IR 05000321/1998003
| ML20236Q645 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236Q638 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-98-03, 50-321-98-3, 50-366-98-03, 50-366-98-3, NUDOCS 9807200384 | |
| Download: ML20236Q645 (31) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 Docket Nos:
50-321. 50-366 License Nos:
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Report No:
50-321/98-03, 50-366/98-03 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc. (SNC)
l Facility:
E. I. Hatch Units 1 & 2 Location:
P. O. Box 2010 l
Baxley. Georgia 31515
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I Dates:
May 3 - June 20. 1998 i
i Inspectors:
B. Holbrook. Senior Resident Inspector J. Canady. Resident Inspector Accompanying Inspector:
T. Fredette. Resident Inspector
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Approved by:
P. Skinner. Chief. Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
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9807200384 900714
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PDR ADOCK 05000321
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-321/98-03, 50-366/98-03 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support.
The report covers a 7-week period of resident inspection.
Operations The procedure requirements for main control room deactivated and e
nuisance annunciators were correctly implemented.
The small number of deactivated annunciators did not detract operators from safely operating the affected systems and components (Section 03.1).
e Operator performance during the operation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system testing on Unit 1 was in accordance with procedures.
Three-part communications between crew members were generally clear and concise.
Control room su3ervisors routinely monitored operator performance and verified t1e recording of test data.
All procedure requirements were met (Section 04.1).
e Operations personnel demonstrated sufficient knowledge to correctly implement the requirements for selected simulated i
security threats (Section 04.2).
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e Operator performance observed during training and a simulator evaluation was consistent with operator performance observed by the inspectors in the main control room.
The instructors'
critique of operator and crew performance was thorough, detailed and critical, and identified strengths and areas for improvement (Section 05.1).
Maintenance o
For two months. maintenance and engineering personnel failed to recognize the root cause of problems associated with the Unit 1
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"B" Core Spray Jockey pump.
The significance of the tolerances
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for the impeller clearance and the flatness of the casing wear plate was not identified.
Examples of this failure to recognize and expeditiously correct mechanical system and component deficiencies were also identified in Inspection Reports 50-321.
366/98-01, 50-321, 366/97-07. 50-321. 366/97-12, and Section E2.1 of this report (Section M1.2).
o Maintenance and engineering personnel took prudent action in
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I conducting an assessment of the bearing condition of the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator after an analysis indicated a wear particle concentration increase (Section M2.1).
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Licensee management was kept informed of the total amount of e
radwaste in-leakage which was indicative of component and system leaks.
Leakage was routinely assessed and leakage reduction was often identified as a priority.
Although management goals for total site radwaste in-leakage were generally not met, the amount of in-leakage for 1998 to date, was improved from the values recorded in 1997 (Section M2.2).
Personnel demonstrated excellent performance for meeting i
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of safety related equipment.
This was evidenced by peer checks, careful switch manipulations, correct procedural usage, and supervisory oversight. All procedure and test requirements were met (Sections M3.1 M3.2. M3.3 and M3.5).
Operator performance for the Unit 1 control rod time testing and e
cor rective maintenance for Balance of Plant leaks was excellent as evidenced by correct procedure usage and clear and concise communications.
Technical Specification and procedure acceptance requirements were met for the activities. Corrective maintenance for the leak repairs was well-planned and implemented.
Procedures were correctly used and supervisors provided good oversight (Section M3.4).
Contract personnel conducting design work activities demonstrated e
a good personnel-safety and radiological control attitude.
Procedures and work packages were up to date and correctly used.
Licensee supervision provided appropriate oversight of the ongoing contract work activities (Section M3.6).
Enaineerina A lack of attention to detail by corporate design engineering e
resulted in undersized wiring and incorrect breaker trip settings for the Motor Control Center (MCC) associated with the Turbine Building Chilled Water System on Unit 1.
As a result, the MCC lost power.
Operations personnel were required to take compensatory actions to limit the loads on the MCC to minimize the impact of the design error (Section E1.1).
The potential problems due to hot weather conditions were e
effectively mitigated. A heightened awareness for emergency equipment operation was demonstrated (Section E1.1).
Enclosure
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The Request for Engineering Review (RER) process was not e
rigorously implemented.
RERs were not consistently tracked by departments.
The disposition of RERs was not thoroughly controlled by the engineering department. nor was the status of RERs communicated to requesting departments.
This was identified as a weakness in the implementation of the RER process (Section E2.1).
Plant Sucoort e
Licensee management demonstrated an increased awareness and sensitivity to radiation worker practices with respect to a recent deficiency associated with the incorrect use of a radiological work permit.
The licensee's immediate actions were prompt and
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thorough to ensure immediate improvements (Section R4.1).
Although some recent improvements were observed in the quality of e
Personnel Contamination Reports (PCRs), some were not thorough and detailed and some corrective actions were not identified to other involved departments.
Personnel assigned to complete the PCRs were not trained for root cause and corrective action analysis (Section R7.1).
e The completion of a contamination control self assessment demonstrated site management's increased sensitivity for contamination control issues and a need for improvement (Section R7.2).
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The Fire Hazards Analysis requirements for inoperable or degraded fire equipment and barriers were correctly implemented.
The assigned fire watch was knowledgeable of fire watch duties and responsibilities (Section F1.2).
Enclosure
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at 100% rated thermal power (RTP) during the entire report period except for minor power reductions on May 17 and June 5.
Power was reduced to about 75% RTP on May 17 for routine testing and leak repairs in the condenser bay area.
Power was returned to 100% the same day.
Unit 2 began the report period at 100% RTP.
Power was reduced to about 57% RTP on May 22 to troubleshoot and repair a bearing sleeve on the 2B Condenser Circulation Water Pump.
Power was returned to 100% the same day.
I. Doerations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations.
On June 5. power on both units was reduced to about 83% RTP as a result of a National Weather Service )rediction of high winds. The units were returned to 100% RTP t1e same day.
The reduction in power was an example of conservative decision making.
In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious: specific events and observations are detailed in the sections below.
Operations Procedures and Documentation 03.1 Review of Control Room Deactivated and Nuisance Annunciator
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Control
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Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed procedure 30AC-0PS-009-0S. " Control Room Instrumentation." Revision (Rev.) 4. and conducted a review of selected disabled annunciators to verify that procedure requirements were met.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that operations had correctly completed the procedural requirements for deactivated annunciators.
