IR 05000321/1989023

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-321/89-23 & 50-366/89-23 on 891025-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Observation & Evaluation of Annual Emergency Exercise
ML19332E895
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 11/30/1989
From: Sartor W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19332E889 List:
References
50-321-89-23, 50-366-89-23, NUDOCS 8912130117
Download: ML19332E895 (18)


Text

,

y.

.

_

s

.. _.

.

.

._

_.

_

.,.

,

, %,

4 - :,

eh y/ -iM"Ng%.

UNITED 8TATES

,7

.

NUCLEA.R REGULATORY COMMISSION

/jk r,.

-;l~ W Q.

-

g._.

REGION 11 -

I, E ' '

  • J -

101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

'~~U

.

ATLANTA, OEORGI A 30323 -

DEC 0 4 29

-.....

.

,

'

-t Report Nos.:

50-321/09-23 and 50-366/89-23

4

.

Licensee: Georgia. Power Company

&,,

P.:0. Box 12S5

'

'

Birmingham.AL -35201

.

'

Docket Nos.:- 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.:

DPR-57 and NPF-5 j

iccility Name:. Hatch l'and 2 a<

' Inspection Conducted: October' 25 26, 1989

,

Inspector:.

A

/m

//730/6l9

.i L M. Sartor, Jr.

-(/

Date Siyned

,,

' Accompanying Personnel:

R. Hogan (NRR,.PEPB)

.M. Stein (Sonalysts, Inc.)

"/30

Ahprovedby:

  1. 1 W. H-Rankin, Chief-Date Signed

'

.

/ V L Emergency. Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness: nd Radiological

,

', * _

- Division of Radiation Safety.and Safeguards Protection Branch

.

SUMMARY

~Scopo:

y This routine, anno 9nced inspa tion was the observation and evaluation of the annualiemergency exercise.

State and local governments participated fully in this, exercise,

'

Results:

p

.

,

In the areas apected violatians or deviations were not identified.

.;

' Based upon the scenario used and the respor.se observed thereto, the licensee

.'

successfully demonstrated the capability to perform in accordance with the Emergency Preparedness Plans and Procedures to adequately provide for the health land safaty of the pubiic.

,

,g '

~

.

m&

t a

_o

7.

l E'

.

,

,

.

,

k L

REPORT DETAILS

,

'

1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • J. Beckham, Vice-President

?

  • J. Davis, Manager, General Support
  • D. Edge, Nuclear Secuiity Superintendent
  • P. Fornel, Manager, Maintenance
  • G. Goode, Manager Engineering Support

. J. Lewis, Operations Manager (Acting)

'

  • C. Moore, Assistant General Manager. Plant Support t

_

  • R. Mothena, Onsite Einergency Preparedness Supervisor
  • H. Nix, General Manager, Nuclear Plant
  • L. Summer, Assistant General Manager, Plant Support
  • S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
  • R. Zavadoski, Manager, Health Physics / Chemistry

' Other licensee _ employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

  • R. Musser.

,

  • Attended exit interview

.'

f 2.

Exercise Scenario (82302)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major i

portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State, and local Emergency Plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),

i 10 CFR 50. Appendix E.

Paragraph IV.F. and specific criteria in HUREG-0654,Section II.N.

l The scenario deveb ped for this exercise was adequate to exercise the F

- onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency' information to the State and local government agencies for their full participation in the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3.

AssignmentofResponsibility(82301)

This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and

.

.,,, _

, l?f

~

~

'

,.

+

.

.

.

~

.,, <

'

that adequate staff was available to response to an emergency as required

by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A. and

specified criteria in NUREG-0654 Section II.A.

The' inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.

No violations or deviations were identified, 4. _

Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

n This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to acconnodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency

,

Operations Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable

'

of augmenting )the planned response have been identified as required by10 CFR 5

,

criteria in NUREG-0654 Section II.C.

State and local staff were accommodated at the near-site Emergency Operations Facility.

Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt and assistance resources from various agencies were prepared to

. assist in the' simulated emergency.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Emergency Classification System (82301)-

This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency

>

- classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility.

licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,

.

' Paragraph IV.C. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654 Section II.D.

An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the Implementing Procedures.

The system appeared to be -d::-" ate for the classification of the simulated Mc1deat ano tne emer?.y procedures provided for initial and contir~.,...ni < : y& M ny actions during the simulated emergency.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50, I

.

.

.

. -

.

j s

m

,

f, y

-

-

-

?

y r

Appendix E Paragraph IV.D. and specified criteria in NUREG-0654. Section

>

II.E.

"

An _ inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated

.

,

emergency conditions to Federal, Stat.o, and local response organizations

'

'

and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.

t No violations or deviations were identified.

L 7.

EmergencyCommunications-(82301)-

-This-area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt comunications among principal response organizations and - emergency personnel as ~ required by 10CFR50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50,- Appendix E,

'

-Paragraph IV.E. and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.

Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities appeared adequate. No comunications related problems were identified during this exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

.

Public Education and Information (82301)

i

"

..

This area was observed to determine that information concerning the o

simulated emergency was made available for' dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.0, and

'

specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.

Information was -provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.- The informatwo incibded details on how the public would be l-notified and wha' initial actions they should take in an emergency.

A rumor control program was in place.

An Emergency News Center (ENC) had been established and appeared adequately equipped and coordinated.

No violations or deviations were identified.

K 9.

Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

l L

This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and t.

l-equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR b0, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.

u

'

The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected emergency response facilities.

No equipment deficiencies were observed c

p during the exercise.

l'

' No violations or deviations were identified.

h

'

-

,

,..

.-

'

T

<

y,.

,

)

'

n

~

Y

.'

i

!

,

'

L 10.LAccidentAssessment(82301)

' This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and

,,

-

equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite

consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as _ required

~

by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). 10 CFR 50. Appendix E. Paragraph IV.D and specific t

,

criteria in NUREG-0654, Section. II.1.

,

The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an~ assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite-personnel resulting-from the accident.

Both programs appeared effective during this exercise in analyzing the plant status so as to make

'

recommendations to the Site Emergency Manager concerning mitigating.

'

actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials and to terminate the emergency condition.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Protective. Responses (82301)

n

~

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in ' place,. and - protective actions for emergency workers, including i

evacuation ~of nonessential' personnel, were implemented promptly' as required; by 10-CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section 11.J.

-An inspector verified the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for,offsite populations

,

within the 10 mile 4mergency planning zone (EPZ).

The licensee's protective ' action recommendations were consistent with-the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and;other criteria and notifications were made to the appropriate Stat? and local authorities within the 15-minute criteria.

The.-licensee did not demonstrate onsite. personnel accountability for this exercise.-

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Exercise Critique (82301)

.The licensee's critique of -the emergency exercise was observed to determine that-deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were forma 11y' presented to licensee management for corrective actions es

'

required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.

A licensee critique of the emergency exercise was held on October 26, 1989, 'with exercise controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management,'and NRC personnel nttending.

,

,

e

<-.,

.,---

--

-,

-

w

,

p,y

.

'T

'

,..

.

'I...

U

  • ,

,

c

,

No violations or. deviations were identified.

'

,

13.

Federal Evaluation Team Report

,

The report by' the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committte

,

and Federal. Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.

'

.14.

Actionon.PreviousInspectionFindings.(92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followuh 3

~) LO-3.

366/87 '3-02:

Verify ' hat fire brigade personne' a

- e? 5 to' departi, the Operatis

'

.

Support Center'(0SC)

.

. sics concerns and plant sta s.

Licensee exercise c'

_

alt"

'

c.

'd

' t brigade rersonnel were properly

'

- briefed prior.to 64-

.15.

Exit Intery" a n.

.

., v*re somr*-ic'd c

.ober 26, 1989. with The inspec,

'

those person cat - Paragraga 1.

