IR 05000321/1990004

Insp Repts 50-321/90-04 & 50-366/90-04 on 900226-0302 & 12-16.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Observation of Work & Work Activities & Review of Radiographs

ML20034B024
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	04/10/1990
From:	Blake J, Chou R, Coley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20034B021	List: IR 05000321/1990004
References
50-321-90-04, 50-321-90-4, 50-366-90-04, 50-366-90-4, NUDOCS 9004250224
Download: ML20034B024 (12)

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UNITE 3 ST ATES,

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON

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REGION 11

,f 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.:

50-321/90-04 and 50-366/90-04 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295

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Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Hos.:

50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.:

DPR-57 and NPF-5

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Facility Name: Hatch I and 2 Inspection Conducted: February 26. March'2 and March 12-16, 1990

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Inspectors:

%. 3 i ha-Jtu 4-7 OO l

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J. L@., ~dL 4A4

q Date Signed-R.

Date igned Approve by:

Y /8 70 Jer f. Blake, Chief Date Signed Ma 61s and Processes Section

En neering Branch l

Division of Reactor Safety l

r SUMMARY

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Scope:

.i This routine unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of inservice inspection-observation of work and work activities.. review of radiographs, visual inspection of snubbers, and review cf licensee corrective actions on

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previous inspection findings and NRC open items.

Results:

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l GeorgiaPowercompany(GPC)andSouthernCompanyServices(SCS)Managementwere

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l observed involved in assuring quality. Technical issues were resolved

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effectively when personnel cognizant of the resolution were contacted by the nondestructive test examiners.

Corrective actions on previous NRC open item were satisfactorily addressed.

However, one concern was addressed-by the inspectors which dealt with the methods use to measure snubber settings.

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different organizations are responsible.for taking snubber setting

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measurements at Hatch and each organization is recording different settings for the same snubber.

The data recorded by each organization is evaluated-by a

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single snubber engineer who was absent when the inspector-discovered the inconsistencies in measurements.

This matter was reported as unresolved item

50-321, 366/90-04-01 and is discussed in further detail in paragraph 2.c.(2) of

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this report.

l Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not identified.

l 9004250224 900419 PDR ADOCK 05000321

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

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Licensee Employees

• C. Blair,. Senior Quality Assurance Engineer

• G. Brinson, Quality Control' Supervisor

• E. Burkett, Project Engineer Supervisor

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• C. Dixon, Acting Quality Assurance Manager i

• P. Fornel, Manager, Maintenance

• G. Goode, Manager, Engineering ans Support

• J. Hammonds, Supervisor, Nuclear Safety and Compliance

• T. Moore Assistant General M Nager, Plant Support

• H. Nix, General Manager, Ple'at Hatch

• L. Sumner, Assistant Generhi Manager, Plant Operations

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• S. Tipps, Manager Nuclear Safety and Compliance

• R. Zavadoski, Manager, Health Physics and Chemistry Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included

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craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

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Other Organizations SouthernCompanyServices(SCS)

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• B. Epps, Manager, Inspection and Testing Services

• R. Healey, Nondestructive Examination Level III

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• A. Maze, Nondestructive Examination Supervisor

• J. Reynolds, Senior Engineer

• D.Swann,InserviceInspection(ISI) Engineer

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NRC Resident Inspector

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• J. Menning, Senior Resident Inspector l

• Attended exit interview

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2.

Inservice Inspection' ( 51) - Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753)-UnitI The inspectors observed ISI work and work activities to determine whether examinations performed on Classes 1,

2, and 3 pressure retaining components and their supDorts were conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications, the applicable ASME Code, correspondence between NRR and the licensee concerning relief requests, and requirements imposed by NRC/ industry initiatives.

The applicable Code for Unit 1 -inservice examinations was ASME Section XI (80W81).

Various applications of three different inservice examination methods were observed by the inspectors on the welds and components delineated below.

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Volumetric Examination of Welds Using the Manual (A-Scan) Ultrasonic Method i

The inspectors observed General Electric (GE) ultrasonic test examiners perform instrument calibrations. and weld examinations on

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the following ASME Class 1 pressure retaining welds:

Weld Number System Coments Size IE21-1CS-108-8 Core Spray None 10 inch Diameter IE21-1CS-108-10 Core Spray

_See note *1 10 inch Diameter

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IB31-1RC-288-10 Recirculation See note *2 28 inch Diameter i

IB31-1RC-288-8 Recirculation.

