IR 05000321/1988030

Insp Repts 50-321/88-30 & 50-366/88-30 on 880924-1021. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint & Surveillance Testing Observations,Ros, Util Operational Upgrade Efforts & Refueling Activities

ML20206A886
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	11/08/1988
From:	Menning J, Randy Musser, Malcolm Patterson, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206A823	List: IR 05000321/1988030 ML20206A821 ML20206A859
References
50-321-88-30, 50-366-88-30, NUDOCS 8811150284
Download: ML20206A886 (12)

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UNIT E3 STATES

[g.oEs:qq%* NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y' ' ' s REGION ti y , j 101 MARIETTA STREET, # 1 s ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos: 50-321/88-30 and 50-366/88-30 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos: 50-321 and 50-466 License Nos: OPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates: September 24 - October 21, 1988 Inspection at h.cch site near Baxley, Georgia Inspectors: _ wnI t //.F- M'

John'E. Menning, Senic, sident inspectcr Date Signed

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/ .n A M all A. Musser, Resident Inspector

// .h W Dafe Signed 0'?d L c<. h Na z PlZ 8C harle A. Patterson, Pro ct Engineer Date igned Approved by: A444Ed x 8 F RirVin V. Sinkule Chief, Project Section 3B D6te 5fgned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observations, Surveillance Testing Observations, Reportable Occurrences Review of Licensee's Operational Upgrade Efforts, and Refueling Activitie Results: In the areas inspected, two violations were identified involving failure to follow written procedure The first violation resulted in the improper addition of water to the suppression pool, and the second violation resulted in the improper leak rate testing of a core spray valve.

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l i 8811150284 G81109 l FDR ADOCK 05000321 l Q PDC I

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REPORT DETAILS l

! Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• C, Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager f

• D Davis, Manager General Support ,

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• J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager f

• 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager  :

• H. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager [

• J. Lewis, Acting Operations Manager 4

• C, Moore, Plant Support Manager  !

H. Nix, General Manager '

• T. Powers, Engineering Manager

• H. Sumner, Plant Manager L

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• S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, {

mechanics, security force members and office personne NRC Resident inspectors  !

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• Menning  ;

R. Musser j

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NRC managerent on site during inspection period: f r

L. Crocker, Project Manager, Project Directorate !!-3, NRR  !

M. Ernst. Acting Regional Administrator, Region !! (

0. Matthews, Director, Project Directorate !!-3, NRR  !

L. Reyes, Director, Divinion of Reactor Projects, Region !!  !

M. Sinkule, Chiaf, Project Section 3B, Region II j

• Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the l last paragrap ( Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors kept themselves infomed on a daily basis of the overall l plant statur, and any significant safety matters related to plant  !

operations. Daily discussiont were held with plant management and various [

members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits  :

to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints i

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and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on i equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to i

limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily j i journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access  ;

! controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions !

i with operators and their supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected ESF l

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systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by verifying i j the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker i a and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrication, !

! cooling, and general conditio !

j General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basi Portions l i of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside !

! areas were visited. Observations included general pant / equipment !

! conditions, safety-related tagout verifications, shif'. turnovar, sampling ;

I program, housekeeping and genera'. plant conditions, five protection !

J equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection [

q controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile i l hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment !

j isolatio t f

l As previously reported in NRC Inspet tion Report Nos. 50-321/88-29 and l t 50-366/88-29, the licensee was in the process of using "high-tech" sonic '

i equipment to map the various frequencies heard in the fuel pool in an ;

i ef fort to locate the Unit 1 spent fuel pool linrr leak. On September 23 j 1988, a frequency that could be attributed to a leak in the liner was

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discovered tear a bracket on the fuel pool cooling return line. A visual

inspection (with an underwater camera) of the area confirmed the existence

of a crack. On September 25-26, 1988, an underwater repair of the spent j

! fuel pool was performed. A patt5 was welded to the liner wall and leakage i i was reduced to zer The repair appears to have co.*rected the condition,