      • i ns- _ive '~Jcribed the areas inspected ana
..s: ed *n detail the intpe et',n rezalts.

Proprietary-information is not conth'r

?n-this report.- Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

-

' Attachment:

,

Scope, Objectives, and Scenaria Timeline

,

'

i I

[

.. -.

- ------ -- ---------

+

,

,

-

.

+

.

,

' ;

.,s

.;.

.

1..

"

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. - HATCH NUCLEAR PIANT 1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE OCTOBER 25, 1989 2.1 S.C.QEZ

,

,

To assure that the health and safety of the general public are protected-in the event of an accident at the E.

I. Hatch Nuclear Plant. (HNP), it.is necessary for the Georgia Power company (GPC)

to' conduct an annual emergency-preparedness exercise.

The 1989 exercise at HNP. involves r.obilization - of GPC, State and local personnel and resources to respond to a simulated. accident scenario.

The exercise will be evaluated onsite by the Nuclear-p L

Regulatory Commission (NRC)- so that the-emergency response L

capebilities-of the utility may be assessed.

,

. Due.to the compressed timeline of the-exercise, some portions of the - GPC :. emergency organization may. be prepositioned.

Onsite

'

.

facilities-will be activated in accordance with simulated L

conditions and appropriate emergency response procedures. Exercise-participants (" players") will not have any prior knowledge of the.

,

simulated. accident events, operational -sequence,- radiological L

effluents or weather conditions.

E

. A radiological medical emergency will be integrated into the

-

operational and radiological portion of the exercise scenario-in

- order to evaluate the ability of the GPC plant staff to effectively respond' to a'

contaminated / injured individual..-

The ' medical

<

l emergency will also test the ability of the designated hospital and emergency medical service to treat a contaminated / injured patient.

>

State and local government will participate fully in the exercise.

The. exercise will be evaluated offsite by - the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) so that the integrated emergency response capabilities of the State, local authorities and the utility may be assessed.

In addition, the exercise incorporates the following:

Radiological Monitoring Drill - both onsite and offsite teams will be dispatched to obtain required air samples and measurements associated with a simulated offsite release of j

radioactivity and communicate thesa results to the appropriate Emergencys Response. Facility (ERF).

(Field monitoring team protective clothing and respiratory protection will be i

,

b simulated in the field.)

GPC-HNP 2.1-1 89EX d

i l[

,

.gis

.,,_

n

._ _

, -,, - -

-

'

'

,

. _

__ -

.

.

.

-.

-

. --

_.

-

- -. -. _

.

-

l

.,

.

.*.

,

.

>

>

.,..

.

,

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT-1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE r

CCTOBER 25, 1989 lg,

-

2.1 S.CQEE l

s

. Health Physics Drill --involves the response to and-analysis

,,

of simulated elevated activity contained in airborne or liquid samples, radiation exposure control, emergency dosimetry and

,

the use:of' protective equipment onsite.

' Fire. Drill ~ - a simulated onsite fire will test the fire

-

>

brigade's ability to contain a fire until the augmented fire team arrives to. assist in extinguishing the fire.

,

<

Staff Augmentation - Augmented staffing of the emergency positions in tha activated facilities as a result of the emergency; response.

'

,

Real-Time Activation - a demonstration of the real-time

'

' -

'

staffing of Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) within the-guidelines of NUREG 0654 Table B-l'and HNP emergency plans and procedures by' emergency response staff personnel.

The preceding-sub-drills are incorporated into the main exercise

,

= scenario and will be demonstrated concurrently in the course of the

!

,

L

' exercise.

The overall intent of the exercise is to demonstrate that the GPC, State and county -organizations and resources are adequate to p otect the health and safety of the public during'a radiological emergency at. Hatch Nuclear Plant.

L

!'

l:

-l l?

'

[>

u

,

,

t :.

(

'

l

[.

GPC-HNP.

2.1-2 89EX s

,

b W

.

.-~...

,. -,

.

