IR 05000321/1990005

Insp Repts 50-321/90-05 & 50-366/90-05 on 900217-0330. Violation Noted But Not Cited.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification,Maint & Surveillance Testing Observation,Ros,Operator Reactor Events & 10CFR21 Followup

ML20034A856
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	04/06/1990
From:	Brockman K, Menning J, Randy Musser NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20034A855	List: IR 05000321/1990005
References
50-321-90-05, 50-321-90-5, 50-366-90-05, 50-366-90-5, NUDOCS 9004240439
Download: ML20034A856 (11)

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- NUCLEAR CEGULATORY COMMISSION t UNITED STATES

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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

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ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323

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.....p Report Numbers:

50-321/90-05 and 50-366/90-05

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Licensee:

Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 1295

Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Numbers:

50-321 and 50-366 License Numbers: -DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch Nuclear Station Units 1. and 2

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Inspection Dates:

February 17 - March 30,1990

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Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia f [6 Inspectors: _

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T> ate'51gned John M Nenning, Senior Res) dent Inspector YY b

<a RandatlA.Musser,Residen)/ Inspector

,4 ate 41gned W N /90 Approved by:

w KefnethE.'fFockeran, Chief,ProjectSection3B Date Signed I)(vision of Rea'etor Projects SUMMARY Scope:

This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation.

Surveillance Testing Observation, Reportable Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events, Information Meeting with Local ~ 0fficials, and 10 CFR Part 21 Report Followup.

l Results: One non-cited violation was identified for deficient RBM surveillance procedures (paragraph 5).

No specific strengths or weaknesses of licensee programs were identified based on the inspectors' findings and observations in the

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areas inspected.

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9004240439 900406

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DR ADOCK 05000321 PDC

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REPORT DETAILS j

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Persons Contacted

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Licensee Employees

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• C. Coggin. Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager _

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• D. Davis, Manager General Support

• D. Edge, Nuclear Security, Manager

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• P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager l

• 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Man 6ger j

• G. Goode, Engineering Support Manager

• M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager u

J. Lewis,-Acting Operations Manager l

• C. Moore, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support H. Nix, General Manager - Nuclear Plant

• H. Sumner, Assistant General Manager - plant 0perations

S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager

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R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager l

I Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, '

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

• J. Menning R. Musser

NRC management on site during inspection period:

K. Brockman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B, Region II

L. Crocker, Project Manager, Hatch, Project Directorate 11-3, NRR

• Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout _ this report are listed in the-

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last paragraph.

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Operational Safety. Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2 l

During this reporting period, Unit I remained in 'the condenser retubing/ _

i refueling outage that commenced on February 17, 1990.

Unit 2-began the -

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reporting period-operating at rated power; At 0915 on March 28,:1990, Unit 2 automatically scrammed on low reactor vessel water level.- (This-

Unit 2 scram is discussed in paragraph 6 of this report.) Rod withdrawal

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for the restart of Unit 2 commenced at 0016 on March 29, 1990. The unit.

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was critical at 0402 on March 29, 1990,.and was synchronized with'the grid'

at 1254 on the same day. Unit 2 achieved rated power at 0510 on March 30, 1990, and ended the reporting operating'at rated power.

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The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

- i pl ant status and any significant safety matters related: to plant

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operations.

Daily. discussions were held with plant mar.agement and various members of the plant operating staff.

The inspectors made_ frequent visits-to the' control room.

Observations included control room manning, access

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control, operator professionalism and attentiveness, adherence. to procedures, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, instrument

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readings.- recorder traces, annunciator ' alarms, operability of nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system-channels, availability of power sources, and operability of the Safety Parameter Display system.

a These observations also included log book entries, tags and clearances on

equipment, temporary alterations in effect, ECCS system lineupsi

containment integrity. reactor mode switch position, conformance -with technical specification safety limits, daily surveillances, plant i

chemistry, scram discharge volume valve positions, and rod movement controls. This inspection activity involved numerous informal discussions with operatort and their supervisors.