The annunciators were correctly identified and were actively tracked.
Compensatory measures were appropriately identified.
The procedural requirements for mont11y reviews and evaluation of problem annunciators older than three months were correctly completed.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that operators were correctly implementing the procedure requirements for deactivated and nuisance annunciators. The small number of deactivated annunciators and the specific annunciators that were deactivated I
did not detract operators from safely operating the affected l
systems and components.
Operator Knowledge and Performance l
04.1 Review of Unit 1 Control Room Goerator Performance Durina Routine Operations and Safety System Testina a.
Insoection Stone (71707)
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performance to verify correct procedural usage, command and
control, communications, and system monitoring during routine l
operations and safety system testing.
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Observations and Findinas
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l Operations personnel conducted a detailed pre-evolution briefing prior to conducting In-Service Testing (IST) and operability i
testing of the Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)
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Personnel involved in the testing activities discussed l
various issues to gain a better understanding of procedure requirements, including management and supervisory expectations.
l The inspectors observed that 03erators conducted a thorough and detailed review of the applica;1e procedures prior to the tests.
Control room supervisors routinely observed operator switch manipulations and the recording of critical test acceptance criteria data.
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The inspectors reviewed procedure 345V-E51-002-1S. "RCIC Pump 0)erability." Rev. 18. and observed that operators correctly used t1e procedure. Control board instrumentation for system
parameters was closely monitored; alarms were acknowledged and
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attended to: three-part communications between crew members were generally clear and concise. The inspectors reviewed the recorded test data and observed that the procedure and Technical i
Specification (TS) requirements were met.
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The inspectors observed that the operator performing the test had some minor difficulty establishing the RCIC turbine speed required by the procedure prior to recording IST data. The turbine speed tended to deviate slightly from the 1% variance allowed by Enclosure l
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procedure. ' Operations had encountered the speed 3roblem'during previous IST and did not pursue a resolution to t1e problem. This
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The inspectors-were informed that the testing process and procedure would be reviewed for improvement. The inspectors concluded that the' speed variance did not-adversely affect-the design function of the system, c.
Conclusions Operator performance during the o)eration of the Unit 1 RCIC was
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in accordance with procedures.
T1ree-part communications between
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crew members were generally clear and concise.
Control room supervisors routinely. monitored operator performance and verified the recording of test data. All procedure requirements were met.
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04.2 Review of Procedures and Operations Personnel Knowledae in
Response to a Postulated Security Event (71707)
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The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures and conducted a
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survey of selected shift crew Plant Equipment Operators (PEOs).
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Control Room operators. and _ Superintendents of Shift (SOS) to I
assess their knowledge and actions that would be taken in response
.to a bomb threat. All personnel questioned were generally
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Threat Checklist, communicating information to otler personnel and l
departments, and validating and classifying the threat.
The inspectors reviewed operations simulator training scenarios and confirmed that the scenarios included security event activities. The inspectors concluded that ' operations personnel surveyed received training and were knowledgeable in implementing the requirements of the associated procedures classifying security events, and coordinating responses with.the plant security department.
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04.3 Concurrent Unavailability of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT)
System and the Hardened Vent System on Unit 2 a.
Insoection Stone (71707) (62707)
As a result of the loss of Primary Containment (PC) venting
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1998, the inspectors reviewed procedure 90AC-0AP-002-OS.
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" Scheduling Maintenance." Rev. 2. Unit 2 clearance 2-98-95, and i
- assessed licensee actions.
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Enclosure
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Observations and Findinas.
I The inspectors review indicated that on May 2. operations personnel planned to placed the "A" train of SBGT under clearance for testing.
A maintenance request was made to change the clearance boundary due to previous difficulties that had been encountered while placing a mechanical block on SBGT inlet isolation valve 2T48-F081.
Changing the clearance boundary also isolated valve 2T48-F082. Torus Vent Isolation Valve. for the Containment Hardened Vent system.
Operations )ersonnel on shift failed to recognize that moving the clearance )oundary resulted in
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a failure to follow procedure for removing equipment from service l
with respect to the maintenance rule.
Changing the clearance boundary resulted in the SBGT and Hardened Vent Systems being isolated at the same. 0)erations personnel on the following shift identified the problem w1ile restoring the clearance.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures and noted that the Maintenance Rule (MR) matrix prohibited the removal of two containment systems from service without an evaluation and approval.
As a result of the clearance change, the SBGT and the containment hardened vent for the Drywell were both isolated and removed from service at the same time without an evaluation or approval.
Procedure notes identified that the hardened vent will be available (no work in progress on the hardened vent valve. T46-F082) and that the importance of the hardened vent increases when work on the SBGT is ongoing.
Work that required closing of the
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T46-F081 valve (SBGT inlet) removes the ability to vent containment through SBGT and will not be done simultaneously with work on the hardened vent, valve T46-F082.
Operators failed to correctly apply the requirements of the notes.
The clearance problem and operator performance was discussed with operations management.
The inspectors were informed that the clearance problem was not identified by peer and operation supervision reviews when the clearance boundary change was made.
Previous clearance review and boundary change problems resulted in a violation that is documented in Integrated Ins)ection Report 50-321. 366/98-01. The inspectors concluded that tie corrective actions for this violation would not have reasonably prevented the recent. problem.
Following identification of the recent problem, operators restored the systems to their original lineup.
Beginning of shift training-(BOST) was performed on the event and operations management stressed the importance of performing an accurate evaluation using the MR matrix.
The inspectors attended a BOST session and
reviewed the BOST document.
The inspectors concluded that the
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training did not clearly identify that the root cause of the problem which was a failure to correctly apply the requirements of j
the MR matrix and notes.
This observations was discussed with
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operations management who revised the document and conducted
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additional training.
The inspectors discussed MR procedural requirements with selected operators and determined that operator
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knowledge of the procedure was satisfactory.
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Based upon the inspectors' review of licensee actions, this l
licensee identified violation constitutes a violation of minor safety significance and is being identified as Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-366/98-03-01. Concurrent Unavailability of Two
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Maintenance Rule Containment Systems in accordance with NUREG 1600.Section VII.
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Conclusions A NCV was identified.
Personnel responsible for equipment clearance implementation failed to identify that two containment systems were made unavailable following a clearance boundary change.
