shall use, to the extent practicable, procedures and engineering controis based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses and doses to members of the public that are ALAR For 1999, the licensee's ALARA program established an annual collective site dose goal of 315 person-rem which included the projected Unit 1 refueling outage dose estimate of approximately 210 person-rem. The Unit 1 outage was completed witn 245 person-re The inspectors reviewed the licensee's post outage report which addressed factors effecting the increase, such as, the refueling outage being extended from 55 days to 6 l days. The inspectors discussed ALARA planning procedures with the ALARA staff, and reviewed ALARA packages and ALARA initiatives for several work evolutions that were over and under projected goals. The licensee had implemented ALARA procedures for those work evolutions reviewed and were effectively tracking exposures received. All personnel radiation exposures during 1999 to date were below regulatory limit j i

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8 P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Activities P Observations Durina EP Exercise (71750)

The inspectors observed the licensee's Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) activities in responso to a simulated plant emergency on July 2 The inspectors observed that the licensee's initial response was complicated by the fact '

that control room Safety Parameter Data System (SPDS) displays were out of service, ;

requiring control room parameters to be relayed to telephone communicators in the TS in general, the inspectors observed that plant information was relayed and updated on )

TSC status boards in a timely fashio The inspectors observed that TSC manager briefings included timely updates of the plant situation and plan of action. Plant parameters and conditions were satisfactorily ;

diagnosed. Goals and priorities were appropriately established. The TSC manager !

demonstrated good command and control of the situation. The inspectors observed that )

some activities directed by TSC personnel were slow to be implemented. For example, it took more than 45 minutes from the time that the TSC directed a repair and troubleshooting team to investigate a problem with a containment isolation valve until the l repair team was actually dispatched from the OSC. The exercise controllers discussed l the need for a more timely response from field teams during the post-exercise critiqu I The inspectors later discussed observed performance attributes with licensee management. The inspectors were informed that performance improvements had beer +

identified, however, all exercise objectives were met. The inspectors concluded that ;

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overall performan::e of TSC and OSC personnel was satisfactor V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 27. An interim exit meeting was held on July 30 to discuss the findings of Region based inspectors. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Betsill, J., Assistant General Manager - Operations Curtis, S., Unit Superintendent Davis. D., Plant Administration Manager Dedrickson, R., Unit Superintendent

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Fraser, O., Safety Audit and Eng'neering Review Supervisor Googe, M., Performance Tearr Manager Hammonds, J., Engineering Support Manager Kirkley, W., Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager Madison, D., Operations Manager Moore, C.~ Ast%! ant General Manager - Plant Support

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Reddick, R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

' Roberts, P., Outage and Planning Manager Thornpson, J., Nuclear Security Manager

Tipps, S., Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager Varnadore, R., Operations Support Superintendent Wells, P., General Manager - Nuclear Plant INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 60853: On-site fabrication of Components and Construction of an ISFSI IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure IP 92700: .Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Non-routine Events at Power Reactor Facilities ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-366/99-007 LER Personnel Error and inadequate Corrective Action Cause Automatic Reactor Shutdown (Section 08.1)

'50-366/99-006 LER Loss of Condenser Vacuum Leads to Manual Reactor Scram and Engineered Safety Feature Actuations (Section 08.2) ,

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