The operability of selected - safety-related systems was reviewed on, essentially, a weekly basis.

These reviews involved verification of -

proper valve and control switch positioning, proper circuit breaker and fuse alignment, and operability of related instrumentation and suppor.t systems.

Major components were also inspected for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and general condition.- On March 8,

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1990, the inspector reviewed the operability of the Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control system.

Proper switch, electrical, and -valve alignments were

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verified using Attachments 1, 2, and 3 to procedure 3450-C41-003-2S. - On

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March 12, 1990, the inspector reviewed the-operability of the Unit 2 RCIC

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system.

Proper switch, breaker, and valve lineups were verified using

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Attachments 1,.2, and 3'to procedure 34S0-E51-001-2S. On March 16, 1990, the operability of the. Unit 2 SGTS was reviewed.

Proper switch, breaker, and valve lineups were verified using Attachments '1, 2, and 3 to.

prGedure 34S0-T46-001-2S.

On March 27. 1990, the operability of the -

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Unit 2 MSIV Leakage Control system-was reviewed.

Proper switch, breaker, and valve lineups were verified using Attachments 1, 2, and 3 to procedure 3450-E32-001-2S.

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On March 27,1990, during the walkdown of the Unit 2 MSly Leakage Control system, the following discrepancies were noted by the ~ inspector.

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Procedure 34S0-E32-001-2S lists the system valves and their normal

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positions.

The following valves were listed in the system operating procedure, but were not installed in the plant:

- 2E32-N051F-TV1, Inboard System Pressure Transmitter, 2E32-N051F, Test Valve;

- 2E32-N051F-EV1, Inboard System Pressure Transmitter, 2E32-N051F, Equalizer Valve; and

- 2E32-N051F-IV2, Inboard System Pressure Transmitter, 2E32-N051F, Instrument Valve.

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3-The following valves were not labeled:

- 2E32-N051P-DV1, Inboard System Pressure Transmitter, 2E32-N051P, Test Yelve and

- 2E32-N051K-DV1, Inboard System Pressure Transmitter, 2E32-N051P, Drain Valve.

Additionally, the following components were not labeled in accordance with ~

the system operating procedure:

- Timers 2E32-K0328, 2E32-K032F, 2E32-K032K, and 2E32-K032P: (as e

listed in the system operating procedure) were labeled as 2E32-N102B, 2E32-N102F, 2E32-K102K, and 2E32-K102P, respectively.

• These discrepancies were brought to the attention of the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor, General p.lant tours were conducted on 'at least a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, diesel generator-building, intake structure, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were toured.

Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, fire hazards, fire alarms, fire extinguishing equipment, emergency lighting, fire barriers. emergency equipment, control of ignition sources and flammable materials, and control of maintenance / surveillance activities in progress.

Radiation protection controls, implementation of the physical security program, housekeeping conditions / cleanliness. control of missile hazards, and instrumentation and alarms in the main control room were also observed.

In the area of housekeeping, one discrepancy was ; observed by - the inspector.

On February 27, 1990, during observation of' the daily' PASS chemical and analysis panel surveillance, the inspector noted that numerous pieces of protective clothing were lying on' the floor.due~ to the protective clothing receptacles in the~ PASS room being filled _ bey'ond capacity. This item was brought to the attention-of the Chemistry Foreman and the Health Physics Superintendent.

The inspectors-observed selected operations shift turnover briefings to confirm that all necessary information concerning the status of: plant systems was being addressed.

Each briefing was conducted by the: oncoming OSOS.

The inspectors noted that each OSOS discussed existing plant problems,. activities that were anticipated for the shift, and any new standing orders or management ' directives.

Radiological and ' industrial safety were generally stressed.

The STAS discussed kny recent procedure revisions that impacted on'the attendees.

The-inspectors attended: shift turnover briefings on the following dates and shifts:

February 19, 1990 -

Day; February 22, 1990 - Day; March 8, 1990 - Day; March 16, 1990 ' Day; and March 28, 1990 - Day.