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Operator Training and Qualification
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05.1 Observation of Licensed Operator Reaualification Trainina (71707)
The inspectors attend selected classroom lectures for licensed operator requalificatiori training and observed portions of the licensee's evaluation of operator performance on the site specific simulator.
The inspectors observed that the classroom instructors demonstrated satisfactory control of the classroom setting.
Lesson plans were used, objectives were discussed. and the presentation supported the lesson plan requirements.
The inspectors observed that the simulator instructors also demonstrated satisfactory control of the simulator training environment.
Personnel conducting the operator evaluations demonstrated an awareness of operator performance, communications, command and control, emergency procedure usage, accident mitigatiori, and teamwork.
The operators identified two minor differences between the simulator response and actual plant response.
The differences dealt with indications when condensate storage tank water was draining into the torus.
The ins)ectors observed that the training instructors documented taese differences.
The inspectors concluded that the minor differences did not adversely affect operator training. The inspectors also concluded that the Enclosure
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operators performance _during training and evaluations was consistent with performance observed in the main control room.
Additionally, the. inspectors concluded that the instructors *
critique of operator and crew performance was thorough, detailed and critical, and identified strengths and areas 'for improvement.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1- (Closed)'VIO 50-321. 366/97-05-01: Failure To Follow Procedure -
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Multiole Examoles.
The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated August 22, 1997. The licensee's corrective actions included training, counseling personnel, and revising procedures and drawings.
Based upon the inspectors' review of the licensee's actions. this item is closed.
08.2~ (Closed) VIO 50-321. 366/97-09-01i F611ure To Follow Procedure -
Multiole Examoles.
The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated November 26, 1997. The licensee's corrective actions included counseling. personnel and revising procedures for clarification.
Based upon the inspectors' review of the licensee's actions, this item is closed.
08.3 (Closed) VIO 50-321/97-10-02: Failure to Meet Technical Specification Requirements Prior to Withdr?wal of a Control Rod While in Cold Shutdown.
The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated December 12. 1997. The licensee's corrective actions included counseling and training of personnel, revising procedures, and
. implementation of a new Operations Department policy'regarding the removal of hydraulic control units from service.
Based upon the
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inspectors' review of the licensee's actions, this item is closed.
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L II. Maintenance f
M1 Conduct of Maintenance l
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M1.1 Observations of Work Performance (62707)
i The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities.
i MWO 1-97-2440:
Replace core spray 1B jockey pump l
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mechanical seal l
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Troubleshoot / repair the 1B jockey pump low DP problem-Enclosure
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MWO 1-98-1167:
Check / replace thermal overloads for 1B
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l jockey pump MWO 1-98-1630:
Install new smoke detector and magnetic
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door holder The inspectors found that the work was performed with the work packages. work instructions, and procedure' present.
These documents were actively used.
Maintenance activities were
generally completed in a thorough and professional manner.
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deficiencies were identified.
M1.2 Recurrina Problems With The IB Core Soray (CS) Jockey Pumo a.
Insoection Scooe (62707) (37551)
The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures and discussed maintenance and engineering personnel performance associated with recurring problems with the 1B CS jockey pump with licensee management.
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Inspection Findinas The CS jockey pum) is described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Re) ort (JFSAR). and is treated as safety related by the licensee.
3etween February 26 and May 15. the pump was disassembled and reassembled on three different occasions.
The problems encountered were a mechanical seal leak low differential pressure (DP) problems, and pump motor problems.
Maintenance and i
engineering personnel suspected that the recurring problems were interrelated.
During the May 15 work activity the inspectors observed that the impeller and wear plate were abnormally worn and contained uneven wear.
Maintenance personnel attributed the component wear to assembling the components without meeting the clearance tolerances recommended by the vendor which were not specifically identified in the vendor technical manual.
The licensee indicated that the impeller clearance and flatness (clearance) of the casing wear plate caused the problems.
Maintenance personnel were not aware of the close tolerances associated with the impeller clearance and the significance until informed by the vendor.
This lack of information contributed to the troubleshooting and repair problems and resulted in maintenance rework.
Maintenance Jersonnel informed the inspectors that a procedural change lad been made to require that the component clearances be measured with a micrometer since the tolerances were small.
The inspectors reviewed procedure 51GM-MME-002-S. and verified that a temporary
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Enclosure
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Conclusions
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The inspectors concluded that for greater than two months, maintenance and engineering personnel failed to recognize the significance of the correlation between the tolerances for the impeller clearance and the flatness of the casing wear plate during troubleshooting activities. This contributed to recurring equipment problems and maintenance rework.
Examples of this failure to recognize and expeditiously correct mechanical system j
and component deficiencies were also identified in Inspection Reports 50-321. 366/98-01, 50-321. 366/97-07. 50-321, 366/97-12.
and Section E2.1 of this report.
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H2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Insoection of 1A Emeroency Diesel Generator (EDG) Outboard Thrust Bearina (62707)
The inspectors reviewed activities and observed ongoing work associated with Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 1-98-1607 to perform an assessment of the outboard thrust bearing on the 1A EDG. The assessment was initiated based on bearing lube oil analysis conducted on April 17. that showed excessive wear particle concentration (WPC).
The inspectors observed that this concentration was an order of magnitude greater than previous
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analyses results conducted over the past ten years.
Maintenance personnel performed the assessment as a preventive measure for a thrust bearing which was installed in 1997, and determined the increased WPC to be the result of bearing ~ wear in."
Bearing surfaces, tolerances and appearance was normal.
The inspectors concluded that maintenance and engineering personnel took prudent action in conducting an assessment of the j
thrust bearing after an indicated increased wear.
H2.2 Review of EauiDment Leakaae and Repair Activities
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Inspection Scone (375E1) (62707)
The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures for documenting system and equipment leakage: temporary and permanent repair
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activities; and assessed licensee performance to identify and repair leaks.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that the licensee assessed system and com)onent leakage daily and discussed the total daily radwaste in-leacage for both units each morning during the plant status meeting.
The licensee routinely assigned leakage reduction as a Enclosure
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priority when total leakage. exceeded 15.000 gallons in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
. period. The inspectors observed that the total leakage generally exceeded this value.
Excessive leakage located in inaccessible areas such as the condenser bays, was assessed by the licensee and reoairs were generally planned for the next scheduled unit
power reduction. The inspectors observed during routine plant L
tours that there was little or no leakage for equipment in areas L
where routine corrective maintenance could be completed.
