IR 05000321/1989004

Insp Repts 50-321/89-04 & 50-366/89-04 on 890225-0320. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observation,Surveillance Testing Observation,Ros & Visit to Lpdr

ML20245A219
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	04/11/1989
From:	Menning J, Randy Musser, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245A193	List: IR 05000321/1989004 ML20245A191 ML20245A209
References
50-321-89-04, 50-321-89-4, 50-366-89-04, 50-366-89-4, NUDOCS 8904250105
Download: ML20245A219 (13)

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i-U 1 9 Rfop UNITED STATES '

,h o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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A REGION il

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101 MARIETTA STREET, ~*h ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 t

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. Report Numbers: .50-321/89-04 and 50-366/89-04 -l Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O.-Bu 1295-Birmingham, AL.35201 Docket Numbers: 50-321 and 50-366 License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5 .

Facility Name:- Hatch 1 and 2 l Inspection Dates: February 25 - March 20, 1989 Inspection at Hatch site-near Baxley, Georgia

'Inspec tors: #[ %

. Johrre tr. Menning, Senior Re5~icent Inspector

/m (W M Date Signed

. Y'// W-Rand 811 A. Musser, Residerit Inspector Date Signed hw Y-//-?'f

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' Approved by: _

Marvirt V.'Sinkule, Chief, Project Section YB Date Signed-Division'of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Testing Observation, Reportable Occurrences, Visit .to the Local Public Document Room, Licensee' Quality Assurance Program Implementation, and Action on Previous Enforcement Matter Results: One violation was identified for a deficient Reactor Water Cleanup system operating procedure (paragraph.2); and two licensee-identified violations, which ara not being cited, were also identified (paragraph 5). .The first licensee-identified violation involved failure to perform required sampling of. the primary containment atmosphere, and the second licensee-identified violation was for a deficient procedure for snubber surveillanc No specific strengths or weaknesses of licensee programs were identified based on the inspectors' findings and observations in the '

areas inspecte '

PDR ADOCK 05000321 Q PDC

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager D. Davis, Manager General Support

• J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager

• P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager

• 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager W. Kirkley, Acting Health Physics and Chemistry Manager J. Lewis, Acting Operations Manager C. Moore, Plant Support Manager

• H. Nix, General Manager

• T. Powers, Engineering Manager

• H. Sumner, Plant Manager

• S. Tipps, Nuc' ear Safety and Compliance Manager Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, !

mechanics, security force members and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• J. Menning

• R. Musser NRC_ management on site during inspection period:

z J. Blake, Chief, Materials and Processes Section, Region II L. Crocker, Project Manager, Project Directorate 11-3, NRR A. Herdt, Chief, Project Branch 3, Region II C. Julian, Chief, Engineering Branch, Region II D. Matthews, Director, Project Directorate 11-3, NRR i

• Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap . Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various l members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits .

l to the control room. Observations included control room manning, access !

l control, operator professionalism and attentiveness, adherence to

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procedures, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, instrument i

