IR 05000321/1989033
| ML20006B038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1990 |
| From: | Brockman K, Menning J, Randy Musser NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006B037 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-89-33, 50-366-89-33, NUDOCS 9001310273 | |
| Download: ML20006B038 (14) | |
Text
_ -. - - _ - _. - -..
..
....
...
/yn y!vf 'o.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
["
'
" ~
REGION 11 n
- J ij 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
,*
~
2. -
ATLANTA, oEORGI A 30323
'%.
/
... o
Report ~ Numbers:
50-321/59'-33 and 50-366/S9-33 Licensee: -Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 1295
'
Birmingham, AL 35201
'
Docket Numbers:
50-32Pand 50-366
,
License Numbers:
DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility-Name: Hatch I and 2'
Inspection Dates:
November 26, 1989 - January 5,'1990 Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia Johnsf. Menning, Senior Resiciafit Inspector _
/-/b [8-Inspectors:
.f
,
Octe Signed AfCi A
/-wFo Ra3darfA.~Musser,Residentgnspector Date Signed s
e
Approved by: hk
- ihar M
-
/- / 9H 9C
'
Koh E. BroplmasP,' Chief,' Project Section 3B Date Signed i
Division 6f Reactor Projects
--
,
SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the 1ta :
- areas of'
Operational Safety Verification,-
Maintenance.,Gn "vation,.
Surveillance Testing Observation, -Reportable Occurrences, Reactor _
j Startup Af ter Refueling' Outage, and Fitness for Duty: Inspection of
'
Initial Training Programs.
Results:
Three non cited violations were identified-duringith'is reporting
. l
'
period.
The first NCV--(paragraph 2) was for antimproper equipment clearance. The second NCV (paragraph 5) was for~ deficient procedurest for technical specification surveillances, and, the - third ' NCV
(paragraph 5) was for f ailure to' take four-hour J reactor. coolant l
conductivity measurements.
!
No specific strengths or weaknesses of licensee programs were..
)
identified based on the inspectors' findings and observations in the
"
areas inspected.
p 90013102g g, h 21
-!
!
s Q
- i
'
/
\\
>
i
_
_
'
"
-.
'
.-
l REPORT DETAILS
'1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C. Coggin, Trch ing and Emergency Preparedness Manager
- D. Davis, Manager General Support
- D. Edge, Nuclear Security Manager
- P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager I
- G. Goode, Engineering Support Manager
- M. Googe, 0utages and Planning Manager
_
J. Lewis, Acting Operations Manager-
- C. Moore, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
.
- H. Nix, General Manager - Nuclear Plant H. Sumner, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager'
- R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Re>ldent Inspectors J. Menning
- R. Musser NRC management on site'during inspection period:
L. Crocker, Project Manager, Hatch, Project Directorate II-3, NRR S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II
.
C. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects,-Region II A. Herdt, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, Region II D. Matthews, Director, Project Directorate II-3, NRR
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this repo'rt' are listed.'in the last paragraph.
,
s 2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2 Unit I continued to operate at. power during this reporting period.- At the
!
start of this reporting period, Unit 2 remained. in the condenser i
retubing/ refueling outage that commenced on September 4,1989.
Control rod ' withdrawal for the-startup of Unit 2 from the outage commenced at 0505 on December 7, -1989.
Criticality was achieved. at 0657 on ~ December 7.
Following the completion of all-main turbine-testing and balancing
-
!
.
.
I
!
t
.
operations, Unit 2 was synchronized with the grid at 0053 on December 22, 1989. Unit 2 achieved rated power at 1220 on December 24, 1989.
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall.
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant nanagement and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included control room manning, access control, operator professionali n and attentiveness, adherence to procedures, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, instrument readings, recorder traces, annunciator. alarms, operability of nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system channels, availability of power sources, and operability of the Safety Parameter Display system.
