IR 05000321/1999009

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Insp Repts 50-321/99-09 & 50-366/99-09 on 990607-11 & 0823- 27.One Violation Being Treated as Ncv.Major Areas Inspected: Maint & Engineering
ML20217G055
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/07/1999
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217G043 List:
References
50-321-99-09, 50-366-99-09, NUDOCS 9910210167
Download: ML20217G055 (20)


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. . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll Docket Nos: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report Nos: 50-321/99-09 and 50-366/99-09 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: E. l. Hatch Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: P. O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515 Dates: June 7-11 and August 23-27,1999 inspectors: T. Fredette, Resident inspector -

N. Merriweather, Senior Reactor Inspector R. Moore, Reactor inspector M. Thomas, Senior Reactor inspector, Lead Inspector Approved by: K. Landis, Chief, Engineering Branch ,

Division of Reactor Safety 9910210167 991007 PDR ADOCK 05000321 G PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-321/99-09 and 50-366/99-09 This inspection included a review of the licensee's calculations, analyses, performance test procedures, and other engineering activities that were used to support design and performance of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The inspection covered a two-week period and focused primarily on Unit 2. The first week of the inspection (June 7-11,1999) was performed at the licensee's corporate Engineering offices. The second week of the inspection (August 23-27,1999) wa , performed at the Hatch sit Overall, the inspection found that operation, maintenance, and testing of the HPCI and RCIC systems were consistent with the licensing and design bases. The engineering staffs (plant and corporate) were knowledgeable of the HPCI and RCIC system licensing and design base They provided good support to operations and maintenanc Maintenance e The material condition of the HPCI and RCIC systems was good, in that no damage or degradation was evident on equipment, piping, and supports examined. No system leaks were observed. Housekeeping in the equipment spaces was generally goo (Section M2.1)

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  • A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failure to use the design control process during replacement of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI booster pump impellers in 1988 and 1992. (Section E1.1)

e The HPCI and RCIC systems have shown an improved level of performance since 1994 due to increased licensee attention and focus following the 1993 HPIC/RCIC Task Force Summary Report, and the licensee's responsiveners to industry operating experienc (Section E1.1)

  • The Data Acquisition System (DAS) modification was identified as a strength due to the increased diagnostic and trending capability provided for pump control system (Section E1.1)
  • The mechanical design of the HPCI and RCIC systems and components was consistent

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with NRC requirements and with the licensing and design bases. The calculations reviewed were adequate for maintaining the licensing and design bases. The quality of design calculations was satisfactory, in that no unverified assumptions were noted, appropriate methodologies were used, and appropriate design controls were used in calculation revisions. (Section E1.2)

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e The electrical design and interface of HPCl/RCIC components and control circuits was consistent with NRC requirements and with the licensing and design bases. The quality of electrical design calculations was satisfactory, in that no unverified assumptions were noted, appropriate methodologies were used, and appropriate design controls were used in processing calculation revisions. (Section E1.3)

e instrument setpoint calculctions used a methodology that was included in approved procedures and considered appropriate sources of instrumentation inaccuracies. The calculations were adequate for maintaining the licensing and design bases for the HPCI and RCIC systems. Some minor discrepancies were identified (and corrected during this inspection)in the calculations reviewed. (Section E1.4)

e Surveillance test procedures and the Inservice Testing (IST) Program were acceptable and adequately incorporated design basis information for the testing of HPCI and RCIC system components. The IST Program documentation provided a detailed bases for testing components in the HPCI and RCIC systems. (Section E3.1)

e Design bases for the HPCI and RCIC systems were specified in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and other design documents such as calculations, analyses, and drawings. The UFSAR and other design documents were generally accurate and reflected plant as-built conditions and the licensing and design bases for the HPCI and RCIC systems. (Section E3.2)

e The licensee's Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) process was effective in identifying problems associated with the HPCI and RCIC systems. (Section E7.1)

  • The team concluded that the engineering staffs (plant and corporate) were knowledgeable of the HPCI and RCIC system licensing and design bases. They provided good support to operations and maintenance. (Sections M2.1 and E1.1)