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readings, recorder traces, annunciator alarms, operability of nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system channels, availability of power sources, and operability of the Safety Parameter Display syste These observations also included log book entries, tags and clearances on equipment, temporary alterations in effect, ECCS system lineups, containment integrity, reactor mode switch position, conformance with technical specification safety limits, daily surveillance, plant chemistry, scram discharge volume valve positions, and rod movement controls. This inspection activity involved numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisor The operability of selected safety-related systems was confirmed on essentially a weekly basis. These confirmations involved verification of proper valve and control switch positioning, proper circuit breaker and fuse alignment, and operability of related instrumentation and support system Major components were also inspected for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and general condition. On March 1 and 2, 1989, the inspector confirmed the operability of the Main Control Room Environmental Control Syste Proper electrical, valve, and switch alignments were confirmed using Data Packages 2, 3, and 4. respectively, in procedure 34S0-Z41-001-1S. On March 10, 1989, the inspector confirmed the operability of the Unit 1 SGTS. Proper switch, breaker, and valve lineups were confirmed using Attachments 1, 2, and 3, respectively, to procedure 3450-T46-001-15. On March 15, 1989, the operability of the Unit 1 "B" Core Spray system loop was confirmed. Proper breaker positions were verified using Attachment 2 to procedure 3450-E21-001-2S. Proper switch and valve lineups were verified using Attachment 3 to procedure 34S0-E21-001-2 General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, diesel generator building, intake structure, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were toure Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, fire hazards, fire alarms, fire extinguishing equipment, emergency lighting, fire barriers, emergency equipment, control of ignition sources and flammable materials, and control of maintenance / surveillance activities in progres Radiation protection controls, implementation of the physical security program, housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, control of missile hazards, and instrumentation and alarms in the main control room were also observe The inspectors observed selected operations shift turnover briefings to confirm that all necessary information concerning the status of plant systems was being addresse Each briefing was conducted by the oncoming OSO The inspectors noted that each OSOS discussed existing plant problems, activities that were anticipated for the shift, and any new standing orders or management directives. Radiological and industrial safety were generally stressed. The STAS oiscussed any recent procedure revisions that impacted on the attendees. The insnectors attended shift turnover briefings on the following dates and shifts: March 4, 1989-day, March 12, 1989-day, March 12, 1989-night, and March 15, 1989-da .

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Several safety-related equipment clearances chat were active were reviewed ,

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to confirm that they were properly prepared and placed. Involved circuit  !

breakers, switches, and valves were walked down to verify that clearance tags were in place and legible and that equipment was properly positione Equipment clearance program requirements are specified in licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-001-05, " Control of Equipment Clearances and Tags." On ]

March 3, 1989, Unit 2 equipment clearance 2-89-0135 was walked down. This )

clearance was placed to isolate a defective blower (2E32-C002A) in the l MSIV Leakage Control system. On March 9, 1989, Unit 1 equipment clearance l 1-89-407 was walked down. This clearance was placed to support mainte-nance on SGTS system demister/ heater 1T46-N77 Implementation of the licensee's sampling program was reviewed by the inspecto This review involved observation of sampling activities (reactor coolant and tank sampling) and chemistry surveillance. Related records were also reviewed. During this inspection period, a review of the records was performed for the Unit 1 and 2 SL'C tank's boron concen-tration surveillance conducted on February 27, 1989; the source check of the Unit 2 Post Treatment Monitors (2D11-K615A and B) per procedure 62CI-CAL-007-0S was observed on March 9,1988; and the sampling and partial chemical analysis of the Unit 1 chemical waste tank was observed on March 10, 198 The licensee's deficiency control system was reviewed to verify that the system is functioning as intende Licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-004-0S,

" Deficiency Control System," establishes requirements and responsibilities  ;

for the preparation, processing, review, and disposition of deficiency

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reporting documents. This procedure applies to all deficiencies affecting equipment, procedures, or personae Deficiencies are reported on Deficiency Cards. On March 2, 1989, the inspector reviewed DCs that had been generated the previous day. The inspector verified that DCs had been prepared as required by the controlling procedure and that several deficiencies that were noted in the Shift Supervisors' logs had been documented on DCs. More specifically, it was verified that DC 2-89-0583 had been written in response to operating problems with reactor building ventilation supply fans 2T41-C001A and It was also verified that DC 1-89-0965 had been initiated when main stack Kaman monitor 1011-K631 was taken out of service for maintenance. On March 13, 1989, the inspector also reviewed recentl) prepared DCs and verified that problems observed in the plant had been properly documented. The inspector observed that DC 1-09-1152 had been written to report improper operation 4 of the "RCIC Barometric Condenser High Pressure" control room annunciato It was also noted that DC 1-89-1176 had been written to document the unexpected loss on power on the "1B" instrument bu Selected portions of the containment isolation lineup were reviewed to confirm that the lineup was correct. The review involved verification of proper valve positioning, verification that motor and air-operated valves were not mechanically blocked and that power was available (unless blocking or power removal was reanired), and inspection of piping upstream of the valves for ' leakage or leakage paths. On March 6,1989, the

