IR 05000321/1990017
| ML20058B352 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1990 |
| From: | Brockman K, Trocine L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058B348 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-90-17, 50-366-90-17, NUDOCS 9010300142 | |
| Download: ML20058B352 (7) | |
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/g 4 coq'o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY 00MMISSION
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REGION 11 101 MARIETTA STRE ET, N.W.
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i e ATLANTA, CEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-321/90-17 and 50-366/90-17 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.:
50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.:
DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name:
Hatch, Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
September 11-14, 1990 Inspector:,
/0//#/fd LeWr7rocine, Project Engineer, Project Section 38, Dtite Jigned Division of Reactor Projects Accompanying Personnel:
Brent L. Collins, Engineering Specialist, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, EG&G Idaho, Washington Technical Office Approved by:
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- M90 Kynneth tf Brp(Kman, Chief, Projects Section 3B Date Signed
, Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine announced inspection was conducted in accordance with Temporary Instruction. 2500/020, Rev. 2, in order to determine compliance with the Anticipated Transient Without Scram Rule,
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This post-implementation inspection involved an evaluation of the design and installation of the Alternate Rod Injection, Standby Liquid Control, and Recirculation Pump Trip systems, as well as a review of the licensee's pertinent programs and
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procedures.
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations, deviations, or specific strengths or weaknesses of licensee programs were identified.
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I 9010300142 901o1p.ADOCK 05000 21
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Anderson, Engineering Group Manager - Electrical T. Barr, Senior Engineer, Southern Company Services C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager C. Dixon, Acting Quality Assurance Site Supervisor H. Dougherty, Oglethorpe Power Company Site Representative
- T. Elton, Plant Review Board Support Coordinator P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0 Fraser, Safety Audit Engineering Review Supervisor
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G. Goode, Engineering Support Manager J. Hammonds, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
- C, Moore, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
- A. Paynes, Senior Engineer I - Nuclear Safety and Compliance
- D Read, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations B. Smith, Training Instructor
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- L. Sumner, General Manager i
S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
- C, Tully, Senior Engineer - Corporate Licensing
- D. Wilson, Project Engineer - Corporate Licensing NRC Resident inspectors
- R. Musser L. Zerr
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NRC Regional Inspector
- L. Trocine, Project Engineer
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NRC Consultant
- B. Collins, Engineering Specialist, Idaho National Laboratory, EG&G
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Idaho, Washington Technical Office
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
'last paragraph.
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Temporary Instruction 2500/020, Revision 2,
" Inspection to Determine Compliance with ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.62," (25020) Units 1 and 2
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The inspectors performed a post-implementation inspection of the design and installation of the Alternate Rod Injection, Standby Liquid Control, and Recirculation Pump Trip systems as well as a review of the licensee's pertinent ATWS programs and procedures.
The licensee's plant specific ATWS design-submittal dated March 4, 1987, and the plant specific NRR Safety Evaluation Report dated December 14, 1988, were also reviewed to verify that the design and installation of these systems conformed to the licensee's plan as endorsed through the SER, a.
Alternate Rod Injection System The ARI system is a dual channel system which is automatically
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initiated by either low reactor water level or high reactor pressure.
It performs a function redundant to the backup scram system.
After system initiation, immediate reset of the ARI system cannot be performed because of a built in 30 second time delay.
This ensures that the protective action goes to completion once the system is initiated.
The ARI system is required to start rod injection motion.
within-15 seconds of initiation and be completed within 25 seconds of initiation.
Test data taken during preoperational and startup testing) indicated that it took more than 25 seconds (approximately 27 seconds to complete an ARI rod insertion.
Plant specific analyses
.were performed by GE to provide justification for up to 35 seconds.
Although these time extensions were not reviewed in the SER, similar reviews and approvals have been made by NRR for other BWRs requiring extended times for the scram function.
The inspectors reviewed the test data and determined that the ARI time limits were acceptable.
This is consistent with the G_eneral Electric plant specific analyses.
It is understood that a clarification letter will soon-be issued by the licensee to provide the actual rod insertion test times.
The ATWS Rule states that' the ARI system should be testable at power.
