IR 05000321/1997008
| ML20211K614 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211K612 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-97-08, 50-321-97-8, 50-366-97-08, 50-366-97-8, NUDOCS 9710090302 | |
| Download: ML20211K614 (20) | |
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~ U!l',. - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II-Docket No:
50-321 _50-366 License No:~
50-321/97-08 and'50-366/97-08'
Licensee:.
Southern Nuclear __ Operating-Company. INC.
Facility:
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear. Plant.
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-Location:-
-11030 Hatch. Pkwy N
--Baxley, GA 31513 Dates:
August 18-22. 1997-Inspectors:
-W.--Sartor. Exercise Team Leader R. Hannah. Assistant Public Affairs-Officer J. Kreh.. Radiation Specialist-N. Stinson, Radiation Specialist
. Approved by:
K. Barr Chief. Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety.:
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9710090302 971003 PDR ADOCK 05000321
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/97-08 AND 50-366/97-08 This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant. This NRC/ FEMA evaluated exercise was a plume exposure exercise fully participated in by the Risk Counties and partially participated in by the State of Georgia.
The exercise was conducted on August 20. 1997 from 8:00 a.m. until 12:36 p.m.
This report summarized the observations of the four-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness program as the utility implemented its Emergency Plan and Procedures. The NRC evaluators observed licensee response from the Control Room Simulator (CRS) the Technical Support Center, the Emergency Operations F6c411ty (E0F), and the Emergency News Center.
From the performance observed.
the evaluators concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to implement the Hatch Emergency Plan and Procedures in response to
the simulated accident.
l Proaram Areas Evaluated and Results Scenario--The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for e
testing the integrated. emergency response capability.
Emergency Response Organization (ERO)--Predesignated personnel with well e
defined responsibilitics promptly staffed the ERFs.
Emergency Detection and Classification--The class 4fication of the Alert e
was unnecessarily delayed from the scenario timeline because calculations were not verified in a timely manner; however, the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency conditions were promptly detected and classified.
Notifications and Communications--Notifications to the offsite agencies e
were ade ' ate.
Communications between and among the facilities was s
good.
Timely press releases were an area for improvement.
Accident Mitigation and Protective Action Decision Making--The managers e
and staff of the ERO worked effectively to mitigate the emergency conditions.
Protective action decision making was prompt and correct.
Critique--The critique process was adequate.
e Facilities--The ERFs were genera,iy organized, equipped, and maintained e
in a manner that provided for the emergency response.
Conclusion--The inspection team concluded the above functional areas were satisfactory. There were no observed areas of weakness that required corrective action.
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Reoort Details SummaryofExerciseEvents This biennial emergency preparedness exercise included partial participation
'by the State of Georgia-and full participation by the' associated Risk Counties.
This plume exposure exercise was evaluated by an NRC inspection team and was conducted from 8:00 a.m. to 12:36 p.m. on August 20, 1997.
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Player critiques were conducted by the licensee's emergency-response partic.ipants in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) follcwing termination
of the exercise.
The NRC exit meeting was conducted on August 22. 1997
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following the licensee's summary to management of exercise results.
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VI. Plant Sucoort i
P4.
Staff Knowledge-and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
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P4.1 Exercise Scenario c.
Insoectior Scooe (82302)
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The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether i
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
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portion of the basic elements of the licensee's plan.
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Qbsg vations and Findinas
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The licensee submitted its scenario package for the Edwin I. Hatch-t Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness Exercise to the NRC with a letter
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. dated June 7. 1997. A review of the package indicated that..the scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations i
of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the State of
Georgia and local government-agencies for their participation in the exercise.
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Conclusion RThe scenario developed for this _ exercise was effective for testing the
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integrated emergency response capability.
y P4.2 ~0nsite Emeroency Oroanization
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a. -Insoection Scone (82301)
The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to respond to the simulated emergenc _ _ - _
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b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted that the responsibilitie: for emergency response were clearly defined.