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Several safety-related equipment clearances that were active were reviewed

to confirm that they were properly prepared and placed. Involved circuit breakers, switches,_ and valves were walked down. to _ verify.that clearance -

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tags were in place and legible and that equipment was properly positioned.

Equipment clearance program requirements are specified in licensee; y

procedure.30AC-0PS-001-0S, " Control of Equipment Clearances and Tags."' On

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February 28,1990, Unit 1-equipment clearances 1-90-613.and 1-90-733 were;

walked down.

Clearance: 1-90-613 was placed to perform outage related-

-inspections on valve 1E11-F021A, while clearance 1-90-733 was placed toi w

ensure that the rod. movement control switch would not be manipulated j

during fuel movement.,

On March 7,1990, Unit 2 ' equipment clearance.

2-90-217 was walked down.

This clearance.was placed to investigate the cause of the tripping of breaker 2T47-C0018.- On March 15,_1990,-Unit 2.

d equipment clearance 2-90-255 was walked down.'

This clearance was placed; j-to support maintenance on the 250 VDC~LPCI' Inverter (2R44-5003).

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Implementation of the licensee's sampling program was reviewed. by the M

inspector, This review involved observation of-sampling activities (reactor coolant' and tank sampling) and chemistry surveillance.

Related records were also reviewed.

During this inspection period, the inspector ~

monitored.the following activities.

On February 27, 1990, the inspector:

observed the performance of the-daily PASS chemical and analysis _ panel surveillance in accordance with procedure-62CI-SUV-001-0. _ On March 13, 1990, the inspector observed the performance of-the Unit = 1 and '2 post i

treatment monitors (1011-K615A and B, 2011-K615A and B) -monthly source -

checks in accordance with procedure 62CI-CAL-007-0S.

.i The licensee's deficiency control system was reviewed to verify that the i

system:is functioning as intended.- Licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-004-OS,

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" Deficiency Control System," establishes. requirements and responsibilities

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for the preparation, processing, review, and disposition:of deficiency __

reporting documents._ This procedure applies to all. deficiencies ~affecting equipment, procedures, or personnel.

Deficiencies are ' reported on Deficiency Cards.. On February 23, 1990, the inspector reviewed recently prepared DCs.

The inspector verified that-the.DCs _ had been prepared as

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required by the controlling procedure and that, several. deficiencies that were observed in the plant had been documented on DCs. More specifically,-

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it was noted that'DC 1-90-1005 had been generated to tiocument the failure-i of Unit I refueling interlocks to function properly during the performance

a of procedure 34SV-F15-001-1S.

It was=also.noted that DC 2-90-0569 had

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been prepared to document the unanticipated tripping of. drywell chiller

2P64-B006A'.

On March '12,1990, the inspector also reviewed recently prepared DCs and verified that problems observed in the plant had been

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properly documented.

The inspector noted that DC 1-90'1315-hcd been

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prepared to document a leak on a seal water line on RHRSW pump ~ 1E11-C0018.

i It was also observed that DC 2-90-0687-had been generated to document'the:

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presence. of water in the ' upper site glass on PSW pump 2P41-C001C.

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Selected portions of the containment isolation lineup were reviewed.

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The review in.-olved verification of proper valve positioning, verification that motor and air-operated valves were not mechanically blocked and that r

power was available (unless blocking or power removal was required), and

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inspection of piping upstream of the valves for leakage or leakage paths.

On February 23, 1990, the inspector reviewed the following Unit 2 containment isolation valves:

2T48-F115, 2T48-F116, 2148-F211, 2T48-F212,

_r 2T48-F310, 2T48-F320, 2T48-F325, 2T48-F326, 2T48-F332A, 2T48-F334A and B, E

2T48-F340, 2T48 F363A, 2T48-F364A, 2T49-F001A and B, 2T49-F002A and B, and

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2T49-F004A and B.

