IR 05000321/1990019
| ML20058E858 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058E852 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-90-19, 50-366-90-19, NUDOCS 9011070379 | |
| Download: ML20058E858 (9) | |
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UNITED STAT ES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION ll 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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ei ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 4"***f
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OCT28n
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I Report Nosl:' 50-321/90-19 and 50-366/90-19 i
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Licensee: Georgia Power Company
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P. O. Box 1295
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Birmingham, AL 35201
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, Docket Hos.:= 50-321-and 50-366-License Nos.:
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Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2-
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LInspection Conducted:
September 25-28, 1990
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Inspector:
[ N [ ~I [ ~ I M Ifa//f'/98
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te Signed Accompanying Personnel:
G.EArthur(Sonalysts,Inc.)
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A.4Herdt
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R. Musser
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- Approvedby
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g W. H. Rankin, Chief.
Date Tigned
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Emergency; Preparedness Section
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Emergency Preparedness and Radiological-
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JProtection-Branch-
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-Division;of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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5 n-SUMMARY--
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_ Scope:
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.This routine,; announced inspection was to dbserve and evaluate"the ann'ual
! emergency exercise.
State and local government. participation wasl involved.'in
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the response to the simulated accident. A medica 1land fire dril1~was, included.
'in'the; scope ~of:the exercise..
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'Results::
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.1+ + Within the areas evaluated. -one exercise weakness was identified involving the
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failuret to promptly1 identify - and? report an unplanned abnormal release of-
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1 radioactivity _on notification and; followup forms.
Thel Xfollowing, (strengths :were
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identified ' in-- the licensee's emergency
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1) use.of the simulator allowed full play in a control room organization:
atmosphere:with a: plant experiencing a casualty; (2) TSC activation was rapid,-
efficient = and a good' displayvof teamwork demonstrated, and (3) the: Emergency
- Director demonstrated excellent command and control.
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Within the scope of the observed exercise, the licensee fully demonstrated the capability of implenienting its Emergency Plan and procedures to provide for the health.and safety of the public in a radiological emergency.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C, Brown, Emergency Plaaning Coordinator, Hatch Project
- E. Burkett, Acting Manager, Engineering Support
- D. Carter, Acting Mant.ger, Plant Administration
- C. Coggin, Training rnd EP Manager
- W. Drinkard, Manager, SAER
- D. Edge, Nuclear Security Manager
- P. Fornel, Manager, Maintenance
- 0. Fraser, SAER Supervisor
- M. Googe, Manager, Outages and Planning
- K. Keyes. Technical Assistant, EP i
- J. Lewis, Manager, Operations
- C, Moore, Assistant General Manager, Plant Support
- R. Mothena, Manager, EP-(FPL)
- D. Read, Assistant General Manager, Operations
- R. Reddick, Acting EP Coordinator
- L. Sumner, General Manager
- S. Tipps, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Compliance
-*R. Iavadoski, Manager, HP/ Chemistry Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craf tsmen. engineers,- operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- L. Wert, Sr. Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
' The -scenario for the emergency exercise es reviewed to determine' that provisions had been made to tast - on. integrated emergency response capability as_ well as the basic elements existing within the licensee,--
State and local Energency-Plans and organization as required-by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed-in advance of the scheduled exercise date and
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discussed with members of the licensee's staff.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to exercise the onsite organizations of the licensee. The final exercise data and necessary packages were distributed during a pre-exercise licensee briefing held on September 26, 1990.
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prompting or undue interaction between controllers and players was observed during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Paragraph IV.A. and specific c-iteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and that there wet e adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives.
The scenario did not require long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization to be demonstrated,
' however, a turnover roster was considered and members listed.
The inspector observed the activation, steffing, and operation of the emergency organizations in the Control Room (simulator) Technical Support Center (TSC),10perations Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F). Staffing and activation were both timely and effective in
The assignment of the responsibilities at each of tthe facilities were consistent with the licensee's emergency plan and implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The' licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following. requirements. were implemented pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E.to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidancc promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1): unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) ~ provision of: adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response-in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification' of onsite and offsite support organization interactions.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the' organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization-of additional day shift personnel. The shif t supervisor (at the simulator), assigned to the exercise, assumed the duties of emergency cocrdinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formerly relieved by the plant manager.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classificativr.
and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section 11.0 of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
Emergency Plan-Implementing Procedure No. 73EP-EIP-001-OS titled Emergency _
Classification and Initial. Actions was used to promptly identify and properly classify the scenario simulated events.