The 15.000 gallon per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> goal was established by management
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and was more conservative than the requirements in Unit 2 3rocedure 34G0-0PS-036-2N. " Locating In leakage To Radwaste."
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The inspectors observed that there was no similar l
procedure for Unit 1.
The inspectors concluded that skill of the
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craft and the use of plant drawings used by engineering and j
operations personnel was satisfactory for identifying leaks.
Engineering personnel informed the inspectors that small bore l
piping valves and Balance of Plant (B0P) piping subjected to and
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eroded by. low pressure wet steam were the two major causes of in-leakage.
The inspectors observed that the majority of leaks were on BOP equipment primarily auxiliary vents. drain, and turbine l.
extraction lines located in the condenser bay area.
The licensee stated that some piaing and valves had been replaced during recent
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refueling outages. 10 wever, other piping and valves identified for
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replacement had been postponed due to time and manpower L
constraints.
The inspectors were informed that some piping and
- valve components were planned for replacement during the u) coming refueling outage. The inspectors did not identify any lea ts that challenged safe operations of the plant. systems or components.
l The inspectors discussed the piping ' erosion / corrosion monitoring L
program with engineering personnel.
The inspectors were informed that many of the piping and valve leaks were associated with low pressure and low temperature systems and did not meet the criteria for inclusion in the monitoring program.
However, some systems had been identified for monitoring.
.The inspectors conducted a review of total radwaste in-leakage for
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1997_ and noted the average leakage exceeded the established goals (the goal for part of 1997 was 20.000 gallons per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period).
A review of the average in-leakage for a com) arable time in 1998.
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-indicated a reduction in total in-leakage.
lowever, the current goal which is 15.000 gallons per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period was generally not met.
Enclosure
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The inspectors reviewed corrective maintenance for liquid penetrant sealant leak repairs conducted by a contract company from January 1997, to present.
The inspectors observed that, the
l majority of the approximately 45 activities to repair leaks were for BOP equipment located in the condenser bay area.
The inspectors reviewed licensee activities associated with back seating two valves on the Unit 1 RCIC system due to valve leakage-.
The inspectors observed that procedure requirements were met.
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Conclusions i
The inspectors concluded that management was kept informed of the total amount of radwaste in-leakage: routinely assessed the significance of leaks and often made corrective maintenance to improve site leakage reduction a priority. Although management goals for total in-leakage were generally not met. improvements for total radwaste in-leakage for 1998 was improved from 1997.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Surveillance Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed all se portions of the fcilowing Unit 1 and Unit 2 surveillance activities:
ATTS Transmitter Channel Calibration. Rev.
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Control Rod Scram Testing. Rev. 2 34SV-E21-003-IS: Jockey Pump Operability. Rev. 3. ED 2 e
57SV-SUV-014-25: ATTS Panel 2H11-P928 Channel FT&C. Rev.
e 13. ED 1 42SV-Z41-005-05: Control Room Unit Capacity Verification.
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Rev. 7 345V-E41-002-2S: HPCI Pum) Operability. Rev. 26
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'57SV-C71-003-1S: Turbine rirst Stage Pressure Permissive e
Functional Test and Calibration. Rev. 6 For the surveillance observed, test data met 'he required acceptance' criteria, and equipment performed satisfactorily. The performance of operators, maintenance and engineering personnel conducting the surveillance was professional and competent.
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M3.2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pumo Motor High Temperature - Unit 2 (61726) (71707)
The ins-)ectors observed operations performance and reviewed a) plica)le procedures in response to a high bearing temperature on t1e 2B RHPsS4 pump motor lower guide bearing during the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) surveillance test completed on June 3.
The inspectors observed control room operators place all four RHRSW pumps in operation for torus cooling in preparation for a HPCI operability test.
During the test. annunciator. 'RHR Service Water Bearing Temperature High." actuated.
The inspectors observed that the operators responded in accordance with the a)propriate Annunciator Response Procedure (ARP).
The inspectors o) served that operators were directed to locally check cooling water, oil level, and monitor pump operation.
The inspectors reviewed the ARP and noted the alarm setpoint of 194 degrees Fahrenheit (F). and that o)erators were required to secure the pump when the lower guide 3 earing reached 205 degrees F.
The inspectors observed that o)erators continued to monitor the bearing temperature througlout the remainder of the HPCI test and the bearing temperature did not exceed 200 degrees F.
The inspectors concluded that operators correctly implemented the procedure requirements for the RHRSW pump high bearing temperature condition. The bearing temperatures observed did not affect the operability of the RHRSW pump.
This issue is discussed in more detail in Section E2.1 of this inspection report.
M3.3 Unit 1 Turbine First Staae Pressure Permissive Switches Found Out of Setooint Tolerance (62703) (62707)
The inspectors observed instrumentation and control technician actions after finding pressure instruments that provide signal inputs to the reactor protection system out of Setpoint tolerance.
Technicians performing surveillance procedure 57SV-C71-003-15.
" Turbine First Stage Pressure Permissive Functional Test &
Calibration," Rev. 6. found two of the four pressure switches out l
i of Setpoint tolerance.
The inspectors observed that the technicians immediately notified the operations shift supervisor and proceeded to perform pressure switch Setpoint adjustments.
No other deficiencies were identified.
The inspectors reviewed past surveillance data sheets and observed l
that these particular Barksdale press"re switches had a history of drifting out of setpoint tolerance.
- he inspectors noted that the surveillance frequency for the switches had 3een increased from a quarterly to monthly check to address this problem until a minor l
Enclosure
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design change (MDC) could be implemented to change out these switches with Static 0-Ring pressure switches.
The inspectors reviewed MDC package 97-5008 and observed that it was scheduled for implementation in June 1998.
The inspectors concluded that the technicians correctly used l
procedures: made careful switch manipulations; and communicated deficiencies to operations personnel.
The corrective actions planned to resolve the pressure switch setpoint drifting problem was reasonable and appropriate.
M3.4 Unit i Control Rod Scram Time Testino and Corrective Maintenance For Balance Of Plant (B0P) Leaks a.
Insoection ScoDe (62707)
The inspectors assessed operator performance during for control rod scram time testing and maintenance leak repairs.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed scram testing for selected control rods.