The Superintendent on Shift for the Control R-Simulator assumed the responsibilities as the Emergency Director anc performed designated responsibilities including the call-oint of personnel to staff the emergency res;y>nse facilities (ERFs).
The predesignated personnel responded ans staffed the ERFs.
c.
Conclusion
Predesignated personnel with well defined responsibilities promptly staffed the ERFs.
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P4.3 Emeroency Classification System
a.
Insoection Scoce (82301)
The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to determine whether a standard emergency classification and action level
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scheme was in use by the licensee, b.
Observation and Findinos The procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, provided the emergency action levels for the activation and implementation of the Emergency Plan. An Alert was declared at 8:40 a.m. based on a reactor coolant system leak greater than 50 gpm.
The classification was s?qhtly delayed from the scenario timeline because the shift supervisor did not have a confirmato y check of the leak rate calculation made until 10 minutes after the first calculation.
The same information that was provided on a controller message 18 minutes earlier then resulted in the Alert classification.
At 9:47 a.m., a Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared due to a continuing fire _ that prevented reflood of the reactor vessel.
At 10:23 a.m.
a General Emergency (GE) was declared due to the multiple failure criteria.
c.
Conclusion The_ licensee had a standard system for emergency classifications and used it to effectively classify the off-normal events promptly and ccrrectly, with the exception of the delayed Alert classification.
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P4.4 Notification Methods and Procedures a.
Inspection Scooe (82301)
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The iroMtors observed the licensers notification of State and local governmental organizations and emergency personnel to determine whether timely and substantive emergency information was provided in accordance with procedures.
b.
Observations and Findinas The initial emergency notifications to the State of Georgia and the Risk Counties were made within 15 minutes of the emergency declarations. The messages were satisfactory in the information they provided in most
cases. An exception was message number 3 from the Technical Support
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Center (TSC) which was long and very technical in nature. As a result, this follow-up message would have provided little if any supplemental information to the offsite agencies that would assist them in their decision making. Also, messages number 2 and 3 both indicated a potential for a release when "no release" as indicated in message number 4 was more appropriate, c.
Conclusion The licensee demonstrated the ability to make initial and follow-up notifications ts the States and counties.
P4.5 Emeraency Communications a.
Insoection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the flow of communications within the emergency response organization and from and between the ERFs to determine whether provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency information.
b.
Observation and Findinas The inspectors observed that the communications between the utility and offsite agencies and amongst the ERFs were generally effective for the prompt transmission of emergency information, fie:ponsible personnel were kept informed of ongoing events and communicated effectively in performing accident mitigation and initiating protective actions for both onsite and offsite personne _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ -
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Conclusion Provisions existed for the prompt communications among and between principal response organizations.
P4.6 Public Education and Information a.
Inspection Scooe (82301)
The inspectors observed how information concerning the simulated emergency was made available to the public, b.
Observations and Findinas l
The Hatch Emergency News Center was established in Vidalia, Georgia.
l The Emergency News Center (ENC) was adequate in size and equipment.
Security was present and provided good access control to the facility, t
j The news releases for both the SAE and GE required an hour or more which was considered too long by the inspector.
This appeared to be a result of tha coordination required amongst the utility. State of Georgia, and the Risk Counties as the emergency information provided was a Joint News Release concurred in by all of the preceding parties.
The inspector noted that news briefings and interim briefings provided key information before the Joint News Releases were provided.
It was also noted that rumor control was well-staffed and people were adequately trained for their responsibilities, c. Conclusions The ENC and its staff were activated and functioned in a manner that provioed for the dissemination of coordinated and accurate information to the public via the news media. Timely press releases were an area for improvement.
P4.7 Emeraency Facilities and Eauioment a.
Insoection Scoce (82301)
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected ERFs to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment were available and maintained to support an emergency respons.
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b.
Observaticas.and Findinas Control Room Simulator - An inspector observed that the on-shift designated crew in the Simulator adequately responded to the off-normal events.
The facility and equipment supported the crew as they entered the Emergency Plan and responded to the simulated emergency.