' and the licensee anticipates no further actio l l

At 0755 on September 27, 1988, the licensee comenced the shutdown of Unit 1 in preparation for the unit's eleventh refueling outage. The

unit's main generator was disconnected from the grid at 0528 on September 28, 198 The reactor was subsequently manually scramed at i 0930 on September 28, 1988, and the cold shutdown condition was achieved

i at 0320 on September 29, 193 At 1025 on October 3, 1988, the licensee j began defueling the core. Core unload was completed at 0557 on October 9,

198 On September 27, 1988, while adding water to the Unit 1 suppression pool

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per Section 7.4.3 of Unit 1 procedure 3450-E21-001-15. "Core Spray l System," personnel allowed the suppression pool water level to reach

approximately 152 inches. Once the addition of water to the suppression pool was stopped, the licensee entered the Technical Specification 3.7. limiti> g condition for operation which requires the unit to be in hot

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shutdown within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> The licensee returned the suppression pool i water level to within the technical specification-pernitted range of

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146-150 inches within 10 minutes thus terminating the limiting condition for operatio At the time of this event, Unit I was operating at

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,] approcimately 95 percent of rated power and was connencing shutdown for

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the refu W ag outag l

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Section 7.4.3 of procedure 3450-E21-001-15 sta'es in part that suppression i pool level must be maintained between 146 inches and 150 it.ches, i

Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures bo i

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i established, implemented, and maintained as "econaended in Appendix A of i- Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2 February 197 Appendix A of !

{ Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rcvision 2. recomendt pr ocedures for startup, ;

i operation, and shutdown of safety-related systems. This matter is a *

violation of Technical Srecification 6.8.1.a in that procedure t l 3450-E21-001-15 was 1ot followed by persnnnel odding water to the j j suppression poo This matter will be tracked as violation 321/8840-01, i j Improper Addition of Water to Suppression Poo j The inspectors toured the diesel generator building on October 5,1988, !

anti inspected the diesel generator building batteries. A seperate i l 125-volt diesel generator building battery is furnished for each diesel i

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generator and associated 4 kilovolt bus. Controi power for each diesen l l generator, its genera'.or breaker, and the associated 4 kilovolt switengear ('

1 bus power feeder circuit breakers is supplied by its respective battery.

J The battery racks are designed to assure continuous operation of ?quipment !

j under maximum seismic shock condition i 2 I i The Unit 1 battery racks showed signs of corrosion, and several bolted !

4 restraints were not properly installed. The restraints of concern were on r the battery rack rails and consisted of a bolt threaded into a rectangular i l me W. locking device. The locking device has "V" notches that me.h with !

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the rails. Several locking devices were not oriented such that the proper {

J sesh was obtained. The inspector discussed this concern with plant !

{ management and the system engineers. The licensee produced an internal i i Georgia Power Company letter dated Febrary 11, 1987, (Seismic Qualif !

I cation of Diesel Generator Battery Ra.k REA HT 6701) stating that the l battery racks were found to be structtrally adequate to withstand seismic j loadings but that the problem with the serrated nutt should be corrected j at the next outage to ensure proper safety margins. Apparently, this work

was not perfonned at the next outage and was delayed. The system i

] engineers initiated MW0s on October 6, 1988, to coerect this item during [

l the current outage for Unit 1. The work was subsequently perforned under ;

l MW0s 1-88-6008, 9, and 10. On October 21, 1988, the inspector verified i

that this work had been performed by inspecting the Unit 1 battery rack f

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l Un;t 2 battery racks are a newer type, and the same conditions did not f j exit as did for Unit !

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One violation was identifie !

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9 e 4 Maintenance Observations (62703) Units 1 and 2 During the report period, the inspcctors observed selected maintenance activities. Th" cbservations included a review of the work document, for adequacy, adherence to procedures, proper tagouts, adherence to *echnical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or pat t of the octual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality control The primary maintenance observations during this month are summarized below:

.tintenance Activity Date Replacement of an oil line on the 10/05/88 Condensate Booster Pump Motor 1N21-C002B per MWO 1-88-1083 (Unit 1) Shortening of wires within a junction 10/07/88 box on Diese' Generator 1C to correct condition of onduit extending from the junction tsx per MWO 1-87-3111 (Unit 1)

I Repair of FW controller 2C32-R600 per 10/13/88 MWO 2-88-4106 (Unit 2)

