IR 05000321/1999004
| ML20210L768 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210L763 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-99-04, 50-366-99-04, NUDOCS 9908100029 | |
| Download: ML20210L768 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 Docket Nos: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report Nos: 50-321/99-04 and 50-366/99-04 Licensee:
Southem Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility:
E. I. Hatch Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location:
P. O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515 Dates:
May 30 - July 10,1999 Inspectors:
J. Munday, Senior Resident inspector T. Fredette, Resident inspector C. Rapp, Senior Project Engineer (Section E3.1)
D. Forbes, Health Physics Inspector, (Sections R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, R2.2, and R7.1)
Approved by: P. Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure i
9908100029 990004 PDR ADOCK 05000321
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i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-321/99-04, 50-366/99-04 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection and inspection by regional-based inspectors.
Operations Operators failed to follow the procedure for returning the 2B Reactor Water Level Keepfill
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system to service.' Several process barriers failed to prevent this error, leading to the Unit 2 reactor trip. The failure to follow procedures was identified as a Non-Cited Violation (Section 01.3).
Plant Support The licensee had effectively labeled., controlled, and stored radioactive material as
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required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations part 20.1904. All radioactive material storage areas observed were appropriately posted to specify the radioactive conditions.
The licensee had effectively implemented a program for shipping radioactive materials required by Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Transportation regulations (Sections R1.1 and R1.2).
Radiation, process effluent, and environmental monitors were maintained in an I
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operational condition in accordance with Technical Specification and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report requirements. Environmental sampling and analysis frequencies specified by requirements were met. The amounts of activity released from the plant in liquid and gaseous effluents has remained about the same over the last several years and the radiation doses resulting from those releases were a small percentage of regulatory limits (Sections R2.1 and R2.2).
The licensee's most recent formal Quality Assurance Audit for the Radiation Protection
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and Chemistry programs identified items of substance and auditors used checklists to effectively assess the transportation program as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 (Section R7.1).
e Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began this report period at 100 percent rated thermal power. On May 30, power was reduced to 50 percent to repair a reactor feedwater pump seal water leak. Power was restored to 100 percent on June 1. On June 22, power was reduced to approximately 11 percent to repair a leak on the Main Steam Moisture Separator Reheater. Power ascension commenced on June 27 and was halted at approximately 97 percent on June 30.
Unit 2 began this report period at 98 percent rated thermal power. A manual reactor trip was initiated on June 15 due to a loss of main condenser vacuum. The reactor was restarted on June 22 and 100 percent Maximum Operating Power (MOP) was attained on June 25. An automatic reactor trip occurred on June 28 due to personnel error. The plant was restarted on June 30 and reached 100 percent MOP on July 1.
j l. Operations
Conduct of Operations j
01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious; specific events, and i
observations are detailed in the sections below.
On June 16,1999, Unit 2 experienced a loss of condenser vacuum and operators initiated a manual trip. Following the unit trip multiple equipment failures occurred.
Balance-of-plant and containment isolation component failures challenged safety-related systems and operator actions necessary to place the unit in cold shutdown. The NRC initiated a Special Team inspection following the unit trip and documented the results in inspection Report 50-321,366/99-10.
01.3 Unit 2 Reactor Water Level Transient and Trio Due to Personnel Error a.
Inspection Scoce (71707)
On June 28, a reactor trip occurred as a result of a procedural error which initiated a reactor water level transient. The inspectors reviewed the event and control room operator performance during the event.
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Observations and Findinas Following maintenance on the Reactor Water Level Kea.a system, operations personnel commenced placing the system back in service in accordance with procedure 34GO-OPS-004-2S, " Nuclear Boiler Lineup and Reference Leg Backfill," Revision (Rev.)
17. Step 7.4.1 of the procedure required the system to be isolated from the water level reference leg if filling and venting was to be performed. Because of the maintenance performed, the system wt required to be vented, however, the operators performing the evolution did not perform step 7.4.1 to isolate the system from the reference le Later, when the system was being vented the water level reference leg was depressurized resulting in a low reactor water level trip.
The inspectors reviewed the procedure for placing the Reactor Water Level Keepfill system in service, the maintenance clearance used to isolate the system, and the maintenance work records. In addition, the personnel involved in the event were interviewed. The inspectors determined that prior to the event a separate error occurred which contributed to the reactor trip. The equipment clearance used to isolate the affected component for the work activity contained amplifying instructions to remove the Reactor Water Level Keepfill system from service prior to placing the clearance.
However, the amplifying instruction was overlooked and the system was not removed from service. Had the system been properly removed from service, the suusequent failure to follow procedure should not have initiated a plant transient and unit trip.
