IR 05000321/2020011

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Temporary Instruction 2515/193 Inspection Report 05000321/2020011 and 05000366/2020011
ML21197A000
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 07/15/2021
From: Shawn Smith
NRC/RGN-II
To: Gayheart C
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2020011
Download: ML21197A000 (8)


Text

July 15, 2021

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANTS, UNITS 1 AND 2 - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/193 INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2020011 AND 05000366/2020011

Dear Ms. Gayheart:

On June 29, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plants, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Sonny Dean, Site VP, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Steven P. Smith, Chief Reactor Projects Branch #6 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000321 and 05000366 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000321 and 05000366

License Numbers:

DPR-57 and NPF-5

Report Numbers:

05000321/2020011 and 05000366/2020011

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-011-0038

Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating CO. INC

Facility:

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plants, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Baxley, GA

Inspection Dates:

October 26, 2020 to June 29, 2021

Inspectors:

B. Bishop, Sr. Project Engineer

R. Rodriguez, Reliability and Risk Analyst

Approved By:

Steven P. Smith, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch #6

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/193 Inspection at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plants, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

2515/193 - Inspection of the Implementation of EA-13-109: Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions

Inspection of the Implementation of EA-13-109: Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions (1 Sample)

(1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the reliable hardened containment wetwell vent as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluations (ADAMS Accession No. ML19044A555), and determined that the licensee was in compliance with NRC Order EA-13-109 Phase 1, Reliable, Severe Accident Capable Wetwell Venting System (ADAMS Accession No. ML13143A321).

The inspectors evaluated licensee implementation of the appropriate elements of the reliable hardened containment wetwell vent as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated NRC safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No.

ML19044A555). Specifically, the inspectors evaluated licensee implementation of the Hardened Containment Vent System (HCVS) functional requirements, design features, maintenance and testing, quality standards, and programmatic requirements as described in Appendix A of TI 2515/193 Revision 1.

The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

  • Installed the HCVS to meet the performance objectives outlined in Order EA-13-109;
  • Installed the HCVS system with the design features specified in Order EA-13-109;
  • Designed the HCVS to meet the quality standards described in Order EA-13-109;
  • Developed and implemented adequate maintenance and testing of HCVS equipment to ensure their availability and capability;
  • Developed and issued procedures to safely operate the HCVS using normal power supplies, during Extended Loss of All AC Power (ELAP), and a postulated severe accident scenario, and integrated the procedures into existing plant procedures; and
  • Trained their staff to assure personnel can proficiently operate the HCVS.

Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the reliable wetwell venting strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML19044A555) and determined that the licensee was in compliance with NRC Order EA-13-109 Phase 2, Reliable, Severe Accident Capable Drywell (or alternative strategy) Venting System (ADAMS Accession No.

ML13143A321).

The inspectors also evaluated licensee implementation of the appropriate elements of the reliable wetwell venting strategy as described in the plant specific submittal(s) and the associated NRC safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML19044A555).

Specifically, the inspectors evaluated licensee implementation of Severe Accident Water Addition / Severe Accident Water Management (SAWA/SAWM) functional requirements, installed instrumentation, maintenance and testing, and programmatic requirements as described in Appendix B of TI 2515/193 Revision 1.

The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily developed a strategy making it unlikely that venting from the containment drywell would be necessary. As part of that strategy, the licensee:

  • Implemented the Severe Accident Water Addition (SAWA)/Severe Accident Water Management (SAWM) systems as defined and fulfilled functional requirements for installed and portable equipment.
  • Installed and/or identified the previously-installed instrumentation necessary to implement SAWM;
  • Developed and implemented adequate maintenance and testing of SAWA/SAWM equipment to ensure availability and capability;
  • Developed and issued procedures to safely operate the SAWA/SAWM during an ELAP and during postulated severe accident scenario, and integrated their procedures into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and exiting from the procedures are clear when using existing plant procedures; and
  • Trained their staff to assure personnel can proficiently operate the HCVS during ELAP and accident scenarios.

INSPECTION RESULTS

No findings were identified.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On June 29, 2021, the inspectors presented the Temporary Instruction 2515/193 Inspection results to Mr. Sonny Dean, Site VP, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2515/193

Corrective Action

Documents

10583367, 10667796, 10675195, 10714850, 10749713

Miscellaneous

Flex Verification and Validation Report, Version 3, with HCVS

Addendum

Final Integrated Plan HCVS Order EA-13-109

Procedures

31EO-FSG-003-1

FSG - ELAP (Extended Loss of AC Power)

2.2

34AB-R22-003-1

Station Blackout

11.2

NMP-GM-038

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Program

3.0

Work Orders

SNC915259, SNC1022034, SNC964621, SNC972716,

SNC962586, SNC962594, SNC984309, SNC984309,

SNC1078029, SNC984199, SNC1016103, SNC943695,

SNC1102718, SNC101444