IR 05000321/1990009
| ML20043G239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1990 |
| From: | Brockman K, Menning J, Randy Musser NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043G234 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-90-09, 50-321-90-9, 50-366-90-09, 50-366-90-9, NUDOCS 9006200080 | |
| Download: ML20043G239 (11) | |
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UNITED 5TATES
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g NUCLE AR CEGULATCRY COMMISslON
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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AT L ANT A. GEORGt A 30323 l'
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Report Numbers:
50-321/90-09 and 50-366/90-09
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o Licensee:
Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 1295
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Birmingham, AL 35201
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Docket Numbers:
50-321 and 50-366 ee
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, License Numbers:
DPR-57 and NPF-5-
~ Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates: March 31 - May 11, 1990 Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia
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Inspectors:
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Jofrn E. Mun.ng, Senfor Resident Inspector Date Signed
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d-/*/d Randall A. Mtister, Res1 dent Inspector Date Signed
Accompanied by: Leigh Trocine and Lloyd Zerr Mh
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[te' Signed Approved by:
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g~Kenneth E. Brockman./ thief, Project Section 3B Ua Division of Reactor' Projects
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SUMMARY Scope:.
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas _of Operational -Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation,
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Surveillance Testing Observation, Allegations Followup, and Reportable Occurrences.
Results: One unresolved item and one non-cited violation were identified
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during this reporting period.
The URI (paragraph 4) was opened to further evaluate the reportability practices of.the licensee.
The NCV was identified for deficient procedures for functional testing of turbine stop valves and drywell high pressure instrumentation, No specific strengths or weaknesses of licensee programs were identified. based on the inspectors' findings and observations in the areas inspected.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
!W C. Coggin Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
- D. Davis, Manager General Support D. Edge, Nuclear Security Manager
- P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0. Fraser Safety Anolysis and Engineering Review Supervisor
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G. Goode, Engineering Support Manager L
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager J. Lewis, Acting Operations Manager
- C. Moore, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
- H. Nix, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
- H. Sumner, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Comp'.iance Manager R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Other licensee employees contacted includeo technician:,, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
.1, Menning
- R. Musser
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l NRC management on site during inspection period:
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K. Brockman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B, Region 11
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F. Jape, Chief, Quality Performance Section, Region 11
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
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Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2 During this reporting period, Unit I remained in the condenser retubing/
refueling outage that commenced on February 17, 1990.
Unit 2 operated at power throughout the period.
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The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
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plant _ status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included control room manning, access a
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5 4 control, operator professionalism and attentiveness, adherence to
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procedures, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, instrument
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readings, recorder traces, annunciator alarms, operability of nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system channels, availability of power sources, and operability of the Safety Parameter Display system.
These observations also included log book entries, tags and clearances on l
equipment, temporary alterations in effect, ECCS system lineups, containment integrity, reactor mode switch position, conformance with i
technical specification safety limits, daily surveillances, plant chemistry, scram discharge volume valve positions, and rod movement controls. This inspection activity involved numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
The operability of selected safety-related systems was confirmed on, essentially, a weekly basis.
These confirmations inve'.ved verification of proper valve and control switch positioning, proper circuit breaker and fuse alignment, and operability of related instrumentation and support systems.
Major components were also inspected for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and general condition.
On April 5, 1990, the inspector confirmed the operability of the Unit 2 RHRSW system.
Proper switch, electrical, and valve alignments were confirmed using Attachments 1, 2, and 3 to procedure 34S0-E11-010-2S. On April 10, 1990, the inspector confirmed Ge operability of the "2A" and "2C" emergency diesel generators.
Proper switch, breaker, and valve lineups were
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confirited using Attachments 1, 2, and 3 to procedure 3450-R43-001-2S. On l
April 17,1990, the operability of the Unit 2 Core Spray system "A" loop
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was confirmed.1 Proper switch, breaker, and valve positions were verified using Attachments 1, 2, and 3 to procedure 34S0-E21-001-2S.
On May 4-7, 1990, the inspector confirmed the operability of the Unit 2 Post LOCA
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Hydrogen Recombiner system.
Proper switch, bre6 er, and valve lineups k
were confirmed using Attachments 1,
2, 3 and a to procedure 34S0-T49-001-2S.
On April 10, 1990, while walking down the "2A" and "2C" emergency diesel
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generators, the inspector observed that valve 2R43-F106C was unlabeled.