The Hatch ARI system utilizes a redundant two-out-of-two logic arrangement which allows for maintenance, testing, and calibration while at power of system logic and instrumentation up to the final four actuation relays (KS, K6, K7, and' K8).
The licensee has implemented a design change (DCR 89-107) which will a'iow testing of the final-four ARI initiation relays while at power.
This change-
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will utilize permanent test switches which will block the actuation
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signal to the ARI solenoid valve during testing, allowing the ARI actuation relays to be energized without causing the. valves to change state.
An alarm will also be provided to alert the operator that-testing is in progress.
Installation of the test switches and alarm has been completed on the Unit 1 ARI system.
Installation on the Unit 2 ARI system will be completed during the next Unit 2 refueling
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outage (Spring 1991).
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The manual controls and system annunciators for the ARI system have been incorporated into the existing operator control panels in keeping with the detailed control room design review process.
The manual initiation, reset, and test switches for the ARI system are located near the manual shutdown control switches for the SBLC and CR0 systems. The ARI annunciators are located on specially installed panels above the ARI controls.
The ARI and RPT systems are not classified as safety-related and are not required to conform to Seismic Category I and IEEE Class 1E codes.
ARI initiation signals are provided for slave trips within the ATTS panels.
Class 1E isolation relays separate non-Class 1E ARI components from the safety-related ATTS system.
In order to comply with the ATWS rule, the ARI system nanded instraent components diverse from those in the reactor trip system. Therefore, as part of
DCR 89-107, the Unit 1 GE trip unit circuit boards in the ATTS panels were replaced with circuit boards manufactured by Rosemount.
This design change will be completed on Unit 2 by the end of the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage.
The new trip units were purchased as Class 1E-components.
Diversity of the remaining ARI equipment from the Reactor Protection System was maintained through the use of components from different manufacturers, different power sources (AC versus DC), and different modes of operation (energize to actuate versus de-energize to actuate).
Similar 24-volt DC Agastat relays were used between the trip units and the relay logic in both the ARI system and tt.e RPS.
This. condition was previously accepted by NRR and reconfirmed in a telephone conference call with NRR on September 13, 1990.
NRR had determined that these relays were part of the trip units and-that adequate diversity. existed because different manufacturers were used for the trip units.
The ARI system is powered from the diesel generator batteries.
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Hatch plant specific ATWS submittal and the SER stated that the ARI
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power would be provided by the Class 1E 125/250-volt DC station service batteries.
While this represents a discrepancy, the inspectors found this arrangement to be acceptable since the use of the diesel generator batteries for ARI constitutes an electrically-indeaendent power source. A clarification-letter will soon be issued by t1eLlicensee to correct the power supply for the ARI system.
Except for the GE trip unit on Unit 2, which will-be replaced during the upcoming refueling outage, the. ARI system is - diverse, electrically independent, and physically separated from the RPS.
The table below summarizes the differences between the ARI and the RPS.
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ATWS: ARI - RPS COMPARIS0N Component ARI System RPS Trip Unit Rosemount(Unit 1)
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GE (Unit 2)
Relays Agastat GE HFA Logic Two-Du t-of-Two One-Out-of-Two Taken Twice
Valves VALCOR ASCO Energize to Open De-energize to Open (Fail Safe)
Power Supply 125-volt DC 120-volt AC
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Battery Backed Motor-Generator i
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Standby Liquid Control System The SBLC system is a manually initiated system for injecting a boron solution into the reactor vessel.
Because the construction permits for both Hatch units were issued prior to July 26, 1984, the existing
SBLC system with manual actuation is acceptable,. and automatic j
initiation is not required.
The licensee has implemented the SBLC i
configuration as approved by the SER and has met the equivalency requirement for injection flow rate and solution concentration by (
using the flow rate from a single injection pump and adding enriched boron to the existing boron solution concentration.
The inspectors
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reviewed the equivalency. requirements and determined that the Hatch configuration was in compliance with the ATWS Rule.
To ensure that i
the-SBLC system is maintained in compliance with ATWS Rule
.i requirements, this system has been incorporated into.the technical specifications. The technical specifications have also been modified
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I to include the changes with regard-to the revised injection flow rate
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and solution concentration.