1 Replacement of lube oil temperature 10/19/83 l switch 2R43-N023A on Diesel Generator 2A per MWO 2-88-1917(Unit 2)

No violations or deviations were identifie Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors observed the perfomance of selected surveillances. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, ccnfomance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all cr part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the accepti. net criteria. The prirary surveillance testing observations during this month are sumarized below:

Surveillance Testing Activity Date Diesel Gererator 1A Monthly Test 10/04/88 per prc a are 345V-R43-001-15 (Unit 1) Source Range Monitor Flux Response 10/07/88 Test per .rocedure 42FH-ERP-013-05 (Unit 1)

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Surveillance Testinq Activity Date  !

(cont'd) HPCURCIC Pump Suction Source 10/19/88 Instrument Functional Test per l procedure 575V-SUY-015-25 (Unit 2)

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At approximately 00M on October 5,1988, personnel on the refueling floor noted tne introduction of bubbles and cloudy water into the Unit I reactor ,

vessel through i core spray sparge Investigation revealed that .

personnel attempting to local leak rate test core spray system valve l 1E21 F005B (in the "B" Loop of the system) incorrectly connected the test .

apparatus to the "A" Loop of the core spray system. Upon pressurizing the  !

test volume, nitrogen was introduced into the non-isolated "A" Loop of the "

system and ultimately exited through the core spray sparger into the [

reactor vessel. At the time of this event, Unit I was in the REFUEL mode,  !

and core unload was in progress. The leak rate testing was being l performed in accordance with procedure 42SV-TET-001-15 "Primary i Containment Periodic Type B and C Leakage Tests," Rev. Attachment 3 of i this procedure provides th* local leak rate test configuration for valve {

1E21-F005 Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written i procedures be establish *d, impemented, and maintained for surveillance ,

and test activities of safety-t elated equipment. This matter is a  !

violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c in that procedure t 42SV-TET-001-15 was not followed by personnel attempting to test valve j 1E21-F005 This matte. Will be racked as violation 321/88-30 02, [

Improper Leak Rate Testing of Core Spray Valv One violation was identifie !

i 5. Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2 A number of LERS were reviewed for potWial generic irrpact, to detect i trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriat I Events which .<ere reported imediately were ;150 reviewed as they occurred  !

to determine that technical specifications w?.i* being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideratio ;

Unit 1: 88-13 Fecdwater Controller Failure Causes Reactor Scram on l Low Water Level l t

This LER concerns the Unit 1 automatic scram on t Septembei 4,198 The "A" RFP controller initially [

malfunctioned, resulting in a decrease in reactor t vessel water level. Yessel water level was restored and power level was reduce The "B" RFP controller subsequently failed downscale, resulting in a rapid i i reduction in vessel water level and an automatic scram  :

l on low water level. The events of this LER and the [

, licensee's corrective actions were previously  :

discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88 29 l and 50-366/88-2 Review of this LER is closed, f i

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r Unit 2: 82-103 RHRSW Heat Exchanger Flow Control Valve Fails in  ;

Closed Position  !

This LER concerns the failure of the "A" RHRSW heat !

exchanger flow control valve in the closed position ;

when operations personnel were attempting to place the .

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"A" loop of RHRSW in service. Unit 2 was operating at approximately 100 percent of rated power at the time of this even The failure was determined to be i caused by a defective relay in the valve's position !

modulator. Corrective act;ons involved replacing the :

defective relay, recalibrating the modulator, and !

satisfactorily operability testing the "A" loop of l RHRS Review of this LER is closed, t 2 88-05 Personna Error Results in Instruments Inoperable i Longer Thar. Allowed t'or Surveillance

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Thi LER cont. erns the removal from service of ATTS trip units 2B21-N680C and D for a period of time i greater than the two hours allowed by the technical .

i specification These trip units are part of the i primary containment isolation instrumentation and are I activated by a reactor vessel low level (Level 3) !