Technical Support Center - The TSC was promptly activated with assigned emergency response personnel.
The facility layout was adequate for the Emergency Director (ED) and his staff. The inspector observed that good command and control was demonstrated by the TSC Manager.
Hourly conferences of the primary staff were useful in gathering and updating information and setting priorities.
The inspector noted that the availability of a centralized listing of OSC repair activities and their priorities would be an improvement.
l Operational Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was activated in accordance with procedures and in a timely manner.
Congestion and noise were minimized and habitability of the facility was verified on a periodic basis.
The facility had been reorganized which improved command and control by the OSC Manager. However, the inspector noted that the area used for briefing the repair teams was not conducive to performing the briefs because of the noise level.
Emergency Operations Facility - The EOF was located in the simulator f
buildt.g. The facility was promptly staffed and activated with designated personnel. The facility was adequate in most respects to perform required functions and interact with offsite officials.
However, the inspectors noted that the presentation of data on the status boards in the EOF focused on plant conditions and parameters rather than the protective actions being implemented or recommended for the protection of personnel in the Emergency Planning Zones. This display of information is in contradiction with the primary responsibilities of the EOF.
Licensee representatives acknowledged that display of information regarding Protective Action Recommendations within the Emergency Planning Zone would be an improvement.
c. Conclusion ERFs were generally organized, equipped, and maintained in a manner that provided for the emergency respons _
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-P4.8 Protective Resoonses-a.4:
Insoection Scooe (82301)-
'The inspectors observed the protective actions-implemented for onsite-
_ personnel and the protective action recommendations (PARS) provided by
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the licensee to the offsite agencies.
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Observations =and Findinas-The ED simulated the evacuation of all non-essential plant personnel c-
' following the GE declaration, l.ikewise. the ED made Protective Action.
-Recommendations for the' EPZ within 15 e nutes-of:the GE-declaration.
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Conclusion-The licensee demonstrated the ability _ to implement protective meaw.4 1-for._onsite personnel and to'make the required PARS for the protection _of the public.
P4.9 Exercise Critiaue a.
Insoection-Scoce (82301)
The11nspectors observed the' facility critiques immediately following the-exercise _and portions.of the controller / evaluator organization critique'
-process to determine whether weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management.
b.
Observations and Findinas-
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The1 licensee-conducted adequate player critiques following' exercise-termination. The controller and evaluato_r staff als) conducted a detailed. review of observations made during the exercise; No.
substantive issues were identified by the ' controller / evaluator staff-that required _ corrective action.
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Conclusion-The controller / evaluator organization conductedLan adequate critique.
P4.10 Miscellaneous EP Issues' (82301)-
(Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-321, 366/96-007-04: Exercise Weakness:
Failure to make: adequate notifications to the-State and local governmental _ agencies. The licensee established a working group and
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made improvements to the notif1 cation proce.;s.
As noted in Paragraph i
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P4.4. there was room for further improvements to the process as observed I
during this exercise.
However, the basic issue of timely and informative notifications was observed.
This item is therefore closed.
V. Manacement Meetinct
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X1 Exit Meeting Summary The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 22, 1997.
The summary indicated satisfactory performance.
No proprietary information is contained in this report.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSON CONTACTED Licensee
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L. Adams, Supervisor, Nuclear Security J. Betsill, Assistant General Manager, Plant Operations C. Boone Nuclear Specialist Emergency Preparedness K. Breitenbach. Acting Manager. Engineering Support C, Brcwn, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Coordinator J. Davis, Manager, Plant Administration R, Godby, Assistant Manager, Maintenance
- W. Kirkley, Manager, Health Physics and Chemistry J,. Lewis, Manager, Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness D Madison, Manager, Operations C. McDaniel, Supervisor, Plant Administration
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T.' Moore, Assistant General Manager, Plant Support R Reddick, Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness P, Roberts, Outage and Planning Manager J. Robertson, Jr., Acting Manager, Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support K. Smith, Shift Technical Assistant S. Tipps. Manager, Nuclear Safety and Compliance L
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301:
Evaluation of Exercises for Power-Reactors IP 82302:
Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED,'AND DISCUSSED ClQSfd 50-321,'366/96-07-04 IFI Exercise Weakness - Failure to make adequate
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notifications to the State and. local governmental agencies.