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The control switches and. annunciator alarms for the SBLC system were not modified and used the' existing. devices in the main control room.
These control switches and alarms were reviewed by the licensee to'
'i ensure the use of good human factors engineering, and no modifica-tions are required.
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Recirculation Pump Trip System -
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The RPT system implementation at Hatch endorses the " original BWR/4" design where a single motor-generator breaker is tripped by a two-out-of-two high pressure or low level initiation to prevent inadvertent actuation.
The Unit 1 RPT system has been implemented in accordance with the design approved by the SER. To be in compliance with the approved design, the Unit 2 RPT system, which currently has.
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a one-out-of-two logic, will be modified to a two-out-of-two logic p
during the next refueling outage.
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All controls and indications for the RPT trip systems are in the original plant design configuration and are located at the recirculation pump panels.
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Programs and Procedures The equipment for the SBLC and RPT systems has been installed as Class 1E. and these systems are controlled by the technical specifications.
Therefore, the plant programs and procedures i
applicable to systems covered by the technical specifications have been addressed.
Although the ARI system is not Class 1E and is not covered by the plant technical specifications, the Nuclear Plant Management Information System - Surveillance Task Tracker (used for tracking technical specification activities) is used to initiate and to ensure that appropriate attention is given to maintaining the ARI
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system in an operable condition.
Modification or replacement of ARI i
components is controlled through existing engineering and administrative procedures.
This should guarantee that diversity and
independence of the ARI system from the RPS is maintained throughout f
the life of the system.
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Quality Assurance, Operations, and Maintenance activities are
performed in accordance with procedures-and requirements for the
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Class 1E systems or non-safety systems, as appropriate.
Both the SBLC
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and RPT systems are covered under technical specifications. Although the ARI is not covered under the technical specifications, licensee requirements for the ARI are similar to the requirements for technical specification systems.
Training programs for the ARI, SDLC, and RPT systems have been incorporated into the existing lesson plans for both Operations and Instrumentation and Control personnel.
The plant-simulator represents Unit 2 and has not.yet been modified to include all ATW5 interfaces; - however, simulator training using scenarios requiring knowledge and interactions with the ATWS systems - have been incorporated into the training program.
.In summary, the inspectors verified the operational -adequacy and.
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reliability of the ATWS equipment; that quality assurance controls were inplace to ensure that major activities such as design, procurement,
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installation, and-testing of ATWS= equipment were adequate; and that '
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training on the ATWS systems was incorporated.
The. Unit 1 ARI, SBLC, and:
RPT systems and the: Unit 2 SBLC system have been adequately implemented to either meet or exceed the design requirements approved by the NRC'in the 1988 SER. -However, the Unit 2 ARI and RPT systems.are not yet in full compliance with all of the design requirements. -In order to correct' this,
.the licensee is planning to install switches for testing the final four -
ARI initiation relays while at power, replace the GE trip unit circuit boards with Rosemount circuit boards, and implement a two-out-of-two actuation logic for the RPT system. The licensee intends to install these T
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design features during the next Unit 2 refueling outage.
These upgrades will be inspected af ter their implementation. This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item 50-366/90-17-01, Completion of ATWS upgrades for Unit 2.
i Although the design and implementation in the plant were adequate, two discrepancies between the SER and ARI system design and installation were noted.
It is understood that a clarification letter will be provided by i
the licensee to provide the actual rod insertion test times and to correct i
the power supply for the ARI syste...
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 14, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not
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identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph 50-366/90-17-01 Opened IFI - Completion of ATWS Upgrades forUnit2(paragraph 2)
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Acronyms and Abbreviations AC Alternating Current ARI Alternate-Rod Insertion System ATTS Analog Transmitter Trip System-ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram BWR Boiling Water Reactor CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRD Control Rod Drive System-DC Direct Current DCR-Design Change Request EG&G Edgerton, Germeshausen, & Grier GE General Electric Company IEEE.
Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers IFI Inspector Followup Item
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NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation RPS Reactor Protection System RPT Recirculation Pump' Trip System SBLC Standby Liquid Control System.
SER Safety Evaluation Report I
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