This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor.
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On May 6,1990, during the walkdown of the Unit 2 Post LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner system, the following discrepancies were noted by the inspector and brought to-the attention of the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor.
Procedure 34S0-T49-001.S -lists the system valves, switches, and breakers and their normal positions.
Attachment 2 of procedure 34S0-T49-001-2S incorrectly stated that switch HS-3 (TURN TO OPERATE Switch located on panel 2T49-P600A) was to be in the ON position.
The inspector found the switch
'4 correctly pv itioned in the 0FF position.
The Shift Supervisor promptly irsued a chage to procedure 34S0-T49-001-2S which correctly designated the position of switch HS-3 as GFF.
Secondly, the inspector found that the following switches, HS-6 (Heater SCR Interlock Relay Switch), HS-7
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( Annunciator Panel Switch), HS-8 (Controller Power Switch),= and HS-9 (Inlet
& Recirc Valve Controls Switch) located in panels 2T49-P600A and i
2T49-P600B were not labeled with their designated on and off positions.
A labeling request was initiated by the Shift Supervisor to properly label
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these switches.
General plant tours were conducted on, at least, a weekly basis.
Portions
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of 'the control building, diesel generator building, intake structure, j
turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were toured.
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Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, fire hazards, i
fire alarms, fire extinguishing equipment, emergency lighting, fire l
barriers, emergency equipment, control of ignition sources and flammable j
materials, and control of maintenance / surveillance activities in progress.
Radiation protection controls, implementation of the physical security j
program, housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, control of missile hazards,
I and instrumentation and alarms in the main control room were also
observed.
The inspectors observed selected operations shift turnover briefings to confirm that all necessary information concerning the status of plant
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systems was being addressed.
Each briefing was conducted by the oncoming OSOS.
The inspectors noted that each OSOS discussed existing plant problems, activities that were anticipated for the shift, and any new standing orders or management directives.
Radiological and industrial safety were generally stressed.
The STAS discussed any recent procedure revisions that impacted on the attendees.
The inspectors attended shift turnover briefings on the following dates and shifts:
April 1, 1990 -
,l Day; April 8,1990 - Day; May 4,1990 - Day; May 6,1990 - Day; and -
May 8, 1990 - Day.
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'Several safety-related equipment clearances that were active were reviewed
'to confirm that they were )roperly prepared and placed.
Involved circuit
breakers, switches, and valves were walked down to verify that clearance
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tags were in place and legible and 'that equipment was properly positioned.
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- Equipment clearance program requirements are specified in licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-001-0S, " Control of Equipment Clearances and Tags." On
' April 10, 1990, Unit 2 equipment clearance 2-90-255 was walked down. This i
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clearance was placed to support maintenance on the "A" LPCI inverter. On April 26, 1990, Unit 2 equipment clearance 2-90-272 was walked down. This clearance was placed on the PASS Hydrogen Analyzer, 2P33-N051, for the purpose of implementing DCR 89-080.
On May 9,1990, Unit 1 equipment clearance 1-90-1207 walked down.
This clearance was placed to support i
maintenance on the 1B Battery Charger.
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Implementation of the licensee's sampling program was reviewed by the i
inspector.
This review involved observation of sampiing activities (reactor coolant and tank sampling) and a chemistry surveillance. Related records were also reviewed.
During this inspection period, the inspector monitored the following activities.
On April 11, 1990, the inspector
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observed the performance of the monthly source check of the main stack in accordance with procedure 62CI-CAL-007-05.
On April 27, 1990, the inspector observed the sampling activities for gamma isotopic analysis of.
noble gases collected from the offgas stack in accordance with procedure 64CH-RCL-001-0S. On May 8, 1990, the inspector observed the change out of the main stack and recombiner building in-line sample filter in accordance
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with procedure 64CH-SAM-005-05.
The licensee's deficiency control system was reviewed to verify that the system was functioning as intended.
Licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-004-05,
- " Deficiency Control System," establishes requirements and responsibilities for the preparation, processing, review, and disposition of deficiency reporting documents. This procedure applies to all deficiencies affecting equipment, procedures, or personnel.
Deficiencies are reported on Deficiency Cards. On April 2 and 16,1990, and May 3, 1990, the inspector reviewed recently prepared DC's and verified that problems noted in the plant had been properly documented.