(Paragraph P4.10)
Attachment (10 pages):
ODjectives, Narrative Summary, and Scenario Timelines (
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HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS i
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1997 Evaluated Exercise NRC / I'EMA EVALUATED EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The E. I. Hatch Nuclear Piant 1997 emergency preparedness exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparednessfor Production and Utilization Facilities. Additional guidance prov;ded in NT1 REG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteriafor Preparation and Evaluation ofRadiological Emergency Resnonse Plans and Preparedness in Support ofNuclear Power Plants, was utillied in developing the objecti"es. The following objectives for the exercise are consistent with the aforementioned documents:
LICENSEE OBJECTIVES A.
Accident Assessment and Classification
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Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine Emergency
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Action Level (EAL) parameters and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.
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Demonstrate the ability to provide core danage assessments.
B.
Notificatio.n-1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize appropriate station and corporate emergency response personnel.
2.
Demonstrate the ability for prompt notification of the State, Local and Federal
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authorides.
3.
Demonstrate the abilhy to warn or advise onsite individuals (including employees, visitors and contract personnel) of an emergency condition.
C.
Emergency Response 1.
Demonstrate that an individual is assigned and is in charge of the emergency respor2.
2.
Demonstrate planning for 24-hotre per day emergency response capabilities.
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Demonstrate the line of succession for the Emergency Director.
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Demonstrate timely response of station and corporate management, administrative and technical staff.
2.21 97 EVEX
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HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ~
1997 Evaluated Exercise
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NRC / FEMA EVALUATED EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 5.
Demonstrate the timely activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operations Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
6.
Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment, security provisions and habitability precautions for the TSC, OSC, EOF, GOOC and the Emergency News Center (ENC).
7.
Demonstrate satisfactory communications ability of all emergency support resources.
D.
Radiological Assessment and Control 1.
Demonstrate the coordinated gathering of rudiological and non-radiological I
(meteorological) data necessary for emergency and environmental response i
including collection and analysis ofin-plant surveys and samples.
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Demonstrate the ability to develop dose projections, compare the projections to
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Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) el determine and recommend the appropriate protective actions.
3.
Demonstrate onsite contamination control measures including area access control.
4.
Demonstrate the ability for determining projected doses from available plant instrumentation.
5.
Demonstrate onsite PAGs for a select number of personnel, as appropriate.
6.
Demonstrate the decision making process for authorizing emergency workers to receive radiation doses in excess of Plant Hatch administrative limits, as appropriate.
7.
Demonstrate the ability for collection and analysis of Post Accident samples.
E.
Public Information Procram y
1.
Demonstrate the timely and accurate response to news inquiries.
2.
Demonstrate timely preparation of accurate news releases and suppression of rumors.
3.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency News Center (ENC).
2.2 2 97 EVEX I
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HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS '*
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- 1997 Evalu'ated Exercise ly NRC / FEMA EVALUATED EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
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) Evaluation -
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Demonstrate ability to conduct a post-exercise citique to determine areas requiring additionalimprovement.
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EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSi
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1997 Evaluated Exercise 3.1 NARRATIVE SUMM ARY Initial conditions establish Unit 2 operating at 100% power, late in core life. Power history has been full power operation for the last 180 days. Unit 1 is in a refueling outage.
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) IB was taken out of service at 1800 (EDT) for maintenance / repair.
EDG 1B is scheduled to be back in service by 1600 EDT today.
Winds are out of the West Southwest at 6 MPH gusting up to 15 MPH.
This scenario begins with a primary system leak into the drywell from a weld on the RHR suction line
between IE11-F009 and 1E11-F067. As a result of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage >50 gpm, an ALERT should be declared IAW procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, Section 20.0, Loss of Coolant.