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Report Details introducti2D

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The objective of this Safety System Engineering Inspection (SSEI) was to assess the adequacy of calculations, analyses, other engineering activities, maintenance, and testing practices that

were used to support the performance of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The inspection was performed by a team of inspectors comprised of a Region ll lead inspector, two Region ll inspectors, and one Hatch resident inspecto II. Maintenance M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Material Condition of the HPCI and RCIC Systems Insoection Scope (93809)

The team assessed the material condition of the HPCI and RCIC systems based on Unit 2 field walk downs and review of equipment maintenance and operating history documented in work orders, event reports, equipment trending, and deficiency card Observations and Findinos The team observed that there were no visible equipment leaks in either the HPCI or RCIC rooms. Both floor drain sumps were examined and found to be dry. General material condition for both systems was good; there were no signs of deterioration in piping, insulation, valves or other equipment. Housekeeping in the equipment spaces was generally good. An exception was noted in that scattered trash such as rags and papers were observed in the lower torus are The team discovered that the HPCI booster pump oillevelindicator consisted of a metal tab with "High" and " Low" markings delineating nominal oil level for the pump. The tab was not fixed in place, but could be moved to any point along the oil level sight glas The team questioned the system maintenance supervisor and system engineer about aow personnel were able to determine whether the oil level was correct for the pump with a moveable indicator. The team leamed that the tab was essentially an operator aid, and that notches had been cut in the sight glass tubing to indicate for maintenance personnel the limits of nominal oillevel. The metal tab was designed to match up with the notches. The maintenance supervisor informed the team that the metal tab would subsequently be secured in the proper location on the sight glas Performance trending information provided by periodic testing indicated that availability

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and reliability of both systems was good. Both systems consistently met the A-2 Maintenance Rule criteria. Maintenance preventable failures have been low and these were appropriately addressed and corrected.

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The team reviewed outstanding corrective maintenance work orders and requests for engineering assistance (REAs) related to the HPCI and RCIC systems. The maintenance backlog consisted of 4 work orders for minor repairs. There were no significant REAs identifie Conclusions Material condition of both the HPCI and RCIC systems, as evidenced by the lack of visible deterioration and leaking components, was adequately maintained. Preventive maintenance has been sufficient to support reliable operation of the systems. The maintenance and REA backlog for these systems was low. Minor issues with the HPCI booster pump oil level indicator were identified and were to be addressed by maintenance personne Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Desian Chance Control and 10 CFR 50.59 Processes l InsDection Scope (93809) 1 The team reviewed design change activity on the HPCI and RCIC systems, including associated 50.59 evaluations, to determine if the implementation of these activities was consistent with regulatory requirements and the design and licensing bases were $

appropriately update ! Observations and Findinas There were several modifications made to improve the systems' reliatiility and level of performance as a result of the 1993 HPCl/RCIC Task Force Summary Report, and other )

licensee actions taken in response to NRC Information Notices and Generic Letters. The I modifications included installation of the Data Acquisition System (DAS), replacement of flow control valves, and modification of turbine steam line drain pot level control instrumentation. The team reviewed a sample of design change request (DCR)

packages. The applicable design and licensing documents were updated to maintain the design and licensing bases current. Associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations were appropriately detailed and documented. During equipment walkdowns, the team verified

"as-built" equipment configuration reflected the intended modifications, and that design and licensing bases documentation was correctly update One of the modifications installed to improve system reliability was the DAS. The DAS established a high capability for on line diagnostic evaluation and trending for the control systems for the HPCI and RCIC pumps and turbines. This permitted fine tuning of the control systems for maintaining a high reliability to meet pump start demands, Implementation of this modification contributed to the improved performance of HPCI and

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RCIC. The DAS modification was identified as a strength due to the increased diagnostic and trending capability provided for pump control system The team noted that the engineering staffs (plant and corporate) were knowledgeable of the HPCI and RCIC system licensing and design bases. They provided good support to operations and maintenanc The team identified two examples of design changes which failed to use appropriate design control processes related to a 1988 Unit 1 and a 1992 Unit 2 HPCI booster pumps impeller replacernents. The original impeller design was changed from a four ,

vane impeller.to a five vane impeller of a different material at the recommendation of the vendor representative to resolve a vibration problem. - The licensee did not perform and document an equivalency design ' view to verify the acceptability of this alternate replacement component. Criterion lli of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Design Control, requires, in part, that measures shall be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, etc, that are essential to the ,

safety related functions of the structures, systems, and components. The impeller is