These observations also included log book entries, tags and clearances on -
equipment, temporary alterations in effect, ECCS system lineups, containment integrity, reactor mode switch position, conformance with technical specification safety limits, daily surveillances, plant chemistry, scram discharge volume valve positions, and rod ~ movement controls. This inspection activity involved numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
The operability _of selected safety-related systems was confirmed on,
.
essentially, a weekly basis. These confirmations involved verification of proper valve and control switch positioning, proper circuit breaker and fuse alignment, and operability of related instrumentation and support systems.
Major components were also inspected for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and general condition. On November-29 and 30, 1989, the inspector confirmed the operability of the Uriit 1-HPCI system.
Proper electrical, valve, and switch alignments were confirmed using Attachments ~
1, 2,
and 3 to procedure 34S0-E41-001-15.
On December 6, 1989, the inspector confirmed the operability of the "2A" and
"2C" emergency diesel generators.
Proper switch, breaker, and valve lineups were confirmed using Attachments -1,- 2, and - 3. to procedure 34S0-R43-001-25. On December 7,1989, the inspector confirmed the status
.-
of the Unit 2 RCIC system.
Proper switch, breaker, and valve' positions-were verified using Attachments 1, 2, and 3 te procedure 34S0-E51-001-2S.
On December 20, 1989, the operability of the Unit 2 SGTS was confirmed.
Switch., breaker, and valve lineups were verified using Attachments.1, 2, and 3 to procedure 34S0-T46-001-2S. On December 26, 1989,- the inspector confirmed the operability of the Unit 1 RHRSW system.
Switch, breaker, and valve lineups were confirmed using Attachments '1, 2, and 3 to procedure 34S0-E11-010-IS.
General plant tours were conducted on, at least, a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, diesel generator building, intake structure, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were toured.
Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, ' fire hazards, fire alarms, fire extinguishing -equipment, emergency lighting, fire barriers, emergency equipment, control of ignition sources and flammable -
.
e G.
.s
,
materials, and control of maintenance /survei.ince activities in progress.
Radiation protection controls, irplementation of the physical security program, housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, control of missile hazards, and instrumentation and alarms in the main control room were also observed.
'
The inspectors observed selected operations shif t turnover briefings to confirm that all necessa ry information concerning the status of plant systems was being addressed. Each briefing was conducted by the oncoming OSOS.
The inspectors noted that each OSOS discussed existing plant problems, activities that were anticipated for the shift, and any new standing orders - or management directives.
Radiological and industrial safety were generally stressed.
The STAS diu assed any recent procedure revisions that impacted on the attendees. The inspectors attended shift turnover briefings on the following dates and shif ts: November 26, 1989 -
Day, November 30, 1989 - Day, December 3,1989 - Day, December 9,1989 -
Day, December 22, 1989 - Day, December 27, 1989 - Day, December 29, 1989
- Day, January 3, 1990 - Day, and January 5, 1990 - Day.
Several safety-related equipment clearances that were active were reviewed to confirm that they were properly prepared and placed. ' Involved circuit breakers, switches, and valves were walked down to verify that cleararce tags were in place and legible and that equipment was properly positioled.
Equipment-clearance program requirements are specified in licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-001-05, " Control of Equipment Clearances and Tags." On November 29, 1989, Unit 1 equipment clearances 1-89-1236 and 1-89-1257 were walked down.
These ciearances were placed to allow maintenance to locate and repair a ground on the refueling bridge and to allow maintenance to repair the RCIC Barometric Condenser Sightglass.
On December 21,1989, Unit 2 equipment clearance 2-89-1877 was walked down.
This clearance was placed to support-maintenance on Plant Service Water valve 2P41-F412A.
On December 26, 1989, Unit l' equipment clearance 1-89-1298 was walked down.
This clearance was placed to electrically
~
isolate Drywell Floor Drain Sump pump 1G11-C001B due to a suspected broken coupling.
On January 2, 1990, Unit 1 equipment clearance 1-89-05 was walked down. This clearance was placed to support maintenance on "A" Loop of the Unit 1 Core Spray System.