Operators will begin venting the drywell through tne Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) LAW procedure 34AB-T23-002-2S, Small Pipe Break inside Primary Containment, to control containment pressure. As drywell pressure and temperature increase, operators will enter em rgency operations procedures on Primary Containment Control. During venting,2T48-F319 sticks in the open position. A controlled reactor shutdown will commence in accordance with procedure 34GO-OPS-014-2S, Fast
Reactor Shutdown. Emergency response organization members will respond and begin activation of the emergency response facilities to assist in mitigation of the event.
The Control Room (simulator) receives indication of a fire in the 4160V 2E switchgear room. Dispatch of the Hatch Nuclear Fire Service (HNFS)is required. HNFS members arrive at the scene and begin fire
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fighting activities. Portable CO extinguishers in the area are ineffective. The CO hose reel located in
2 the 4160 V 2E switchgear room vestibule is inoperable. HNFS members must resort to the application of water to extinguish the blaze. These activities result in a grounding of the supply cables from the Unit 2 start-up truisformers 2C and 2D. Since there are no protective devices between the start-up transformers and the switchgear, grounding of both of these cables causes the disconnects between the two 230 kV buses and the two start-up transformers (i.e.,520,530,470, and 480) to trip open. This results in a loss of offsite power to all three 4160V emergency buses.2 e
3.1-1 97 EVEX
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EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT (
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSi
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1997 Evaluated Exercise 3.1 NARRATIVE SUMMARY The 2A EDG will start, run unloaded and trip due to high temperature. The 1 B EDG is tagged out for maintenance. The 20 EDG will start and tie to the 4160V G Bus. During the transfer, a phase to phase short occurs in the feeder cable for 2R24-S012.* This short results in the trip of the supply breaker from 600V Bus 2D. The opening of this breaker de-energizes 2R24-S012, S012A and S012B. Motor operated valves for the following systems are affected.
CORESPRAY e
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. CRD Additionally, pump power is lost for SBLC pump 2B and SBGT filter train 2B. Damage assessment i
teams should be dispatched to determine the extent of damage to the 4160V E bus, SUT 2C, SUT 2D and to investigate problems with 2R24-S012.
The reactor scrams, On the scram, the RHR suction line suffers a complete shear resulting in an RCS LOCA of approximately 1500 GPM. Reactor water level begins to drop dramatically. - Attempts to inject with HPCI are unproductive as 2E41-F001 is stuck in the closed position due to a problem in the control circuitry. RCIC starts but then auto isolates due to shorted high DP sensor auxiliary contact (E51-N656A) energizing K303A and sending a close signal to RCIC steam supply valve 2E51-F008.
The 2A RHR pump and 2A Core Spray pump are de-energized as a result of the fire in the 4160V E bus.
RHR pumps 2C and 2D are unavailable due to the inability of the 1 B EDG to energize the 4160V F bus.
Core Spray (CS) pump 2B is supplied with power from the 2G 4160V bus but fails to autostart due to a problem with the pump motor windings. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump 2B autostarts with power supplied from the 2G 4160V emergency bus. However, this train of LPCI is ineffective due to a blockage in the suction strainer.3 RHRSW pumps 2B and 2D are powered from the 4160V G bus.
However, the crosstie valve from RHR to RHRSW (2El1-F073) is unavailable due to the loss of 2R24-S012.
With no feed to the reactor vessel and the ongoing RHR suction LOCA, the reactor vessel depressurizes and drains down to the drywell. As it becomes evident that the coolant leak exceeds the capacity of the available 2B LPCI pump, a Site Area Emergency (SAE) should be declared in accordance with 73EP-ElP-001-05, Emergency Classification and initial Actions, section 20.0, Loss of Coolant.