On March 8, 1990, the inspector reviewed the following

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Unit 2 conthinment isolation valves: 2011-F050, 2D11-F052, 2E11-F0P8A and

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-B, 2E11-F041B and D,

2E41-F121, 2E41-F122, 2Gll-F003, 2G11-F000

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PP33-F004, 2P33-F006, 2P33-F007, 2P33-F012, and 2P33-F015.

On March 27, h

1990, the following Unit 2 containment isolation valves were reviewed:

g 2P51-F513, 2P64-F045, 2T23-F004, 2T23-F005, 2T48-F115, 2T48-F116, g

2T48-F212, 2T48-F310, 2T48-F311, 2T48-F320, 2T48-F324, 2T48-F325,

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2T48-F326, 2T48-F332A and B, 2T48-F334A and B, 2T48-F338, and 2T48-F340..

Ei During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's (T

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controls on overtime of personnel who parform safety-related functions.

Section 6.2.2 9 of the technical specifications establisnes requirements

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for the control of sucn overtime, and Section 8.4 of licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-003-05, " Plant Operations," provides implementing instructions to

E support the technical specification requirements.

On March 8, 1990, the if-inspector reviewed a Health Physics and Chemistry Department Overtime m

Report for the month of February and determined that technical

specification and procedural requirements had been met, s

ET On March 16, 1990, the inspector verified that all required notices to

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workers were appropriately and conspicuously posted pui..

t to 10 CFR 19.11. The licensee has established posting locations at the Waste Separation and Temporary Storage Facility, Simulator Building near the

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breakroom, Service Building near the cafeteria, and Security Building, e

The inspector reviewed the pestings at these locations and observed no

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discrepancies.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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3.

Maintenance Observation (62703) Uait 2 mh During the report period, the inspector observed selected maintenance W

activities.

The observations included a review of the work documents for

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adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical L

specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the L"

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actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest ' requirements,.

and adherence to the_- appropriate quality controls.

The primary maintenance observations.during-this month are summarized below:

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Repair of Multipoint Temperature 02/27/90

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Recorder 2T41-R620 in accordance.

a with MWO 2-90-569 and procedure

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57CP-CAL-162-2S-

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Adjustment of-the !'2C" Diesel Generator '

03/09/90!

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Governor Synchronous Speed' Switch in accordance'with MWO 2-90-0386

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LPRM Detector Voltage versus Currenti 03/14-15/90-Plot in accordance with MWO 2-90-0027 i

and_ procedure 57CP-C51-012-OS-

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One year PM on the 250-VDC LPCI

'03/15/90'-

Inverter in accordance with; MWO-2-89-2931 and procedure 52PM-R44-004-0S a

No violations or deviations'were identified.

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Surveillance Testing'0bservations (61726)-Unit 2

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The -inspector observed the performance of _ selected surveillances, jThe-t observation included a review of the procedure for Ltechnical adequacy, conformance. to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or _ part of L the ; actual - surveillances, t

removal from service and return to service of the' system or components affected, and' review.of the data for acceptability based upon - the '

acceptance-criteria.

The primary surveillance testing observations'during this month' are summarized below:

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Surveillance Testing Activity

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'"2A" Diesel Generator Monthly

'02/26/90;

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. Test in-accordance with-

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procedure 34SV-R43-001-2S

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ATTS Panel 2H11-P921 Channel l03/05/90

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Functional Test-and Calibration

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-in accordance with procedure

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~"2C" Diesel Generator Monthly 03/ M 90 -

l Test in accordance with procedure 34SV-R43-003-2S-t j

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RHR Service Water Pump 03/13/90 Operability in accordance with procedure 34SV-E11-004-2S e.

RCIC Monthly Pump Operability 03/14/90 in accordance with procedure 34SV-E51-002-2S No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2 A number of LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to: detect trends, and to-determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.

Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred ~

to determine that technical specifications were being met 'and-the public health and safety were of utmost consideration.. The LERs discussed below-

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were reviewed in detali.

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Unit 1:

89-16 Less Than Adequate Procedure Causes Improper Technical Specification Surveillance i

This LER relates to the licensee's discovery that

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procedures 57SV-C51-001-1/2S,

"RBM Instrument j

Functional Test," did not fully test the;RBM function.