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essential to the safety related function of the HPCI booster pumps. The inspectors 4 determined that the impeller replacement design reviews were not performed in accordance with NRC requirements and is identified as a violation. In accordance with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy, this level IV violation will be identified as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-321,366/99-09-01, Failure to Perform Design Review for Unit 1 i and Unit 2 HPCI Booster Pumps Impeller Replacement '

Following identification of this item during the inspection, the licensee initiated deficiency card 9904784 to document the issue and track corrective action. An equivalency evaluation was performed and documented which verified the acceptability of the j replacement impeller.-

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The equivalency evaluation process was revised in 1996 to enhance the process for i performing design reviews for replacement part changes. The previous procedure revision did not clearly specify when a design review of replacement parts was require The revised procedure,42EN-ENG-009-0S, Equivalency Determination, Revision 5, included more comprehensive definitions when design reviews are required for replacement parts. Additionally, process upgrade training was provided to responsible 1 personne I c. Gonclusion The HPCI and RCIC systems have shown an improved level of performance since 1994 due to increased licensee attention and focus following the 1993 HPIC/RCIC Task Force Summary Report, and the licensee's responsiveness to industry operating experienc Implementation of the DAS moc'Mation was identified as a strength due to the increased diagnostic and trending capability provided for pump control system i i

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l Overall, appropriate design control measures were implemented in modifications to the HPCI and RCIC systems. Exceptions were identified related to the HPCI booster pump impeller replacements. An NCV was identified for this issue. Appropriate corrective actions were implemented (during the inspection) to perform and document a design review which verified the acceptability of the modified impeller The engineering staffs (plant and corporate) were knowledgeable of the HPCI and RCIC system licensing and design bases. They provided good support to operations and maintenance, as discussed in Section M2.1 of this inspection repor E Mechanical Desian Review Inspection Scope (93809)

The team reviewed system design and licensing bases documentation to determine if applicable limits and parameters were appropriately translated into surveillance and operating procedures. In particular, the team verified that design input changes due to the plant power up rates were appropriately incorporated into system design calculations and translated into procedure Observations and Findinas The plant power uprate license changes in 1996 and 1998 resulted in increased reactor i vessel pressure conditions that required changes to HPCI and RCIC operating conditions and functional testing. These design input changes were appropriately s incorporated into system design calculations and translated into surveillance procedure acceptance criteria and operating procedures. The quality of design calculations was satisfactory, in that no unverified assumptions were noted, appropriate methodologies were used, and appropriate design controls were used in calculation revisions. During the inspection the licensee performed calculations to determine the pressure drop between the HPCI and RCIC pumps and the reactor pressure vessel to verify that appropriate acceptance criteria were used in the pumps' operability surveillance test The quality of the calculations reviewed (both old and new) indicated that adequate procedural guidance was implemented for the calculation control proces Conclusions Adequate calculations and design analyses were available to support the mechanical j design basis for the HPCI and RCIC systems. Calculation quality was satisfactory and controls were consistent with regulatory requirements. Design and licensing bases limits were appropriately translated into surveillance and operating procedure !

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E1.3 . Electrical Deslan Review ,

a.- Inspection Scope (93809)

The team reviewed electrical drawings, calculations, and other design and licensing bases documentation to determine if the HPCI and RCIC electrical components,