The NOVE, Alert, and Site Area Emergency classifications were timely and correct by procedure.
The NOVE was declared at about 9:00 a.m. caused by contaminated injured personnel being transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment.
The Alert was declared at approximately 9:45 a.m. as a result of a fire lasting greater than.10-minutes and potentially affecting safety systems.
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The Site Area Emergency was declared at approximately 10:45 a.m. due to a reactor protection system (RPS) failure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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NotificationMethodsandProcedures(82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established-for notification by the licensee of State.and local response organizations and' emergency personnel. and that the content of initial and followup
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messe005.to response organizations had been established; and means to k
provide early notification to :the popul_ ace 'within the plume exposure pathway had been established.as required by,10:CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50,
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Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section
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II.E.
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The' inspector observed-that notification ' methods and procedures had been
established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated
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emergency: conditions. to-Federal, State, andflocal response organizations-and to alert the licensee's augmented eraergency response organization.
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Notifications to the State and designated local-offsite organizations were
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completed within 15 minutes following the declaration of _ the emergency events.
The scenario had radioactivity released to the Reactor Building using the design basis leakage rate of the dry well and torus.
From there the Icakage and' continued through the reactor building and'was released'to
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the environment through the standby gas' treatment system.
This release i
information was not entered on :the emergency notification forms nor was
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this fact identified and/or relayed to the State and local _ agencies for a period of approximately one hour after release commenced.
The radioactivity that was being released during this. period of time increased to a' point that finally exceeded Technical Specification limits.
This-failure to make this information available in a timely manner was identified as an exercise weakness.
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l Exercise Weakness (50-321, 366/90-19-01):
Failure to promptly-identify l
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and report an unplanned obnormal release of radioactivity on the i
notification and followup forms.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Conmunications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt l
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
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personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, i
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Paragraph IV.E. and specific in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency i
response organization and offsite authorities, j
No violations or deviations were identified, s
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Emergency Facilities end Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and i
equipment to support an emergency response-are provided and maintained as required by:10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E and j
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
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The. inspector observed activation,. staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities.
No major equipment deficiencies were observed.
Facilities observed by the NRC evaluation team included:
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Control Room (simulator) - The exercise control room was established outside the main control room in the simulator at the training center. The inspector observed that following review.and analysis of the sequence of: accident events, control room operations personnel acted promptly to the initiate required response to the simulated
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emergencies.. Emergency procedures were available and followed. The-
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designated exercise shift supervisor evaluated the significance of each degradation in plant conditions and quickly and continuously
.prioritized repair activities.
The contaminated injured personnel causing the declaration of Notification of Unusual Event were handled -
expeditieusly and offsite notification to-the ambulance and hospital were made in a timely manner. The simulator shift personnel followed procedures and command and control were demonstrated in a competent
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manner.
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Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC manager demonstrated:
effective command and control providing periodic informative briefings on plant status to TSC staff. ' The facility staff appeared to-be cognizant of their duties, authorities and responsibilities.
' The.TSC manager (new plant manager) demonstrated excellent ' command amd control and knowledge of the plan '
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Operations Support Center (OSC) - The inspector observed that following the request for activation, personnel responded promptly to staff the facility.
The inspector observed that adequate health
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physics controls were demonstrated to pnclude the spread of contamination when teams returned from their work jobs to the OSC.
The inspector also observed that checks for contamination in the OSC were conducted periodically.
Teams being dispatched to various work activities received adequate health physics and industrial safety briefings.
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOFi - The E0F was staffed and activated well within one hour of the Alert declaration.
The facility staff were familiar ',i th ;.hei r emergency ties.
_ authorities, and emergency responsib111Ue..
The EOF t.
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with adequate equipment to support the assigned staff.
Security / access control was observed to be appropriately established and maintained.
Status boards and other graphic aids were strategically located and appropriately maintained.
The TSC director (Plant Manager) briefed the new TSC director and moved to the E0F to performed the duties of the EOF director.