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inspector reviewed the following Unit 1 containment isolation valves:

1011-F051, 1011-F053, 1P33-F002, IP33-F003, IP33-F010, 1P33-F011, IP33-F013, 1T48-F319, IT48-F320, 1T48-F340, and 1T48-F34 On March 12, 1989, the inspector reviewed the following Unit 2 containment isolation valves: 2011-F050, 2011-F052, 2E11-F004A, 2E11-F004B, 2E11-F004C, 2E11-F0040, 2E11-F007A, 2E11-F007B, 2E11-F011A, 2E11-F011B, 2E11-F023, 2E11-F026A, and 2E11-F026 During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's controls on overtime of personnel who perform safety-related function Section 6.2.2.g of the technical specifications establishes requirements for the control of such overtime, and Section 8.4 of licensee pro-cedure 30AC-0PS-003-02, " Plant Operations," provides implementing instructions to support the technical specification requirement On March 7,1989, the inspector reviewed a Health Physics and Chemistry Department Overtime Report for the month of January and determined that technical specification and procedural requirements had been me The inspector reviewed the status, scope, and findings of scheduled QA audits / surveillance of control room activities. This review focused on two of the most recent QA surveillance of control room activitie On March 7, 1989, the inspector reviewed documentation for Surveil-lance 89-0RA-4 (performed on January 3-4,1989) and Surveillance 89-0RA-12 (performed on March 3, 1989). The inspector noted that these activities utilized INP0-prepared checklists and that the involved QA personnel were well qualified to evaluate control roem activitie Surveillance i 89-0RA-12 resulted in no negative findings or concerns. Surveillance 89-0RA-4 resulted in the identification of one concern. This concern related to frequent, annoying control room alarms during surveillance testing of a torus water level transmitter on January 3,198 The ;

concern was transmitted to the Maintenance Department on January 23, 1989, !

via letter LR-QAM-025-0289. The Maintenance Department responded on January 25, 1989, recommending that individual surveillance test procedures not be changed to control anticipated nuisance alarms. Rather, it was recommended that operations personnel use an existing, approved procedure (30AC-0PS-009-0S) to pull alarm cards for nuisance alarms during surveillance testin In reviewing this matter, the inspector noted that .

the licensee's consideration of this concern was expeditiou '

On March 3,1989, the inspector verified that all required notices to l workers were appropriately and conspicuously posted pursuant to 10 CFR 19.11. Related posting requirements are delineated in Section of licensee procedure 40AC-REG-002-05, " Federal and State Reporting i

Requirements." This procedure establishes posting locations at the Waste Separation and Temporary Storage Facility, Simulator Building near the Breakroom, and Unit 1 Switchyard near Gate 16. The inspector reviewed the postings at these locations and observed no discrepancie The inspector reviewed the medical records and related certification documentation for three licensed reactor operators and one senior reactor operato More specifically, the inspector confirmed that in each case I

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r the certification of medical examination by GPC (as documented on NRC Form 397) was consistent with the results of the most recent medical examination. It was also confirmed that laboratory tests identified in ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983 had been performed. The inspector noted that GPC had recently upgraded the licensed operator medical examination form to specifically identify the minimum capacity requirements delineated in Section 5.4 of the standar The inspector concluded that GPC was exercising due care in the execution of its responsibilities in this are On February 4,1989, an isolation of the Unit 1 Group 5 Primary Contain-ment Isolation System valves occurred due to a high differential flow ,