3.1-2 97 EVEX
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EOWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS i 1997 Evaluated Exercise 3.1 NARRATIVE SUMMARY As the fuel becomes uncovered, fuel cladding failure begins and gas gap activity is released to the coolant and containment. As the released activity is transported outside the sacrificial shield in RCS poing and released to the primary containmcat atmosphere through the RHR LOCA, drywell post a ci%nt radiation monitors trend upward. Torus post LOCA monitors r-flect the increase in radiation levels as the released activity is transported to the torus through the downcomers. Area Radiation Monitors (ARM') alarm in the reactor building. Radiation levels in the reactor building areas begin to impact repair team hetivities.
A shorted control circuit for the 18" Drywell purge line valve,2T48 F320, opens the valve and allows contaminated Drywell atmosphere to be drawn into the operating train of SBGTS.
Inventory contained in the drywell will flow to the main stack via the Stand By Gas Treatment System (SBGT). A filtered release of radioactivity to the environment begins through SBGT and the Plant Stack.
A GENERAL emergency will be declared based on multiple failure criteria. Stack monitors begin to ramp up as SBGT pumps the activity to the environment. The Dose Assessment Staff evaluates the release and coordinates activities to issue protective action recommendations to State and Local authorities.
l Successful repair of the IB EDG will allow the recovery and re-energization of the 2F 4160V cmergency
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bus. This will allow the starting of the 2C and 2D RHR pumps.
LPCI 2C and 2D provide feed, flooding-up and covering the exposed fuel. The release of radioactive material to the environment will continue as SBGT continues to draw from the Drywell atmosphere.
After field monitoring teams have tracked and monitored the radiological release and protective action considerations have been determined and recomisended from the EOF and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), the exercise is terminated.
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3.1-3 97 EVEX l
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1997 Evaluated Exercise 3.1 NARRATIVE SUMMARY l
References:
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NUE,01/29/97, Hatch Nuclear Electric Generating Plant 2.
Analyses Of_ Plant Systems, Sequence, and Plant Response, 4.6.2.1.1(2), Switchgear 2E Fire Causing Loss of Offsite Power 3.-
-NRC IN-93-34, Potential Loss of ECCS function due to a combination of operational and post-LOCA debris in containment
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NRC IN91-57 Operational Experience on bus transfers
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EDWIN I HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EMEI.GENCY PREPAREDNESS i 1997 Evaluated Exercise
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3.2 TIMELINE TIME EVENT (mprox.)
0730 Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2_ operating at 100% power, late in core life. Power hist ;y has been full power operation for the last 180 days. Unit 1 is in a refueling outage. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) IB was taken out of service at 1800 (EDT) for maintenance / repair. EDG 1B is scheduled to be back in service by 1600 EDT today.
Winds are out of the West Southwest at 6 MPH gusting up to 15 MPH.-
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'0800'
A leak develops from a weld on the RHR suction line between valves 1El1-F009 and IEll-l.
P067. Leakage is calculated to be >50 GPM. Operators will begin venting the drywell l
through the Stan6y Gas Tmatment System (SBGTS) IAW procedure 34AB-T23-002-2S, Small Pipe Break inside Primary Containment, to control containment pressure..
t 0810:
An - ALERT should be declared IAW procedure. 73EP-EIP-001-0S,' Emergency
Classification and initial Actions, Section 20.0, less of Coolant. Emergency response organization (ERO) members are notified of the event via the plant public address system.
Emergency response organization members will respond and begin' activation of applicable emergency response facilities to assist in mitigation of the event.
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- 0830 As drywell pressure and -temperature increase, operators enter _ emergency operations
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procedures on Primary Containment Control. A controlled reactor shutdowr will commence IAW Procedure 34GO-OPS-014-2S, Fast Reactor Shutdown. During the venting operation 2T48-F319 sticks in the open position.
0900 The Operations Support Center (OSC) and Technical Support Center (TSC) are staffed and activated. The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is in standby, The-Control Room (simulator) receives indiemion of a fire in the 4160V 2E switchgear room.. Dispatch of the Hatch Nuclear Fire Service (HNFS)is required.
0915 HNFS members arrive and make their initial attack on the fire. Portable CO extinguishers
in the area are ineffective. The CO hose reel located in the _4160 V 2E switchgear room
- vestibule is inoperable. HNFS members resort to the application of water to extinguish the blaze.