The scram pilot solenoid valves (SPSV) for two control rods had been replaced the previous day due to slow scram times observed during previous scram time testing.
The inspectors verified that the procedure and Technical Specification requirements were met for the work activity.
The inspectors observed that operators conducted peer checks during the selection, scramming, and withdrawal of each control rod tested. The int,pectors also verified that the operators performed the Technical Specification required overtravel test q
when withdrawing the control rod.
The operators correctly used procedures and effectively used three-part communications.
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The condenser bay work included the repair of BOP leaks and the inspection / replacement of electro-hydraulic control (EHC) servo
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strainers for the turbine valves.
The licensee discovered during the inspection of the strainers that crud buildup on some of the strainers was unacceptable.
The strainers were replaced.
Plugged strainers had caused a reactor scram and other plant challenges in the past.
The licensee believed that this problem had been corrected. The crud material observed during this inspection was sent to an off-site laboratory for analysis.
Initial indications were that the material was similar to that found several years ea" lier and will be further reviewed by the licensee.
The licensee continued to inspect the strainers on an increased frequency.
Enclosure
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l The inspectors observed that procedures were correctly used and supervisors provided oversight during the work activities.
c.
Conclusions Operator performance for the Unit 1 control rod time testing and corrective maintenance for Balance of Plant leaks was excellent as evidenced by correct. procedure usage and clear and concise communications. All Technical Specification and procedure acceptance requirements were met.
Corrective maintenance activities for the leak repairs were well-planned and implemented.
Procedures were correctly used and supervisors provided good oversight.
M3.5 Performance Durina Testina of Safety Related Eauioment (61726)
The inspectors observed operator and technician performance during
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the testing activities for the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
and the Unit 1 HPCI system.
The inspectors observed that operations aersonnel conducting the test continually used procedures.
The Slift Technical Advisor conducted almost continuous peer checks to ensure operator actions were correct and per the test procedures.
Operators made careful switch manipulations, initialed procedure steps when the steps were completed, and attended to control room annunciators. Control room supervision routinely observed operator performance and provided necessary oversight.
The inspectors concluded that operators conducting the surveillance demonstrated excellent performance for meeting procedure requirements and management ex)ectations. This was evidenced by almost continuous manipulations, procedure usage, peer chects, careful switch and supervisory oversight. All
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test procedure requirements were met.
M3.6 Review of Maintenance Activities for Plant Desian Chanaes (37551)
(62707)
The inspectors reviewed Design Change Request (DCR)94-044.
Thermal Science Incorporated (TSI) Abatement. (fire barrier material) and observed ongoing work activities by contract
personnel.
The DCR was for the installation of a new fire barrier material. The inspectors also reviewed MWO 1-98-1630 associated with installing new smoke detectors and repair and replacement of magnetic door holders on designated fire doors.
The inspectors
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I observed'that workers were sensitive to Jersonnel safety and radiological controls. The inspectors o) served that work packages l
.and procedures were at the work location.
The inspectors verified that four procedures associated with one work package were a)propriate and the correct revision. The inspectors observed tlat licensee and contract su)ervision routinely monitored ongoing work and provided oversight w1en required.
The inspectors concluded that contract personnel conducting design work activities demonstrated a good personnel safety and radiological. control attitude.
Procedures and work packages were correct and correctly used.
Licensee supervision provided appropriate oversight of the ongoing contract work activities.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92700) (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-321/98-03: Actuation Set ooints for Ventilation Radiation Monitors Set Outside Technical Soecificacions Limits This problem is discussed in Section M3.4 of-Inspection Re) ort 50-321, 366/98-02.
No new information was presented in the LER.
This item-is closed.
M8.2 (Closed) IFI 50-366/98-02-01: Review As-Found Conditions. ReDair Activities. and Post-Maintenance Testino for Valve 2E11-F031B The insoectors observed that the licensee completed packing check valve 2E11-F0318 on May 5. after the valve failed to close on
' April 24.
The completed MWO work package identified that the valve packing configuration was changed but failed to address whether or not corrosion contributed to the valve failure problem.
The inspectors discussed this observation with maintenance supervision. The inspectors were later informed that craftsmen performing the work informed maintenance supervision that corrosion was not a contributor but failed to document that conclusion.
The inspectors discussed the current valve packing configuration with maintenance and engineering personnel. The inspectors.were informed that the packing was changed to reduce the number of compression rings in the packing.
This would result in less friction and still prevent valve leakage.
The inspectors were informed that the packing for other similar check valves would be changed during future maintenance activities.
The inspectors reviewed procedure 52CM-MME-001-05. " Repacking Valves and the Adjustment of Valve packing". Rev. 13. and observed-that all procedure requirements were met.
The inspectors reviewed procedure requirements for post maintenance testing of check valves and discussed post maintenance testing requirements with Enclosure t
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l planning and control and operations personnel who routinely assign testing requirements.
Personnel demonstrated a satisfactory understanding of the testing requirements.
Based upon the inspectors' review of the licensee's actions and review of applicable procedures, the inspectors concluded that licensee actions were satisfactory.
This item is closed.
III. Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Preparations for Hot Weather Ooerations and Turbine Buildina Chiller Suooort System Wirina Problem a.
Insoection Scone (37551) (71707)
The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures and observed plant equipment performance and licensee activities associated with the potential for problems which could be caused by hot weather.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding an undersized wiring and breaker problem associated with a design change to improve hot weather operations.
b.
Observations and Findinas Due to the Unit 1 Turbine Building (TB) Chilled Water system having less than desired cooling capacity during the peak summer months. the licensee implemented a design change request (DCR) and replaced the Unit 1 Chillers.
The TB chillers are non-safety related components that are within the scope of the Maintenance Rule.
The maintenance rule assessment of the system concluded that there was no risk significance.
However the assessment identified that there was a ]otential for a reactor scram due to a Main Steam Isolation Valve (iSIV) closure on high tem]erature during the summer, if leaks occurred in the area of t1e MSIVs.
The feeder breaker for motor control center (MCC) 1R24-5006 tripped while operations personnel were running the Condensate Demineralized Backwash pump. As a result, the new 18 TB chilled water system was not available for operation.
Corporate engineering determined that a design error was made wherein the breaker trip setting and the cable sizing were not changed to
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accommodate the new load on the MCC following the implementation i
of the new TB chilled water DCR.
The inspectors discussed the design error with site and corporate licensee personnel.