. including control circuits, and interfaces with the 125/250 VDC system were consistent with the licensing and design bases for the system b; Qhservations and Findinas C The team noted that the HPCI and RCIC electrical components had been properly -

considered in the calculations performed to size the 125/250 VDC batteries. The calculation inputs and design assumptions for a sample of HPCI and RCIC components were compared to as-built drawings and other design and licensing basis documents and determined to be acceptable. The calculations demonstrated that there was adequate capacity in the 125/250 VDC batteries to supply the HPCI and RCIC design loads for the design d' uty cycle. Other design basis calculations for the systems were reviewed and found to be acceptable with only minor discrepancies being identified in a calculation involving the 250 VDC switchgear relay settings. Overall, the electrical calculations were satisfactory, in that no unverified assumptions were noted, appropriate methodologies were used, applicable design inputs were identified, and appropriate design controls were used in processing calculation revision The team reviewed the records of the last two discharge service tests that were performed on the Unit 2,2A and 2B ,125/250 VDC batteries. The discharge test profile ,

for the batteries and test acceptance criteria were found to be consistent with the licensing and design bases documentation for the DC system. The tests had been completed satisfactorily with all acceptance criteria being met. An inspection of the battery cells and racks found them to be in good material condition, with no visible signs of corrosion or degradation. The licensee demonstrated operation of the DC ground detection system from inside the main control room and verified that there were no existing electrical ground problems on the DC syste The team observed that the HPCI and RCIC systems, initiation and control logic, and interlocks, functioned as described in design drawings and other design and licensing bases documentation. The team examined the functional operation of the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems during two recent plant events in June 1999 (that were described in Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 50-366/99-06 and 50-366/99-07) and determined that both systems performed satisfactorily in accordance with desig The team also reviewed several electrical modification packages involving the HPCI and RCIC systems and found that they were completed in accordance with the design control requirements, and no unreviewed safety questions were introduced with the change The team found that the 50.59 safety evaluations had been properly documented. The specific modification packages reviewed are contained in an appendix to this repor j

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6 I l Conclusions l The design of the HPCI and RCIC electrical components, including control circuits, and interfaces with the 125/250 VDC system was consistent with NRC requirements, and the l licensing and design bases for the systems. The quality of electrical design calculations was satisfactory, in that no unverified assumptions were noted, appropriate j methodologies were used, and appropriate design controls were used in processing l calculation revisions.

E1.4 Instrumentation Desian Review l Inspection Scoce (93809) l The team reviewed the licensee's procedures governing setpoint calculation l methodologies, setpoint design changes and the setpoint index, and selected HPCI and RCIC system instrument setpoint and uncertainty calculations, Observations and Findinas The team conducted detailed reviews of selected instrument setpoint calculation Generally, all calculations reviewed followed the format outlined in Nuclear Engineering Procedure NEP4-4," Preparing and Reviewing Design Calculations" Revision 2. Process safety limits were correctly derived from design basis documentation and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Minor deficiencies identified in the methods and ;

documentation for specific calculations were discussed with licensee engineering 1 personnel and correcte j l

The team compared analog trip and transmitter system (ATTS) instrument loop setpoints i and head correction factors for selected loop transmitters to calibration procedure I acceptance criteria to assess the adequacy with which setpoint data was incorporated into active procedures. No discrepancies were identifie j Conclusions .

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Instrument setpoint calculations were verified to adequately support the design bases of the HPCI and RCIC systems. Setpoint data was properly incorporated into existing instrument surveillance and calibration procedures. Minor discrepancies identified in l some calculations were immediately corrected by the license l

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E3; Engineering Procedures and Documentation

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E3.1 ' Surveillance Procedures and' inservice Testina Proaram Insoection Scope (93809)

The team reviewed surveillance procedures and the Inservice Testing (IST) program to verify that selected risk significant components in the HPCI and RCIC systems were being tested consistent with the licensing and design base ' Observations and Findinas

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- The team reviewed Revision 6 of the Hatch IST Program document which was dated-January 30,1998. The team' verified that the HPCI and RCIC pumps and selected risk significant valves were included in the IST program and were being tested at the required frequency. The team also verified that licensing and design bases limits and

requirements were appropriately incorporated into the IST Program document and the -

acceptance criteria for surveillance test procedures. The IST Program document provided a detailed description for testing components in the HPCI and RCIC system Review of completed surveillance test procedures indicated that acceptance criteria were