See note *3 28 inch Diameter

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• Note 1 The examination observed by the inspectors was an extremely limited examination due-to the valve that was on one side of the

weld and a pipe support that had not been removed for the

examination on the other side of the weld.

The inspectors were i

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later informed by the SCS Level III Examiner-that the pipe

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support would be removed and the weld re-examined.

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• Note 2 The examination of this weld was in accordance with NUREG 0313, Rev. 2, Weld Category F.

Category F welds are welds.with known

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l cracks that either have not been repaired-or the repair overlay -

is inadequate.

Ultrasonic examination is_ required every

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l refueling outage for Catergory F welds..

The ultrasonic examinatior, observed by the inspectors revealed significant

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crack growth since the previous ultrasonic examination and makes this weld an excellent candidate for a repair weld overlay.

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• Note 3 This is a NUREG 0313, Category F weld.

Eight new cracks were detected during the ultrasonic examination of this weld.

The cracks have significant through-wall dimensions making this weld a candidate for a repair weld overlay.

The licensee has presently completed the ultrasonic examinations for all nine Category F welds on Unit 1.

These examinations revealed

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that at least 4 of the welds exhibited significant crack growth which will necessitate their repair by overlay welding. All of these welds-

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had received induction heat stress improvement in 1985 and Unit I has

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operated since the previous outage with hydrogen chemistry installed.

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During the calibrations and examination of the welds listed above.Ethe inspectors observed that the examination procedure was being followed verbatim and that the examiners observed were knowledgeable of the

examination methods and operation of the test equipaent.

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In addition, the inspectors reviewed personnel qualification and certification records for all of the SCS and GE examiners. Material and equipment certifications for all methods of inservice examination were also verified, b.

Surface Examination of Welds Using the Magnetic Particle Method of Examination The inspectors observed GE Magnetic particle examiners conduct weld examinations on the following ASME Class 1 pressure retaining welds.

Weld No System Size Configuration IE21-1CS-10B-5 Core Spray 10 inch Dia.

Pipe to Elbow

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1E21-1CS-10B-8 Core Spray 10 inch Dia.

Valve to Elbow 1E21-1CS-10B-10 Core Spray 10 inch Dia.

Pipe to Valve The inspector observed that the examinations were bang conducted in accordance with SCS examination procedure No. MT-8-500, Rev. 4, and that the examiners were knowledgeable of the examination method and operation of the test equipment.

c.

Visual Examination of In-vessel Components, Component Supports and Other Components Listed in ASME Section XI (1) The inspectors observed the in-vessel visual examinations of the following reactor vessel internal components:

Jet Pumps No.17 thru No.20 Riser Brace Arm to Riser and

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s Vessel Welds Jet Pumps No.17 thru No. 20 Inlet Mixer Areas and Nozzles

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The above examinations were performed utilizing remote cameras from the bridge crane platform.

Evaluation of the components and camera position was done via portable monitors which also stayed on the platform.

Visual Examination Procedure No.

VT-H-755, Rev. 1, was used to conduct the above examination and was being followed verbatim during the inspectors' observations.

(2) The inspectors observed visual examinations of the pipe supports (mechanical, hydraulic, and welded) listed below to determine the

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effectiveness of the examination methods:

Support Numbg Discrepancies / Comments 1E11-RHRH-96 None 1E11-RHRH-285 None t

1E11-RHRH-286A See Note Below i-(

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l IE11-RHRH-286B See Note Below i

i 1E11-RHRH-287 None IE11-RHRH-292 See Note Below 1E11-RHRH-293 None 1E11-RHRH-294 None i

1E11-RHRH-295 None

IE11-RHRH-296 None IP41-ISH-27 None

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IP41-ISH-28 None IP41-ISH-34 None t

IP41-SWH-206 None

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IP41-ISK-75 None

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IP41-SWH-211.

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Note:

The inspectors observed that the licensee's ISI examiners e

measured and recorded the snubber stroke as a maximum opening between the face of the gland and the top edge of the attachment that engaged the threaded portion of the main shaft.