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condition in the RWCU system. Operations personnel were preparing to swap the inservice RWCU system pump from 1G31-C0018 to 1G31-C001 After securing and allowing for cooldown of the IB RWCU pump, non-licensed operations personnel began the pump warming section of procedure 3450-G31-003-1S for the 1A RWCU pum The first step of this process involved opening the pump's manual suction isolation valves,1G31-F043A and 1G31-F005 Due to a decrease in the system's temperature and pressure during the process of swapping the inservice pump, the RWCU system piping became partially voided when the density of the water in the piping increased. Upon opening of the pump's suction valves, the system began to rapidly fill and the system flow summer sensed a high differential flow conditio An isolation of the Group 5 Primary Containment Isolation valves occurred as a result of this sensed high differential flow conditio This event Lppears to have been caused by a deficient RWCU system  :

More specifically, procedure 34S0-G31-003-1S,

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operating procedur " Reactor Water Cleanup System," did not caution against the possibility of system cooldown or provide adequate instructions to provent rapid system filling. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained as recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Section 4 of Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, recommends procedures for operation of the RWCU system. This matter is considered a violation of Technical g Specification 6.8.1.a and will be tracked as violation 321/89-04-01 -  !

Deficient RWCU System Operating Procedur l r

One violation was identifie . Maintenance Observation (62703) Unit 2  ;

During the report period, the inspectors ot' served selected maintenance activitie The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, obser vation of all or part of the l actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the 6ppropriate quality control The primary maintenance observations during this month are summarized below: l

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Maintenance Activity Date ;

' Removal of the Vital AC 02/28/89 Inverter per MWO 2-89-414 and DCR 88-273 (Unit 2)

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' Preventative Maintenance on the 03/08/89 2C RHR Pump per MW0 2-88-4419 and procedure 52PM-E11-003-2S (Unit 2) Troubleshooting of Recorder 03/17/89 2B31-R625 per MWO 2-89-826 (Unit 2)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Testing Observation (61726) Unit 2 .

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The inspectors ob;.erved the performance of selected surveillance. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,

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conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillance, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during this month are sunmarized below:

Surveillance Testing Activity Date Core Spray Pump 2A Operability 02/28/89 per procedure 34SV-E21-001-2S (Unit 2) Source Check of Post Treatment 03/09/89 Monitors 2D11-K615A and 2011-K615B per procedure 62CI-CAL-007-0S ,

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(Unit 2) RHR Pump 2A Operability per 03/13/89 procedure 345V-E11-001-2S (Unit 2) RCIC Pump Operability per 03/13/89 procedure 34SV-E51-002-2S (Unit 2)

No violations or deviations were identifie I

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t 5. Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2 l

A number of LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect l trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriat )

i Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred i to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost ccasideratio Unit 1: 89-01 Inadequate Procedure Results in Group 5 Isolation of Primary Containment Isolation System The events of this LER were discussed previously in paragraph 2 and are being cited as violation 321/89-04-0 Review of the LER is closed since this matter will be tracked with the violatio Technical Specification Surveillance Missed Due To Personnel Error This LER concerns a failure to perform required four-hour sampling and analysis of the primary containment atmosphere for particulate radioactivit The particulate FPM was declared inoperable on February 5, 1989. Technical Specification 3.6.G. requires sampling and analysis of the primary containment atmosphere every four hours when the particulate FPM is inoperable. Involved operations supervisory personnel failed to recognize this requirement, and required samples were not taken and analyzed for approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. Samples taken subsequent to the identification of this deficiency yielded nominal result The missed surveillance was identified by the licensee and properly reported to the NRC subsequent to 10 CFR Part 50.7 The root cause of the missed surveillance was determined to be cognitive personnel error. Corrective actions involved counseling the two ;

involved individuals and reviewing the plant procedure l for the processing of LCO This procedure was determined to be adequat This instance of missed surveillance is a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.G. However, this violation meets the criteria specified in Section V of !