- being met, Conclusions The team concluded that surveillance test procedures and the IST Program adequately incorporated design basis inforntion for the testing of HPCI and RCIC system components. The IST Program oocumentation provided a detailed bases for testing components in the HPCI and RCIC system E3.2 - System Desian Basis Documents Insoection Scope (93809)

- The team reviewed various design documents to determine if the licensee was I adequately controllira the design bases of the HPCI and RCIC system . Observations and Findinas

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The design bases requirements for the HPCI and RCIC systems were contained in various design documents which included the UFSAR, calculations, analyses, drawings, and other design documents reviewed by the team. The team noted that applicable design and licensing documents were updated to reflect modifications to the systems

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calculation discrepancies which were corrected by the licensee prior to completion of this inspection. Except for the minor calculation discrepancies, the UFSAR and the other design documents were generally accurate and reflected the plant as-built conditions and design bases for the HPCI and RCIC system l

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8 Conclusions The team concluded that the design bases for the HPCI and RCIC systems were specified in the UFSAR, calculations, analyses, drawings, and other design document Except for some minor calculation discrepancies, the UFSAR and the other design documents were generally accurate and reflected the plant as-built conditions and design bases for the HPCI and RCIC system E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities i d Quality Assurance Audits Insoection Scope

The team reviewed selected completed audits performed by the licensee's Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) grou Observations and Findinos The inspectors reviewed the following SAER audit report TS-1 Technical Specifications, dated February 1,1996 96-RPO-1 Reactor Plant Operations, dated March 21,1996 96-TRM-1 Technical Requirements Manual, dated January 2,1997 97-RPO-1 Reactor Plant Operations, dated February 26,1997 98-TP-1 Testing Program, dated November 10,1998 )

99-SA-7 Terry Turbine Operating Experience, in progress l The team noted that these audits included the review of activities related to the HPCI and RCIC systems. The completed audit reports reviewed did not identify any findings related to either HPCI or RCIC. Audit 99-SA-7, which was still in progress at the ,

conclusion of this inspection, had some preliminary results which included audit findings ;

l related to HPCI and RCIC. The licensee had initiated deficiency caras to address the '

findings in audit 99-SA- Conclusions The inspection team concluded that the licensee's SAER process was effective in identifying problems associated with the HPCI and RCIC system ,

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V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS -

X1 Exit Meeting Summary The team discussed the progress of the inspection witr Lcensee representatives on a daily basis and presented the results to members of lic .1see management and staff at the conclusion of the inspection on August 27,1999. Tne licensee acknowledged the findings presented. There were no dissenting comment il

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t l 10 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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, ) ' J. Betsill, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations R. Bunt, Project Engineer, Nuclear Maintenance Services D. Crowe, Hatch Licensing Manager

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J. Daily, Senior Engineer, Southern Company Services O. Fraser, Supervisor, Safety Audit and Engineering Review

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- R. Glisson, Maintenance Superintendent :

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M.' Googe, Maintenance Manager J. Hammonds, Engineering Support Manager R. King,- Supervisor, Engineering Support D. Madison, Operations Manager . .

~ T. Metzler, Engineering Supervisor, Nuclear Safety and Compliance (NS&C)

C. Moore, Assistant General Manager- Plant Support- R. Pooni, System Engineer, Engineering Support

- P. Roberts, Outage and Planning Manager

- S.- Tipps, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Compliance C. Tully, Senior Licensing Enginee P. Wells, Nuclear Plant General Manager Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, and administrative personne NBG

- K. Landis, Chief, Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety, Region ll J. Munday, Hatch Senior Resident inspector

' LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 93809 Safety System Engineering Inspection