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signal. Jumpers were installed across these trip units on March 5, 1988, during the validation of EFCV Approximately

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j operability procedure 575V-SUV-004-2 eight and one half hours later, ATTS trip units  !

j 2B21-N680C and 0 were returned to servic Footnote b !

i of Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1 allows a trip i unit to be placed in an inoperable status for up to i

- two hours for required surveillance without placing :

the absociated channel in a tripped conditio l l '

Personnel validating procedure 575V-SUV-004-25 had d

apparently failed to comply with the time limitation :

section of that procedure. The inspcctor reviewed the !

licensee's corrective actions for this matter which ;

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included revising the EFCV operability procedure to r

emphasize the two-hour technical specification time !

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, limitation. The inspectors reviewed Revision 2 of [

procedure 575V-SUV-004 ts, "Excess Flow Check Valve :

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Operebility," and determined that the intended changes had been made. This matter appears to be a violation !

of Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1. Howeve :

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since all the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2 >

Appendix C,Section V, were satisfied, this licensee- p

identified violation is not being cited.

i Additionally, review of this LER is close i

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88-21 Component Failure Results in Group 5 Isolation of Primary Containment Isolation System This LER concerns the unanticipated isolation of the RNCU system on high differential flow on August 31, 1988. At the time of this event the RWCU system "B" demineralizer was being placed into service following backwash and precoat operation Investigation revealed that the "B" demineralizer loop relief valve (2G31-F0628) had lifted and remained open for an indeterminate amount of time. The open reitet valve diverted process fluid to the RBED sump r,reating a high differential flow conditio Corre ctive action involved repiacing the relief valve with a similar valve under DCR 88-27 The fatied valve was identified as Model No. LCT-?G manufactured by J. E. Lonergan Company. RevirW of this LER is close High Pressure Coolant Injection Isolation Oue to Broken Wire to Speed Pickup The events of this LER concern the unanticipated isolation of HpCI during post maintenance testing on September 2, 198 The HPCI turbine tripped and the inboard steam supply primary containment isolation

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salve (2E41-F002) closed on a high steam line differential pressure signal. No evidence of leakage

, was found. Fu.*ther investigation revealed that the l cable to the magnetic speed pickup for the HPCI l turbine had been damaged (presumedly duri ni, the maintenance). This cable provides speed feedback to

! the turbine speed controller. The cable was found to be pulled loose from its connector preventing feedback i

of turbine speed to the flow controller (2E41-F612)

and speed indicatcr (2E41-C002). This condition caused the Turbine control Valve to go full open l during ':he testing, resulting in the closure of

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2E41 F002 on hi h differential pressure. The licensee l intends to deve op a meuanism to better protect this I cable from inadvertent damag It is anticipated that this mechanism will be implemented in Unit i during the current refueling outage and in Unit 2 during the Spring 1989 refueling outage. Review of this LER is ,

close (

6. Review of Licensee's Operationa? Upgrade Efforts - Units 1 and 2 As discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-14 and 50-366/88-14 the licensee voluntarily initiated a progran in April of 1988 to upgrade certain aspects of operational performanc The referenced reports i

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J l i mentioned that the resident inspectors would review longer-term I

! operational upgrade efforts as related activities were completed. The I

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areas discussed below were reviewed during this reporting perio i j Nuisance Annunciates: The skansee has conducted a review of annuncia- ;

, tors for their functhnal purpose 3nd desig Design changes have been (

, initiated for 47 annunaiators (24 in Unit 1 and 23 in Unit 2) to reduce !

nuisance conditions. 1he inspectors conducted a review of the list of j jl affected annunciators. This included a partial review of the Design

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Change Requests which changed the annunc'ators status. Additionally, on t

October 14, 1988, a rout \ne tour of the Utit 2 control room revealed only two lit annunciators. These annunciators wtre being controlled and logged j in the annunciator control Nook as specified by procedure 30AC 0PS-009-05, [

l Rev. O. "Control Roon Instramentation." The aondition of the nuisance i 1 annunciators has improved vastly since the st art of the operational *

j upgrade program as evidenced by only two lit annunciators on the front f panels in the Unit 2 control them. Review M the licensee's operational l

j upgrade efforts in the nuisance enunciatM area is considered closed, i Houtekeepino and Cleanliness: The licensee decided to reemphasize the ;

j autnority and responsibility for establishing and maintaining high  !

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standards of plant housekt; ping and cleanliness in less traveled areas of t l t'ie plant. Additionally, a follow-up comprehensive management inspection [

j to evaluate the effectiveness of this effort was planned and expected to l l be completed by August 198 !