....

. -.

- -.

- -

- a

-

,

-.

....

.. - _..

..

..

- -.

--

. - --_ _ -

_- -_ _.-

.

.-

.

.

(}

  • ,

r p

GEORGIA POWER-COMPANY-i h

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT

"

1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

.

EVALUATED. EXERCISE OCTOBER:25, 1989 2.2 OBJECTIVES

-

The E.

I.

Hatch. Nuclear Plant (HNP) 1989 emergency preparedness

'

exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Esergency Planning

and Preparedness for Production and Utilisation Facilities.

c l

. Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1,

Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation-of Radiological

'

(

Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Ruclear

,

K Power Plants,.was utilized in developing the objectives.

The following objectives for the exercise are consistent with the

.

aforementioned documents:-

,

i A..

Accident Assessment and Classification

'

,

i; 1.

Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine. Emergency Action Level (EAL)

L parameters - and correctly classify the. emergency L

throughout the exercise.

2.

Demonstrate the ability to provide core damage

'

.

i assessments.

[

?

B.

Notification

,

1.

Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and l

mobilize appropriate station and corporate emergency

'

response personnel.

.,

.

2.

Demonstre' e the ability for prompt notification ~ of

~

?

the State, local-and Federal authorities.

3.

Demonstrate the ability to warn or advise onsite individuals (including employees, visitors and contract personnel) of an emergency condition.

+

(

,.

"

C.

Emergency Resnonse

,

1.

Demonstrate that an individual is assigned and is

>

in charge of the emergency response.

2.

Demonstrate planning for 24-hour per day emergency response capabilities.

GPC-HNP 2.2-1 89EX s

'

~

..

.

-..

~...

_........ _ _... _.,....... _. _.,.

-....

......

..,. _ -..,....,

.-.

. ~..

__

_ - _ _

__ _.

... _ _. _.

_ _ _ _ _... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._

-

j.-

,.

,

-

>

.

,.,

.

'

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR. PIANT

.

1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

'.

. EVALUATED EXERCISE p

OCTOBER 25, 1989-f

'

2.2 OBJECTIVES

,

,

,.

.C.

Emergency Response (Continued)

L 3.

Demonstrate the line of succession for the Emergency

.

?

Director.

4.

Demonstrate timely response of station and corporate management, administrative and technical staff, 5.

Demonstrate the timely activation of the Technical o

l-Support center (TSC),

Operations Support Center-lL

'(OSC),

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

and

.

General Office Operations Center (GOOC).

l

,

t.

6.

Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment, security provisions and habitability precautions for the TSC.

L OSC, EOF, GOOC and the Emergency News Center (ENC).'

.

-

7.

Demonstrate satisfactory communications ability of all emergency support resources.

D.

Radioloaical Assessment and Control

.,-

.1.

Demonstrate the coordinated-gathering of radiological and non-radiological (meteorological)

data - necessary' for emergency and environmental r

y response including collection and-analysis of

.in-plant surveys and shaples.

2.

Demonstrate the ability to develop doce projections, compare the projections t')

Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) and determine and recommend the appropriate protective actions.

3.

Demonstrate onsite contamination control measures including area access control.

4.

Demonstrate the ability for determining projected g

doses from available plant instrumentation.

5.

Demonstrate onsite PAGs for a select number of personnel, as appropriate.

GPC-HNP 2.2-2 89EX

'

.. -. -..

-..... -. - -..

-..

. -

. -

..., -

. -,. ~

....,;

-.

..

. --..

.,

...

, ---..~.

.-.... -.....

.-

. -,. -...

._

.-

~

w-

,.. -

.

.-

,

'

,

.

a, D_

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY.

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT 1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

EVALUATED EXERCISE

.

OCTOBER 25, 1989 2.2 QAZECTIVES J

s w.

D.

'Radioloaical Assessment and Control-(Continued)

6.

Demonstrate the decision making-process for

'

authorizing-emergency workers to receive radiation-doses in excess of Plant Hatch administrative limits, as appropriate.