Specifically, it was observed that DC 2-90-926 had been prepared to document indication of L high metal temperature on the main turbine's No. 3 bearing and that DC 2-90-945 had l
been generated to document the unanticipated closing of PSW MOV 2P41-F316A.
The inspector observed that DC 1-90-2329 had been prepared to
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document the downscale failure of the "B" SRM and that DC 2-90-1109 had l
been generated to document a flange leak on valve 2N22-F235A.
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the inspector noted that DC 1-90-2862 had been prepared to document the
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tripping of the HPCI Static Inverter 1E41-K603 and that DC 1-90-2872 had
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been generated to document the failure of RHRSW discharge gage 1E11-R004A.
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Selected portions of the containment isolation lineup were reviewed to
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confinn that the lineup was correct. The review involved verification of proper valve positioning, verification that motor and air-operated valves I
were not mechanically blocked and that power was available (unless
blocking or power removal was required), and inspection of piping upstream of. the valves for leakage or leakage paths.
On April 4,1990, the
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inspector reviewed the following Unit 2 containment -isolation valves:
2011-F050, 2011-F052, 2E11-F0288, 2E11-F041B and D, 2E41-F121, 2E41-F112, i
2p33-F004, 2P33-F007, 2P33-F012, 2P33-F015, and 2P64-F045.
On April 17, i
1990, the inspector reviewed the following Unit 2 containment isolation
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valves: 2E51-F105, 2P51-F513, 2T23-F004, 2T23-F005, 2T48-F104, 2T48-F115-j 2T48-F116, 2T48-F118A and B,
2T48-F307, 2T48-F308, 2T48-F310, and i
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During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's i
controls on overtime of personnel who perform safety-related functions.
i Section 6.2.2.g of the technical specifications establishes requirements i
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for the control of such overtime, and Section 8.4 of licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-003-0S, " Plant Operations," provides implementing instructions to
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t support the technical specification requirements.
On May 10, 1990, the inspector reviewed a Maintenance Department Overtime Report for the month of March and determined that technical specification and procedural i
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L On April 16, 1990, the inspector verified that all required notices to workers were appropriately and conspicuously posted pursuant to 10 CFR 19.11.
Related posting requirements are delineated in Section 8.1
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of licensee procedure 00AC-REG-001-0S, " Federal and State Reporting Requirements."
This procedure establishes posting locations at the Waste Separation-and Temporary Storage Facility, Simulator Building near the
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breakroom, Service Building outside the breakroom, and Plant Entrance o
Security Building. The inspector reviewed the postings at these locations and observed no discrepancies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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MaintenanceObservation(62703) Unit 1 During the-report period, the inspector (s) observed selected maintenance activities.
The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedures, proper tagouts, adherence to technical
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specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
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actual work end/or retesting in progress,.specified retest requirements, and adherence to. the appropriate quality controls.
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maintenance observations during this month are summarized below:
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Maintenance Activity Date a.
Installation of Insulation on 04/05/90
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PSW piping in accordance with MWO 1-90-2120 and procedure i
52GM-MNT-019-0S b.
Post Maintenance Function Testing 04/06/90
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of Valve 1E21-F015A in accordance with MWO 1-89-7471
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Repair of the CS/RHR Pump Room 04/06/90
Area Cooler (1T41-B002A) in accordance with MW0 1-90-2110 d.
Repair / Calibration of the "A" 04/11/90 SRM Drawer in accordance with e
procedure 575V-C51-007-1S e.
Repair of Seal Water Leak on RHRSW 04/13/90
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Pump 1E11-C001B in accordance with MWO 1-90-2790
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Diagnostic Test (MAC) on Limitorque 04/26/90 M0V 1E41-F002 in accordance with MWO 1-89-5936 and procedure 53IT-TET-001-0S No violations or deviations were identifie *
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Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Unit 1 The inspector (s) observed the performance of selected surveillances.
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observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument chlibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillance,
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removal from service and return to service-of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the
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acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during this month are summarized below:
Surveillance Testing Activity Date a.
Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer 04/05/90 Pump. Capacity Test in accordance with procedure 34SV-R43-010-0S
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RHR Pump 1A Operability Test in 04/09/90 accordance with procedure e
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34SV-E11-001-1S c.
-RCIC Turbine Mechanical Overspeed 04/24/90 Trip FT&C in accordance with
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procedure 52SV-E51-002-15 d.