The inspectors were informed that the error was discussed with the responsible engineer and the independent Enclosure
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i reviewer. The error will also be discussed at electrical group meetings. A sampling of safety related DCRs worked within the past year by the involved and other individuals would be reviewed to ensure that cable sizes and breaker settings are appropriate.
l The inspectors concluded that the design error was an isolated case.
To compensate for the design error, operations management issued an operation order specifying to only run the support equipment for the ~B" TB chiller in the event the "A" chiller trip)ed.
All loads on the MCC not supporting the ~B" TB chiller must
)e removed from service and tagged prior to energizing the required support components. The inspectors verified that operations personnel had a clear understanding.of required actions to minimize the effect of the error.
The inspectors observed the running of electrical conduit and the pulling of cabling for implementation of the DCR change.
The work was being performed correctly. The inspectors were informed that the work activity to correct the error was scheduled to be completed by June 30.
The inspectors observed that procedure requirements for hot weather operations were being met.
Licensee management routinely cautioned personnel of potential effects of hot weather problems on emergency equipment. A heightened awareness was demonstrated with respect to river level and temperature, operating temperatures of emergency equipment, temperature regulating valve response and position, and overall equipment performance.
c.
Conclusions A lack of attention to detail by corporate design engineering resulted in undersized wiring and incorrect breaker trip settings for the Motor Control Center (MCC) associated with the Turbine Building Chilled Water System on Unit 1.
As a result, the MCC lost power. Operations personnel were required to take compensatory actions to minimize the impact of the design error.
Licensee personnel effectively mitigated the potential problems due to hot weather conditions. A heightened awareness for emergency equipment operation was demonstrated.
Enclosure
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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Untimely Response to Reauest for Enaineerino Review of Residual
Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pumo Motor Bearina Temperature Issue a.
Insoection Scooe (37551)
)
The inspectors reviewed the engineering and maintenance department interface and activities in response to high bearing temperature issues with the RHRSW pump motors. Additionally, the licensee's engineering resolution process was reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed MWO 2-98-1275 which documented a problem with the 2B RHRSW motor bearing high temperature, which was attributed to less than satisfactory intake structure ventilation and air circulation in the area of the pump motor.
In discussions
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with maintenance personnel, the ins ectors discovered that Request j
for Engineering Review (RER)95-002 had been submitted to engineering in July 1995. requesting a resolution to the high bearing temperature problem.
High bearing temperatures for both the 2B and 1C RHRSW pump motors had been identified as a maintenance concern, especially during hot weather conditions when all four RHRSW pumps were in service for a particular unit. The inspectors review indicated that the high bearing temperature annunciators had actuated during recent High Pressure Coolant Injection system testing.
The current annunciator procedures required operators to make local checks of the equipment in an attempt to identify the cause of the problem.
The )rocedure required that the pump be removed from service if t1e bearing temperature increased to a predetermined setpoint.
The inspectors observed that operators made the required checks and were not aware of any time that a pump was required to be removed from service.
The inspectors reviewed the RER response provided to maintenance in May 1998. The response did not include any evaluation and did not address the ventilation issue, but instead attributed the problem to " stuck open louvers." and problems with an intake structure exhaust ventilation fan. Maintenance department Jersonnel were not satisfied with the response and resubmitted the RER for disposition.
l The inspectors reviewed procedure DI-ENG-01-0184N. " Processing j
Requests for Engineering Review / Assistance." Rev. 1.
Step 4.1.6 of the procedure recuires, in part, that RERs be processed in a l
" timely manner." anc that if responses cannot be provided in a Enclosure
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" reasonable time (30 days)." an interim response on the status of the RER will be made via memo.
The 3rocedure did not provide specific guidance on timeliness of RER responses.
No interim l
responses on the status of RER 95-0027 had either been requested or provided during the three-year period that the RER was being dispositioned.
The inspectors reviewed a selection of 3ending RERs submitted by the maintenance department, and found t1em to be between 6-months and 2-years old. Although none of the RERs related to problems l
with critical or safety-related equipment. (except for the RHRSW pump) no documentation existed providing status of these RERs The inspectors examined the current engineering backlog of RERs.
Of the 29 outstanding RERs.14 were over one year old, including the recently resubmitted RHRSW pump RERs.
The inspectors discussed the backlog and process with the engineering manager and the RHR system engineer.
The inspectors were informed that the RHRSW pump RER had been overlooked.
Typically. RERs were left to the individual system engineers to evaluate and respond per their own schedules.
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The inspectors reviewed GE Nuclear Energy Letter No. JSM18-49.
dated August 25. 1993, which first evaluated the acceptability of i
increasing the RHRSW pump motor bearing temperature setpoint and the reliability of the motors during operations at high ambient temperature.
Recommendations to reduce motor and bearing temperatures included replacing exhaust ventilation screens with
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screens of higher. air flow capacity or installation of an external i
air deflector. The inspectors observed that these recommendations had never Nen implemented, but that maintenance engineers had requesi.ed an evaluation of the acce)tability of modifying the missile barrier that separates the Jivision I and II RHRSW pumas to facilitate improved air circulation for the pump motors. T1is recuest was included in the resubmittal of RER 95-0027.
rece.signated as RER 98-0025. dated June 11. 1998.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors determined. that although the Request for Engineering Review (RER) process was in place. it was not rigorously implemented.
RERs were not consistently tracked by departments. The disposition of RERs was not thoroughly controlled by the engineering department, nor was the status of RERs communicated to requesting departments. The inspectors identified i
this as a weakness in the. implementation of the RER process and untimely response to resolve equipment deficiencies.
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) IFI 50-321. 366/97-12-04: Review of IST Basis for PSW Makeuo Valves to Soent Fuel Pool.
Aaditional reviews by Nuclear Safety and Compliance (NSAC)
personnel determined that the valves were not required to be in the In Service Testing (IST) program because they did not perform
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a specific function in shutting down the reactor to the cold shutdown condition or mitigating the consequences of an accident as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
The ins)ectors reviewed Chapter 14 of the Unit 1 UFSAR and Chapter 15 of t1e Unit 2 UFSAR to verify the rationale used by NSAC for determining that the valves were not required to be in the IST program.
Based upon the UFSAR review, the inspectors concluded that NSAC's rationale was reasonable.
As a good engineering practice. NSAC recommended that the valves be periodically tested to ensure operability.