The inspectors observed that several barrier features of operations processes, designed to eliminate or mitigate this type of error, were implemented for this particular activity, but failed to prevent the error. These included:
An operations pre-job brief was conducted prior to the evolution by the (
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Shift Support Supervisor (SSS) to discuss, among other things, procedure usage and critical steps and actions that could result in plant transients. The briefing did not identify any precautions that could have aided the Plant Equipment Oper:itor (PEO) in returning the reactor water level keepfill system to service.
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Two PEOs were assigned the task of placing the reactor water level
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keepfill system in service, with one PEO serving strictly as a peer checker to verify that procedure steps were performed correctly.
The SSS was at the work location to provide supervisory oversight of the
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activity to ensure this critical task was performed correctly. This oversight failed to detect the error.
The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) and observed that
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Section 5.4.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering activities and applicable procedures recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33. RG 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A, Section 1.d states, in part, that safety-related activities be governed by edministrative procedures to include procedure adherence. Procedure 10AC-MGR 019-0S " Procedure Use and Adherence,"
Rev.1, Step 8.1 states, in part, " Follow steps in sequence unless otherwise allowed."
Contrary to the above, operators did not follow procedure steps in sequence and failed to perform step 7.4.1 of procedure 34GO-OPS-004-2S. This licensee identified violation is identified as Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-366/99-04-01; Failure to Follow The System Operating Procedure While Returning the Reactor Water Level Keepfill System to Service. This violation is documented in the licensee's corrective action program as Significant Occurrence Report (SOR) C0990524 *
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c.
Conclusions
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Operators failed to follow the procedure for returning the 2B Reactor Water Level Keepfill system to service. Several process barriers failed to prevent this error, leading to the Unit 2 reactor trip. The failure to follow procedures was identified as a Non-Cited Violation.
O1.4 Unit 1 Power Reduction Due to Balance-of-Plant Eauipment Leaks (71707)
On June 21, personnel entered the Unit 1 condenser bay to identify the source of excessive amounts of radwaste inleakage from turbine building floor drains. The licensee identified that the "A" Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) 20 inch drain line pipe cap leaked due to a cracked weld and leakage past the seat of the 8* stage feedwater
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heater relief valve. Additionally, problems with feedwater heater level control valves were identified. The licensee decided to remove the unit from service and effect comprehensive inspection and repairs of affected equipment.
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l The inspectors observed that operator performance during the power change was satisfactory. Procedure and Technical Specification requirements were met.
'3erational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Eno;neered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the Main Control Room Environmental Control system and verified the system configuration was consistent with the applicable procedures and drawings. No air or oil leaks were observed on the system actuators, dampers or fans. The inspectors reviewed the maintenance work history associated with system components. No equipment deficiencies which appeared to be problematic or repetitive were identified. Surveillance procedures were reviewed and verified to contain testing acceptance criteria required by TS, Regulatory Guide 1.52, and American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D3803-89. The inspectors identified that the method used by the licensee for acquiring charcoal test samples from the control room filter trains was not in accordance with the standard the licensee was committed to and referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The inspectors verified the licensee had previously identified this issue and noted that it was being tracked and resolved in accordance with Licensing Document Change Request 98-202.
Procurement records were reviewed and verified that qualified replacement charcoal had been procured. The system automatic initiation setpoints were verified to have been properly calibrated and preventive maintenance activities had been completed in accordance with applicable procedures. The inspectors identified no substantive concerns with this system during this inspectio o
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07 Quality Assurance in Operations i
07.1 Licensee Corrective Action Proaram Self-Assessment (40500)
On June 10, the inspectors attended a presentation on the results of a licensee conducted self-assessment which focused on the Corrective Action program. The self-assessment team was comprised of site and corporate personnel. The team reviewed various aspects of the corrective action program including the identification of issues, quality, timeliness, follow-ap, root cause determinations, and corrective actions.
The team concluded that the Corrective Action program met all regulatory requirements.
The inspectors concluded the assessment was probing and thorough.
j ll. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of several work activities. Work performed was professional and thorough. Maintenance Work Order (MWO) packages and procedures were present and used. Radiation protection and control measures were in place where necessary. Maintenance workers were knowledgeable of assigned tasks and demonstrated active interface with supervisors, engineers, and quality control personnel.
111. Enaineerina E? 1 Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness Proaram Review (Tl 2515/141)
The staff conducted an abbreviated review of Y2K achvities and documentation using j
Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/141, " Review of Yer.r 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." The.eview addressed aspects of Y2K
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management planning, documentation, implementation planning, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Y2K testing and validation, notification
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activities, and contingency planning. The reviewers used NEl/NUSMG 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," and NEl/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," as the primary references for this review. Based on this abbreviated review, the inspectors did not identify any issues that could affect Y2K readiness.