HPCI Turbine Mechanical Overspeed 04/25/90 Trip FT&C in accordance with
. procedure 52SV-E41-002-1S e.
Main Steam Isolation Valve Trip-05/06/90 Test in accordance with procedure 34SV-B21-002-1S On April 26, 1990, during the performance of Unit 1 procedure 42SV-R43-025-1S, " Diesel Generator 1B Logic Tests", an undervoltage
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condition resulted in a loss of the RPS "B" Bus due to the 600 Volt-10 Bus being supplied by its alternate ICD (4160 - 600 Volt) transformer from the IF 4160 Volt Bus.
(The 600 Volt-10 Bus is normally supplied by the ID (4160 - 600 Volt) transformer from the 1G 4160 Volt Bus).
As a result of the loss of the RPS "B" Bus, valve 1E11-F008 (Shutdown Cooling Suction)
isolated causing a loss of shutdown cooling. Additionally, the "B" train of the SBGT system auto-started in Units 1 and 2.
The isolation of shutdown cooling and the. auto-start of the "B" trains of the SBGT systems are expected with the loss of the RPS "B" Bus and are stated as such in licensee' abnormal operating procedure 34AB-0PS-066-1S, " Loss of RPS Bus."
Approximately 22 minutes af ter the loss of the RPS
"B" Bus, plant operators restored power to the bus, returned the "A" loop of RHR to the shutdown cooling mode, and restored the "B" trains of the SBGT systems to a standby statu,
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4 Subsequent to these events, the licensee determined that the isolation of shutdown cooling and the auto-start of the IB and 2B trains of the SBGT system were not Engineered Safety feature Actuations and, therefore, not reporteble in accordance with the applicable portions of 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73.
In support of their decision not to report the above described events, the licensee intends to submit a reportability position paper to the NRC staff for technical-evaluation by June 15, 1990.
This will also be processed within internal NRC reporting channels.
Pending completion of this evaluation, this matter will be tracked as Unresolved Item 321,366/90-09-01 - Questionable Reporting Practices.
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One URI was identified.
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Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Unit 1 A number of LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications were being met and the public
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health and safety were of utmost consideration.
Unit 1 90-02 Personnel Error Causes Procedure Deficiency and Missed Technical Specifications Surveillance This LER relates to licensee-identified deficiencies in procedure 34SV-071-001-2S, " Turbine Stop Valve Instrument Functional Test."
As written, the procedure could_ be completed without testing the TSV limit switches when the TSVs are closed.
Testing of the TSV limit switches is required by Unit 2 Technical Specifications Tables 4.3.1-1 and 4.3.9.2.1-1.
The deficiencies were introduced during a recent revision of procedure 34SV-C71-001-2S.
The deficiencies were discovered during a validation of the plant's Commitment Tracking System Database.
Corrective action involved revising both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 procedures 34SV-C71-001-1/2S.
On April 4, 1990, the inspector reviewed Rev. 2 of procedure 34SV-C71-001-1S and Rev.
of procedure 34SV-C71-001-2S and confirmed that the intended revisions had been made.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written procedures be maintained for the surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment.
The deficiencies in the TSV functional test procedures are a violation of Technical Specification 6.8. '
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However, this violation meets the criteria in Section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a'
Notice of Violation and, therefore, is not being cited.
This matter, identified as NCV i
321,366/90-09-02, is considered closed. Review of the LER is also closed.
90-03 Personnel Error Results in Missed Technical
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Specifications Surveillance
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This LER refers to licensee-identified deficiencies in surveillance procedures for performing monthly functional testing of drywell high pressure instrumentation logic.
Requirements for this testing are contained in Unit 1 Technical Specifications Table 4.2-1. Item 3, and Unit 2 -Technical Specifications Table 4.3.2-1, Items 1.b and 2.b.
The subject procedures did not require functional verification of relays 1/2A71-K5A, B, C, and D which provide a
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protective action signal to the Reactor Building Ventilation system, the Standby Gas Treatment systom, and the Primary Containment Isolation system Group 2 valves.
The deficiencies were discovered during an ongoing review of the plant's Licensing Conunitment Tracking Database.
The root cause of the problem was determined to be cognitive personnel. error.
A nonlicensed individual deleted testing of the relays from the Unit 1 procedures and failed to include testing of-the relays in the Unit 2 procedures.
Corrective action involved revising the affected procedures to address testing of the A71 relays.