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11 APPENDlX 1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IfCHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Plant Hatch Units 1&2 Technical Specifications Plant Hatch Units 1&2 Technical Requirements Manual UFSAR Unit 2 UFSAR Section 5.2.1.1.6, Performance' Objectives for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Unit 2 UFSAR Section 5.2.1.1.10, Performance Objectives for the High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) System Unit 2 UFSAR Section 5.5.6, RCIC System Unit 2 UFSAR Section 6.3, Emergency Core Cooling Systems Unit 2 UFSAR Section 7.3, Engineered Safety Features Systems Unit 2 UFSAR Section 7.4, Systems Required For Safe Shutdown Unit 2 UFSAR Section 7.8, Analog Transmitter Trip System Unit 2 UFSAR Section 8.3.2, DC Power System DESIGN BASIS ANALYSES RELATED TO POWER UPRATE Safety Review for Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant Units 1&2 Updated Safety Relief Valve Performance Requirement, NE DC-32041P, Class ill, April 1996 Extended Power Uprate Evaluation Task Reports for Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Power Plants Units 1&2, Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and Associated Systems, GE-NE-A13-00402-12, Appendix G-HPCI, Appendix l-RCIC, March 1998 Power Uprate Evaluation Task Reports for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1&2, NSSS and associated Systems GE-NE-A00-05389-11, Appendix I and G, February 1995 CALCULATIONS i

Bechtel Calculation 9, Vol.1, Binder 1, RCIC System Pressure Drop Calculation, dated February 2,1990 l

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f, 12 Bechtel Calculation 3, Vol.1, Binder 1, HPCI Pressure Drop Calculation, dated November 12, 1986 Southern Company Services (SCS) Calculation SNH-8G-022, Unit 1&2 E51-0006 Orifice Sizing for High Reactor Pressure Test, dated January 281987 SCS Calculation SNH 8G-021, Unit 1&2, E41-0010 Orifice Sizing for High Reactor Pressure Test, dated January 28,1987

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SMNH-94-002, Minimum Wall Thickness Calculation for Orifice Trap 2E41-0001&0002, dated March 9,1995 ,

SCS Calculation 0056 (V999, B999) Calculatiois of System Head Loss Between RCIC Pump {

and RPV Nozzle, dated June 21,1999 SCS Calculation 0057 (V999, B999) Calculation of System Head Loss Between HPCI Pump and RPV Nozzle, dated June 18,1999 SENH 93-024, " Station Service Battery 2A Sizing and Voltage", Revision 3 SENH 93-025, " Station Service Battery 2B Sizing and Voltage Profile", Revision 3 SENH 93-008, "DC MOV Terminal Voltage", Revision 0 SMNH 94-034, "Derated Torque Calculation", Revision 4 SENH 93-010, "DC MOV Base Calculation", Revision 1 SENH 95-007, " Combined Performance and Service Test for S9 tion Service and Diesel Generator Batteries", Revision 0 SENH 93-028, Justification Calculation for Replacing the Pacific 70 Watt Resistor with a Dale 250 Watt Resistv on tbs HPCl/RCIC Turbine Control Panels", Revision 0 SENH 91-011. " Coordination Study for 250 Volt DC Switchgear 2R22S016 & 2R22S017",

Revision 2 Bechtel CS52-2E41-04, HPCI Aux. Oil Pump Low Pressure Start Bechtel CS52-2E41-01, Condensate Storage Tank Low Level Bechtel CS52-2E41-15, HPCI Steam Line Low Pressure

Bechtel CS52-2E51-09, RCIC Steam Line High Differential Pressure - ,

i Bechtel CS52-2E51-22; RCIC Flow Control l

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, Bechtel CS52-2E51-26, RCIC Differential Temperature PROCEDURES 42SV-E41-002-2S, HPCI Logic System Functional Test, Revision 9, edition 1 ~

34SV-E41-001-2S, HPCI Valve Operability l Revision 10 SV-E41-002-2S, HPCI Pump Operability, Revision 28,' edition 1

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. 34SV-E41-005-2S, HPCI Pump Operability 165 psig Test, Revision 7

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34SV-E51-001-2S, RCIC Valve Operability, Revision 12, edition 1 34SV-E51-002-2S, RCIC Pump Operability, Revision 19 '

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34SV-E51-004-2S, RCIC Pump Operability 150 psig Test, Revision 6 l 34SV-SUV-016-2S, Cold Shutdown Valve Operability, Revision 11  !