Specific conclusions regarding the Y2K readiness of the facility are not included in this report. The results of this review will be combined with the results of reviews of other licensees in a summary report to be issued by July 31,1999.
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IV. Plant Succort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (RP&C)
R1.1 Tour of Radioloaical Protected Areas (86750)
During tours of the radiological protected areas, the inspectors reviewed implementation of selected elements of the licensee's radiation protection program as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 20.1902, and 1904. The review included observation of radiological protection activities for control of radioactive material, including postings and labeling, and radioactive waste processing. The inspectors reviewed survey data of radioactive material storage areas. All radioactive material storage areas observed were appropriately posted to specify the radiological conditions.
Based on obseivations and independent radiation and contamination survey results, the inspectors determined that the licensee effectively labeled, controlled, and stored radioactive material as required.
R1.2 Transoortation of Radioactive Materials (86750)
Licensee's records for six shipments of radioactive material performed since the last inspection of this area were reviewed. The inspectors determined the shipping papers contained the required information for five of the six shipping papers reviewed. For the one set a shipping papers containing errors the licensee corrected the identified errors and identified the problem in tneir corrective action program. The inspectors also determined the licensee had maintained records of shipments of licensed material for a period of three years after shipment as required by 10 CFR 71.91(a). In addition, the licensee personnel qualified to perform shipments of radioactive material met the recurrent training requirements of 49 CFR 172.704.
Based on the above reviews, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had effectively implemented a program for shipping radioactive materials required by NRC and Department of Transportation regulations.
R2 Status of Radiation Protection and Chemistry Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Radioactive Effluent Monitorina Instrumentation (84750)
The inspectors reviewed the performance of several licensee radiation monitors and the quantification of selected liquid and gaseous effluent samples from release pathways described in the licensee's Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
The inspectors toured the control rooms and the relevant areas of the plant to determine the operational status of effluent monitors. Those monitors observed were maintained in operational condition to comply with Technical Specification (TS) and UFSAR commitment.
l For gaseous and liquid effluent releases reviewed, the sample results met the chemistry l
release permit procedure and the ODCM requirements. Channel calibrations for selected radiation and environmental monitors were also reviewed. The inspectors observed the l
filter change out for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 gaseuos and particulate effluent monitors, observed flow rate checks on selected monitors, and determine the work was performed in accordance with licensee procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's 1998 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report issued prior to May 1,1999. Based on the report data, the inspectors determined that the environmental sampling and analysis frequencies specified in the ODCM were met. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's 1998 Annual Effluent Release Report issued prior to May 1,1999. Based on the report data, the amounts of activity released from the plant in liquid and gaseous effluents had remained stable over the last several years and the radiation doses resulting from those releases were a small l
percentage of regulatory limits.
R2.2 Environmental Samplers (84750)
The inspection scope was to determine if environmental monitors were being maintained in an operational condition as required by TS and UFSAR to monitor the radiation and
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radionuclides in the environs. The inspectors determined that the environmental I
sampling equipment was calibrated and functional. The inspectors also verified sampling i
locations were consistent with their descriptions in the ODCM and UFSAR and that the i
samples performed were in accordance with procedures.
The inspectors concluded that environmental air samplers were being maintained in an operational condition to comply with TS and UFSAR requirements.
R7 Quality Assurance in Radiation Protection and Chemistry R7.1 Quality Assurance Audits (40500)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's most recent quality assurance audit report and checklist used to conduct an audit in the area of environmental monitoring. The inspectors concluded that the report identified items of substance to effectively assess the environmental sampling program.
V. Mananoment Meetinas and Other Areas l
X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 19,1999. An interim exit meeting was held on June 11,1999 to discuss the findings of Region based inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
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should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Betsill, J., Assistant General Manager - Operations Curtis, S., Unit Superintendent Davis, D., Plant Administration Manager Dedrickson, R., Unit Superintendent Fornel, P., Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support Manager Fraser, O., Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor Hammonds, J., Engineering Support Manager Kirkley, W., Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager Madison, D., Operations Manager Moore, C., Assistant General Manager - Plant Support Roberts, P., Outage and Planning Manager Thompson, J., Nuclear Security Manager Tipps, S., Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager Varnadore, R., Operations Support Superintendent Wells, P., General Manager - Nuclear Plant Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation, and corporate personnel.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 84750:
Radioactive Waste Treatment and Effluent and Environmental Monitonng IP 86750:
Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials i
Tl 2515/141: Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness Program Review ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-366/99-04-01 NCV Failure to Follow The System Operating Procedure While Returning the Reactor Water Level Keepfill
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System to Service (Section 01.3).
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