On November 29, 1989, while walking down equipment clearance 1-89-1236, the inspector observed that tag number one of the clearance was placed on breaker 1F15-E003 in lieu of the breaker (1F15-E005) that was specified on the danger tag and clearance sheet. This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the. Unit 1 Shift Supervisor, who subsequently determined that the intended component had been tagged, but that the danger tag and clearance sheet did not properly reflect this component. The Unit 1 Shift
,
'
Supervisor corrected the' condition by ha'eing a corrected tag placed on the component and by annotating _the clearance sheet with the correct breaker number. _The' licensee's corrective action was confirmed by the inspector
.
.
'
.
on November 29, 1989. This failure to tag out the specified component, although an isolated event, is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be implemented covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of
',
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Section 1 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends procedures for equipment control (e.g., locking and tagging).
However, this violation meets the criteria specified in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation and, therefore, is not being cited.
This matter, identified as NCV 321/89-33-01, is considered to be closed.
Implementation of the licensee's sampling program was reviewed by the inspector.
This review involved observation of. sampling -activities (reactor coolant and tank sampling) _and chemistry surveillances. Related records were also reviewed. During this inspection period, the-inspector monitored the following activities.
On January 3,1990, the ' inspector observed the changing of the Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Building Stack
,
Particulate and Iodine Filters in accordance with procedure 64CH-SAM-005-05.
The licensee's deficiency control system was reviewed to verify that the
,
system was functioning as intended.
Licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-004-0S,
" Deficiency Control System," establishes requirements and responsibilities for the preparation, processing, review, and disposition of deficiency reporting documents. This procedure applies to all deficiencies affecting i
equipment, procedures, or personnel.
Deficiencies are reported on Deficiency Cards.
On November 27, 1989, the inspector reviewed recently generated DCs. The inspector verified that the DCs had been prepared as required by the controlling procedure and that several deficiencies that were noted in the Shift Supervisors' logs had been documented on DCs.
More specifically, the inspector observed that DC 1-89-4799 had.been generated to document upscale spiking of Reactor Building Stack Monitor 1011-K619B.
It was also observed that DC 2-89-3943 had been prepared to document leakage from the operators of valves 2P64-F027 and -F029.
On December 11, 1989, the inspector also reviewed' recently prepared DCs and verified that problems observed in the plant had been properly-documented, The inspector noted that DC 2-89-4285 had been generated to document the failure of Unit 2 IRM detectors 2C51-N002A and B.
It was also noted that DC 2-89-4322 nad been prepared _to document improper op.eration of the Motor Speed Changer for Unit 2 Reactor Feedwater pump 2N21-C005B.
Recently prepared DCs were also reviewed on December 27, 1989. The inspector noted that DC 1-E3-3311 had been _ generated to dccument the failure of the Group 2 inboard isolation valves to reset following a secondary containment surveillance. -The problem was caused by a blown fuse (2P33-F:1) in panel 1H11-P700. The inspector also noted that DC 2-89-4702 had been prepared to document the failure of the ball valve on the Unit 2
-
"A" TIP machine to open.
>
i
,
'
.-
Selected portions of the containment isolation lineup were raviewed to confirm that the lineup was correct. - The review involved verification of poper valve positioning, verification that motor and air-eperated valves
,, re not mechanically ~ blocked and that power was available (unless ulocking or power removal was required), and inspection of piping upstream of the valves for leakage or leakage paths. On November 30, 1989, the inspector reviewed the following Unit 1 containment isolation valves; IP70-F066, IP70-F067, IT48-F103, IT48-F104, IT48-F113, IT48-F114, IT48-F115, IT48-F116, IT48-F118A and B,1T48-F307, IT48-F308, IT48-F309, IT48-F311, IT48-F319, IT48-F320, IT48-F321, IT48-F322, 1T48-F324, IT48-F325, IT48-F326, IT48-F327, IT48-F328A, IT48-F332A and B, IT48-F333A and B,
1T48-F334A and B,
IT48-F335A and B,
IT48-F338, IT48-F339,
.,
IT48-F340, and IT48-F341. On December 7, 1989, the inspector reviewed the l
following Unit 2 containment isolation valves; 2B31-F020, 2C41-F006, 2011-F050, 2011-F052, 2E11-F023, 2E11-F041B and D, 2P33+F002, 2P33-F004, 2P33-F010, 2P33-F012, 2P51-F513, 2P64-F045, 2T23-F004, 2T23-F005, and 2T48-F320. On December 25, 1989, the inspec:or reviewed the following j
Unit I containment isolation valves; IB31-F020, IC41-F006, ID11-F051,
-
ID11-F053, IE11-F004B, IE11-F011A and B, 1E11-F016A and B, 1E11-F023, i
1E11-F026A and B,
IE11-F028A and B,
IE11-F030, IE11-F055A and B, I
1E11-F103A and B, IE11-F3078A and B, 1E21-F015A and B, and IE21-F031B.