E.

Public Information Procram

i 1.

. Demonstrate the timely and accurate response to news inquiries.

2.

Demonstrate timely preparation of accurate news releases and suppression of rumors.

.

3._

Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency News'

Center (ENC).

F.

Medical'Emeraency

-

,

.1.

Demonstrate the ability to respond to a radietion medical emergency.

2.

Demonstrate the adequacy of communications

%

(

offsite responsa agencies (Meadows Memorial Hospit et and local ambulance service).

3.

-Demonstrato the ability to evaluate a radiological injury.

4.-

. Demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate

-

f.irst aid and contamination control techniques.

5.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the interface between plant, station and offsite personnel (Meadows Memorial-Hospital and local ambulance service).

6.

. Demonstrate the ability of ambulance personnel to treat an injured and ccntaminated patient while maintaining contamination control.

GPC-HNP 2.2-3 89EX

..

_ -...

..

..

.

.

.

-..

.

- -

.

.,

.

-..- --

-

-.

..-

-.,

- -.. -

.... - - _. - - -

.. -. - -.. - -.

.

>

,

,

,

,

. o

-,

' '

'

q

+

,.

,

,

'

lh

-

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY (

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR FLANT

,

1989-EMERGENCY'PPEPAREDNESS L

EVALUATED EXERCISE-

,

l.

OCTOBER 25, 1989

"

p.

2.2 OBJECTIVES l

F.

Medical Emeraency (Continued)

"

7 ',

Demonstrate the ability of Meadows Memorial Hospital personnel to treat and decontaminate an injured and contaminated patient.

G.

Evaluation

,

L.

1.

' Demonstrate acility to conduct a post-exercise LIK critique to determine areas - requiring additional

,

improvement.

,

-

A' reas of the-HNP Emergency Plan that Nill EQT be demonstrated i

during this exercise include:

Onsite personnel. accountability

<

-

Actual shift turnover (long term shift assignmentr, will

-

t

- be demonstrated by rosters).

h

'

-

- Real time actuation of the ENC Conduct of reentry and recovery operations

-

,

.

.

.

.

GPC-HNP 1.2-4 89EX

.

/

@

+my e.

-a-----we,v.e--

- - * -. - - - -. -

rw-e.

m.

,+-w

--

--

w-y-

-.-e c

w.

,

e-n e

a-

-mgse

-=

.

, _..

,

_

_ _ _ _ _

_. _

_

_. _ _ _

__ _

_

.-

._

_

__

(

q

,

. ', t

.

,

GEORGIA-POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT 1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE i

,

OCTOBER 25, 1989

,

3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME EVENT RAS?ltu CENTRAL DESCRIPTION l

'

'

0730 0630 Initial Conditions:

HNP Unit 2 is in End of Core Life (EOL) coastdown at approxiinately 91%

power.

Reactor power has been 2 90%

-

power for'the last 180 days and Xenon

.

is at equilibriuu.

Unit 1 is in normal full-power operation.

'

The fc,llowing eqaipment ic out-of-service:

.The backup meteorological tower

.,

-

suffered a lightning strike the previous day and ic no longer providing data feed.

It ic-under repair and inspection..

" Swing" Emergency Diesel

-

Generator (EDG)

1B is under repair for a damaged crankshaft bearing. identified on the last routine surveillance operation..

The EDG is being disasseacled and work is anticipated to

!

l.

require another 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to

complete.

This ~ places both Units in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Limiting condition for Operation (LCO)

I and the clock began at 2200 yesterday when the 1-B EDG was tagged-out.

The High Pressure Coolant

-

Injection (HPCI) steam turbine is tagged-out for the repair of the turbine-driven oil pump.

'

E

'

Low and irregular oil pressure resulting in govaraor tripping

was occurring in test operation.

Pump overhaul parts are on-hand.

,

GPC-HNP 3.2-1 89EX

-

..

.

-

. - -..

.