The procedures did not test sufficient portions of-the.

.l circuitry to verify operability.

At the time -of -

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discovery, the RBM was-not required to be operable.

Functional testing of the RBM is required by the Unit.

l 1 and Unit 2 Technicel Specifications, Tables 4.2-7

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and 4.3.5-1, respectively.

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Corrective action involved revising procedures.

57SV-C51-001-1/2S to correctly implement the RBM

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functional test.

On March 13, 1990, the inspector a

reviewed Revision 3 of procedure 57SV-C51-001-1S

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(effective. December 19, 1990) and Revision. 3 of procedure 57SV-C51-001-2S (effective January 11,

1990).

This review confirmed that the intended.

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procedure changes had been made by the -licensee.

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Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for the activities ' referenced in Appendix A of

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.

Section 8-in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends procedures for surveillance testing listed in the technical specifications.

The licensee-identified deficiencies in procedures.

57SV-C51-001-1/2S are a violation of Technical l

Specification 6.8.1.a.

However, this violation meets

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the criteria in Section Viof the NRC Enforcement Policy ' for' not; issuing a-Noticej of ; Violation and,

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therefore, is:-not being ~ cited.

This. matter,.

identified as NCV-321,366/90-05-01,- is considered'to.

-be closed.' Review of the LER is also closed. V

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90-01 Component Failure Results Lin-Inoperability of.High:

Pressure-Coolant Injection System-

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' This LER concerns a ' failure of the. HPCI' system-to maintain. rated. flow during the: performance.of normal--

surveillance testing. 1 Investigation revealed that af d

failed resistor resultedrin Lacloss-of-power.to the :

i electronic' governor ' controlling the/HPCI' turbine speed.

' Corrective - action'-involved replacing 1the ?

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defective resistor.

demonstrating /' system

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operability via the _ performance 7:of1 procedure...

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34SV-E41-002-1S. Since appropriate-corrective. actions

1 have been completed, review of this LER is closed.

One NCV was identified.

6.

weting Reactor Events (93702)

The inspectors reviewe'd activities ' associated with the below listed reactor event.

The review 1ncluded -determination of: cause,' safety a

significance, performance of-personnel and = systems, land corrective' action.

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The inspectors examined instrument ' recordings,. computer printouts,.

operations journal entries, and scram reports: and: also'.had. discussions--

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with operations, maintenance, and engineering : support person'nel: as'

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appropriate.

At 0915 on March 28, 1990, Unit 2-automatically scrammed from rated powe'r

'due to a false low water level signal in the "A2" Land "B2" RPS trip

channels. The false low water level signal was determined to-be caused by.

a pressure perturbation in the sensing : line of level transmitters

_l 2B21-N080C and D.

This pressure perturbation caused the transmitters to

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send a false low water level signal to trip units-2B21-N680C 'and-D and

resulted in-a full scram.'

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Following the scram, reactor vessel water level-decreased to a minimum of approximately minus 23 inches indicated.

Vessel water level was' restored via manual operation of the RFPs. Water level never reached the automatic -

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initiation setpoints for HPCI and RCIC, and -manual operation of' these systems was not required.

Since the MSIVs remained-open during the event, pressure was controlled with the BPVs.

Reactor pressure did not' exceed '

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normal operating pressure.

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The pressure ' perturbation which ultimately caused the: scram was introduced-p when an MSIV Leakage Control system instrument -(2E32-N050) was1 valved.

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into service following calibration. - This instrument was?at approximately

atmospheric pressure when it was valved into service. This led to a large

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,1 pressure perturbation on the sensing.line shared with 2B21-N080C and. D.

The instrument being calibrated was not pressurted to reactor pressure

because the procedure (57CP-CAL-103-25) did nec require -this to be done.-

Also, the - procedure did not - contain. adequate return to - service

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instructions (e.g., opening of links', installation of jumpers).'to prevent pressure perturbations from actuating logic that could result in a full

reactor scram.