One non-cited violation was identified.
3.
Maintenance Observation (62703) Units 1 and 2 During the report period, the -inspectors observed selected maintenance activities. The observations included a review of-the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest -requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
The primary maintenance observations du' ring this month are summarized below:
Maintenance Activity Date
a.
Replacement of a Regulator 12/12/89 I
(1G31-F0988) and 90 micron j
Filter on the' RWCU Sample panel,
'
in accordance~with MW0 1-89-4035 (Unit 1)
b.
Preparation of NAMCO Limit Switches 12/15/89 j
for Installation on Valve IB21-F028A, in accordance with MWO 1-89-5359 and
_,
procedure 52GM-MEL-006-0S (Unit 1)
c.
Repair of the Spent Fuel Pool Demin 12/19/89
ARM (ID21-K601), in accordance with l
MWO-1-89-6589 and procedure
'
57CP-CAL-005-1S (Unit - 1)
i
.
,
'
,.
Maintenanct Activity Date
!
(Continued)
r d.
Calibration of Recirculation Flow 12/29/89
'
Unit (2831-K607A), in accordance with
..
MWO 2-89-6959 and procedure
57CP-C51-006-2S (Unit 2)
e.
Replacement of an Overload Relay 01/04/90
- _
for Drywell Cooling Fan 7A (2T47-B007A), in'accordance with
'!
MWO 2-90-0007 (Unit 2)
.
.
.
No violations or deviations were identified.
.
4.
Surveillance Testing ~ Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances.1The -
observation included a review of the procedure - for technical adequacy, conformance to techrical specifications, verification of test instrumet:c
calibration, observation of all or part of; the actual surveillances,,
'
removal from service and return to service of the system or -components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon ; the
,
acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations ~ durirg.
-
this month are summarized below:
Surveillance Testing Activity Date
I a.
Diesel Generator "1A" Semi-11/27/89'
Annual Test,.-in accordance.with
'
procedure 345V-R43-004-IS (Unit 1)
b.
APRM Functional Test and
'12/03/89; Calibration, in accordance with.
procedure 34SV-C51-002-15
+
(Unit 1)
.
c.
'12/10/89
'
Exercise Test, in accordance with procedure 34SV-B21-003-1S (Unit 1)
d.
Diesel Generator "1B" Semi-12/14/89 Annual Test, in accordance with procedure 34SV-R43-005-IS (Unit 1)
e.
Remote Shutdown Panel Instrument 12/27/89'
Checks, in cccordance with procedure 34SV-C82-001-2S'
,
(Unit 2)
>
,
,
i
'
.
'
,.
Survei' lance Testing Activity Date (Continued)
f.
Quarterly Reactor Building Vent 01/04/90 Setpoint Checks, in accordance with procedure 62CI-CAL-011as (Unit 2)
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2 A number of LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications were being met and that public health and safety were of utmost consideration.
Unit 1:
89-11 Deficient Procedures Result in Inadequate Technical Specifications Surveillance This LER relates to the licensee's discovery that procedures 34G0-0PS-013-IS and 25, " Normal Plant Shutdown," did not fully verify the operability of the RWM as required by Unit 1 Technical Specifications 4.3.G.I.d and Unit 2 Technical Specifications 4.1.4.1.a.2.
It was established. that adequate procedures were in place to properly test the RWM during plant startups. Procedures 34G0-0PS-013-IS and 2S - were deficient in that RWM operability was demonstrated by selecting an out-of sequence control rod, inserting the control rod, and verifying the receipt of the RWM rod block.