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the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation and, therefore, is not being cite This matter, identified as LIV 321/89-04-02, is considered close Review of the LER is also close <

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l Unit 2: 88-15 Equipment Failure Results in Reactor Water Cleanup Isolations This LER relates to three unanticipated isolations of the RWCU syste Each isolation was caused by RWCU system high differential flow. Two of the isolations were attributed to a bound open relief valv The ,

third isolation was attributed to an inoperable RWCU

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demineralized vent valv The relief valve (2G31-F062B) was repaired and returned to servic The demineralized vent valve (2G31-F114) was also repaired and returned to service. Review of this LER is close Deficient Procedure Causes Missed Snubber Surveillance This LER concerns a deficient surveillance procedure-that resulted in missed snubber surveillance. More specifically, the licensee discovered that procedure 52SV-SUV-004-25, " Inspection and Testing Pacific Scientific Mechanical Snubbers," did not list seven installed snubbers that required inspection each refueling outag The deficient procedure was attributed to personnel erro The seven involved snubbers were identified as 2E21-CS-98A and B, 2N11-MS-R46A and B, 2N11-MS-R39A and B, and 2N11-MS-R7 As a result of the deficiencies, the 2EE1 snv.bbers were not inspected as required from September 4, 1984, to March 21, 198 Required surveillance was not performed on the 2N11 snubbers during the 1986 refueling outag This matter was properly reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.73 when identified. Corrective ;

action involved temporarily changing procedure

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52SV-SUV-004-2S to correct the deficiencies and inspecting the seven snubbers with satisfactory results. Procedure 52SV-SUV-004-2S was subsequently revised permanently to include the seven snubbers. On March 13, 1989, the inspector reviewed Revision 1 of this procedure and verified that the intended changes had been mcd Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained Tor the surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment. This matter is considered to be a violation of Technical Specification 6.8. However, this violation meets the criteria specified in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation and, therefore, is not being cite This matter, identified as LIV 366 is considered to be close Review of ,

the/89-04-03LER is afso close ]

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Two licensee-identified violations, which are not being cited, were )

identifie . Visit to Local Public Document Room (92701) Units 1 and 2 On March 9,1989, the resident inspectors visited the local PDR at the Appling County Library. The inspectors familiarized themselves with the location of the PDR, the arrangement of documents within the PDR, and the types of documents available for public review. A review of the Hatch FSARs, NRC Information Notice files, and Hatch Inspection Report files showed that the FSARs and files were current. The inspectors also observed that a document location index was available to assist members of the public in finding specific document . Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35502) Units 1 and 2 An internal office evaluation of the licensee's quality assurance program implementation was conducted by the regional staff by reviewing recent Inspection Reports, SALP reports, open items, licensee corrective actions for NRC inspection findings, and licensee event report Particular emphasis was placed on all new items since the last SALP period (January 1, 1987, to June 30,1988).  !

All functional areas appeared to be satisfactory, and improving trends l were noted in the areas of plant operations and emergency preparednes Although a recent negative trend was noted in the number of missed technical specification surveillance due to either personnel error or procedural deficiency, no significant problems have Leen identified at Hatch since the end of the last SALP perio . Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) Units 1 and 2 (Closed) Violation 321,366/88-11-01, Design of Test Solenoid Valves The licensee's letter of response cated June 3, 1988, was reviewed by the inspecto Corrective actions involved implementing a design change to reverse the direction of the Unit 2 solenoid valves, initiating an MWO to temporarily remove the Unit 1 solenoid valves and cap the lines, having SCS perform a review of the Hatch LLRT program, and performance of a Corporate QA audit of BEPC in the area of design revie The inspector reviewed MWO 2-88-1091 (which implemented DCR 88-31) and determinod that the Unit 2 solenoid i valves had been reverse Data from procedure 42SV-TET-001-25,

" Primary Containment Periodic Type B and C Leakage Tests," was reviewed by the inspector for valves 2T48-F342A-L and determined to be satisfactor MWO 1-88-2286 (which implemented DCR 88-30) was l reviewed by the inspector. This MWO would place a stronger spring in any of the Unit 1 solenoid valves that failed LLR Only the 1T48-F342K valve failed LLRT and, therefore, had its spring replace Additionally, the data generated by procedure 42SV-TET-001-1S,