This recommendation will be implemented and the inspectors reviewed a draft copy of procedure 34SV-G41-002-0S. " Fuel Pool Makeup Valve Test.~ The inspectors verified that there was a testing requirement for each of the PSW makeup valves.
Based upon the inspectors' review of the licensee's actions, this item is closed, j
E8.2 (Closed) DEV 50-366/97-10-04: Missed Commitment For Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 132.
The licensee responded to this deviation in correspondence dated December 12. 1997. The licensee's corrective actions included system and component testing and review and subsequent revision to IST Program drawings.
Based upon the inspectors' review of the licensee's actions. this item is closed.
IV Plant Support i
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls RI.1 Observation of Routine Radiological Controls (71750)
i General health physics (HP) activities were observed during the report period.
This included locked high radiation area doors, proper radiological posting, and personnel frisking upon exiting the Radiological Control Area (RCA). The inspectors made frequent tours of the RCA and discussed radiological controls with HP technicians and HP management.
Minor deficiencies were discussed with licensee management and supervisory personnel.
Enclosure
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R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Radiological Protection and i
Chemistry Controls
R4.1 Review of Radworker Control Deficiencies and Licensee Actions For Improvement a.
Inspection Scooe (71750) (92904)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding a deficiency when two maintenance workers failed to update the radiological work permit (RWP) computer prior to entering a high radiation area to perform work.
The inspectors assessed licensee immediate corrective actions for this problem and discussed long range corrective actions for improvements.
b.
Observations and Findings On June 9 operations had reduced hydrogen injection on Unit 1 in 3 reparation to perform a RCIC operability surveillance.
maintenance personnel made preparations to enter the condenser bay area to look for and assess leakage while the hydrogen injection flow rate was reduced.
Two workers attem]ted to use the RWP computer system to log on the correct hig1 radiation area RWP.
Since the workers had not used the RWP in 1998, the log in was not successful.
The computer system displayed a message for the workers to contact Health Physics (HP). The workers correctly used the general RWP and proceeded to the HP department office.
The HP staff assisted the workers with the correct briefing and com)leted the required actions for the condenser bay entry. The worcers, with HP personnel as escort, completed the condenser bay work activities.
When exiting the condenser bay area, the workers observed that their digital alarming dosimetry (DAD) was in alarm.
At that time the workers realized that they had failed to log off the general RWP and log on the high radiation area RWP. The DAD was set to be more conservative for the general area RWP: however, the dose rate for the condenser bay area was in excess of that for the general area.
The inspectors reviewed the 3roblem and verified that all necessary actions to enter tie condenser bay were complett j with the exception of updating the computer.
The required briefing was conducted, radiological surveys were discussed, work requirements and work location, as well as stay times in the area were discussed.
HP accompanied the workers during the time spent in the condenser bay area. The inspectors reviewed dose records and l
concluded that the dose received by the workers was not excessive i
for the work performed in the area. A review of the statements l
made by the workers involved indicated that the workers forgot to l
l Enclosure
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change to the correct RWP.
The inspectors reviewed and verified the licensee's immediate corrective actions. The actions included a stop work for each department. One inspector attended a department stop work meeting and observed that the meeting communicated managements expectations for radiation worker performance: included a review of recent deficiencies and overall performance: and presented an explanation of more significant changes that were to occur in the radiation protection program.
Additional corrective actions and program changes included the following:
Access to the radiological controlled area (RCA) was
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temporarily removed for the individuals involved Informational meetings were held with HP personnel to
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discuss the problem in detail A problem solving team reviewed the issue and briefed senior
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site management Three entry points to the RCA were closed and HP personnel
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were stationed at all remainir.g RCA entry points Additionally, the licensee was still in the process of implementing corrective actions for a violation issued in December 1997. when personnel used the incorrect RWP.
The actions being implemented were a continuation of numerous quality checks, observations by HP management, and working more closely with other departments to ensure workers were aware of radworker requirements
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and expectations. The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions for the previous violation would not have reasonably i
prevented this problem.
This failure to follow procedure for signing in on an incorrect RWP was identified as a minor violation that was not subject to formal enforcement action in accordance with NUREG-1600. " Enforcement Policy." Rev. 1.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that licensee management demonstrated an increased awareness and sensitivity to a recent deficiency in radworker practices associated with the incorrect use of a radiological work permit.
The licensee's immediate actions, such as a stop work for each department, and increased emphasis on radworker expectations and performance, were prompt and thorough to ensure immediate improvements.
Enclosure
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R7 Quality Assurance in Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R7.1 Review of Personnel Contamination Reports a.
Insoection Scope (71750) (92904)
The inspectors reviewed procedure 62RP-RAD-004-05, " Personnel Decontamination." Rev. 9, and assessed licensee actions to complete Personnel Contamination Reports (PCR).
b.
Insoection Findinas The procedure required that a PCR be completed for all contamination events which involve intakes of radioactive material or for other contamination events which involve levels greater
than or equal to 10.000 disintegrations per minute (dpm).
The I
purpem of the PCR is to document the event. identify root cause and reuummend corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
The inspectors reviewed eight PCRs dated between March 20 and May 21. 1998, to assess the detail, content, and recommended corrective actions. The inspectors observed that the PCR form was generally completed in detail.
However, there was one example where data was missing from the PCR and no corrective actions were recommended. Additionally, specific facts surrounding some contamination events were not clear and concise.
Some PCRs did not always identify what corrective actions were recommended to other departments that had personnel involved in the contamination event.
The inspectors observed that the procedure required page two of the PCR to be completed under certain circumstances when a follow-up investigation was necessary.
For seven of the eight PARS reviewed by the inspectors, page two was completed even though it was not required by procedure.
The inspectors observed that completing page two provided a more in-depth view of the circumstances surrounding the contamination event.
Overall, the inspectors observed improvement in the quality of the PER reports.
The inspectors discussed the PARS with Health Physics (HP)
supervision.
The inspectors were informed that most of the personnel responsible for completing PARS had not received any training in root cause and corrective action analysis.
This was discussed with HP management.
Enclosure i
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Conclusions
.The inspectors concluded that some PARS were not thorough and detailed and some corrective actions were not identified to other involved departments.
Personnel assigned to complete the PARS were not' trained for root cause'and corrective action analysis.