This method of measurement was in accordance

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with the ISI examination procedure which also required that the recorded data be sent to the snubber engineer for

evaluation.

However, during visual inspections of snubber

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maintenance per the plant technical specification the inspectors had noted that the maintenance group measured the snubber stroke from the face of.the gland to a stenciled reference mark and then substracted 3/4 inch to obtain the correct setting.

The snubber maintenance group had also informed the inspectors that plant Hatch used three types of hydraulic snubbers from three different manufacturers and each manufacturer referenced different measurements for stroke length.

The inspectors then went

to Quality Control (QC) and asked the QC supervisor and a QC visual examiner how they measured snubber stroke.

Their measurements were taken from the face of the gland to the reference line.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee

has three different organizations taking measurements on identical snubbers and assigning different values to the stroke setting.

However, the results are sent to the same person (the snubber engineer) for evaluation.

The snubber

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engineer was absent during the inspectors' visit and,.

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therefore, insight as to how he performs his evaluation with the data provided could not be confirmed.

Pending resolution by the licensee and the inspectors', this item

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will be identified as Unresolved Item 50-321,366/90-04-01, i

" Hydraulic Snubber Stroke Measurements."

(3) The ' inspectors also observed the visual examinations of the following reactor vessel head closure washers.

Washer No.

Washer No.

21

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17

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The above examinations were performed in accordance with SCS

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Visual Procedure VT-H-710 R-2 by GE visual examiners.

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Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

3.

Revicw of Radiographic Film, Unit 2 (57090)

The inspectors reviewed radiographic film and associated records for welding performed during the previous Unit 2 outage.

This review was conducted to determine the quality of the radiographs-and the quality of welding at the Hatch Facility.

The licensee's radiographic procedure was used to evaluate the film quality, radiographic technique, and the weld acceptance for the welds listed below:

Component Weld No.

Class Maintenance Work Order 2E51 FW-2

2-88-3560 2E51 FW-3

2-88-3560 2T23X8 6-1 NE 2-89-5967 6-2

2T23X8 5-A-1 NE 2-89-5967 5-A-2

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5-B-1 5-8-2

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2T23X8 7-A-1 NE 2-89-5967 7-A-2 7-B-1 7-B-2 2T23X9A 3-1 NE 2-89-5670 3-2 7-A-1 7-A-2 7-B-1 7-B-2 2T23X9A-1 5-A-1 NE 2-89-5670 5-A-2 5-B-1 5-B-2 2T23X9A-1 4-1 NE 2-89-5670 4-2 2T23X9A-1 6-1 NE 2-89-5670 6-2 2T23X9A-1 3-3 NE 2-89-5670 Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

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4.

Testing of Piping Supports and Restraint Systems - Unit 1 Snubber InspectionandObservation(70370)

Per Section 4.6.L of the Technical Specification, each snubber shall be demonstrated operable by performance of visual inspections and functional tests during each refueling outage.

All saf ety-related snubbers shall tu!

visually examined to verify snubber operability.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, a representative sample of 10' percent of the total of each type (hydraulic or mechanical) of safety-related snubber in use in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or bench tested.

Plant Hatch Unit I has approximately 440 snubbers in safety-related piping systems of which 270 are hydraulic snubbers and 170 are mechanical snubbers.

Two surveillance procedures are used for visual inspection and functional tests:

Document Numbers 52SV-SUV-001-1S, Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestor Inspection and Functional Test, Rev. 4, and 52SV-SUV-004-1S, Inspection and Testing Pacific Scientific Mechanical Snubbers, Rev. 1.

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_ Snubber Inspection The licensee had completed the visual inspections on all snubbers.

Approximately eight snubbers have minor problems such as the requirement of washers for gap, cotter pin replacement, etc. - To date,18 out of the 25 snubbers required to have functional tests, i

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had been functionally tested, with one failing the test.

The inspectors conducted independent-visual verifications of nine

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snubbers selected ct random.

All were hydraulic snubbers. These

verifications were conducted in order to evaluate the adequacy of the

surveillance procedures being used by the licensec and to assess the-information being reported by the examiners.

The inspectors'

examination generally agreed with the findings of the visual

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examiners.

Listed below are the component supports verified by the j

inspectors:

Support No.