. --

-

.

. -

.

-.

,

,

-.- -

-

.._

.

-..-

.-

_--

-.

.. -. -. -,

,... -

._-

L

.

.

'

.,,

..

a-,..

l:

.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLAND 1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE OCTOBER 25, 1989 3.2 SCENARIO TIMELIN$

TIME EVENT

'

EAS.fgag CzuTRAL DasCaiPTICM

'

0730

' 0630 (Cont.)

Initial Conditions: (Continued)

The HPCI turbine was tagged-out at 0100 and dimssembly began on -the midnight shift.

This places Unit 2 in another LCO of

-

14 days.

!

Weekly control rod exercising

-

in accordance with procedure #

34SV-C11-003-2S, Weekly Control Rod Exercise, is to be performed L.

.this morning.

!

'

,

Plant radiological and radiochemical, (;;

conditions are normal.

The winds are from the south at 3 to 4 aph.

Temperature is 56* with an anticipated high in the low seventies.

No precipitation is forecast and there has been no

.

measurable precipitation in the last

'

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

0800 0700 After assuming control of the Unit 2

-

control room (Simulator) and walking-down the panels, oparators should maintain steady-ste.te operation and begin the weekly control rod exercise in accordance

with (IAW) procedure i 34SV-C11-003-2S, Weekly Ccntrol Rod Rrercise.

!

0s15 0715 When rod #26-03 is selected for testing, it will not move in the '" insert" direction.

If " withdraw" is selected on the rod control switch at any time during

.

this test, contrcl rod drive (CRD)

overtravel alarm and indication will occur indicative of an uncoupled rod.

  • GPC-HNP 3.2-2 89EX F

ame

  • me.

.m e,

.e

,v-e

.- -,.


,,,_a

- -

.. - -

---...----a-

- - -.. - - - - -

- - - - - - -.

.

- - - - - - -

- -- -

- -

.. -

..

-

. -. - -...

..

-._

_,

Y

.

_..

,

.

^

'

.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT 1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE OCTOBER 25, 1989 3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE

TIME.

EVENT EASTERN CENTRAL DESCRIPTION 0415.

0715 (Cont.)

A leakage of the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the drywell (DW) will begin from:

the #26-03 CRD flange at approximately 60 i

gpm.

/

0830 0730 DW temperature, humidity and pressure will begin to rise.

DW floor drain and equipment drain sumps will alarm.

Sump timers will start.

Radwaste (RW) sump flow integrators data will indicate 60 gpm leakage to the DW.-

An ALERT should-be declared based upon >50 gpm unidentified i

RCS leakage. Drywell venting should begin through the Standby. Gas Treatment System (SBGTS)

to control DW pressure.

A controlled quick chutdown of the reactor should commence.

l l

0930 0830 Fire in the 2D start up transformer (SUT).

Loss of the 2D SUT and its associated

"

electrical loads.

Power lineup switched to the 2C.SUT and electrical system stabilized.

,

I; 1015 0915 Ground fault in the 2C:3UT.

Loss of the l

2C SUT. The 2A and 2C EDGs start and load L

on the loss of 4KV bus voltage.

'

1030 0930 The 2A EDG output brcaker burns out. Loss of EDG 2A and the 2E 4KV bus.

The 2C EDG e

and the 2G bus are the only available 4KV power s.'urces.

)

'

,,

GPC-HNP 3.2-3 89EX l

l

--..

.

.

-.

.. - - -

--.

.

-

.

.,

.

- -

- - -.. _ ~ -. _.

-- -

-..

_ -

- - - - _.. -. -

_

'

+

.-

.

,

,.

'

..

GEORGIA' POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT 1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE OCTOBER 25, 1989

'

3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME EVENT EASTERM CFJftB&L DESCRIPTION 1030 0930-(Cont.)

The leaking #26-03 CRD housing. separates from the reactor lower head' flange.

The RCS leak is now a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) of approximately 2,000 gpa.