The involved-calibration procedure was a new procedure in'

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the process.of being validated.

Review of this event by the resident inspectors will remain:open pending-

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review of the full Event Review Team Report, the LER, and'the licensee's-

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corrective actions.

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Within the areas inspected, no violations-or deviations.were identified.

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Information Meeting with Local Officials (94500)

On March 6. 1990, the Chief of Region II Reactor. Projects Section:3B'and.

the resident-inspectors held an information meeting with - the Appling County Board of Commissioners. The NRC representatives-provided.the Board

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with an overview of the NRC organization, a summary of plant status, and the telephone numbers of appropriate NRC contacts._ Additionally, the Hatch resident inspectors were introduced-and information available_ in-the

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local Public Document Room was discussed.

The NRC representatives

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responded to questions posed by the Board at'Lthe conclusion of this:

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information meeting.

8.

10 CFR Part 21 Report Followup (92701) Units 1 and 2 By letters dated January 13,.1989, and February 16, 1989,. Asea _ Brown

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Boveri made a report to the NRC pursuant-to 10.CFR Part. 21. concerning-

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K-Line K-225 through K-2000 circuit breakers that were delivered-prior-to-

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July 1974.

Users of these K-line circuit breakers were advisedato add-rebound springs on the slow close levers in accordance with provided instructions.

On February 6, 1989,.the licensee made_the determination

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that such circuit breakers were not employed in safety-related

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applications at Plant Hatch.

Based on -this review, this-matter, tracked by Region II as item 321,366/P2189-01, was closed in-NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/89-01 and 50-366/89-01.

Subsequent to this-determination, the licensee discovered on July 12, 1989, that there weret four Asea Brown Boveri K-Line circuit breakers supplied in Cutler-Hammer switchgear in Unit 1.

The licensee initiated corrective action by obtaining rebound springs from Asea Brown'Boveri and schedulin; them for installation via MW0s 1-89-3207 and 1-89-3208.

Based on a: review c' thes<

MW0s, the inspector determined that the installation of the rebound

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springs in' the affected ; circuit breakers was-completed' by' December -18,-

1989.

Review of this matter, tracked by Region II as. item:

321,366/P2189-01, is closed.

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.ExitInterview(30703)

The' inspection-scope and findings.were summarized-on April 12,- 1990,-with l ~1

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those ~ persons indicated:in paragraph.1 above.. Particular emphasis! was;

'placed on the NCV discussed in pragraph: 5..

The licensee'was also advised that review of the LERs discussed in; paragraph.5 'and the Part 2111 tem-

- discussed in paragraph _8 were considered to be closed.

The.-licensee did not-identify as proprietary any of the. material provided to or reviewed'by -

' the inspectors during --this.' inspection. - Dissenting comment s : were i not -

received from the licensee.

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Item Number Status

- Description / Reference Paragraph

321,366/90-05-01 Opened'and NCV - Deficient RBM Functional'

Closed:

.TestingProcedures(paragrap_h5))

i 10. Acronyms and Abbreviations j

l ATTS - Analog Transmitter Trip System-Bypass Valve BPV

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Deficiency Card.

DC a

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ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System HPCI:- High Pressure Coolant Injection LER ' - Licensee Event Report.

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LPCI - Low Pressure Coolant Injection.

LPRM - Local Power Range Monitor-MW0 Maintenance Work Order

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MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve Ncn-Cited Violation

..

NCV

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Office-of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRR

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OSOS - On-Shift Operations Supervisor

PASS - Post Accident Sampling System Preventive Maintenance PM

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o

'PSW Plant Service Water a

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RBM Rod-Block Monitor

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RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Reactor Feedwater Pumps RFP

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Residual Heat Removal RHR

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RHRSW - Residual Heat Removal' Service Water RPS Reactor Protection System

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,

SGTS - Standby Gas Treatment System J

STA Shift Technical Advisor f

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Volts Direct Current

.j VDC

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q l

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a

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