R7.2 Review of licensee Contamination Control Self Assessment (71750)
(40500)
Between May 4-8. the licensee conducted a contamination control self assessment. The team consisted of five personnel from facilities within and outside the Hatch organization. The assessment was requested from HP management in an effort to improve the contamination control program.
The inspectors attended the self assessment team debriefing. The inspectors observed that the assessment team and detailed review of contamination control. conducted a thorough practices. Team members demonstrated an excellent understanding of HP practices and requirements.
The team presented to site management findings, i
conclusions, and recommendations for improvement. The inspectors reviewed action' items and observed that some recommendations were implemented almost immediately and others were being scheduled for implementation. Other recommendations were being reviewed for possible future implementation.
R8 Miscellaneous RP&C Issues R8.1 (00en)-Insoector Follow-uo Item (IFI) 50-321. 366/98-01-07: Review of May-June 1998 Main Control Room Ventilation Coolina Caoacity-Test.Results and Evaluate Material Condition of System Comoonents.
This IFI identified two issues for further review: (1) a review of the system cooling capacity test results: and (2) review of improvements to the material condition of the Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) system.
Regarding issue (1). the inspectors reviewed the results from surveillance test 42SV-Z41-005-0S. " Main Control Room Unit Capacity Verification." Rev.1. conducted June 9.1998.
Based on a review of the test results, this portion of the IFI is closed.
Regarding issue (2), a minor design change (MDC) and MWO have been
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initiated to effect necessary repairs to the MCREC system L
ductwork.
This IFI will remain open pending implementation of i
these repairs.
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Enclosure
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S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment (71750)
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The inspectors toured the protected area and observed that the perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by erosion nor disrepair.
The fence fabric was secured and barbed wire was angled as required by the licensee's PSP.
Isolation zones were maintained on both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which could shield or conceal an individual.
The inspectors observed personnel and packages entering the protected area were searched either by special purpose detectors or by a physical patdown for firearms, explosives and contraband.
Badge issuance was observed, as was the processing and escorting of visitors.
Vehicles were searched, escorted and secured as described in applicable procedures.
The inspectors concluded that the areas of security inspected met the applicable requirements.
F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities F1.2 Review of Selected Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) Requirements a.
Insoection Scooe (71750)
The inspectors reviewed FHA requirements for selected inoperable fire protection equipment / barriers and the identification and completion of compensatory measures.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors verified that the requirements of the FHA were being met for equipment and barriers that were determined to be inoperable or degraded. The required Fire Action Statements (FAS)
were entered and appropriate compensatory measures were established.
The inspectors reviewed procedure 31G0-0PS-011-0S. " FHA Operating Requirements." Rev 2. and verified that the procedural requirements were met for documenting FASs and fire watch requirements.
The ins)ectors reviewed the applicable sections of the FHA and verified tlat the requirements were correctly implemented by the procedure.
The operations department recently transferred all fire watch duties from plant equipment operators to contract personnel.
One of the inspectors accompanied an individual assigned to fire watch duties on a fire watch tour.
The inspector observed that the
l individual was knowledgeable of the duties and responsibilities of l
the fire watch position.
The individual was knowledgeable of l
early fire detection techniques and the required process for Enclosure
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reporting a detected fire. The inspectors verified that the fire watch tour encompassed all the areas identified as having inoperable or degraded fire equipment or barriers.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the Fire Hazards Analysis requirements for inoperable or degraded fire equipment and
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barriers were correctly implemented.
The assigned contract fire
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watch was knowledgeable of fire watch duties and responsibilities.
V. Manaaement Meetinas l
X.1 Review of UFSAR Commitments While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the
i inspectors' reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the~ areas inspected.
The inspectors verified that the
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UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters.
X.2 Other NRC Personnel On Site
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From May 5 through May 7. Mr. L. 01shan NRR Project Manager-Hatch.
visited the site to perform an audit of the licensee's commitment tracking program.
J X.3 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to 'cmbers of
licensee management at the conclusion of the inspecuon on June 30, 1998. The license acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Anderson J. Unit Superintendent Betsill. J., Assistant General Manager - Operations Breitenbach. K., Engineering Support Manager - Acting Curtis. S., Unit Superintendent Davis. D.. Plant Administration Manager l
Fornel. P., Performance Team Manager
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Fraser. 0.. Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor Hammonds. J., Operations. Support Superintendent Kirkley. W., Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Lewis J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager Enclosure
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Madison. D., Operations Manager l
Moore. C.. Assistant General Manager - Plant Support J
l; Reddick. R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator l
Roberts. P.
Outages and Planning Manager Thompson, J.
Nuclear Security Manager.
Tipps. S... Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager l
Wells. P., General Manager - Nuclear Plant INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
.IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 40500:
. Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in l
Identifying. Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62703:
Maintenance Observations j
IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations i
IP-71707:
P1 ant Operations IP 71750:
Plant. Support Activities IP 92700:
Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Power Reactor Facilities l-IP 92901:
Followup - Operations IP-92902:
Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance IP 92903:
Followup - Followup Engineering IP 92904:
Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-366/98-03-01 NCV Concurrent Unavailability of Maintenance Rule Containment Systems (Section 04.3).
Closed 50-321. 366/97-05-01 VIO Failure To Follow Procedure -
Multiple Examples (Section 08.1).
50-321. 366/97-09-01 VIO Failure To Follow Procedure -
Multiple Examples. (Section 08.2).
50-321/97-10-02 VIO Failure to Meet Technical Specification Requirements
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Prior to Withdrawal of a Control Rod While in Cold Shutdown (Section 08.3).
l Enclosure l
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l 50-321/98-003 LER Actuation Set points for Ventilation Radiation Monitors Set Outside Technical Specifications Limits (Section M8.1).
50-366/98-02-01 IFI Review As-Found Conditions, Repair Activities, and Post-Maintenance Testing for 2E11-F031B (Section M8.2).
50-321.366/97-12-04 IFI Review of IST Basis for PSW Makeup Valves to Spent Fuel Pool (Section E8.1)
50-366/97-10-04 DEV Missed Commitment For Unit 2 Technical Specification
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Amendment 132 (Section E8.2).
Discussed 50-321, 366/98-01-07 IFI Review of May-June 1998 Main Control Room Ventilation Cooling Capacity Test Results and Evaluate Material Condition of System Components
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(Section R8.1).
Enclosure
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