The RSCS is more i
i restrictive in the ancerned region of operation, and it was determined that the rod block resulting from the performance of the procedures was initiated by RSCS rather than the RWM.
Corrective. action involved revising the deficient procedures to provide for proper operability testing of the RWM during shutdown operations.
On-December 19, 1989, the inspector reviewed Revision 6 of prc cedure-34G0-0PS-013-IS (ef fective December 9, 1989) and - Revision 7 of procedure 34GO-0PS-013-2S
~
(effective December 2,1989) and confirmed that the
,
intended revisions had been made.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that procedures be established, implemented, and maintained-for the surveillance and test of safety related equipment.
The licensee-identified deficiencies in these procedures represent a violation of the technical specification requirements.
However, this-violation meets the criteria in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notic.e of Violation and,
_
,
~'
.
'
,.
therefore, is not being cited.
This matter,
.
identified as NCV 321,366/89-33-02, is considered closed.
Review of the LER is also closed.
89-12 Leaking Relief-Valve Lifts Causing RWCU Isolation This LER-concerns an unanticipated isolation of the RWCU system after indication of high system differential flow.
The root cause of the e/ent was determined to be component. f ailure.
Investigation revealed elevated temperature on the tailpipe of relief valve 1G31-F3058, indicating that the valve was leaking past its seat.
The leakage exposed an increased proportion of the valve seat surface to=high pressure water and steam.
This decreased. the~ lif t
pressure setpoint and lead to a spurious blowc'own ~of
!
the RWCU system and the isolation.
The failed component was identified as a 3/4-inch relief valve, Model No. 1975T, manufactured by Consolidated Valve Company.
Corrective actions involved functionally testing and calibrating the RWCU system differential flow sensing equipment and removing and replacing heat ' exchanger relief valve - 1G31-F3058.
Since corrective-actions
,
have been completed, review of this LER is closed.
'
89-13 Personnel Error Results in Missed Technical Specifications Surveillance
This LER concerns a failure.to take. compensatory =
actions required by Technical Specifications section 4.6.F.2 to ensure that reactor coolant conductivity is monitored when the continuous conductivity monitor is inoperable. The continuous monitor had been rendered inoperable by the planned closing of RWCU system valve 1G31-F020.
Licensed personnel failed to recognize that closing of this valve rendered. the monitor inoperable and.that compensatory actions were required. Under the plant-conditions at-the. time of this event, in-line conductivity measurements were required to be taken every ' four hours. Approximately twenty hours elapsed before the required four-hour
!
conductivity surveillance was' initiated. The licensee concluded that reactor water conductivity did not exceed the technical specification liinit during the -
event.
1
.
.
- .
Corrective action involved obtaining the required four-hour conductivity measurements and counselling involved personnel.
The failure to initiate -the four-hour surveillance as required is a violation of Technical Specification section 4.6 F.2.
However, this violation meets the criteria in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not-issuing a Notice of Violation and, therefore, is not being cited. -This matter, identified as NCV 321/89-33-03, is considered to be closed.
Review of the LER is also closed.
Unit 2:
89-04 Personnel Error Results in an Inadequate Procedure and an Actuation of an ESF'
This LER concerns the unanticipated closing of HFCI inboard steam supply isolation valve 2E41-F002 during the performance of procedure 57SV-SUV-004-25, " Excess Flow Check Valve Operability."
Upon valving in differential pressure transmitter 2E41-N057A, a PCIS signal was generated resulting in closure of 2E41-F002.
Investigation revealed that the test procedure was deficient in that adequate provisions i
for electrically isolating 2E41-N057A were not specified.
'
Corrective action involved ' permanently Lrevising y
procedure 57SV-SUV-004-25 to include the opening of an i
additional link (JJ32)
prior to valving out differential pressure transmitter: 2E41-N057A.. A.
requirement to allow the pressure in instrument-lines -
to equalize prior to closing isolation logic circuit links was also to be included in the permanent revision.
On-December 18..