31EO-EOP-100-1S/2S, Miscellaneous Emergency Overrides, Revision 3 31EO-EOP-102-1S/2S, RPV Venting During Primary Containment, Revision 7, edition 2 34AB-R22-003-2S, Station Blackout, Revis!on 2 42SV-R42-009-OS, " Combined Service - Performance and Modified Performance Tests",

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~ 52PM-MEL-012-0S, " Low Voltage Switchgear Preventive Maintenance", Revision 22 ED10 57SV-E51-003-1S : "RCIC Turbine Electrical Overspeed Trip Test," Revision 2 57SV-SUV-011-2S "ATTS Panel Functional Test and Calibration," Revision 18

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57CP-CAL-102-2S " Analog Master / Slave Trip Unit Calibration," Revision 12

57SV-CAL-003-2S "ATTS Transmitter Channel Calibration," Revision 14

- 571T-CAL-002-2S "RCIC Turbine Control Functional Test and Calibration," Revision 5 g

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DESIGN CHANGES / MODIFICATION _3 DCP 97-040-0-004 "MOV Modifications," Revision 0 DCP 93 068-0-002 " Replace RCIC Valve 1E51-FO22," Revision 0 MDC 97-5005 "HPCI Snubber Reduction," Revision 0 3 (

DCR 90-237 " Steam Supply Isolation Valve," Revision 0 l I

DCR 90-020 "RCIC Turbine Steam Supply MOV," Revision 0 i I

DCR 92-084 "EQ Valve Overload Jumpers," Revision 0

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DCR 91-052 " Cable Upgrades for DC Motor Operated Valves," Revision 0 l

DCR 92-070 " Electronic Overspeed Trip," Voided 6/2/94 )

l DCR 92-164 "HPCI Discharge Valve," Revision 0 DCR 92-066 " Rotate HPCI Valve E41-F001," Revision 0 I (

DCR 95-052 " Torus Water Level Transmitter Replacement," Revision 0 DCR 93-037 "HPCl/RCIC EGM Modifications," Revision 0 DCR 92-093 "RCIC Flow Controller Replacement," Revision 0 DRAWINGS H-26841, Revision 4, HPCI System Steam Supply to Turbine and RHR Hx H-16322, Unit 1, HPCI Sytem P&lD, Revision 48 H-26844, Unit 2, RCIC Suction from Torus, RHR Hx, and Condenser Storage Tank, Revision 1 B-51625, Sheet 2 "125/250 VDC Switchgear "2B" 2R22-S017 Division 11 EC-Trip Device Setpoints", Revision 4 B-51625, Sheet 1, "125/250 VDC Switchgear "2A" 2R22-S016 Division i EC-Trip Device Setpoints", Revision 3 H-27664, Sheet 1 of 11, "HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 39 H-27665, Sheet 2 of 11 "HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 35 H-27666, Sheet 3 of 11 "HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 23

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15 H 27667, Sheet 4 of 11, "HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 29 H-27668, Sheet 5 Of 11, "HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 24 H-27669, Sheet 6 of 11, "HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 28 H-27670, Sheet 7 of 11, "HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 24 H-27671, Sheet 8 of 11, *HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 26 H-27672, Sheet 9 of 11, "HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 26 H-51689, Sheet 11 of 11, "HPCI System 2E41 Elementary Diagram", Revision 2 H-27673, Sheet 1 of 9, "RCIC System 2E51 Elementary Diagram", Revision 36 1 l

H-27674, Sheet 2 of 9, "RCIC System 2E51 Elementary Diagram", Revision 16 H-27675, Sheet 3 of 9, "RCIC System 2E51 Elementary Diagram", Revision 25 I l