At about 12:15 p.m.,
senior managment personnel from the General office arrived to relieve the P.lant Managerzin the EOF. The Plant Manager conducted a thorough
. turnover briefing.
The Plant Manager and senior management planned to work: in parallel for about 30 minutes' to ensure a complete understanding of the situation.before finally assuming the full E0F
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' director duties. ~ The exercise; however, ended before this' occurred.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Accident. Assessment (82301).
- This area!was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and eq'uipment for assessing and monitoring actua1L or potential-offsite-
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-consequences' of a~ radiologi".a1 emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),10 'FR 50, Appendix E Paragraph IV.B,' and specific
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criteria in-NUREG-0654, Se: tion II.I.
The accident assessment' trogram included an engineering' evaluation of plant status, & age caured by the simulated events, and determination of-the=radi & g1 cal i. m rd to onsite'and offsite. personnel resulting from the accidrnt'. Onsite und offsite radiological environmental monitoring teams
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were dispatched to determine the' level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the. simulated plume.
Radiological effluent data
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The inspector observed good command' and-control of the licensee's field monitoring team, including-
>early dispatch, concern for minimization of dose to team members, excellent communications, and frequent plant status' updates.
No violations or deviations were identifie px
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ProtectiveResponses(82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions
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.b Section II.J.
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h An inspector verified that the licensee had developed and implemented i
emergency procedures formulating protective action reconnendations (PARS)
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The licensee's PARS were consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and othe" criteria.
Although the exercise events did not progress to a genert.1
emergency classification, events at the site were continuously reviewed and discussions concerning the options available for PAR recommendations i
were considered during the periodic updates.
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The inspector observed that a site accountability computer run was I
completed within the 30 minute goal.
Actual site accountability; however, was notJ an -objectiv~e of this exercise.
The alarm and public address
announcements were audible in the TSC, OSC and E0F.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
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ExerciseCritique(82301)
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- The. licensee's ' critique of. the' emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies' identified as a result of the exercise and
- weaknesses-noted in; the licensee's emergency response organization were l
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formally presented? to licensee management for corrective actions as
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recuired by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix.E. Paragraph IV.F.
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The licensee conducted a series of post-exercise critiques on y
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September 27-28, 1990. -Critiques were held with players, controllers, and j
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management.
Findings identified during the exercise and plans for
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corrective action were discussed.
Licensee action on identified findings-will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
The licensee's critique
was detailed, and addressed substantive deficiencies and planned improvement items.
The conduct of the critique was consistent with the v
regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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12.. Action of Previous Inspector Findings (92701).
(Closed) Inspector Followup. Item (IFI) 50-321, 366/89-18-01:
Conduct an unannounced augmentation drill to verify Table B-1 Augmentation Requirements.-
The inspector reviewed licensee documentation of augmentation drills conducted on July 12, 1990, July 19, 1990, and E:
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August 17. 1990.- The docuac.itation from the August 20, 1990, unannounced =
activation drill indicated that all facilities were activated well-within'
the one hour time frame required by the emergency plan and. procedures.
(Closed) 1FI 50-321,366/88-32-01:
Ensure that PARS are included in all i
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notifications and respective followup of emergency declarations involving offsite releases.
The inspector reviewed a training and information memo dated January 9,1989, which states that it is " imperative that this
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recuirement be met in order to ensure satisfactory protection of health anc safety of public."
The inspector also reviewed the' emergency
preparedness training program self-study module on protective action
guidelines and - reconcendations and Attachment I to Procedure
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73EP-EIP-054-0S entitled Protective Actions Reconnendations to State and local-authorities.
Qualified emergency directors have received the
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information and training on this module.
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Exit Intarview The.-inspection scope and results were summarized on. September: 28.1990,
with-_those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the
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. Licensee management was-ir. formed that two IFis -(listed in
Paragraph 12) were considered closed.
Proprietary information is not
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contained in this report. ' Dissenting concents'were not received from the d
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l Item Number, Description _a,n_d, Re_ferences y
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' Exercise Weakness - Failure to-
.promptly identify and report an
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unplanned abnormal release of-
radioactivity on notification andt
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L followup forms (Paragraph 6)'.-
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" Timeline and Scope'and Objectives y
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