1989, the inspector reviewed Revision 4 of procedure; 57SV-SUV-004-2S (effective November-11, 1989) and confirmed. that the
-
intended corrective actions had been completed.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written procedures-be established,-implemented, and maintained for surveillance and test activities of. safety-related equipment-This instance of a deficient procedure for
,
excess flow check valve testing is a violation of this technical specification requirement.
However,.the violation meets the criteria in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for n'ot issuing a Notice of l
Violation and, therefore, is not being cited.
This matter is another example of NCV 321,366/89-33-02 which is considered'to be closed. Review of this LER is also closed.
i l
i
-
..
~
.
'
..
89-06 Personnel Error Results-in an Inadequate Procedure and Missed Surveil, lance This LER concerns licensee-identified deficiencies in procedure 34SV-SUV-019-2S, " Surveillance Checks."
It was determined that the procedure did not fully implement the surveillance check requirements of Technical Specifications Table 4.3.2-1, item 1.g, and Table 4.3.6.4-1, item 12.
The channel check of Drywell High Range Radiation indicators 2011-K621A and B was specified to be performed once per~ seven days instead of the required once per day. Additionally, a required monthly channel check of the blue pen, the drywell radiation parameter, of Drywell High Pressure / Radiation recorders 2T48-R601A and B was not specified in the procedure.
The root cause of this event was determined to be cognitive personnel error 'in that nonlicensed personnel failed to adequately-incorporate the
technical specification requirements into a major revision. of the procedure made. effective on November 11, 1988.
Corrective action involved revising procedure 34SV-SUV-019-25 to incorporate the proper channel check frequencies for indicators 2011-K621A and B and the blue pens of recorders 2T48-R601A and B.
On December 15, 1989, the inspector reviewed Revision 4 (effective December 2, 1989) of procedure 34SV-SUV-019-2S and confirmed that the intended changes had been made.
,
Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for the surveillance of safety related equipment. The deficiencies in ' procedure 34SV-SUV-019-2S are a violation of Technical Specification-6.8.1.c.
.
However, this licensee-identified violation: meets the
criteria in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing.a Notice of Violation and, therefore,-
is not being cited. This-matterf is another example of NCV 321,366/89-33-02 which is considered to be closed.
Review of this LER is also closed.
89-08 Faulty Time Delay Relay Causes Two Partial. Reactor Water Cleanup Isolations This LER refers to two unanticipated partial isolations of the RWCU system that occurred on-November 2 and 9,1989.
The.first event occurred-as operations personnel were placing an RWCU system filter /demineralizer in service.
The second event
..
k
"
s
,
'
.i
.
,
i occurred as operations personnel were placing an RWCU pump in service. In both cases, annunciation of high system differential flow was _ initially received,'
>
followed by immediate closure of the outboard system isolation valve (2G31-F004).
Normal system response would have been isolation of both 2G31-F004 and the-inboard isolation valve (2G31-F001), following a 45-second time delay.
The root cause was determined to be component failure.
More specifically, time
"
delay relay 2G31-R616D was found to have experienced intermittent contact failure.
This pneumatic time delay relay was identified as a GE Model No. CR2820-
-
relay.
Corrective action involved replacing the defective relay, and functionally testing and-t calibrating the newly _ installed relay.
Since the.
corrective actions have been completed, review of'this:
.
matter is closed.
Two non-cited violations were identified.
6.
Reactor Startup After Refueling Outage (61707 and 71711) Unit 2 Prior to the Unit 2 startup, the inspectors performed walkthroughs of selected systems to independently verify that they had been returned to service in acccrdance with the licensee's approved procedures.
More
,
specifically, on December 4, 1989, the
"B" Core Spray system L loop was
-
walked down. The CRD Hydraulic system and the "2A" and "2C" emergency diesel generators were walked :asn on December 6,1989. - TheLRCIC system was reviewed on December 7, 1989. No discrepancies were identified during these walkthroughs.
The inspectors also reviewed some licensee. training -activities as part of;
~
the inspection of prestartup activities.