H-27676, Sheet 4 of 9, *RCIC System 2E51 Elementary Diagram", Revision 21

H-27677, Sheet 5 of 9,"RCIC System 2E51 Elementary Diagram", Revision 22 l H-27678, Sheet 6 of 9,"RCIC System 2E51 Elementary Diagram", Revision 41 H-27679, Sheet 7 of 9, "RCIC System 2E51 Elementary Diagram", Revision 20 H-27680, Sheet 8 of 9. "RCIC System 2E51 Elementary Diagram", Revision 24 H-24102, Sheet 9 of 9, "RCIC System 2E51 Elementary Diagram", Revision 13 H-27947, Sheet 1 of 3, " Reactor Water Clean-Up & Recirculation Benchboard 2H11-P602 External Connection Diagram", Revision 31 H-27876,"HPCI System 2E41 Panel 2H11-P620 & Rack 2H21-P014,16,34,36 External Connection Diagram", Revision 20 H-27014, " Single Line Diagram - Reactor Building 600/208V AC Essential MCC 2B - Sheet 2 of 2 MPL's 2R24-S012 and 2R25-S102", Revision 30 H-23390, Sheet 1 of 2, " Single Line Diagram 125/250V DC Station Service - Division 12R42A MPL's 2R25-S001 and 2R25-S003", Revision 45 H-23390, Sheet 2 of 2, " Single Line Diagram 125/250V DC Station Service Division 112R42A -

MPL 2R25-S002", Revision 13

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H-23369, Sheet 1 of 2," Single Line Diagram 120/208V Essential AC System 2R20N MPL's 2R25-S036 and 2R25-S037", Revision 41 H-23369, Sheet 2 of 2, " Single Line Diagram 120/208V Essential AC System 2R20N MPL's 2R25-S064 and 2R25-S065", Revision 11 H-27009, Sheet 1 of 1, " Single Line Diagram - Reactor Building 600V AC Essential MCC MPL 2R24-S011 A", Revision 13 H-27010, " Single Line Diagram - Reactor Building 600V AC Essential MCC MPL 2R24-S012A &

2R24-S012B", Revision 12 H-27011, Sheet 1 of 2,'" Single Line Diagram - Reactor Building 600/208V AC Essential MCC 2C ,

Sheet 1 of 2 MPL 2R24-S011", Revision 40  :

H-27012, Sheet 2 of 2, " Single Line Diagram - Reactor Building 600/208V AC Essential MCC 2C MPL's 2R24-S011,2R25-S101", Revision 28 H-27014, Sheet 2 of 2, " Single Line Diagram - Reactor Building 600/208V AC Essential MCC 2B MPL's 2R24-S012 and 2R25-S102", Revision 30 H-27023, " Single Line Diagram Reactor Building 250V DC Essential MCC 2A MPL 2R24-S021",

Revision 17 ,

H-27024, " Single Line Diagram Reactor Building - 250V DC Essential MCC 2B MPL 2R24-S022", Revision 20

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H-26020 "HPCI System P&lD Sheet 1", Revision 35 H-26021, "HPCI System P&lD Sheet 2", Revision 24 H-26023, "RCIC System P&lD Sheet 1", Revision 25 H-26024, RCIC System P&lD Sheet 2", Revision 22 i i

MISCELLANEOUS I HPCl/RCIC Task Force Summary Report, July,1993 GENERIC LETTERS (GL)

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GL 97-04, Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head to Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removat Pumps GL 98-04, Potential for Degradation of the Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Spray )

System After a Loss of Coolant Accident

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l INFORMATION NOTICES UN)

IN 93-51, Repetitive Overspeed Tripping of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps IN 94-66, Overspeed of Turbine Driven Pumps Caused by Binding in Stems of Governor Valves IN 94-66, Supplement 1, Overspeed of Turbine Driven Pumps Caused by Binding in Stems of Governor Valves IN 94-84, Air Entrainment in Terry Turbine Lubricating Oil System IN 96-08, Thermally Induced Pressure Locking of a High Pressure Coolant injection Gate Valve IN 98-24, Stem Binding in Turbine Governor Valves in RCIC and Auxiliary Feedwater System items Opened. Closed. and Discussed Ooened

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50-321,366/99-09-01 NCV Failure to Perform Design Review for Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI Booster Pumps Impeller Replacements (Section E1.1).

Closed 50-321,366/99-09-01 NCV Failure to Perform Design Review for Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI Booster Pumps Impeller Replacements (Section E1.1).

Discussed 50-366/99-06 LER Loss of Condenser Vacuum Leads to Manual Reactor Scram and Engineered Safety Features ,

Actuations (Section E1.3)

50-366/99-07 LER Personnel Error and inadequate Corrective Action Cause Automatic Reactor Shutdown (Section E1.3)

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