LPCI pump 2B autostarts of f the 2G 4KV bus.

LPCI injection valve F0-15B fails in the closed position, preventing feed

"

to RCS without' manual opening of RHR

cross-connect valve FO-10 and "A" train

'

injection valve F0-15A.

Core Spray (CS) pump 2B autostarts off the

2G 4KV bus.

The-disk of the puup.

discharge check valve, FO-03B, comes loose o

from its swing arm and jams into flow element NO-02B, preventing Core Spray flow

.,

to the RCS.

c i

With no available emergency core cooling system (ECCS) feed to the RCS, the reactor vessel depressurizes and begins to drain down.

Drywell temperature and pressure

'

increase as the RCS drains into the i

drywell.

1100 1000-As reactor vessel level reaches the low-

'

low-low level, a SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared on loss of coolant criteria.

,

I GPC-dip 3.2 4 89EX

'

n gj:;

_,

,. _

..

m

.

.,,.

. ~....

..

....

.____......_..-..m.,

.,_,_,,,_...-,.....,.m.,...

_,,..,,,,,

...

_

_.... _.

__... _. -

._.

. _ _ - _ _ _. _ _ _ _

_ _ _...

.. _,

,

-

  • -

-

'

,.

,

i GEORGIA' POWER COMPANY l

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT 1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE OCTODER 25, 1989 3.2 SCENARTO TIMELINE TINE EVENT HASTERN CENTRAL DESCRIPTION 1130 1030 As the uncovered fuel overheats from decay heat, gas gap'. activity and fuel. damage t

releases radioactive material. to the vessel.

Released activity is drained to the drywell and torus through the CRD l

LOCA.

DW and torus' radiation monitors increase.

The source term builds up in

'

the torus and running torus cooling piping

,

of the active LPCI system, reducing access of repair teams to the FO-15B valve and-the LPCI cross-connect valves.

I 1200 1100 EDG 2A output breaker is replaced.

EDG 2A is started and loaded onto the 2E 4KV bus.

Core Spray 2A and LPCI 2A are started and begin feeding the reactor vessel. A water hammer occurs in the piping of the LPCI 2A pump as it autostarts, partially damaging and unbalancing the pump impeller.

i GPC-HNP 3.2-5 89EX i

-..,_L

..--

-

..

-., -. -..

... -

... -.

...

..

~. -. -.. -. -

~

.,

,

,

.

+-

p

- ;

'

)

'

.y y.

,

.,\\

'

GEORCIA POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT 1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATED EXERCISE

- 1 OCTOBER 25, 1989 J

3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME EVENT ~

EASTERN-CENTRAL DESCRIPTION.

1230 1130

'Ihe 2A LPCI pump impeller disintegrates,

,

l rupturing the pump casing and flooding the Northeast Diagonal room w th contaminated-torus water.

The mechanical and thermal shock of the restored ~ faed to the reactor vessel causes

'

stuck control rod #26-03 to release from its stuck position and seat onto. the

thermal sleeve, effectively stopping the

,

CRD LOCA flow to the drywell.

{

Torus and diagonal ~ room water leavels equalize.

Once the levels have reached

'

equilibrium, there is no further net flow and isolation of the failed ' pump will restore primary containment.

Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS)- and leak (.

detection monitors-alarm as the z'

radioactivity.is liberated to the diagcnal n

room and the reactor building.

!~

Radioactive material is diffused into the reactor building and pumped to the environment through the SBGTS.

A GENERAL EMERGENCY ehould be declared on radiological criteria.

1400 1300 The primary system has been flooded-up, l

cooled-down and stabilized.

Release to the environment is declining as SBGTS

turns over the contaminated atmosphere of l

the reactor building. The release has been

'

monitored, tracked and sampled.

The exercise is terminated.

l

,

,

I GPC-hNP 3.2-6 89EX y

1, y,

Y

',s

-,

.

-

...

,, - -.

... - ~..-....- -- -

~. - -.

. - - -. < - - - -

- ---