On November 30, 1989, the inspectors attended a training session for operations personnel on DCRs that had been implemented during the-Unit 2 refueling / condenser retubing
. outage. The training was conducted in accordance with instructor outline.
S0-IH-75202-00.
The inspectors observed that. the - instructor. was well prepared and effectively responded to a broad range of questions on the DCRs.
The inspector also reviewed a training initiative that, was'
undertaken during the period November 29-30, 1989.
During this -period,.
the licensee. conducted plant startup training on the simulator efor licensed operations personnel (the. "B" and "C" teams) scheduled for duty; during' the Unit 2 startup.
The inspector reviewed the specifics of-this refresher training as delineated in. simulator guide LT-SG-50346-01, and noted that the-training was comprehensive at;d included potential equipmentM malfunctions.
The inspector commended cognizant licensee management for this initiative.
d
,
_
t.~
'
.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the Unit 2 startup to verify that control rod withdrawals were properly controlled and that operations were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and the technical specifications. The startup was performed in accordance with Revision 9 of procedure 34G0-0PS-001-25, " Plant Startup," which became effective on November 22, 1989. The status of plant systems and surveillances' required for startup was confirmed in accordance with Revision 3 of procedure 34GO-0PS-003-25, "Startup System Status Checklist," which became effective on December 2,1989.
The inspectors noted no discrepancies during the observation of operations personnel conducting the startup or the review of related procedures and documentation.
The inspector witnessed the shutdown margin demonstration that was performed in accordance with Revision 0 of procedure 42CC-ERP-010-0S (effective January 20, 1989).
The demonstration was performed on December 7,1989, soon after criticality was achieved in Unit 2.
The inspector reviewed the procedure for technical adequacy, verified 'the licensee's calculations, and verified that data supplied in the Cycle Management Report was' utilized, j
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Fitness for Duty:
Inspection of Initial Training Programs (TI 2515/104)
During the reporting period, the inspector performed an inspection of the licensee's fitness for duty training as required by TI-2515/104.
All training materials -(video tape presentations and literature) provided by the licensee in this subject area were examined by the inspector.
Additionally, the inspector toured the licensees' collection facility and
'
observed its operation.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified, i
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 5,'1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
Particular emphasis was placed on the NCVs discussed in paragraphs 2 and 5.
The licensee was also advised that the LERs discussed in paragraph 5-were ' considered to be closed. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material
'
provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph 321/89-33-01 Opened and NCV - Improper Equipment Closed Clearance (paragraph 2)
i
,
b
-
s
n
, -
.,,
7*
. g.:
,
Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph
,
(Continued)
.
'
321,366/89-33-02 Opened and NCV - Deficient Procedures for Closed Technical Specification 1
'
Surveillances (paragraph S)
.
321/89-33-03-Opened and NCV - Failure to Take Four-Hour Closed Reactor Coolant Conductivity
Measurements (paragraph 5)-
,
'
9.
Acronyms and. Abbreviations
'
APRM - Average Power Rar.ge Monitor ARM Area Radiation Monitor-
-
CRD - Control-Rod Drive
!
DC Deficiency-Card
-
DCR Design Change Request
-
ECCS - Emergency-Core Cooling System'
Engineered Safety Feature _
-
'
' General Electric Company
-
-
'
HPCI - High Pressure Coolant. Injection IRM Intermediate Range Monitor
,
-
+
,
LER - Licensee Event Report MWO Maintenance Work Order'
-
NCV - Non-Cited Violation.
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission Li
-
'. _
NRR - Office of Nuclear Reactor' Regulation OSOS -- On-Shift Operations Supervisor:
.
,
PCIS'- Primary Containment Isolation' System
!
RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation CoolinD
~
' l RHRSW - Residual Heat Removal Service Water
'
RSCS - Rod Sequence Control System
-
RWCU - Reactor. Water Cleanup i
-
. Standby Gas Treatment-System
-
TI Temporary Instruction
'
-
'
TIP - Traversing Incore Probe t
TS-Technical. Specifications
-
,.
i
..
,
i
>
r
?
-
F J
d
+
T
%
-
r