.On April 3,- 1990, the inspector
reviewed the below listed procedures and confirmed that the intended procedure changes had been made.
57SV-SUV-007-1S, "ATTS Panel 1H11-P921 Channel Functional Test and Calibration," Rev. 4 57SV-SUV-007-2S, "ATTS Panel 2H11-P921 Channel J
Functional Test and Calibration," Rev. 4 57SV-SUV-008-IS, "ATTS Panel 1H11-P922 Channel
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Functional Test and Calibration," Rev. 5 57SV-SUV-008-2S, "ATTS Panel 2H11-P922 Channel Functional Test and Calibration," Rev. 4 57SV-SUV-009-1S, "ATTS Panel 1H11-P923 Channel Functional Test and Calibration,"'Rev. 5 57SV-SUV-009-2S, "ATTS Panel 2H11-P923 Channel Functional Test and Calibration," Rev. 4 b
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57SV-SUV-010-1S, "ATTS Panel 1H11-P924 Channel Functional Test and Calibration," Rev. 5 57SV-SUV-010-2S, "ATTS Panel 2H11-P924 Channel
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Functional Test and Calibration," Rev. 5 Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written F edures be established, implemented, and. maintained for the surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment. The deficiencies in the previously
discussed procedures constitute a violation' of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c.
However, this violation meets the criteria in Section V.G.1 of the
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NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notke of Violation and, therefore, is not being cited.
This matter -is considered to be another example of NCV 321,366/90-09-02.
Review of the LER is closed.
f Cne NCV was identified,
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6.
Allegation Followup (92701) Units 1 and 2 During this reporting period, Allegation RII-89-A-0067 was resolved by regional inspectors.
The alleger had identified the following three specific items to the NRC:
(1) there was a procedural deficiency-in establishing RHR-Shutdown Cooling from both the control room and the remote shutdown panel, (2) implementation of Revision 4 of the BWR Owner's
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Group recommendations to the Emergency Operating Procedures was not-i incorporating all identified shortcomings, and (3) deficiency Cards were not used to identify Job Performance Measure inaccuracies.
Regional review of the concerns has occurred over the past several months
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t and has included procedural verifications, observation of training
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activities, -personnel interviews, and performance demonstrations during licensed operator requalification examinations.
At no time were safety significant items which could endanger public health ' and safety identified.
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The first two allegations have been resolved satisfactorily.
Revision 9 to procedure 34S0-E11-010-15 allows for the proper establishment of shutdown cooling.
Revision 4 to the E0Ps was implemented-on March 31, 1990, after extensive verification and validation activities.
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allegation that Deficiency Cards were not used to identify JPM problems was confirmed.
Memoranda.were used for minor deficiencies, and there was t
no feedback to the originator for these issues.
Walkdowns and verifications identified numerous difficulties.
The utility was'
responsive to fixing these problems.
During the NRC administered requalification examinations, substantive problems were not identified.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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ExitInterview(30703)
Tne inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 15, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. Particular emphasis was placed on the URI discussed in paragraph 4 and the NCV discussed in paragraph 5.
The licensee was also advised that review of the LERs discussed in paragraph 5 were considered to be closed.
The licensee did
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not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector (s) during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not i
received from the licensee.
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Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph 321,366/90-09-01 Opened URI - Questionable Reporting Practices (Paragraph 4)
321,366/90-09-02 Opened and NCV - Deficient Procedures for Closed Functional Testing of Turbine Stop Valve and Drywell H10h Pressure Instrumentation i
(paragraph 5)
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Acronyms and Abbreviations ATTS - Analog Trip Transmitter System Core Spray System CS
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Design Change Request DCR
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ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System Engineered Safety Feature ESF
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HPCI - High Pressure Coolant Injection LER - Licensee Event. Report LPCI
' Low. Pressure Coolant Injection LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident Motor Actuator Characterizer MAC
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Motor Operated Valve M0V
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MWO Maintenance Work Order
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Non-Cited Violation NCV
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OSOS - On-Shift Operations Supervisor PASS - Post Accident Sampling System PSW' - Plant Service Water RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHR - Residual Heat Removal System RHRSW - Residual Heat Removal Service Water SBGT - Standby Gas Treatment System Silicon Controlled Rectifier SCR
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Source Range Monitor SRM
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Technical Specifications TS
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Turbine Stop Valve TSV
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Unresolved Item URI
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