Snubber. Series Capacity (Kips)

I 1E11-RHR-H213 Hatch-248

1E11-RHR-H216 Hatch-251

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IE11-RHR-H217 Hatch-148

l IE11-RHR-H226 Hatch-150

1E11-RHR-H227 Hatch-271

1E11-RHR-H228 Hatch-222

IE11-RHR-H229 Hatch-94

1E21-CSH-57 Hatch-200

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1E21-CSH-71 2500-10-463 10-b.

Snubber Functional Test Observation Twenty Seven hydraulic snubbers and 17 mechanical snubbers were i

initially required to have functional tests for this refueling

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outage.

To date,16 hydraulic snubbers and 8 mechanical snubbers have been functionally tested with one hydraulic snubber failing the test.

The inspectors observed a functional test demonstration.

The test machine was a Bergen-Paterson 25000 MK4, Serial No. 25000-019, with a calibratic., expiration date of August 28,_1991.

The machine can test for low Load, High Load, Low Velocity, High Velocity, and Drag Load. The test procedures are as follows:

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Load computer load disc for as-found (removed from field) or

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rebuilt (ready to be installed in the field) computer program.

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Calibrate machine to check the machine and computer readings

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within the tolerances.

The calibration is good for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />

'l continuing operation.

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Record room temperature, j

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Compression test for stroke to bottom.

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Drag test for tension force.

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i Drag test for compression force,

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Activation test for tension force and acceleration (or velocity).

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Activation test for compression force and acceleration.

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Return snubber to cold condition.

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The test results were compared to acceptance" criteria.

The

inspectors reviewed the functional test documents for the following i

supports:

t Support No.

Snubbar Series Capacity (Size), Kips

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IG31-SM-5 29883 PSA-3

IC11-CRD-H130A 13016 PSA-3

1821-109-H010 Hatch-209

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IE41-MS-SS-8 Hatch-20b

l 1E11-RHR-SMI 2500-50-198

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PSA-3 means capacity 3 kips for mechanical snubber.

The rest

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are hydraulic snubbers.

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Within the areas inspected, violations and deviations were not observed.

5.

Licensee'sActionsonPreviousInspectionFindings(92701&92702)

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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 50-321/88-38-04, Piping System Modification Completion for IEB 79-14

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(1) Status

The licensee will complete all the modifications for the

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approximately 185 remaining pipe-supports during the current

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refueling outage. Eighty five pipe supports will be completed in inaccessible areas such as the drywell.

The restart schedule for Plant Hatch 1 is June 1,1990.

All documentation, such

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as calculation revisions, drawing incorporations and revisions,

and the final summary report will be completed by end of 1990.

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e (2) Walkdown Reinspection To check the licensee performance on the pipe support modifications which were completed since the.last outage (including this outage)',

l the inspectors randomly selected 21 pipe supports which were accepted-by the licensee'> QC inspection. The.21 pipe supports include 15. in accessible areas and 6 in inaccessible areas.-

The'walkdown i

reinspection was completed with-the assistance of the licensee's engineers and QC inspectors._ The supports were partially reinspected

against their detail drawings for configuration. identification, fastener / anchor installation, member size, weld sizes, component l-identification numbers, dimensions, rust, maintenance, and damage /

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Listed below, 'are the supports which were. verified" is during the walkdown reinspection.

All-inspected supports were

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acceptabb except P41-SWH-228 which was found to have a-different base pletc size than indicated on the drawing.

The licensee issued a FCR to correct the problem ~ before ; the ' end of'

inspection.

Rev.

Accesible Condition.

Support No.

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During Operation Discrepancies / comments E21-CSH-63

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None E51-RCSEH-25 C

Yes None

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P41-F68-H800 A

Yes None.

P41-F68-H803 A

Yes --

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P41-SWH-177 B

Yes None--

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s P41-SWH-180B, B

Yes

.None P41-SWH-228 B

Yes-Item.4, base plate

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size, was 7/8" X 7" X 18

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5 1/8" and drawing showed-7/8" X /" X l'-6" FCR N0. 81-058-410

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was issued to-.

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corrected-the:

prob'l em.

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P41-SWH-238 B

Yes None I

P41-SWH-250 B

Yes None.

P41-SWH-251 B

Yes None.