\ Procedurc 20AC-BLO-001-05, "Plant Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control," I was issued on August 10, 1988, to establish the requirements and [

l responsibilities for implementing an effective housekeeping and  ;

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cleanliness program at Plant Hatch. In reviewing this procedure the l inspectors noted that it addresses housekeeping practices, levels of i cleanliness, system cleanliness, and tool contro*, requirements. Related j

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l inspection requirements are also proviled. Fe instance, the Manager }

l General Support is responsible for issuing ant' periodically updating a ,

t Plant Responsibility Matrix which identif tt.s responsibility for [

j housekeeping inspection Department managers are responsible for

ensuring that weekly housekeeping inspections are conducted in those areas

for which they are responsible. Personnel responsible for cleanup must i

! also be identified. Inspections must be documented on a nonthly basis and l forwarded to the Superintendent of Buildings and Grounds fur review and l

subseqsent traasmittal to Document Contro !

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The licensee also developed administrative guideline AG-MGR-36 0588N,

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"Management Housekeeping Inspection Program, to define a program for (

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conducting management housekeeping inspection In essence, the administrative guideline assigns responsibility to the Plant Manager, Plant Support Manager and Department Managers for conducting housekeeping inspections of assigned areas and reporting results at the monthly

< Management Staff Meetin Inspections are required on a quarterly basis

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and inspection findings are reported on a special Housekeeping Inspection j

Form. The inspectors reviewed forms documcnting the results of management i l

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.! housekeeping inspections conducted August 4-5, 1988. The inspectors

determined that the licensee had conducted .he management housekeeping

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inspections committed to in *,he operational upgrade program.

! Review of the licensee's operational upgrade effortr in the area of housekeeping and cleanliness is closed. However, tne inspectors will

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continue to monitor the licensee's performance ir,inis area as part of the routine implementation of NRC Inspection Procedure 71707.

! Equipment Labeling: The licensee's longer-tem efforts in this area J involved correcting any remaining equipment labeling that did not comply

< with Plant Hatch labeling procedures. Current labeling requirements are i contained in procedure 30AC 0PS-008-05, "Systen and Component labeling,'

Rev. O, dated May 17, 1988. Licensee representatives indicated to the inspectors early in this reporting period that they considered the longer-term upgrado efforts to be completed. The inspectors subsequently reviewed the labeling on selected panels, systems, and other items of equipmen*, to assess the effectiveness of the licensee's actions. Labels on the following items were reviewed on September 28-29, 1988: th and 12th Stage Heaters Instrument Panel 2H21-P218 (Unit 2) Stator Cooling Unit 2N43-B001 (Unit 2) Condensate Polishing Control Panel 2N21-P001A (Unit 2) th Stage Heater Instrument Panel 2H21-P216 (Unit 2) i /200 Volt MCC 2R24-5012 (Unit 2) Reactor Yessel Level and Pressure Instrument Pack 2H21-P405B (Unit 2)

9 RecirculationMGSet2B31-5001A(Unit 2) CRD Hydraulic System (Unit 2) th and 8th Stage Heater Panel 1H21 P217 (Unit 1)

j. Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit INA2-0001 (Unit 1) Volt MCC IL24 5006 (Unit 1) Condensate Booster Pumps 1N21-C0028 and C (Unit 1)

The inspectors concluded during reviews of the above items that observed labeling essentially complied with the requirements of 30AC 0PS-008-0 However, two discrepancies were observed and brought to the attention of cognizant licensee personnel. Instrument valve 2C11-N002-TV1 in the Unit 2 CR0 Hydraulic system was unlabeled. Additionally, a circuit breaker in the 58 position on Unit 1 600 volt MCC 1R24-5006 was unlabele In view of the very large number of equipment labels at Plant Hatch, it is clear that the licensee's labeling program will only be effective over the long tem if technicians, equipment operators, and craf t personnel are diligent in reporting discrepancies. The inspectors noted that the Plant Manager comunicated equipeent labeling requirements to plant personnel via Managenent Memo MM-MGR-02-0888 dated August 25, 198 Review of the licensee's operational upgrade efforts in the area of equipment labeling is close .-

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J 7. Refueling Activities (60710) Unit 1 The inspectors observed the off-load of fuel from Unit 1 on October 4-5, !