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- EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLAyl'
1997 Evaluated Exercise 3.2 TIMELINE
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TIME EVENT
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0930!
The supply cables from the Unit 2 start-up transformers 2C and 2D are grounded._ This results in a loss of offsite power to all three 4160V emergency buses (4160V E, F,and G).
The 2A EDO starts, runs unloaded and then trips on high temperature. The 1 B EDG is tagged out for maintenance. The 2C EDG starts and ties to the 4160V G Bus.
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The reactor scrams. On the scram,'the RHR suction line leak increases to approximately u
1500 GPM. Reactor water level begins to drop dramatically.
A phase to phase short occurs in the feeder cable for 2R24-S012 resulting ir. the trip of the.
supply breaker from 600V Bus 2D. The opening of this breaker de-energizes 2R24 S012, S012A and S012B, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) valve 2E41-F001 sticks in the closed position mndering HPCIineffective. RCIC starts but then auto isolates due to a CLOSE signal being-received by the RCIC steam supply valve 2E51-F008.
The 2A RHR pump and 2A Core Spray pump are de-energized as a result of the fire in the 4160V E bus RHR pumps 2C and 2D are unavailable due to the inability of the 1 B EDG to energize the 4160V F bus. Core Spray (CS) pump 2B fails to autostart due ta a problem with the pump motor windings,
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q Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump 2B autostarts but-is ineffective due to a blockage in the suction strainer. RHRSW pumps 2B and 2D are powered from the 4160V G
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bus. However, the crosstie valve from RHR to RHRSW (2 Ell-F073) is unavailable due to the loss of 2R24-S012.
0945'
Damage assessment teams should be dispatched to determine the er. tent of damage to the 4160V E bus, SUT 2C, SUT 2D and to investigate problems with 2R24-S012.
1000 With no' feed to the reactor vessel and the ongoing RHR suction LOCA, the reactor vessel
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' depressurizes and drains down to the drywell. As reactor water level reaches -155, Control room (simulator) personnel will emergency depressurize the reactor. As it becomes evident that the coolant leak;cxceeds the capacity of the available 2B LPCI pump, a Site Area Emergency (SAE) should be declared in accordance wi.h 73EP-EIP-001-0S, Emergency L
Classfication andinitial Actions, section 20.0, Loss af Coolant.
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3.2-2 97 EVEX
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EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 1997 Evaluated Exercise 3.2 TIMELINE
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TIME EVENT (approx.)
1045--
As the fuel becomes uncovered, fuel cladding failure begins and gas gap activity is released to the coolant and containment drywell post accident radiation monitors trend upward.
Torus post-LOCA monitors reflect the increase in radiati(n levels as the released activity is
- transported to the torus through the downcemers. Area R.:diation Monitors (ARMS) alarm in the reactor building. Radiation levels in the reactor building areas begin to impact repair team activities.
1100 Successful repair of the IB EDG will allow the recovery and re-energization of the 2F 4160V emergency bus. This will allow the starting of the 2C and 2D RHR pumps. LPCI 2C and 2D provide feed, flooding-up and covering the exposed fuel.
I145 A shorted control circuit for the 18" Drywell purge line valve 2T48-F320 opens the valve
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i and allows contaminated Drywell atmosphere to be drawn into the operating train of SBGTS. Inventory contained in the drywell will flow to the main stack via the Stand By Gas Treatment System (SBGT). A filtered release of radioactivity to the environment begins through SBGT and the Plant Stack.
A GENERAL emergency will be declared based on multiple failure criteria. Stack monitors begin to ramp up as SBGT pumps the activity to the environment. The Dose Assessment Staff evaluates the release and coordinates activities to issue protective action recommendations to State and Local authorities.
1215 Field monitoring teams have tracked and monitored the radiological release and protective action considerations have been determined and recommended from the EOF and
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~ Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)
~1230 The exercise is terminated.
3.2-3 97 EVEX
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