P41-SWH-701 B

Yes None

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10 P52-F787-M1 C

Yes None (DataPoint710)

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H PS2-F787-H2 C

Yes None (DataPoint685)

PS2--F787-H2 C

Yes None (DataPointL18)

P52-RB1H-222A A

Yes None B21-F1-H004 C

No None-D31-102-H005'

A No None E41-SS-20 A

No None P41-SWH-137 A

No-None P41-SWH-162A A

No None P41-SWH-163A B

No None-(3) Calculation Reviewed

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Five pipe support design calculations were partially reviewed and'

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evaluated for thoroughness,, clarity, consistency, and accuracy.

In-p general, the design calculations were of good quality.

The

^f calculations contain the loading data, calculation and analysis, computer input and output, and~ base plate analysis input and output.-

The calculations reviewed were for support = Nos.1E11-RHR-H800,-

1E21-CSH-63, IE51-RCSEH-25, IP41-SWH-66, and 1P41-SWH-238.

b.

(Closed) Deviation 50-321, 366/88 18-02, Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System

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Thit, matter concerned the four.origi_nal sensors used for alarm i

setting-(annunciation). instead of 11 new sensors required by Plant,-

ci Unique 1 Analysis Report (PUAR) = for-Plant Hatch. ~ The four original sensors are located at the 0*, 90", 180, and.270* locations of the suppression pool for bulk temperature monitoring and weresinstalled-and connected to-the control room for display'and alarm setting

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during original construction. The 11-new sensors were designed andL l

installed per the PUAR for Mark I, Containment Modification. GThe-11-

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new sensors were connected to the control room-for display, but were not used for alarm setting. The four. original sensors which were not

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mentioned.in the PUAR were continuously used for alarm setting. The.

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suppression pool bulk temperature monitoring (system with alarm

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setting is required by NUREG-0661.

The -inspectors reviewed the response letter HL-330, dated February 21, 1990, and other

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information provided and discussed the alarm setting problem with

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the licensee's engineers and NRR.-

NRR agreed with the. licensee's

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proposal to use all 15 sensors-to establish the bulk pool temperature per Meeting Summary of Memorandum for-Director,- Project Directorate II-3, from Hatch Project Manager dated April 6,1989.

Discussions-held with the licensee's engineers and NRR,. reveal that whether the alarm settingtwould be based on all 15 sensors or just the four original sensors was probably not discussed: during the meeting.

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The licensee agreed 'that the four original sensors do not read a true bulk pool temperature per Enclosure 1~ of the above response to the deviation and the average of four sensors is 10*F lower-than the'

average of 11 sensors per Enclosure 1 of the-Request,to-Revise-Technical Specifications:

Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring dated January 26, 1990 (Letter No. HL-911). Therefore, the continued.

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use of the four original sensors to set the alarm could_not represent j

the true bulk-temperature in the suppression pool and the basis for

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technical specification.

NRR -agreed to review the alarm setting

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problem.

Region II send a Memorandum to NRR and requested 'an i

adequacy determination of the ' alarm setting based.on-the' four j

original sensors for suppression pool bulk temperature during their i

review of Plant Hatch Request to Revise Technical Specification:

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Supprescion Pool Temperature Monitoring, dated January 26, 1990.-

c.

(0 pen) Violation 50-321, 366/88-31-01,. Failure to Adequately Control

Special Processes For Welding and Nondestructive. Testing

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This violation dealt with 11 exanples of nondestructive testing-.

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or welding discrepancies / program yeaknesses, which indicated that-y special processes were not adequately being controlled.

During this inspection,.9 of the items in the licensee's response-were verified as being satisfactorily completed. However, Item I in theilicensee's

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i response indicated that an evaluation would be performed to: determine i

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what long term actions could be taken to improve welding controls.

This evaluation will not be completed until the end of:the present

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outage on Unit 1.

In addition, Item 7 of the response required that y

additional radiography be performed on a residual heat removal'(RHR)

limit switch weld (FW-3). This radiography is also1 scheduled to be performed during the present outage.

Satisfactory completion of the licensee's two outstanding items will be addressed during a

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subsequent inspection.

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Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

6.

Exit Interview i

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l The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 12, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspectors described the--

J areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.

Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

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(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-121, 366/90 04-01, " Hydraulic Snubber Stroke

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Measurements" (paragraph 2.c(2))

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