1988. Fuel handling operations were monitored from the control room and i i refuel floo Phone comunications were established between the control l room and the refuelint bridge. A senior Reactor Operator was in charge of

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the refueling operations and stationed on the refueling bridge. Fuel i

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handling operations are conducted per plant procedure 42FH-ERP-014-05, i Fuel Movement Operatio Also, the radiation work permit for fuel !

handling was reviewed and plant personnel on the refueling bridge were i dressed in the appropriate protective clothing as required by the permi {

i lhe fuel transfer shects and fuel status tag board was observed being used

and kept curren The fuel off-load wr3 being conducted in a spiral t

! pattern as required by un' t technical necifications. The off load  !

I sequence also retained fur fuel bundles iround each of the four source !

I range monitors until all other bundles vere removed. This off-load i sequence allowed maximum usage of the source range monitors during off-

) load. The inspectors did not observe any problems while watching fuel

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1 However, two minor problems did occur during fuel movemen First, fuel }

l handling was delayed for two hours on October 4,1988, af ter air bubbles j and dirty water was noted coming from the core spray sparger when local

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leak rate testing was started on core spray loop "B". This event is

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discussed in paragraph 4 abov )

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l The second problem occurred on October 5,1988, af ter a fuel bundle was l J slightly buttped against the transfer canal between the reactor cavity and I spent fuel pool. This occurred because the fuel "grapple normal full up" f I light was on but the grapple was actually several feet from full up, i

After moving the bundle away from the core, the operator noticed that the i

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bundle would not clear the transfer canal. However, the movement was not !

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stopped in time to prevent the morrentum of the bundle from causing the 1 bundle to buep into the transfer canal. Fuel handling procedure

.I 42FH-ERP-014-05, step 5.2.11 states that the fuel grapple must be in the i full up position prior to moving the bridge or trolle The inspectors .

reviewed this natter with the cognizant system engineers. The fuel  !

grapple consists of several telescoping sections. The top section is

stationary and contains the limit switches for full out. The next lower

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section moves up into the top sectior, to make up these limit switches. In this case, the associated air hoses for the fuel grapple had become caught

in the telescoping section, causing the limit switches to indicate full j

, out although the fuel grapple was not full up. It appeared that the air j hoses were not being taken up smoothly on the takeup reels. The hoses f j were subsequently lubricated to allow smooth takaup. Reactor Sngineering l

' was tasked to examine the fuel channel surrounding the fuel bundle for any {

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The inspecurs reviewed the procedere for fuel handling equipment checkout [

for usage and notea that smooth operation of the takeup reels is checke !

Since the fuel grapple was nearly full out and indicated this, this f problem was not easil/ identified by operations personnel. The problem (

was one requiring minor equipment adjustment and did not involve a i procedure or personnel error, f

) ExitIn'.erview(30703) l L

The inspection scos e and findings were summarized on October 21, 1988, l with those persons 2ndicated in paragraph 1 above. The license !

identified violation %dicated in paragraph 5 was also discussed. The inspectors described tre areas inspected and discussed in detail the  !

g inspection results listed below. The licensee did not identify as '

proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors owing this inspection, and dissenting coments were not received from the license j Item Number Status Description /Referenct paraqraoh [

321/88-30-01 Opened VIOLATION - Improper Addition of Water to Suppression Pool  ;

(paragraph 2) {

321/88 30-02 Opened VIOLATION - Improper Leak Rate Testing of Core Spray Valve (par: graph 4) Acronyms and Abbreviations l

ATTS Analog Transmitter Trip System f CRD - Control Rod Drive  !

DCR - Design Change Request i EFCV - Excen Flow Check Valve [

ESF - Engineered Safety feature t FW - Feedwater i

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HPCI - High Pressure Coolant injection LER - Licensee Event Report MCC - Motor Control Center NG - Motor-Generator MWO - Maintenance Work Order NRR - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation .

RBED - Reactor Building Equignent Drain j RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [

RFP - Reactor feedwater Pump t RRRSW - Residual Hiat Removal Service Water RWCU - Reactor Water Cleanup l

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