" Primary Containment Periodic Type B and Type C Leakage Tests," was

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reviewed by the inspector and determined to be satisfactory for valves 1T48-F342A- The SCS review of the Hatch LLRT program was verified by the inspector's review of SCS letter REA-8-2-139 dated February 24, 198 The GPC Corporate QA review of BEPC was verified by the inspector by reviewing GPC letter CQA-0222, dated June 6, 1988. Since corrective actions in response to this event have been completed, review of this matter is close (Closed) Violation 321/88-30-01, Improper Addition of Water to Suppression Pool The licensee's letter of response dated December 7, 1988, was reviewed by the inspector. Corrective actions involved lowering the suppression pool water level to within technical specification and procedural limits, counseling involved personnel on the importance of maintaining adequate communication to assure control over plant operations, and briefing each shift of operations personnel on the importance of utilizing proper and adequate communications. The inspector determined throu p review of LC0 status sheet 1-88-450 that the suppression pool water level was returned to within technical specification and procedural limits. Additionally, through review of Hatch Operations letter LR-0PS-002-1088, the inspector determined .

that the involved personnel were counseled on the event and all

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operations personnel were briefed on the importance of proper communication technique Since corrective actions in response to this event have been completed, review of this matter is close (Closed) Violation 321/88-30-02, Improper leak Rate Testing of Core Spray Valve The licensee's letter of response dated December 7,1988, was reviewed by the inspector. Corrective action beyond performing the LLRT on the correct valve (1E21-F005B) involved formally disciplir,ing the I&C technicians involved in the event, counseling all I&C technicians associated with LLRT activities on the importance of following procedures and paying attention to detail, and establishing the practice of holding prejob briefings prior to starting LLRT activities. The inspector determined through discussions with an I&C supervisor and the I&C foreman in charge of LLRT activities that the above corrective actions had taken place. The I&C shop weekly supervisors meeting minutes of October 5, 1988, were reviewed by the inspector. The meeting minutes stressed the importance of paying attention to detai Since corrective actions in response to this event have been completed, review of this matter is close . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 20, 1989, with ,

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described l the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

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Particular emphasis was placed on the violation discussed in paragraph 2 and the two licensee-identified violations discussed in paragraph 5. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. Dissenting comments 1 were not received-from the license , Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph 321/89-04-01 Opened VIOLATION - Deficient RWCV System Operating Procedure (paragraph 2)

321,366/88-11-01 Closed VIOLATION - Design of Test Solenoid Valves (paragraph 8)

321/88-30-01 Closed VIOLATION - Improper Addition of Water to Suppression Pool (paragraph 8)

321/88-30-02 Closed VIOLATION - Improper Leak Rate Testing of Core Spray Valve (paragraph 8)

321/89-04-02 Opened LIV - Failure to Perform Sampling and Closed of Primary Containment Atmosphere (paragraph 5)

366/89-04-03 Opened LIV - Deficient Procedure for and Closed Snubber Surveillance (paragraph 5)

Licensee management was also informed that four of the LERs discussed in paragraph 5 were considered to be closeJ. Another subject discussed at the exit interview included the residelt inspectors' visit to the local public document room discussed in paracraph . Acronyms and Abbreviations i ANSI - American National Standards Institute 1 BEPC - Bechtel Eastern Power Corpora tion DC - Deficiency Card DCR - Design Change Request ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System ESF - Engineered Safety Feature l FPM - Fission Product Monitor j FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report '

GPC - Georgia Power Company I&C -

Instrument and Control INP0 - Institute of Nuclear Power Operations q LC0 - Limiting Condition for Operations '

l LER - Licensee Event Report LIV - Licensee Identified Violation l

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LLRT - Local Leak Rate Testing i

MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve J MW0 - Maintenance Work Order l NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

OSOS - Operations Supervisor On Shift -  ;

PDR - Public Document Room l

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QA - Quality Assurance RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHR - Residual Heat Removal System i RWCU - Reactor Water Cleanup System SCS - Southern Company Services SGTS - Standby Gas Treatment System SLC - Standby Liquid Control System f STA - Shift Technical Advisor  !

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